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Western Hemisphere > Argentina

You are looking at 1 - 10 of 160 items for :

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Cover The IMF’s Exceptional Access Policy
The IMF’s Exceptional Access Policy
Evaluation Report Dec 2024
Vivek B Arora
,
Miguel de Las Casas
,
Yasemin Bal Gündüz
,
Jérémie Cohen-Setton
,
Kelsie J Gentle
,
Jiakun Li
,
Carmen Rollins
, and
Sandra Saveikyte

Abstract

The evaluation assesses the EAP’s rationale, evolution, and implementation during the period since its adoption in 2002. It assesses whether the EAP has fulfilled the objectives that guided its creation, namely, shaping members’ and market expectations, providing clearer benchmarks for Board decisions on program design and exceptional access, safeguarding the Fund’s resources, and helping to ensure uniformity of treatment of members. The evaluation draws on background papers comprising both thematic and country studies that draw on experience with the 38 exceptional access programs completed through mid-2023. The thematic papers analyze the rationale and evolution of the EAP as well as the three building blocks of the policy: the exceptional access criteria, enhanced Board decision-making procedures, and ex post evaluations. The country papers comprise both cross-country studies and country-specific studies of the completed programs with Argentina (2018), Ecuador (2020), and Egypt (2020).

Keywords:
Exceptional access; IMF lending; safeguarding Fund resources; program design; uniformity of treatment; risk management; program success; EA program; surcharge rate; ToC of an Na arrangement; detailed Theory of Change; Debt sustainability; Reputational risk; Balance of payments need; Capital account crisis; Global
Cover IMF Working Papers
Inelastic Demand Meets Optimal Supply of Risky Sovereign Bonds
Matías Moretti
,
Lorenzo Pandolfi
,
German Villegas Bauer
,
Sergio L. Schmukler
, and
Tomás Williams
We present evidence of inelastic demand for risky sovereign bonds and explore its implications for optimal government debt policies. Using monthly changes in the composition of a major international bond index, we identify flow shocks unrelated to fundamentals that shift the available bond supply. From these shocks, we estimate an inverse demand elasticity of -0.30 and show that it increases with countries’ default risk. We formulate a sovereign debt model with endogenous default and inelastic investors, calibrated to our empirical estimates. By penalizing additional borrowing, an inelastic demand acts as a disciplining device that reduces default risk and bond spreads.
Keywords:
inelastic financial markets; institutional investors; international capital markets; sovereign debt; IMF working paper research Department; debt issuance; price reaction; convenience yield; default cost parameter; long-term debt; U.S. dollar; bond payoff; investor demand; bond characteristics-month; inelastic investor; bond price change; unit price; price movement; Bonds; Asset prices; Demand elasticity; Debt default; Sovereign bonds; Global
Cover Policy Papers
Operational Guidance Note On Program Design and Conditionality
International Monetary Fund. Strategy, Policy, & Review Department
This note aims to provide guidance on the key principles and considerations underlying the design of Fund-supported programs. The note expands on the previous operational guidance notes on conditionality published over 2003-2014, incorporating lessons from the 2018-19 Review of Conditionality, and other recent key policy developments including the recommendation of the Management’s Implementation Plan in response to Independent Evaluation Office (IEO)’s report on growth and adjustment in IMF-supported programs. The note in particular highlights operational advice to (i) improve the realism of macroeconomic forecast in programs and fostering a more systematic analysis of contingency plans and risks; (ii) improve the focus, depth, implementation, and tailoring of structural conditions (SCs), with due consideration of growth effects; and (iii) help strengthen the ownership of country authorities. Designed as a comprehensive reference and primer on program design and conditionality in an accessible and transparent manner, the note refers in summary to a broad range of economic and policy considerations over the lifecycle of Fund-supported programs. As with all guidance notes, the relevant IMF Executive Board Decisions remain the primary legal authority on matters covered in this note.
Keywords:
Conditionality; Conditionality guidelines; Use of Fund resources; Fund-supported adjustment programs; Debt sustainability analysis; Structural reform; Fragile and conflict-affected states; transparency policy; guidance note; Fund-supported program; financing gap; climate change policy assessment; policy note; existing IMF policy; financial support; Balance of payments need; Debt sustainability; Structural reforms; Global
Cover Policy Papers
Staff Guidance Note on Information Sharing in The Context of Sovereign Debt Restructurings
International Monetary Fund. Legal Dept.
