Business and Economics > Banks and Banking
Abstract
Short-term prospects for Asia and the Pacific have improved slightly compared to the IMF’s April forecasts, even though growth is still expected to moderate in 2024 and 2025. The regional growth projection for 2024 has been marked up to 4.6 percent from 4.5 percent in April, largely reflecting the over-performance in the first half of the year, and the region is forecast to contribute roughly 60 percent to global growth in 2024. In 2025, more accommodative monetary conditions are expected to support activity, resulting in a slight upward growth revision to 4.4 percent from 4.3 percent in April. Inflation has retreated in much of the region. At the same time, risks have increased, reflecting rising geopolitical tensions, uncertainty about the strength of global demand, and potential for financial volatility. Demographic change will act increasingly as a brake on activity, though structural shifts into high-productivity sectors such as tradable services hold promise to sustain robust growth.
Abstract
Chapter 1 shows that although near-term financial stability risks have remained contained, mounting vulnerabilities could worsen future downside risks by amplifying shocks, which have become more probable because of the widening disconnect between elevated economic uncertainty and low financial volatility. Chapter 2 presents evidence that high macroeconomic uncertainty can threaten macrofinancial stability by exacerbating downside tail risks to markets, credit supply, and GDP growth. These relationships are stronger when debt vulnerabilities are elevated, or financial market volatility is low (during episodes of a macro-market disconnect). Chapter 3 assesses recent developments in AI and Generative AI and their implications for capital markets. It presents new analytical work and results from a global outreach to market participants and regulators, delineates potential benefits and risks that may arise from the widespread adoption of these new technologies, and makes suggestions for policy responses.
Abstract
After four turbulent years, the outlook for sub-Saharan Africa is gradually improving. Growth will rise from 3.4 percent in 2023 to 3.8 percent in 2024, with nearly two thirds of countries anticipating higher growth. Economic recovery is expected to continue beyond this year, with growth projections reaching 4.0 percent in 2025. Additionally, inflation has almost halved, public debt ratios have broadly stabilized, and several countries have issued Eurobonds this year, ending a two-year hiatus from international markets. However, not all is favorable. The funding squeeze persists as the region’s governments continue to grapple with financing shortages, high borrowing costs, and impending debt repayments. Risks to the outlook remain tilted to the downside. The region continues to be more vulnerable to global external shocks, as well as the threat of rising political instability, and frequent climate events. Three policy priorities can help countries adapt to these challenges: improving public finances without undermining development; monetary policy focused on ensuring price stability; and implementing structural reforms to diversify funding sources and economies. Amid these challenges, sub-Saharan African countries will need additional support from the international community to develop a more inclusive, sustainable, and prosperous future.
Abstract
Chapter 1 documents that near-term global financial stability risks have receded amid expectations that global disinflation is entering its last mile. However, along it, there are several salient risks and a build-up of medium-term vulnerabilities. Chapter 2 assesses vulnerabilities and potential risks to financial stability in corporate private credit, a rapidly growing asset class—traditionally focused on providing loans to midsize firms outside the realms of either commercial banks or public debt markets—that now rivals other major credit markets in size. Chapter 3 shows that while cyber incidents have thus far not been systemic, the probability of severe cyber incidents has increased, posing an acute threat to macrofinancial stability.
Abstract
Europe is at a turning point. After last year’s crippling energy price shock caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Europe faces the difficult task of restoring price stability now while securing strong and green growth in the medium term. Economic activity has started to cool and inflation to fall as a result of monetary policy action, phasing-out supply shocks, and falling energy prices. Sustained wage growth could, however, delay achieving price stability by 2025. Failing to tackle inflation now will risk additional growth damage in a world exposed to structural shocks from fragmentation and climate change. These global headwinds add to Europe’s long-standing productivity and convergence problems. To lift Europe’s potential for strong and green growth, countries need to remove obstacles to economic dynamism and upgrade infrastructure. This will strengthen business-friendly conditions and investment. Cooperation at the European level and with international partners will position Europe as a leader in the climate transition and support economic stability across the continent.
