The impact of the 2009 tsunami on tourism and on the Samoan economy is likely to be substantial. The effectiveness of monetary transmission in Samoa has improved over time; however, it is still below international standards. The adverse impact of the crisis on the functioning of the banking system may be alleviated by an improvement in the financial infrastructure. State-owned enterprises (SOE) continue to play an important role in Samoa, and the key to successful SOE reform in Samoa will be placing them on a fully commercial footing.
1. World Bank Work Program 1
Legislative and governance reforms for State Owned Entities (SOEs). Produce a green paper as the basis for the SOE Act focused on institutional arrangements for centralized oversight; appointment procedures for SOEboard members; performance management framework; and procurement.
Support program on townships economies for metropolitan cities.
Strategies/policies on financial stability, financial inclusion, fintech and cooperative banking.
Technical assistance on
monitoring and analyzing the performance of SOEs. To improve the monitoring of fiscal risks at all levels of government, the SOE oversight role of the Ministry of Finance could be further strengthened by ensuring that the Public Finance Act and its fiscal rules cover the monitoring also of municipally-owned SOEs more explicitly. Finally, customer satisfactions surveys and other forms of output quality control could be developed and executed by external, independent consultants, using consistent methodologies across SOEs.
Transparent and Professional SOEBoard and CEO
Francisco J. Parodi, Bobana Cegar, and Srikant Seshadri
assets, not exposed to risk by its own account, and acts on behalf of the RS government, and thus it should be classified as general government.
In FBiH and RS central governments, supervisory and board members are nominated by line ministries and approved by cabinets . While professional competency requirements for board member selection exist, there are no provisions requiring independence from political parties nor regulating conflicts of interest. In addition, competency requirements are perceived to be weakly defined.
Christine J. Richmond, Ms. Dora Benedek, Ezequiel Cabezon, Bobana Cegar, Mr. Peter Dohlman, Michelle Hassine, Beata Jajko, Piotr Kopyrski, Maksym Markevych, Mr. Jacques A Miniane, Mr. Francisco J Parodi, Gabor Pula, Mr. James Roaf, Min Kyu Song, Mariya Sviderskaya, Rima Turk, and Mr. Sebastian Weber
The Central, Eastern, and South Eastern European (CESEE) region is ripe for a reassessment of the role of the state in economic activity. The rapid income convergence with Western Europe of the early 2000s was not always equally shared across society, and it has now slowed dramatically in many countries of the region.
reflect the suggestions provided by partner international institutions. These suggestions, amongst other things, focus on appointment and dismissal of SOEsboard members, their mandate contracts and administration/management plans, SOEs annual budgets, as well as on the MoPF’s oversight role.
27. Exercise political will to implement provisions of the new legislation as improved legislation alone will not ensure progress . While the government has reiterated its commitment to improved SOE corporate governance in line with good international practice, it is time for
capacities of SOE boards.
Lessons for Maldives : A key lesson for the Maldives from the Seychelles’ experience is that the PEMC Act on SOEs stipulates the comprehensive oversight of SOEs by the Minister of Finance. This includes the requirement to receive regular (quarterly) reports on SOE activities and financial reports. It also sets out clear roles and responsibilities for the PEMC, including the requirement for it to inform the Minister of Finance of specific financial risk from SOEs and weaknesses or shortcomings of any SOEBoard. The act also sets out the
Based on a new database of State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) financial statements, we find that
SOEs in Bosnia and Herzegovina are mostly in poor financial shape. We estimate the overall
size and composition of the SOE sector, and identify individual companies that affect fiscal
and macroeconomic performance. Financial analysis suggests that SOEs are not contributing
enough to the economy. We also review the SOE governance framework and find that
governments do not exercise their ownership function in line with WB/OECD guidelines.
Reforms to the governance frameworks are necessary to foster transparency and improve
accountability. More fundamental reform of the SOE sector might increase overall GDP by 3
percent per year.
board members by the company or shareholders are rare.
77. There is no definition of or requirements for “independent” board members in BiH. Management may not serve on the supervisory board in FBiH or RS, and if an RS company has an executive committee, its members are limited to one third of the management board. SOEBoard members may not be civil servants, members of government or parliament. In practice many companies also have board members that are considered “minority representatives”. There is also no local training for board members that would enhance the
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) play an important role in Emerging Europe’s economies,
notably in the energy and transport sectors. Based on a new firm-level dataset, this paper
reviews the SOE landscape, assesses SOE performance across countries and vis-à-vis
private firms, and evaluates recent SOE governance reform experience in 11 Emerging
European countries, as well as Sweden as a benchmark. Profitability and efficiency of
resource allocation of SOEs lag those of private firms in most sectors, with substantial
cross-country variation. Poor SOE performance raises three main risks: large and risky
contingent liabilities could stretch public finances; sizeable state ownership of banks
coupled with poor governance could threaten financial stability; and negative productivity
spillovers could affect the economy at large. SOE governance frameworks are partly weak
and should be strengthened along three lines: fleshing out a consistent ownership policy;
giving teeth to financial oversight; and making SOE boards more professional.