

**Maldives: Request for Disbursement  
Under the Rapid Credit Facility-Press  
Release; Staff Report; and Statement by  
the Executive Director for Maldives**



# MALDIVES

April 2020

## REQUEST FOR DISBURSEMENT UNDER THE RAPID CREDIT FACILITY—PRESS RELEASE; STAFF REPORT; AND STATEMENT BY THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR MALDIVES

In the context of the Request for Disbursement under the Rapid Credit Facility, the following documents have been released and are included in this package:

- A **Press Release** including a statement by the Chair of the Executive Board.
- The **Staff Report** prepared by a staff team of the IMF for the Executive Board's consideration on April 22, 2020, following discussions that ended on April 5, 2020, with the officials of Maldives on economic developments and policies underpinning the IMF disbursement under the Rapid Credit Facility. Based on information available at the time of these discussions, the staff report was completed on April 16, 2020.
- A **Debt Sustainability Analysis** prepared by the staffs of the IMF and the International Development Association.
- A **Statement by the Executive Director** for Maldives.

The documents listed below will be released.

Letter of Intent sent to the IMF by the authorities of Maldives\*

\*Also included in Staff Report.

The IMF's transparency policy allows for the deletion of market-sensitive information and premature disclosure of the authorities' policy intentions in published staff reports and other documents.

Copies of this report are available to the public from

International Monetary Fund • Publication Services  
PO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090  
Telephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201  
E-mail: [publications@imf.org](mailto:publications@imf.org) Web: <http://www.imf.org>  
Price: \$18.00 per printed copy

**International Monetary Fund**  
**Washington, D.C.**



## IMF Executive Board Approves a US\$28.9 Million Disbursement to the Republic of Maldives to Address the COVID-19 Pandemic

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

- The IMF Executive Board approves the 30<sup>th</sup> request for emergency financial assistance to help its member countries address the challenges posed by COVID-19.
- The pandemic is inflicting significant damage, especially on tourism activity, and is expected to result in substantial weakening of the Maldives' GDP growth, balance of payments and the fiscal position.
- The government of the Maldives acted quickly to put in place containment measures and is seeking support from the international community for its crisis response plan.
- IMF financing will help to catalyze further assistance from the international community.

**Washington, D.C. – April 22, 2020.** The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved the disbursement of SDR 21.2 million (about US\$28.9 million) to be drawn under the [Rapid Credit Facility](#) (RCF) to help cover balance of payments and fiscal needs, stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic. Global and domestic containment measures are leading to a substantial reduction in economic activity, with sectors such as tourism, transport, and construction hit particularly hard. As a result, the short-term economic outlook has deteriorated significantly, with large uncertainties surrounding the duration of the pandemic and the timing of the recovery of tourism.

The authorities have acted fast to mitigate the impact of the pandemic by increasing health spending and putting in place measures to contain the outbreak. They have also responded with a combination of fiscal, monetary, and prudential measures that seek to minimize its economic impact, as well as providing temporary support for vulnerable households and business most affected by the crisis. The IMF financing will help ease some of these measures and garner further donor support.

Following the Executive Board's discussion of the Maldives, Mr. Tao Zhang, Deputy Managing Director and Chair, issued the following statement:

"The COVID-19 pandemic is having a pronounced negative impact on the Maldivian economy and is expected to cause a significant growth contraction. Containment measures are adversely affecting domestic economic activity. The temporary stop of tourist arrivals, the main source of foreign earnings, has severely weakened the fiscal and external positions, giving rise to large financing gaps.

"The authorities have responded quickly to the COVID-19 outbreak, including specific travel restrictions and subsequently more comprehensive travel measures. They also put together a set of measures to alleviate its social and economic fallout. The IMF's financial assistance will

cover part of the financing gap, supporting fiscal rebalancing and the implementation of the anti-crisis plan. Additional support from the international community will be needed.

“The temporary fiscal accommodation is appropriate. The authorities will reprioritize and cut capital expenditures, redirecting funds as needed to combat the pandemic and provide temporary and well-targeted support to the most vulnerable households and businesses, while maintaining high standards of transparency and governance. The central bank focuses on providing targeted liquidity support to banks and avoiding a credit freeze, through temporary and targeted financial macroprudential easing.

“The authorities remain committed to fiscal and debt sustainability over the medium term. They intend to achieve a balanced fiscal adjustment based on the reduction of capital spending to historical averages, recurrent expenditure discipline, and revenue mobilization. Continued efforts are needed to improve governance, build resilience to climate change, and strengthen policy buffers.”

