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Global Moral Hazard, Capital Account Liberalization and the 'Overlending Syndrome'

Global Moral Hazard, Capital Account Liberalization and the 'Overlending Syndrome' »

Source: Global Moral Hazard, Capital Account Liberalization and the 'Overlending Syndrome'

Volume/Issue: 1999/100

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): Eduardo Levy Yeyati

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 01 July 1999

ISBN: 9781451852387

Keywords: Banking Crises, Capital Account Liberalization, Deposit Insurance, Moral Hazard, international capital, deposit rates, international capital markets

The removal of government guarantees in borrowing countries does not eliminate the moral hazard problem posed by the existence of deposit guarantees in lender countries. The paper shows that, after restrictions on...

Global Moral Hazard, Capital Account Liberalization and the 'Overlending Syndrome'

Global Moral Hazard, Capital Account Liberalization and the 'Overlending Syndrome' »

Volume/Issue: 1999/100

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): Eduardo Levy Yeyati

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 01 July 1999

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5089/9781451852387.001

ISBN: 9781451852387

Keywords: Banking Crises, Capital Account Liberalization, Deposit Insurance, Moral Hazard, international capital, deposit rates, international capital markets

The removal of government guarantees in borrowing countries does not eliminate the moral hazard problem posed by the existence of deposit guarantees in lender countries. The paper shows that, after restrictions on...