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A Political Agency Theory of Central Bank Independence

A Political Agency Theory of Central Bank Independence »

Source: A Political Agency Theory of Central Bank Independence

Volume/Issue: 2003/144

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): Gauti Eggertsson , and Eric Le Borgne

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 01 July 2003

ISBN: 9781451856460

Keywords: Central Bank Independece, Career Concerns, Elections, Experimetation, inflation, monetary policy, central bank, average inflation, Structure, Scope

We propose a theory to explain why, and under what circumstances, a politician gives up rent and delegates policy tasks to an independent agency. We apply this theory to monetary policy by extending a standard dyna...

A Political Agency Theory of Central Bank Independence

A Political Agency Theory of Central Bank Independence »

Volume/Issue: 2003/144

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): Gauti Eggertsson , and Eric Le Borgne

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 01 July 2003

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5089/9781451856460.001

ISBN: 9781451856460

Keywords: Central Bank Independece, Career Concerns, Elections, Experimetation, inflation, monetary policy, central bank, average inflation, Structure, Scope

We propose a theory to explain why, and under what circumstances, a politician gives up rent and delegates policy tasks to an independent agency. We apply this theory to monetary policy by extending a standard dyna...