For information on the emergency financing requests approved by the IMF Executive Board, please see a link to the IMF Lending Tracker:

<https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-covid19/COVID-Lending-Tracker>

For upcoming discussions on the emergency financing requests, please see a link to the calendar of the IMF Executive Board meetings:

<https://www.imf.org/external/NP/SEC/bc/eng/index.aspx>



# MALDIVES

April 16, 2020

## REQUEST FOR DISBURSEMENT UNDER THE RAPID CREDIT FACILITY

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

**Context.** The Maldives is suffering from the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. The Maldivian economy is one of the most dependent countries on tourism. GDP growth is projected to be about -8.1 percent in 2020, about 15 percentage points below the pre-pandemic growth rate, and with large downside risks. The baseline impact would open a 2020 external financing gap of about US\$214 million and a fiscal financing gap of around US\$ 228 million.

**Request for Fund support.** The authorities are seeking financial assistance under the exogenous shock window of the Rapid Credit Facility (RCF) to address the urgent balance of payments needs posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. In the attached letter, the authorities request a disbursement of SDR 21.2 million, equivalent to 100 percent of quota, with the full amount to be used for budget support. Staff supports the request. The capacity to repay the Fund is adequate. Maldives continues to be at a high risk of debt distress. The RCF disbursement will be magnified by the catalytic role of Fund assistance. It is expected that the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and World Bank (WB) will also provide additional financing in concessional terms.

**Policy recommendations.** The authorities' responses to the pandemic have been timely, scaling up health care spending and putting in place measures to contain the outbreak. The authorities have also responded with a combination of fiscal, monetary, and prudential measures that seek to minimize its economic impact. These are appropriate, but the fiscal space to respond to the crisis by increasing spending and the deficit is limited due to the high public debt. The fiscal policy response should focus on carefully designed spending reductions, especially in terms of the past ambitious public investment plans, and a reallocation of resources towards healthcare spending and other measures that provide temporary support for vulnerable households and businesses most affected by the crisis. The authorities should focus on crisis management and ensure that the policy response to the crisis is consistent with the current de-facto pegged exchange rate regime (e.g., no central bank monetization of fiscal deficits).

Approved By  
**Ranil Salgado (APD)**  
 and **Vikram Haksar**  
**(SPR)**

An IMF team consisting of E. Cerutti (head), J. Jonas, and R. Moussa (all APD) held discussions with the Maldivian authorities by teleconferences led by Minister of Finance Ibrahim Ameer, Central Bank Governor Ali Hashim, and other senior government officials during April 1–5, 2020. Maya Choueiri (OED) participated in the policy discussions. Tubagus Feridhanusetyawan, Guli Gamwalla-Khadivi and Biying Zhu (all APD) collaborated in preparing this report.

## CONTENTS

<b>INTRODUCTION</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>IMPACT OF THE PANDEMIC AND OUTLOOK</b>	<b>4</b>
A. Pre-Pandemic Conditions	4
B. Post-Pandemic Outlook and Authorities Responses	5
C. Medium Term Recovery and Risks	7
<b>POLICY ISSUES AND DISCUSSIONS</b>	<b>8</b>
A. Fiscal Policy	8
B. Monetary Exchange Rate and Financial Sector Policy	9
C. Strengthening Governance, Fiscal Transparency, and Resilience to Natural Disasters	10
<b>RATIONALE FOR RAPID CREDIT FACILITY ACCESS, ABILITY TO REPAY THE FUND, AND SAFEGUARDS ASSESSMENT</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>STAFF APPRAISAL</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>BOX</b>	
1. Recovering After the Indian Ocean Tsunami and the Global Financial Crisis	8
<b>FIGURES</b>	
1. Summary of Recent Developments	13
2. Comparison with other Tourist Dependent Economies	14
3. External Sector Developments	15
4. Fiscal Developments	16
5. Money and Credit Developments	17
<b>TABLES</b>	
1. Selected Economic Indicators, 2016–25	18
2a. Central Government Finances, 2016–25 (In millions of Rufiyaa)	19

2b. Central Government Finances, 2016–25 (In percent of GDP)	<u>20</u>
3. Monetary Accounts, 2016–25	<u>21</u>
4. Balance of Payments, 2016–25	<u>22</u>
5. Selected Financial Soundness Indicators, 2013–2019	<u>23</u>
6. External Financing Requirements and Sources, 2020–2025	<u>24</u>
7. Indicators of Capacity to Repay the Fund, 2020–2030	<u>25</u>

**APPENDIX**

I. Letter of Intent	<u>26</u>
---------------------	-----------

## INTRODUCTION

1. **The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic outbreak on economic activity has triggered the emergence of an urgent balance of payments (BOP) need in the Maldives.** The global impact of the pandemic is expected to severely cut tourism receipts during 2020 by around 40 percent relative to pre-pandemic projections. The measures to contain the outbreak and its related uncertainty are also affecting economic activity. The impact of the shocks on the economy is very uncertain and subject to large downside risks. The BOP financing gap is estimated to amount to US\$214 million for 2020 (4 percent of GDP), and the fiscal financing gap to around US\$228 million for 2020 (4.2 percent of GDP).
2. **The authorities have requested Fund assistance under the exogenous shock window of the Rapid Credit Facility (RCF) to address an urgent balance of payments need posed by the COVID-19 pandemic.** The financing provided by the Fund is expected to provide budget support as well as catalyze support from other development partners (details below), through additional grants and concessional loans.

