Business and Economics > Banks and Banking

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  • Industrial Organization and Macroeconomics: Industrial Structure and Structural Change; Industrial Price Indices x
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Wojciech Maliszewski
,
Mr. Serkan Arslanalp
,
Mr. John C Caparusso
,
Jose M Garrido
,
Mr. Si Guo
,
Mr. Joong S Kang
,
Mr. Waikei R Lam
,
Daniel Law
,
Wei Liao
,
Ms. Nadia Rendak
,
Mr. Philippe Wingender
,
Jiangyan Yu
, and
Ms. Longmei Zhang
Corporate credit growth in China has been excessive in recent years. This credit boom is related to the large increase in investment after the Global Financial Crisis. Investment efficiency has fallen and the financial performance of corporates has deteriorated steadily, affecting asset quality in financial institutions. The corporate debt problem should be addressed urgently with a comprehensive strategy. Key elements should include identifying companies in financial difficulties, proactively recognizing losses in the financial system, burden sharing, corporate restructuring and governance reform, hardening budget constraints, and facilitating market entry. A proactive strategy would trade off short-term economic pain for larger longer-term gain.
Alexander F. Tieman
and
Wilko Bolt
In a dynamic theoretical framework, commercial banks compete for customers by setting acceptance criteria for granting loans, taking regulatory requirements into account. By easing its acceptance criteria a bank faces a trade-off between attracting more demand for loans, thus making higher per period profits, and a deterioration of the quality of its loan portfolio, thus tolerating a higher risk of failure. Our main results state that more stringent capital adequacy requirements lead banks to set stricter acceptance criteria, and that increased competition in the banking industry leads to riskier bank behavior. In an extension of our basic model, we show that it may be beneficial for a bank to hold more equity than prescribed by the regulator, even though holding equity is more expensive than attracting deposits.
Mr. Abdourahmane Sarr
The paper shows that commercial banks’ ability to lower deposit interest rates (market power) can increase deposit mobilization. Interest expenses saved can subsidize and lower fees on checking and branching services and thus help attract deposits. United States data illustrates the financial deepening effect of this market power. Commercial banks’ ability to lower deposit interest rates diminishes when their deposits become closer substitutes to nonbank liabilities requiring greater interest rate competition. Lack of bank deposit market power, including through capital account mobility, may lessen financial deepening.