participates in policy formulation.
There is no constitutional reference.
In case of a conflict, when the government instructs the central bank to pursue a specific policy, both parties shall make statements, presented to the legislature or published.
The central bank is not subordinated to governmentdirectives and central bank independence is strongly stated.
The central bank does not accept orders in particular areas and independence is strongly stated.
It is stated that the central bank is autonomous or that the bank does not accept orders from
Yes (Canada Gazette)
Board of Governors
Joint central bank sets target but with the consent of the Prime Minister provisioned for in the central bank act. Target breaches to be explained to the government publicly.
Internal rules on preparation of, arguments for and presentation of monetary policy decisions by Board of Governors is approved by the Supervisory board (7 member board of political appointees with proportional representation). Supervisory board also looks at bank organization, operating budget, internal audit
Significant changes with far-reaching impact have taken place during recent years in public expenditure management. These changes which are being implemented in a few industrial countries are likely to be emulated by other industrial and developing countries. The content of these changes is enumerated in some detail, and their impact is assessed in terms of specified criteria. Other continuing problems that are not addressed by these advances are also considered in detail.
This paper surveys decision-making roles of governing bodies of central banks that have formally adopted inflation targeting as a monetary framework. Governance practices seek to balance institutional independence needed for monetary policy credibility with accountability required to protect democratic values. Central bank laws usually have price stability as the primary monetary policy objective but seldom require an explicit numerical inflation target. Governments are frequently involved in setting targets, but to ensure operational autonomy, legal provisions explicitly limit government influence in internal policy decision-making processes. Internal governance practices differ considerably with regard to the roles and inter-relationships between the policy, supervisory, and management boards of a central bank.