## IMPACT OF THE PANDEMIC AND OUTLOOK

### A. Pre-Pandemic Conditions

3. **Before the pandemic, GDP growth was projected to accelerate in 2020 and continue on a strong path in the medium term, driven by continued strong tourism growth.** The pre-shock GDP growth projection for 2020 was about 7.0 percent, with tourism benefitting from new infrastructure. Ongoing further improvements in the airport (new runway, terminal, etc.) and plans for new resorts (more than 116 islands would be available for development during the next 10 years) make strong tourism growth feasible in the medium term.
4. **Following electoral promises, record levels of public capital expenditure were included in the 2020 Budget.** The government's 2020 Strategic Action Plan and 2020 budget envisioned more housing units (about 20,000), further decentralization (through 5 urban centers), and two flagship infrastructure projects. These are the relocation of the port to a nearby island outside the capital Malé and a bridge that will link the port with Malé. As a result, the 2020 budget envisaged a jump in capital spending by 75 percent, to a record-high 14 percent of GDP. These large-construction projects financed externally not only rely on imported materials, but also a large share of the labor and professional services is also from abroad.
5. **The 2020 Budget contained a number of revenue measures, but these were expected to finance only a small part of the capital expenditure increase.** To fulfill its electoral promises, the new government introduced a Personal Income Tax (PIT) and planned increases in airport development fees and airport service charges, as well as other fees (import duty-related fees and foreign workers' registration fees). These revenue measures were expected to finance only a small



part of the capital expenditure increase, with the rest expected to be financed mostly by grants and external borrowing.

**6. The Maldives maintains a stabilized exchange rate arrangement vis-à-vis the US dollar.**

The Maldives is a small open and partially dollarized economy, and the stabilized arrangement, a de-facto peg, has been serving it well, helping to anchor inflation and providing a hedge to the tourism sector. At the same time, the Maldives Monetary Authority (MMA) has maintained tight controls on the availability and use of foreign exchange. As discussed in the 2019 Article IV Staff Report, the foreign exchange (FX) rationing to banks sometimes triggers FX shortages that have led to the emergence of a parallel market.



**7. The financial sector remains broadly sound and financial sector oversight is broadly appropriate.** The authorities have been making progress in strengthening financial sector stability and banks remain in good health, with strong capitalization and profitability. Nonperforming loans (NPLs) are relatively low and well-provisioned.

**8. Policy space and buffers were limited before the pandemic, given high public debt levels and the large current account deficit.** Total public debt (including guarantees) stood at an estimated US\$4.4 billion in 2019, around 77 percent of GDP. External public and publicly guaranteed debt stood at an estimated US\$2.2 billion in 2019, around 38 percent of GDP. The current account deficit was about 26 percent of GDP in 2019.

## B. Post-Pandemic Outlook and Authorities Responses


**9. The reversal in tourist arrivals to Maldives due to the COVID-19 shock is significant.**

Tourist arrivals were projected to grow by around 13 percent in 2020, and actual arrivals in January 2020 recorded 14 percent growth y/y. By February 4, the first travel ban on flights from China was enforced, and Chinese arrivals fell to zero. Growth in other markets remained healthy in February, but they fell in March, initially due to travel restrictions on several countries, and then further with suspension of on-arrival visas. Growth in arrivals contracted by 20 percent during 2020Q1 with respect to 2019Q1. Assuming that restrictions on travel and on-arrival visas will be lifted in June,



total tourist arrivals will contract by 31 percent in 2020 with respect to 2019 (39 percent fall with respect to pre-pandemic 2020 projections).

10. **GDP growth is projected to be about -8.1 percent in 2020, about 15 percentage points below the pre-pandemic growth rate, and with large downside risks.** The contraction in tourist arrivals leads to a decline in GDP of around 11.7 percentage points. Disruptions to domestic activity, particularly construction, manufacturing, and wholesale and retail trade, account for around 3.4 percentage points. This contraction in domestic activity is linked to lower tourist arrivals, lower capital flows affecting especially tourism sector-related FDI, as well as domestic disruptions related to government containment measures.<sup>1</sup> The social impact of the shock could be larger in the atolls away from the capital Malé since over 90 percent of poor Maldivians live in atolls.