and
International Monetary Fund. Strategy, Policy, & Review Department
The guidance note sets out principles governing information sharing in the context of sovereign debt restructurings. It restates the existing Fund governance and policy guidelines for information sharing to help inform and harmonize practices across Fund country teams. In addition to outlining guiding principles applicable to information sharing, it provides guidance on what level of information can be shared during each stage of the restructuring and program design process and in the surveillance context
Keywords:
confidentiality; debt relief; debt sustainability analysis; executive board documents; external debt; fund policies; policy framework papers; political economy; publications; public debt; transparency; draft debt sustainability analysis; transparency policy; Fund staff; Fund arrangement; draft DSA document; restructuring process; Fund-supported program; analysis act; Debt sustainability; Debt restructuring; Sovereign debt restructuring
Cover IMF Working Papers
Sovereign Debt
Mr. Leonardo Martinez
,
Mr. Francisco Roch
,
Francisco Roldán
, and
Mr. Jeromin Zettelmeyer
This paper surveys the literature on sovereign debt from the perspective of understanding how sovereign debt differs from privately issue debt, and why sovereign debt is deemed safe in some countries but risky in others. The answers relate to the unique power of the sovereign. One the one hand, a sovereign has the power to tax, making debt relatively safe; on the other, it also has control over its territory and most of its assets, making debt enforcement difficult. The paper discusses debt contracts and the sovereign debt market, sovereign debt restructurings, and the empirical and theoretical literatures on the costs and causes of defaults. It describes the adverse impact of sovereign default risk on the issuing countries and what explains this impact. The survey concludes with a discussion of policy options to reduce sovereign risk, including fiscal frameworks that act as commitment devices, state-contingent debt, and independent and credible monetary policy.
Keywords:
Sovereign Debt; Safe Debt; Debt Default; Debt Restructuring; Costs of Sovereign Default; Political Defaults; Fiscal Frameworks; State Contingent Debt; Original Sin; debt contract; short-term debt; market value; sovereign default; capital market exclusion; default decision; default event; payment terms; liquid asset; Securities markets; Fiscal rules; Global
Cover Policy Papers
Reviews of the Fund's Sovereign ARREARS Policies and Perimeter
International Monetary Fund. Legal Dept.
,
International Monetary Fund. Monetary and Capital Markets Department
, and
International Monetary Fund. Strategy, Policy, & Review Department
This paper undertakes a comprehensive review of the Fund’s sovereign arrears policies. Staff assesses that the Fund’s Lending into Arrears to Private Creditors (LIA) policy (established in 1989 and last reviewed in 2002) remains broadly appropriate, while recommending some improvements given the experience gained over the last 20 years. Staff also sees merit in codifying the existing practice guiding the Fund in preemptive debt restructurings into a Fund policy, together with an amendment focusing on debt transparency. Given limited experience with the application of the LIOA policy (established in 2015), staff does not propose any amendments but only one restatement confirming current practice. Given recent developments in the international creditor community, staff proposes refining the Fund’s arrears policies with respect to multilateral creditors. Finally, recent developments raise questions about the perimeter between official bilateral and private claims, with significant implications for the Fund’s arrears policies.
Keywords:
executive board understanding; draft executive board understanding; SPR coordinator; fund policy; executive board consideration; Arrears; Debt restructuring; Debt sustainability; Multilateral development institutions; Bonds; Global
Cover IMF Working Papers
Sovereign Debt Repatriation During Crises
Mr. Serkan Arslanalp
and
Laura Sunder-Plassmann
We use a new, comprehensive data set on the sovereign debt investor base to document three novel empirical facts: (i) sovereign debt is repatriated - that is, shifted from external private to domestic investors - prior to sovereign defaults; (ii) not all crises are equal: evidence for repatriation during banking and currency crises is more limited; and (iii) the nature of defaults matters: external investors do not leave during preemptive debt restructurings. We further show that repatriation appears to be prevalent when defaults happen in large markets with low capital controls. The data set we use is uniquely suited to analyzing investor base dynamics during rare crises due to its large cross-section and time series, covering 180 countries from 1989 to 2020.
Keywords:
Sovereign debt; External debt; Capital flows; Sovereign default; Financial crisis; Banking crisis; Currency crisis; analyzing investor base dynamics; external investor; investor base; investor database; debt maturity; Currency crises; Private debt; Debt default; Global; Caribbean
