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Eugenio M Cerutti
,
Melih Firat
, and
Hector Perez-Saiz
Digital money and digital payments innovations have the potential for improving cross-border payments by reducing costs, enhancing speed, and improving transparency. This note performs an empirical analysis of the potential impact of digital money on the volume and transaction costs of cross-border payments, with a focus on the short-term intensive margin. The market of cross-border payments is very large, with retail transactions having a low share of the total but the highest transaction costs, particularly for remittances. Our illustrative scenarios assume an estimated 60 percent reduction in transaction costs and short-term elasticities to changes in costs estimated from remittances data. The results show two outcomes. First, the cross-border volume increases could be sizable for countries that are large remittance recipients and face expensive transaction costs. Second, even with a large drop in transaction costs, the short-term rise in global cross-border transaction volumes could be limited as a result of the low transaction costs of the wholesale segment. Moving outside the short-term intensive margin, the impact could potentially be much larger as digital currencies and other digital payments innovations—together with tokenization of assets on programmable platforms—could move the financial system into a transformative new era by fostering financial development and promoting further inclusion across borders.
Itai Agur
,
German Villegas Bauer
,
Tommaso Mancini-Griffoli
,
Maria Soledad Martinez Peria
, and
Brandon Tan
Most financial assets are digital today. Tomorrow, they may be tokenized. Tokenization implies recording and transferring assets on a widely shared and trusted digital ledger that can be programmed. Interest in tokenization is strong and experiments abound, but what are the consequences of this new trend for financial markets? This note introduces a taxonomy and a conceptual framework centered on market inefficiencies to evaluate this question. Some inefficiencies could decline across the asset life cycle. Others would remain, however, and new ones could emerge. Issuing, servicing, and redeeming assets might involve fewer intermediaries and thus become cheaper. The costs of trading assets may also decrease as tokenization lowers some counterparty risks and search frictions and offers flexibility in settlement. Additionally, greater competition among brokers could lower transaction fees. However, tokenization may amplify shocks if it induces institutions to become more interconnected and hold lower liquidity buffers or higher leverage, potentially jeopardizing financial stability. Programs themselves may introduce new risks related to strings of contingent contracts or faulty code. While competition may grow among financial intermediaries, the provision of market infrastructure could become more concentrated due to network effects.
Tansaya Kunaratskul
,
Andre Reslow
, and
Manmohan Singh
This Fintech Note aims to analyze how the issuance of central bank digital currency (CBDC) could affect monetary operations, which include central banks managing the demand and supply of reserves to achieve a desired stance of monetary policy. The note outlines three scenarios: CBDCs substituting cash, commercial bank deposits, and reserves, with implications varying based on design features and market developments. It discusses how these scenarios influence balance sheets and reserves, potentially drawing short-term interest rates away from the policy target and complicating liquidity forecasting. Furthermore, the note shows how central banks could calibrate monetary operations such as engaging in a fine-tuning operation and provide additional reserves on demand to ensure that central banks can maintain their monetary policy stance. Finally, careful design of CBDCs, such as setting criteria for access, holding quantity, and remuneration, can mitigate adverse effects on monetary operations.
Manisha Patel
,
Safari Kasiyanto
, and
Andre Reslow
The IMF is frequently approached by central banks seeking guidance on the balance between central bank digital currency (CBDC), fast payment systems (FPS), and electronic money (e-money) solutions. Common questions arising include: Do central banks need a CBDC when already equipped with other well-established digital payments systems? For central banks with less-developed solutions: Should central banks establish one system over the other? This discussion is then compounded by the reality of constrained resources. This note focuses on the comparison of retail CBDC—that is, the presence of digital central bank money available to the general public—with FPS and e-money systems from a payments perspective, and how CBDC may support a jurisdiction’s vision on payments in the digital age. The note does not seek to advocate for CBDC over an FPS or e-money. The balance of arguments for any one system may change over time, and the choice may not be mutually exclusive in many jurisdictions. In the future, it is possible to envisage the coexistence of an FPS, e-money, and CBDC in many payment landscapes across the world. Through good design, all three systems could meet central bank objectives such as payments efficiency and supporting financial inclusion; some benefits are unique to CBDC, such as maintaining access to central bank money in an increasingly digitalized age. While central banks will make choices unique to their circumstances, it remains important for central banks to establish a strategy that allows them (at minimum) to monitor trends and core benefits of multiple solutions as developments occur, to allow them to plan, adapt, and drive developments in their payments landscape.
Tayo Tunyathon Koonprasert
,
Shiho Kanada
,
Natsuki Tsuda
, and
Edona Reshidi
Among the countries that have launched central bank digital currency (CBDC) or are conducting large-scale pilots, adoption remains slow and limited due to various challenges such as lack of public awareness and trust, preference for existing payment methods, and inadequate incentives for intermediaries. Central banks cannot take it for granted that CBDC, once launched, will be adopted and scaled up easily. Forming part of the CBDC Virtual Handbook, this paper aims to encourage policymakers to consider CBDC adoption early on, by arguing that successful CBDC adoption hinges not only on technical readiness and operational robustness, but also on strategic policy and design choices that target end-user and intermediary involvement from the outset. The paper introduces The REDI Framework which outlines various regulatory strategies, education/communication initiatives, design/deployment choices, and incentive mechanisms to prepare for CBDC adoption.
Kieran P Murphy
,
Tao Sun
,
Yong Sarah Zhou
,
Natsuki Tsuda
,
Nicolas Zhang
,
Victor Budau
,
Frankosiligi Solomon
,
Kathleen Kao
,
Morana Vucinic
, and
Kristina Miggiani
This note offers a framework to help countries navigate, as well as tools to help them manage, the trade-offs between CBDC data use and privacy protection. It addresses retail CBDC, as data access and privacy-preserving considerations in a wholesale environment are similar to those of the traditional RTGS systems. It emphasizes the role of institutional arrangements, data collection, access and storage policies, design choices, and technological solutions. At a given level of preference for privacy, central banks can facilitate better use of CBDC data through robust transparency and accountability arrangements, sound policies, and judicious adoption of privacy-by-design approaches including the use of privacy-enhancing technologies.