11. **The BOP gap will be around US\$214 million.** The decline in tourists will lead to a loss of around US\$1.46 billion in tourism receipts. Imports of goods and services related to the tourism industry will decline as a result of the shock, along with imports related to construction and manufacturing. The fall in oil and commodity prices will also reduce the import bill. Gross international reserves are projected to decline by US\$173 million to US\$580 million or 2 months of prospective imports.<sup>2</sup>

12. **The fiscal impact of COVID-19 will also be significant.** The decline in tourism will adversely affect tax revenues, which are projected to decline by about one third compared to 2019. The main source of the decline is lower tourism GST collection. Lower GDP growth and tourism would also adversely affect the business profit tax. There are increases in COVID-19 related

<sup>1</sup> The government declared a Public Health Emergency in March 12, 2020. There are several adopted containment measures, including suspension of on-arrival visas, quarantine for all passengers traveling to the Maldives by air except for tourists checking-in to resorts, all cruise ships are banned from entering and docking, all guest houses and city hotels are required to suspend all tourist check-ins since March 17, and school closures.

<sup>2</sup> At the end of March 2020, gross reserves stood at USD 741 million (about 2.6 months of prospective imports), and usable reserves at USD 369 million (0.9 months of prospective imports). Since assessing the adequacy of reserves in terms of the traditional 3-month import coverage is not very suitable for the Maldives, considering the large capital imports related to infrastructure projects and imports by the tourism sector, we calculate the BOP needs using a 2-month ratio.

expenses, such as in health expenditure (about 0.25 percent of GDP, for the purchase of medical consumables and medical equipment and the management of the quarantine facilities and the Emergency Operations Center) and in financing of subsidies and transfers. The overall fiscal deficit widens significantly from 2019, to 11.7 percent of GDP as a result of lower revenue, and despite reductions in some non-priority current expenditure as well as large cuts in capital expenditure compared with the original budget. The fiscal financing gap is estimated at around US\$228 million for 2020 (4.2 percent of GDP).

### C. Medium Term Recovery and Risks

13. **The speed of the recovery will depend mainly on the length of the coronavirus-related disruptions and the preservation of economic capacity.** The experience from the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) suggests that tourist arrivals and economic activity can recover very quickly since infrastructure was not damaged unlike the case of the 2004 tsunami (see text box). As the COVID-19 shock spares tourism infrastructure, arrivals can resume more quickly. Although the duration of the shock is uncertain, the nature of the shock is temporary, so preserving the capacity of the economy to receive back tourists as well as dampen the social cost of the economic adjustments are essential.



14. **However, the baseline scenario of a V-shaped recovery is subject to significant downside risks.** Key factors determining the resumption of tourist arrivals will be the lifting of travel bans and restrictions as well as the return of confidence that travel is safe in the second half of 2020. If it takes longer to bring the coronavirus spread under control, it may also take longer for travel demand to recover. Serious economic damage in Europe and other countries from which many tourists arrive, including the economic health of airline companies, could slow down the recovery in tourist arrivals. Under such circumstances, the recovery could take the shape of a fat-bottomed U, which could trigger a further decline in economic activity, adversely impacting debt sustainability, as well as potentially larger financing gaps.

15. **Maldives remains at a high risk of debt distress.** The sustainability of public debt in the Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA) is predicated on the authorities' commitment to reprioritize and cut capital expenditures, a V-shaped recovery in tourism, and strong medium-term growth prospects, along with the continued accumulation of liquid assets to the Sovereign Development Fund (SDF).<sup>3</sup> Rollover risks from the two outstanding international sovereign bonds are mitigated by two factors. First, the SDF accumulation of revenues from the Airport Development Fees and other services. Second, the preemptive voluntary extension of the US\$100 million privately placed bond in Abu Dhabi by three years to 2026. Funds in the SDF are estimated to be enough to cover the US\$250 million bond due in 2022, and funds accumulated up to 2026 will come close to the amount due then. Lack of full fiscal commitment would continue to leave the Maldives vulnerable to adverse shocks, as well as affect its ability to increase resilience to longer-term challenges resulting from climate change.


<sup>3</sup> Medium term debt paths are more favorable than in 2019 DSA due to authorities' commitments to reduce capital expenditures and lower assumed nominal interest rates due to their calibration using actual data (see DSA annex).

### Box 1. Recovering After the Indian Ocean Tsunami and the Global Financial Crisis

The Maldives has been subject to large shocks in the recent past. The Indian Ocean Tsunami hit the Maldives on December 26, 2004. It took the lives of more than 80 people and led to estimated damages of US\$470 million or 62 percent of 2004 GDP. GDP growth in 2005 was -13.1 percent with tourism contributing -10.9 percentage points. Tourist arrival growth remained negative for a year after the Tsunami, with a large rebound in January 2006.



