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Vivek B Arora
,
Miguel de Las Casas
,
Yasemin Bal Gündüz
,
Jérémie Cohen-Setton
,
Kelsie J Gentle
,
Jiakun Li
,
Carmen Rollins
, and
Sandra Saveikyte

Abstract

The evaluation assesses the EAP’s rationale, evolution, and implementation during the period since its adoption in 2002. It assesses whether the EAP has fulfilled the objectives that guided its creation, namely, shaping members’ and market expectations, providing clearer benchmarks for Board decisions on program design and exceptional access, safeguarding the Fund’s resources, and helping to ensure uniformity of treatment of members. The evaluation draws on background papers comprising both thematic and country studies that draw on experience with the 38 exceptional access programs completed through mid-2023. The thematic papers analyze the rationale and evolution of the EAP as well as the three building blocks of the policy: the exceptional access criteria, enhanced Board decision-making procedures, and ex post evaluations. The country papers comprise both cross-country studies and country-specific studies of the completed programs with Argentina (2018), Ecuador (2020), and Egypt (2020).

International Monetary Fund. Independent Evaluation Office
Executive Directors welcomed the report of the Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) on the IMF’s Exceptional Access Policy (EAP), encompassing the policy’s objectives and design, successive reforms, and experience with its implementation. They recognized that the Fund has sought to find a generally good balance between rules and flexibility in applying the EAP, while reinforcing transparency and accountability and adopting adequate safeguards. Directors generally concurred with the thrust of the evaluation that the EAP provided a structured framework for higher scrutiny through the exceptional access criteria (EAC) and enhanced decision making procedures, while maintaining flexibility through room for judgment in assessing the EAC.
International Monetary Fund. Policy Development and Review Dept.
On October 11, 2024, the IMF’s Executive Board concluded the Review of Charges and the Surcharge Policy. The review is part of a broader ongoing effort to ensure that the IMF’s lending policies remain fit for purpose to meet the evolving needs of the membership. Charges and surcharges are important elements of the IMF’s cooperative lending and risk-management framework, where all members contribute and all can benefit from support when needed. Together, they cover lending intermediation expenses, help accumulate reserves to protect against financial risks, and provide incentives for prudent and temporary borrowing. This provides a strong financial foundation that allows the IMF to extend vital balance of payments support on affordable terms to member countries when they need it most.



Against the backdrop of a challenging economic environment and high global interest rates, the Executive Board reached consensus on a comprehensive package of reforms that substantially reduces the cost of borrowing for members while safeguarding the IMF's financial capacity to support countries in need. The approved measures will lower IMF borrowing costs by about US$1.2 billion annually or reduce payments on the margin of the rate of charge as well as surcharges on average by 36 percent. The number of countries subject to surcharges in fiscal year 2026 is expected to fall from 20 to 13.



Key reforms include a reduction in the margin for the rate of charge, an increase in the threshold for level-based surcharges, a reduction in rate for time-based surcharges, an alignment of thresholds for commitment fees with annual and cumulative access limits for GRA lending facilities, and institution of regular reviews of surcharges.



The series of three papers informed the Executive Board’s first and second informal engagements (July and September 2024) and the formal meeting (October 2024) on this review.
Maria-Angels Oliva
and
Nika Khinashvili
In a 157 emerging markets and developing countries sample, remittances continue to grow fast, outpacing other financial inflows (as a share of GDP), particularly in Asia. Without alternative policy instruments, foreign exchange interventions (FXIs) have often been the authorities’ go-to tool to manage the short-term effects of these remittance inflows. However, this practice comes at a cost. This paper shows that FXIs are quick, temporary solutions that often may hinder the development of the recipient country’s financial sector and may not support financial stability over the medium term. The analysis suggests that FXIs act as an insurance tool that, by mitigating FX volatility, protect remittance recipients and tradable sectors from FX risks, encouraging less bank deposits (consistent with more spending) and lower buffers in the banking sector. These costs add to other direct FXI-related costs already identified in the literature. The development of private sector market risk management tools should support longer-term structural reforms required to increase the absorptive capacity of additional FX inflows.
International Monetary Fund. Monetary and Capital Markets Department
During two visits in 2023-24, the IMF mission implemented a set of recommendations made by a previous technical assistance mission in May 2022 which were aimed at improving the solvency stress model of the Superintendency of Banks, Panama (SBP). The mission also provided training on the design of a cash flow-based liquidity stress tool and another system-level liquidity stress testing methodology. During a follow-up mission, work was carried out on market risk and corporate risk, and the methodology for the liquidity stress test that was used during the 2023 Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) with Panama was anchored at the SBP.
International Monetary Fund. Strategy, Policy, & Review Department
The interim review on PRGT access limits follows the call from the Executive Board in March 2023 and confirmed by the IMFC in October 2023. Low-income countries (LICs) face high economic uncertainty and pressures, while grappling with limited policy space and a funding squeeze. In March 2023, access limits under the General Resources Account (GRA) were temporarily increased for 12 months to give space for countries to face such economic pressures. The IMF Executive Board emphasized the importance of the alignment of the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT) access limits with those of the GRA that was achieved in 2021. The Board also agreed that, once substantial progress with PRGT fundraising toward the SDR 2.3 billion first-stage target for subsidy resources agreed in 2021 has been made—with total pledges of SDR 2 billion or more—access limits under the PRGT would be reviewed at an ad hoc interim review. This target has now been reached, paving the way for the review, also called for by the IMFC during the Annual Meetings in October 2023, in a context where the LICs’ economic challenges have further increased, including due to the risk of additional negative spillovers on the global economy stemming from the current geopolitical tensions and conflicts.
Mr. Andrew Berg
,
Yaroslav Hul
,
Mr. Philippe D Karam
,
Adam Remo
, and
Diego Rodriguez Guzman
This paper presents a semi-structural macroeconomic model aimed at facilitating policy analysis and forecasting, primarily in countries with imperfect capital mobility and hybrid monetary policy regimes. Compared to earlier gap-trend projection models, the Forecasting Model of Internal and External Balance (FINEX) contains three main innovations: it accentuates external and internal balances; explicitly incorporates fiscal policy; and partly endogenizes the main trends. FINEX thus covers a broad set of policy instruments, including foreign exchange interventions (FXI), capital flow management measures (CFM), as well as common fiscal policy instruments. The model incorporates insights from the recent DSGE literature, while maintaining a more accessible gap-trend structure that lends itself to practical policy applications. While the paper refrains from drawing broad policy lessons, it emphasizes the model's ability to interpret recent data in terms of structural shocks and policy responses, thereby aiding policymakers in constructing coherent economic narratives and considering alternative scenarios.
International Monetary Fund. Middle East and Central Asia Dept.