Cover IMF Staff Country Reports
Argentina: Staff Report for 2022 Article IV Consultation and request for an Extended Arrangement under the Extended Fund-Facility-Press Release; Staff Report; and Staff Supplements
International Monetary Fund. Western Hemisphere Dept.
Against the background of a decade of declining per-capita income and high inflation, the Article IV consultation focused on policies to begin to tackle Argentina’s underlying impediments to sustained growth and low and stable inflation. Avoiding boom-bust dynamics suggests the need for greater emphasis on policies to promote net exports and mobilize domestic saving to finance much-needed investment. Reversing the high degree of financial dollarization, however, will take time and will require a durable commitment to tackle fiscal dominance and strengthen debt sustainability. Meanwhile, addressing budget rigidities is essential to improve Argentina’s resilience to shocks, while reorienting public spending towards investment and innovation is critical to support productivity and reduce intergenerational inequities. Sustained political and social consensus is necessary for policy predictability and to balance demands from financing Argentina’s large social welfare system while also encouraging private investment and formal employment.
Keywords:
IFC investment activity; EFF arrangement; portfolio investment position; deep-seated challenge; peak fund exposure; policy implementation risk; Inflation; Debt service; Government debt management; Global; Caribbean
Cover Policy Papers
Issues in Restructuring of Sovereign Domestic Debt
International Monetary Fund
As emerging and developing economies accumulate more domestic sovereign debt, it is likely to play a larger role in the resolution of future sovereign debt crises. This paper analyzes when and how to restructure sovereign domestic debt in unsustainable debt cases while minimizing economic and financial disruptions. Key to determining whether or not domestic debt should be part of a sovereign restructuring is weighing the benefits of the lower debt burden against the fiscal and broader economic costs of achieving that debt relief. The fiscal costs may have to be incurred in the context of restructuring because of the need to maintain financial stability, to ensure the functioning of the central bank, or to replenish pension savings. A sovereign domestic debt restructuring should be designed to anticipate, minimize, and manage its impact on the domestic economy and financial system. Casting the net wide across claims can help boost participation in the restructuring by lowering the relief sought from each creditor group. A strategy that engages creditors constructively, and as transparently as possible, that relies on market-based incentives, and that presents the exchange as part of a consistent macroeconomic plan typically works best.
Keywords:
domestic debt; sovereign debt restructuring; sovereign default; emerging market economies; developing economies; debt reduction strategy; Restructuring event; transparency policy; reduction episode; restructuring events; debt exchange; Debt restructuring; Domestic debt; Sovereign debt restructuring; Global
Cover IMF Working Papers
On the Benefits of Repaying
Francesca G Caselli
,
Matilde Faralli
,
Paolo Manasse
, and
Ugo Panizza
This paper studies whether countries benefit from servicing their debts during times of widespread sovereign defaults. Colombia is typically regarded as the only large Latin American country that did not default in the 1980s. Using archival research and formal econometric estimates of Colombia's probability of default, we show that in the early 1980s Colombia's fundamentals were not significantly different from those of the Latin American countries that defaulted on their debts. We also document that the different path chosen by Colombia was due to the authorities' belief that maintaining a good reputation in the international capital market would have substantial long-term payoffs. We show that the case of Colombia is more complex than what it is commonly assumed. Although Colombia had to re-profile its debts, high-level political support from the US allowed Colombia do to so outside the standard framework of an IMF program. Our counterfactual analysis shows that in the short to medium run, Colombia benefitted from avoiding an explicit default. Specifically, we find that GDP growth in the 1980s was higher than that of a counterfactual in which Colombia behaved like its neighboring countries. We also test whether Colombia's behavior in the 1980s led to long-term reputational benefits. Using an event study based on a large sudden stop, we find no evidence for such long-lasting reputational gains.
Keywords:
Sovereign Debt; Default; Reputation; probability of default; Colombia's behavior; Colombia's probability; default probability; adjustment program; market access; International capital markets; Debt default; Caribbean; Global