The GFC also hit the Maldives in 2009 with GDP contracting by 7.2 percent. The tourism sector contributed less to the downturn (1.4 percentage points) than manufacturing, construction, and wholesale and retail trade (5.8 percentage points). Tourism growth was negative in the first half of 2009 and rebounded strongly after, since, unlike the 2004 tsunami, infrastructure was not affected by the GFC.



## POLICY ISSUES AND DISCUSSIONS

### A. Fiscal Policy

16. **Because of the high public debt and fiscal deficits, fiscal space to respond to the crisis by increasing spending and the deficit is limited.** The 2020 Budget already targeted a significant increase in capital expenditures and the deficit, accompanied by record-high grants. In the absence of a policy response, reduced tax revenues would push the deficit to an unsustainable level and could lead to pressures on the MMA to provide monetary financing.

17. **The fiscal policy response should focus on carefully designed non-priority spending reductions, and a reallocation of resources towards crisis-affected sectors.** The authorities are scaling down the implementation of the ambitious 2020 budget public investment plans. They are

completing ongoing public sector investment projects but also cancelling several new projects. The announced initial MVR 3.1 billion (3.7 percent of GDP) reduction in capital expenditure as well as non-priority recurrent expenditure by MVR 1 billion (1.2 percent of GDP) are steps in the right direction. Available resources need be directed to healthcare spending and other well-targeted measures needed to combat COVID-19, and provide temporary support to vulnerable households and businesses affected most by the crisis.<sup>4</sup>

18. **In the medium-term, sustained fiscal consolidation is imperative.** A balanced fiscal adjustment based on the reduction of capital spending to historical averages, recurrent expenditure discipline, and measures to boost revenues by tax administration reform and possibly improvements in the recently introduced PIT should be the centerpieces of a medium-term fiscal strategy. The DSA shows that debt is sustainable, but that the Maldives continues to be at high risk of debt distress. The sustainability of debt hinges critically on the authorities' commitment to reprioritize capital expenditure and active debt management, including accumulation of liquid assets in the SDF. Capital spending should be prioritized toward highly efficient projects as recommended by the 2015 PIMA assessment.

## B. Monetary, Exchange Rate, and Financial Sector Policy

19. **The authorities should be ready to provide targeted liquidity support and temporary and targeted financial macroprudential easing.** Monetary policy has played a very limited role in the Maldives as a tool of cyclical management, and the policy response thus should focus mainly on regulatory measures and liquidity provision. To ensure continued operation of solvent firms and avoid freezing up of credit and liquidity, the MMA should closely monitor credit conditions and provide targeted liquidity support to financial institutions (fully collateralized, with applicable haircuts on assets for risk mitigation) and consider temporary easing of prudential/regulatory measures. The MMA has announced a gradual lowering, as and when needed, of reserve requirements in order to provide liquidity support to banks. In addition, the MMA has introduced a moratorium of 6 months on banking loan repayments for those affected by COVID-19. The MMA should also monitor closely foreign exchange reserves and maintain close contact with the Reserve Bank of India to activate the bilateral currency swap if needed.

20. **The banking sector is in relatively good financial health and should be able to withstand a temporary and not-protracted shock to tourism and growth.** Given banks' high liquidity and capital cushions, they are in a position to provide temporary easing in lending terms to otherwise creditworthy borrowers under temporary liquidity needs due to the exogenous shock. It is important that any government policy which allocates resources to assist distressed borrowers

---

<sup>4</sup> Staff will continue to work with the authorities to discuss the size and composition of fiscal adjustment depending on the evolving situation.

and/or banks is transparent, targeted, and clearly temporary, so as not to create moral hazard and foster poor credit risk management practices (e.g., lowering lending and provisioning standards).<sup>5</sup>

21. **These policies should also support the continuation of the currency peg.** In the last Article IV report, staff recommended an eventual medium-term shift from a peg to the US dollar to a currency basket peg to increase resilience to external shocks, and the MMA was undertaking technical medium-term preparations to that effect within the MMA strategy plan. However, under the current emergency circumstances, the authorities should focus on crisis management and ensure that the policy response to the crisis is consistent (e.g., no central bank monetization of fiscal deficits) with the continuation of the current exchange rate arrangement.

### C. Strengthening Governance, Fiscal Transparency, and Resilience to Natural Disasters

22. **The authorities have recently been taking welcome steps to improve governance, transparency, and resilience to climate change.** There has been a welcome renewed momentum to strengthen regulations and institutions to fight corruption, but significant work remains on the agenda. The authorities have taken steps to improve fiscal transparency, including regular publication of fiscal data, as well as improving accountability, something very important to place emphasis on during the current crisis-mitigation spending. Addressing climate change-related vulnerabilities and improving buffers and policy space remain key medium-term challenges. In recognition of the importance of increasing resilience to climate change and natural disasters, the government launched in October 2019 a Strategic Action Plan which seeks to integrate climate change as a cross-cutting issue in sectoral development plans.