Abstract

Across the Middle East and Central Asia, the combined effects of global headwinds, domestic challenges, and geopolitical risks weigh on economic momentum, and the outlook is highly uncertain. Growth is set to slow this year in the Middle East and North Africa region, driven by lower oil production, tight policy settings in emerging market and middle-income economies, the conflict in Sudan, and other country-specific factors. In the Caucasus and Central Asia, although migration, trade, and financial inflows following Russia’s war in Ukraine continue to support economic activity, growth is set to moderate slightly this year. Looking ahead, economic activity in the Middle East and North Africa region is expected to improve in 2024 and 2025 as some factors weighing on growth this year gradually dissipate, including the temporary oil production cuts. But growth is expected to remain subdued over the forecast horizon amid persistent structural hurdles. In the Caucasus and Central Asia, economic growth is projected to slow next year and over the medium term as the boost to activity from real and financial inflows from Russia gradually fades and deep-seated structural challenges remain unsolved. Inflation is broadly easing, in line with globally declining price pressures, although country-specific factors—including buoyant wage growth in some Caucasus and Central Asia countries—and climate-related events continue to make their mark. Despite some improvement since April, the balance of risks to the outlook remains on the downside. In this context, expediting structural reforms is crucial to boost growth and strengthen resilience, while tight monetary and fiscal policies remain essential in several economies to durably bring down inflation and ensure public debt sustainability.

Camila Casas
,
Sergii Meleshchuk
, and
Mr. Yannick Timmer
We provide evidence of a new channel through which exchange rates affect trade. Using a novel identification strategy that exploits firms’ maturity structure of foreign currency debt around a large depreciation in Colombia, we show that firms experiencing a stronger debt revaluation of dominant currency debt due to a home currency depreciation compress imports relatively more while exports are unaffected. Dominant currency financing does not lead to an import compression for firms that export, hold foreign currency assets, or are active in the foreign exchange derivatives markets, as they are all hedged against a revaluation of their debt. These findings can be rationalized through the prism of a model with costly state verification and foreign currency borrowing. Quantitatively, the dominant currency financing channel explains a significant part of the external adjustment process in addition to the expenditure switching channel. Pricing exports in the dominant currency, instead of the producer’s currency, mutes the effect of dominant currency financing on trade flows.
International Monetary Fund. Research Dept.

Abstract

Global current account balances—the overall size of headline current account deficits and surpluses—widened for a third consecutive year in 2022. Main drivers were Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the uneven recovery from the pandemic, and the rapid tightening of US monetary policy. Concurrently, the US dollar appreciated substantially, and the uphill capital flow reappeared. IMF’s external sector assessments suggest that the overall size of excess current account deficits and surpluses has remained unchanged since 2021, after declining for several years. This highlights the importance of efforts in both excess surplus and deficit economies to promote external rebalancing. The US dollar appreciation under the “global dollar cycle”, which is driven primarily by global financial risks, has negative spillovers on activity and imports that fall on emerging market economies more severely than on advance economies. More flexible exchange rates and more anchored inflation expectations can mitigate negative spillovers to emerging markets.