This paper evaluates how successful is a policy of exchange rate stabilization to counteract the negative effects of a Dutch Disease episode. We consider a small open economy model that incorporates nominal rigidities and a learning-by-doing externality in the tradable sector. The paper shows that leaning against an appreciated exchange rate can prevent an inefficient loss of tradable output but at the cost of generating a misallocation of resources in other sectors of the economy. The paper also finds that welfare is a decreasing function of exchange rate intervention. These results suggest that stabilizing the nominal exchange rate in response to a Dutch Disease episode is highly distortionary.
This paper uses a newly constructed revenue dataset of 35 resource-rich countries for the period 1992-2009 to analyze the impact of expanding resource revenues on different types of domestic (non resource) tax revenues. Overall, we find a statistically significant negative relationship between resource revenues and total domestic (non resource) revenues, including for the major tax components. For each additional percentage point of GDP in resource revenues, there is a reduction in domestic (non resource) revenues of about 0.3 percentage points of GDP. We find this primarily occurs through reduced effort on taxes on goods and services—in particular, the VAT— followed by a smaller negative impact on corporate income and trade taxes.
Recent empirical studies have shown an inverse relation between natural resource intensity and long-term growth, implying that the natural resources generally impede economic growth through various channels (the “natural resource curse”). This paper departs from these studies by exploring the intersectoral linkages between oil and non-oil sectors in a cross-country perspective. The paper shows that the applicability of “natural resource curse” across oilbased economies should be treated with caution as the externalities of the oil sector highly depend on the countries’ degree of oil-intensity. In particular, the results show that, in low oil-intensity economies, the incentives to strengthen both fiscal and private sector institutions lead to positive inter-sectoral externalities. In contrast, weaker incentives in high oil-intensity economies adversely affect fiscal and private sector institutions and consequently lead to negative inter-sectoral externalities.
Aqib Aslam, Samya Beidas-Strom, Mr. Rudolfs Bems, Oya Celasun, and Zsoka Koczan
Commodity prices have declined sharply over the past three years, and output growth has
slowed considerably among countries that are net exporters of commodities. A critical
question for policy makers in these economies is whether commodity windfalls influence
potential output. Our analysis suggests that both actual and potential output move together
with commodity terms of trade, but that actual output comoves twice as strongly as
potential output. The weak commodity price outlook is estimated to subtract 1 to 2¼
percentage points from actual output growth annually on average during 2015-17. The
forecast drag on potential output is about one-third of that for actual output.
We examine the existing fiscal policy paradigm in commodity-exporting countries. First,
we argue that its centerpiece—the permanent income hypothesis (PIH)—is not consistent
with either intergenerational equity or long-term sustainability in the presence of
uncertainty. Policies to achieve these goals need to be more prudent and better anchored
than the PIH. Second, we point out the presence of a volatility tradeoff between
government spending and wealth and re-assess long-held views on the appropriate fiscal
anchors, the vice of procyclicality, and the (im)possibility of simultaneously smoothing
consumption and ensuring intergenerational equity and sustainability. Finally, we propose
what we call a prudent wealth stabilization policy that would be more consistent with
long-term fiscal policy goals, yet relatively simple to implement and communicate.
We examine the impact of resource windfall on the standard of living both in the short-run and long-run, using a sample of 130 countries, 1963-2007. Then, we systematically investigate the effect of resource windfall on welfare in three different groups of countries: We find that in the short-run resource windfall is welfare enhancing in the whole sample, especially via increases in income and decreases in inequality. However, in
SSA countries, the size of welfare improvement is small and it is smaller and almost zero
after one year in fragile Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries. In the whole sample, a
resource windfall shock leads to significant welfare growth even in the long-run, but we
couldn’t find any significant long-run effect of resource windfall in SSA countries.
This paper investigates the deindustrialization and welfare effects of infrastructure aid in developing countries. In the short run, cost-saving infrastructure aid in the export sector increases the domestic wage rate, whereas the same aid in the import sector lowers it. The cost of nontraded goods rises whether the export or the import sector receives infrastructure aid. Infrastructure aid in the nontraded sector has no effect on domestic factor prices. Laborsaving infrastructure aid causes an expansion of the export sector, while capital-saving infrastructure aid results in a Dutch disease effect in the export sector. If aid is below the optimal level, infrastructure aid increases consumer income and welfare.