## RATIONALE FOR RAPID CREDIT FACILITY ACCESS, ABILITY TO REPAY THE FUND, AND SAFEGUARDS ASSESSMENT

23. **Given the urgency of the situation, a RCF is the most appropriate instrument for Fund assistance to the Maldives.** The Maldives could benefit from an Extended Credit Facility (ECF) arrangement that focuses on fiscal and external sustainability, improving structural issues, and building resilience to climate change. However, given the current urgency of the need and level of uncertainty, an agreement on the parameters of a long-term Fund arrangement would take time, leaving short-term external financing needs unattended.

<sup>5</sup> In particular, it is key to ensure that: (i) borrowers that were already highly unlikely to repay before the COVID-19 crisis started do not unduly benefit from wide-ranging repayment holidays, and (ii) borrowers facing temporary difficulties are not disincentivized to resume loan repayment at the end of the application of the moratorium.

24. **Staff consider access at the maximum 100 percent of quota under the exogenous shock window of the RCF to be appropriate given the scale of the urgent BOP needs and the size of the economy.** At 21.2 million SDR, around US\$ 28.9 million, the amount to be provided under the RCF would be equivalent to 13.5 percent of the balance of payments funding needs brought on by the pandemic. Other major donors, such as the WB (US\$17.3 million) and the ADB (US\$27.6 million), have indicated that they will provide recovery assistance on a similar or greater scale, much of it in the form of grants, so as to avoid increasing the debt burden.
25. **Capacity to repay the Fund under such access would remain adequate.** If the disbursement were to be approved according to the above parameters, the Fund's exposure to the Maldives would amount to about 0.54 percent of GDP or about 5 percent of gross international reserves in 2020. This level of access would be manageable, given the level of reserves. While the Maldives remains at high risk of debt distress, the staff judge debt to be sustainable over the medium term in a baseline that assumes rapid recovery in growth and the authorities' commitment to reprioritize and cut capital expenditures and active debt management including accumulation of liquid assets in the SDF. Significant risks to debt sustainability would arise from deviations from this favorable outlook. Staff consider the Maldives' capacity to repay the Fund adequate but subject to risks, with total Fund obligations based on existing and prospective credit peaking at 1.12 percent of exports and 3.18 percent of government revenue in 2020.
26. **The authorities have requested channeling the expected RCF disbursement to the budget.** Budget support provides the fastest way to both reduce the BOP and fiscal budget financing gaps. Consistent with standard practice and with the central bank law, it is anticipated that the allocation of the RCF would take the form of a credit to the MMA. On receipt the MMA would be expected to provide credit of an equivalent amount to the government of the Maldives.
27. **The letter of intent (LOI) signed by the authorities in conjunction with the RCF disbursement includes commitments to improve debt and macroeconomic sustainability.** This commitment is needed to ensure an orderly adjustment, without pressuring domestic credit conditions and the exchange rate regime. The authorities commit to evaluate fiscal priorities across current and capital spending and redirect the available funds as needed to combat the coronavirus and provide temporary support to the most vulnerable households and businesses. At the same time, they commit to direct monetary and financial policies to support liquidity and economic activity, while maintaining financial stability and avoiding undermining banking system soundness. The authorities will incorporate any budget support from donors through the single Treasury account to fund priority expenses and provide support to vulnerable groups. There are also commitments to avoid monetary financing of government credit operations.
28. **The 2010 safeguards assessment of the MMA will be updated in connection with the RCF disbursement.** All but one safeguards' recommendations have been implemented and the MMA continues to publish its audited financial statements. The authorities committed to undergo a safeguard assessment, including providing authorization for Fund staff to hold discussions with the central bank's external auditors, and to have access to the central bank's most recent external audit reports.

## STAFF APPRAISAL

29. **The Maldivian economy is being hard hit hard by the COVID-19 outbreak, putting pressure on the BOP and the fiscal budget.** Even assuming a temporary disruption and resumption of travel in the second half of the year, tourist arrivals are projected to decline by 31 percent in 2020 and tourism receipts by around US\$1.46 billion. Following an estimated 5.7 percent growth in 2019, real GDP growth is projected to decline to -8.1 percent in 2020. Gross international reserves are projected to decline to US\$580 million or 2 months of imports, with a US\$214 million BOP need.
30. **To minimize the economic impact, a combination of fiscal, monetary, and prudential measures has been implemented.** The MMA measures focus on preventing a tightening of liquidity conditions and assisting financial institutions so as to minimize economic disruptions. Minimum required reserves could be gradually cut as necessary, a short-term MMA credit facility made available to banks, and a temporary, transparent, and well-targeted moratorium on bank loan repayments introduced. Recurrent spending cuts and reallocation to health and income support to the vulnerable are also appropriate. However, the authorities should reduce as much as possible the infrastructure projects envisaged in the 2020 Budget in order to free resources.
31. **The Maldives is a country with high external vulnerabilities and high risk of debt distress, and medium-term policies need to be geared towards reducing these vulnerabilities.** To ensure debt sustainability, the fiscal deficit and public debt will need to be brought down significantly over the medium term by a combination of revenue measures and spending restraint, including reassessment of the ambitious public infrastructure investment plan. Debt sustainability hinges critically on the authorities' commitment to medium-term fiscal consolidation as well as favorable short and medium-term macro assumptions. Given the high debt distress, the authorities should continue to actively seek grant financing to help make up for the expected loss in tourism revenue and avoid a further increase in debt. Monetary policy needs to be modernized in line with the MMA Strategic Action Plan, to improve its efficiency and capacity as a tool of cyclical management.
32. **The outbreak represents a significant shock to the Maldives and staff supports the authorities' request for a RCF disbursement in the amount of 100 percent of the quota.**