Abstract
After a stronger-than-expected recovery from the pandemic and continued resilience in early 2023, economic growth in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) is softening as the effect of tighter policies to combat inflation is taking hold and the external environment is weakening. The early and swift monetary tightening across the region since 2021, together with the withdrawal of most of the pandemic fiscal stimulus and the reversal of external price pressures, have helped put headline inflation on a downward trajectory. Core inflation has also started to ease, as price pressures are becoming less generalized, although it remains elevated amid strong labor markets and positive output gaps in some countries. Banking systems have weathered the rise in interest rates well and are generally healthy, though credit to the private sector is decelerating amid tighter supply conditions and weaker demand.
Abstract
Across the Middle East and Central Asia, the combined effects of global headwinds, domestic challenges, and geopolitical risks weigh on economic momentum, and the outlook is highly uncertain. Growth is set to slow this year in the Middle East and North Africa region, driven by lower oil production, tight policy settings in emerging market and middle-income economies, the conflict in Sudan, and other country-specific factors. In the Caucasus and Central Asia, although migration, trade, and financial inflows following Russia’s war in Ukraine continue to support economic activity, growth is set to moderate slightly this year. Looking ahead, economic activity in the Middle East and North Africa region is expected to improve in 2024 and 2025 as some factors weighing on growth this year gradually dissipate, including the temporary oil production cuts. But growth is expected to remain subdued over the forecast horizon amid persistent structural hurdles. In the Caucasus and Central Asia, economic growth is projected to slow next year and over the medium term as the boost to activity from real and financial inflows from Russia gradually fades and deep-seated structural challenges remain unsolved. Inflation is broadly easing, in line with globally declining price pressures, although country-specific factors—including buoyant wage growth in some Caucasus and Central Asia countries—and climate-related events continue to make their mark. Despite some improvement since April, the balance of risks to the outlook remains on the downside. In this context, expediting structural reforms is crucial to boost growth and strengthen resilience, while tight monetary and fiscal policies remain essential in several economies to durably bring down inflation and ensure public debt sustainability.
Abstract
Chapter 1 assesses that risks to global growth are skewed to the downside, similar to the assessment in the April 2023 Global Financial Stability Report. Cracks in the financial system may turn into worrisome fault lines should a soft landing of the global economy hoped for by market participants does not materialize. Chapter 2 homes in on the global banking system, providing a fresh assessment of vulnerabilities in a higher-for-longer environment, using an enhanced global stress test and a set of newly developed market-based indicators. In response to the vulnerabilities that are uncovered, enhancements to supervisory practices and tightening of regulatory standards are proposed. Chapter 3 notes that a broad mix of policies is required to unlock the private capital necessary to cover climate mitigation investment needs in emerging market and developing economies.
Abstract
Still emerging from the COVID-19 pandemic, countries in sub-Saharan Africa have been hit by a sluggish global economy, worldwide inflation, high borrowing costs, and a cost-of-living crisis. In many cases, inflation is still too high, borrowing costs are still elevated, exchange-rate pressures persist, and political instability is an ongoing concern. To ensure that the coming rebound is more than just a transitory glimpse of sunshine, it is important for authorities to guard against a premature relaxation of stabilization policies, while also focusing on reforms to both claw back lost ground from the four-year crisis and also to create new space to address the region’s pressing development needs.
Abstract
Global current account balances—the overall size of headline current account deficits and surpluses—widened for a third consecutive year in 2022. Main drivers were Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the uneven recovery from the pandemic, and the rapid tightening of US monetary policy. Concurrently, the US dollar appreciated substantially, and the uphill capital flow reappeared. IMF’s external sector assessments suggest that the overall size of excess current account deficits and surpluses has remained unchanged since 2021, after declining for several years. This highlights the importance of efforts in both excess surplus and deficit economies to promote external rebalancing. The US dollar appreciation under the “global dollar cycle”, which is driven primarily by global financial risks, has negative spillovers on activity and imports that fall on emerging market economies more severely than on advance economies. More flexible exchange rates and more anchored inflation expectations can mitigate negative spillovers to emerging markets.