Financial crises are traditionally analyzed as purely economic phenomena. The political
economy of financial booms and busts remains both under-emphasized and limited to
isolated episodes. This paper examines the political economy of financial policy during
ten of the most infamous financial booms and busts since the 18th century, and presents
consistent evidence of pro-cyclical regulatory policies by governments. Financial booms,
and risk-taking during these episodes, were often amplified by political regulatory stimuli,
credit subsidies, and an increasing light-touch approach to financial supervision. The
regulatory backlash that ensues from financial crises can only be understood in the context
of the deep political ramifications of these crises. Post-crisis regulations do not always
survive the following boom. The interplay between politics and financial policy over these
cycles deserves further attention. History suggests that politics can be the undoing of
-owned commercial banks (accounting for 82 percent of total bank assets), 51 joint-stockbanks, whose shareholders include state-owned enterprises and private entities (accounting for 10 percent of total assets), and 23 branches of foreign banks and four joint-venture banks (together accounting for 8 percent of total assets). 3 Total bank assets were equivalent to 38 percent of GDP at end-1998, total loans to 22 percent, and total deposits for 20 percent, indicating a relatively low degree of monetization of Vietnam’s economy.
9. As in other transition economies, the problems
II.3 Outstanding FDI Commitments, 1994-98
III. Banking Reform
A. Economic Setting
B. Nature and Scope of Problems
C. Reforms Since 1998
D. Approach to Banking Reform
III.1 Composition and Growth of Credit, 1994-98
III.2 Open Foreign Currency Positions of Commercial Banks, 1994, 1994-98
III.3 Foreign Currency Lending of Commercial Banks, 1994-98
III.4 Bank Soundness Indicators, 1994-98
III.5 Capital Adequacy of State-Owned Commercial Banks, 1998
III.1 Summary of Restructuring Plan for the Joint-StockBanks
ownership transferred, while in the outright repo the ownership of the bond is transferred.
6 The major suppliers of liquidity in the loan market are state commercial banks, joint-stockbanks, policy banks and the Postal Savings Bank, while the borrowers are finance companies, city commercial banks, foreign institutions and security companies. In the repo market, suppliers of liquidity are state commercial banks, joint-stockbanks, policy banks, and the borrowers are city commercial banks, RCC and security companies.
7 Participation in the interbank bond
Resolution of collateralized NPLs, which are typically to the private sector, was sped up by streamlining regulations on the sale of collateral, permitting banks to bypass the state auction center.
8 Two phases of recapitalization have been completed by June 2003, providing banks with nonnegotiable recapitalization bonds of D 5.3 trillion (nearly 1 percent of GDP).
9 This program is similar to the restructuring of semiprivate small joint-stockbanks in Vietnam, whose number was reduced from 48 to 35 under a program supported by the IMF’s Poverty Reduction and