**Figure 1. Maldives: Summary of Recent Developments**


*Until the outbreak, strong tourism supported growth....*




*... but in March, arrivals stopped growing or fell sharply (China).*




*The REER appreciated after the devaluation in 2011 but has been depreciating since 2017*




*Import and export growth have slowed down in 2019.*



*CPI inflation has hovered close to zero recently.*



*Fiscal deficits have been volatile but generally elevated.*




**Figure 2. Maldives: Comparison with other Tourist Dependent Economies**


Tourist arrivals have been relatively strong....




...with tourism receipts a relatively high share of GDP.




Maldives' current account deficit is among the highest among tourist dependent countries.




Like other tourist dependent countries, REER has depreciated moderately recently.



Maldives' government expenditures-to-GDP ratio is broadly in line with other tourist-dependent economies...




... and so is the government revenue-to-GDP ratio.




**Figure 3. Maldives: External Sector Developments**


The current account deficit remained high in 2019....




... reflecting large imports for investment.




The overall balance of payments was close to zero in 2019....




...with debt and FDI the main sources of CAD financing.



External debt has been increasing as infrastructure investment picked up.



Reserve coverage improvement in 2019 reflects mainly the decline in projected imports in 2020.




**Figure 4. Maldives: Fiscal Developments**

Public debt has been gradually increasing....

**Public Debt**

(In percent of GDP)




Sources: Maldivian authorities; and IMF staff estimates.

...reflecting high fiscal deficits.

**Overall Fiscal Balance**

(In percent of GDP)




Sources: Maldivian authorities; and IMF staff estimates.

Growth in spending picked up in 2018 and 2019....

**Government Total and Current Expenditure**

(Year-on-year change)




Sources: Maldivian authorities; and IMF staff estimates.

... reflecting mainly stronger growth in current spending.

**Government Expenditure**

(In percent of GDP)




Sources: Maldivian authorities; and IMF staff estimates.

Tax revenue growth has been declining...

**Tax and Nontax Revenue**

(Year-on-year change)




Sources: Maldivian authorities; and IMF staff estimates.

...resulting in falling revenue-to-GDP ratio.

**Total Tax and Non-Tax Revenue**

(In percent of GDP)




Sources: Maldivian authorities; and IMF staff estimates.

**Figure 5. Maldives: Money and Credit Developments**

Money growth has picked up somewhat recently.

**Monetary Aggregates**

(Year-on-year change, in percent)




Sources: Maldivian authorities; and IMF staff estimates

Commercial banks' reserves are high.

**Commercial Banks' Reserves**

(In percent of total deposits)




Sources: Maldivian authorities; and IMF staff estimates.

Private credit growth moderated and public sector credit picked up.

**Credit**


(Year-on-year change, in percent)



Sources: Maldivian authorities; and IMF staff estimates.

Private credit-to-GDP ratio remains relatively low.

**Private Credit, Emerging Markets and LICs 2019**




Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook and IFS database.

Tourism and construction are the top credit recipients....

**Sectoral Composition of Private Credit, 2019**

(In percent of total credit)




Sources: Authorities data and IMF staff calculations.

...though credit growth has been slowing down.

**Private Sector Credit by Industries**

(Year-on-year change, in percent)



Sources: Authorities data and IMF staff calculations.

