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Mario Tamez
,
Hans Weenink
, and
Akihiro Yoshinaga
Well-designed legal frameworks and institutional arrangments support the legitimacy of central banks’ autonomous decision-making when grounded on sound legal basis and can prevent over-stepping in the remit of other authorities. This paper explores the key legal intersections of climate change and central banks. Climate change could impact price and finanical stability, which are at the core of a central bank’s mandate. While central banks’ legal frameworks can support climate change efforts they also determine the boundaries of the measures they can adopt. Central banks need to assess their mandate and authority under their current legal frameworks when considering measures to contribute to the global response to climate change, while taking actions to fulfill their legal mandates.
Mr. Ashraf Khan
This paper argues that central bank legal protection contributes to safeguarding a central bank and its financial supervisor’s independence, especially for conducting monetary and financial stability policy. However, such legal protection also entails enhanced accountability. To this end, the paper provides a selected overview of legal protection for central banks and financial supervisors (if the supervisor is part of the central bank), focusing on liability, immunity, and indemnification arrangements, and based on the IMF’s Central Bank Legislation Database. The paper also uses data from the IMF’s Article IV and FSAP Database, and the IMF MCM’s Technical Assistance Database. It lists selected country cases for illustrative purposes. It introduces the concepts of “appropriate legal protection” and “function-specific legal protection” as topics for further research.
Mr. Ashraf Khan
This paper describes how behavioral elements are relevant to financial supervision, regulation, and central banking. It focuses on (1) behavioral effects of norms (social, legal, and market); (2) behavior of others (internalization, identification, and compliance); and (3) psychological biases. It stresses that financial supervisors, regulators, and central banks have not yet realized the full potential that these behavioral elements hold. To do so, they need to devise a behavioral approach that includes aspects relating to individual and group behavior. The paper provides case examples of experiments with such an approach, including behavioral supervision. Finally, it highlights areas for further research.