Table 1. Maldives: Selected Economic Indicators, 2016–25

	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
				Prel.	Proj.					
<b>Output and prices</b>										
Real GDP	6.3	6.8	(Annual percentage change)							
Inflation (end-of-period) 1/	1.8	2.2	0.5	1.3	1.4	2.1	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0
Inflation (period average) 1/ GDP deflator	0.8	2.3	1.4	1.3	1.5	1.5	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0
	0.2	1.4	2.0	2.0	2.4	2.5	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0
<b>Central government finances</b>										
			(In percent of GDP)							
Revenue and grants	27.5	27.8	27.1	27.3	19.4	23.7	25.1	26.0	26.3	26.4
Expenditure and net lending	36.9	34.1	32.2	32.1	31.2	29.8	30.1	29.8	29.6	29.3
Overall balance	-9.3	-6.3	-5.1	-4.8	-11.7	-6.2	-4.9	-3.8	-3.3	-2.9
Overall balance excl. grants	-9.6	-6.6	-6.1	-6.2	-14.3	-7.6	-5.9	-4.4	-3.9	-3.5
<b>Financing</b>	9.3	6.3	5.1	4.8	11.7	6.2	4.9	3.8	3.3	2.9
Foreign	2.6	4.2	3.9	1.5	3.0	3.0	2.7	2.0	1.5	0.8
Domestic 2/	6.7	2.1	1.2	3.3	8.7	3.1	2.2	1.8	1.8	2.0
Primary balance	-7.4	-4.8	-3.3	-3.1	-10.1	-4.4	-3.1	-1.9	-1.4	-1.1
<b>Public and publicly guaranteed debt</b>	57.7	61.3	71.3	76.9	93.9	87.3	85.4	83.0	80.7	78.1
<b>Monetary accounts</b>										
			(Annual percentage change)							
Broad money	-0.2	5.2	3.4	7.8	-5.9	16.0	8.5	8.0	7.5	7.5
Domestic credit	19.7	1.7	5.2	3.8	-3.1	10.3	6.0	5.9	5.6	5.8
<b>Balance of payments</b>										
			(In percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)							
Current account	-23.6	-21.7	-28.2	-26.1	-23.1	-11.8	-9.2	-9.1	-9.3	-9.0
<i>Of which:</i>										
Exports	5.9	6.7	6.4	6.3	6.3	6.5	6.3	6.2	6.1	
Imports	-48.0	-47.1	-51.9	-48.0	-32.8	-31.2	-32.3	-33.3	-34.3	-33.5
Tourism receipts (in nonfactor services, net)	57.4	58.0	54.9	58.8	41.7	53.0	54.7	55.7	55.9	56.2
Income (net)	-8.1	-7.9	-9.3	-9.7	-5.0	-6.6	-6.3	-6.4	-6.4	-6.3
Current transfers	-14.4	-9.9	-9.3	-10.1	-8.3	-9.7	-9.9	-10.0	-9.9	-9.7
Capital and financial account (including e&o)	21.4	24.2	30.6	26.8	16.0	14.2	9.7	12.5	10.6	9.9
<i>Of which:</i>										
General government, net	2.6	7.0	13.9	5.5	6.9	3.0	2.7	2.0	1.5	0.9
Banks and other sectors, net	-0.1	-7.5	5.8	2.1	2.1	2.2	1.5	1.2	0.4	0.3
Overall balance	-2.2	2.5	2.4	0.7	-7.2	2.3	0.5	3.4	1.3	0.8
<b>Gross international reserves (in millions of US\$; e.o.p.)</b>	468	588	712	753	580	724	759	1,007	1,110	1,178
In months of GNFS imports	1.6	1.7	2.1	2.9	2.0	2.3	2.2	2.7	2.8	2.8
Exchange rate (rufyiaa/US\$, e.o.p.)	15.4	15.4	15.4	15.4	...	...	...	...	...	...
<b>Memorandum items:</b>										
GDP (in millions of rufiyaa)	67,300	72,873	81,994	88,365	83,179	96,513	104,753	113,181	121,659	130,787
GDP (in millions of U.S. dollars)	4,367	4,729	5,321	5,738	5,398	6,263	6,798	7,345	7,900	8,493
Tourism bednights (000 <sup>1</sup> )	7,771	8,596	9,477	10,689	7,121	10,517	11,779	12,957	13,994	15,113
Tourist arrivals (000 <sup>1</sup> )	1,286	1,386	1,484	1,703	1,167	1,724	1,931	2,124	2,294	2,478
Tourism bednights (% change)	6.1	10.6	10.2	12.8	-33.4	47.7	12.0	10.0	8.0	8.0
Tourist arrivals (% change)	4.2	7.8	7.1	14.7	-31.4	47.7	12.0	10.0	8.0	8.0
Dollarization ratio (FC deposits in percent of broad money)	48.5	48.7	48.8	52.9	...	...	...	...	...	...

Sources: Maldivian authorities and IMF staff projections.

1/ CPI-Male definition.

2/ Domestic financing includes SDF contribution and in 2020 financing gap.

**Table 2a. Maldives: Central Government Finances, 2016–25**  
(In millions of Rufiyaa)

	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
	Actual	Actual	Actual	Prel.	Proj.					
Total revenue and grants	18537	20259	22192	23980	16176	22861	26313	29458	31965	34525
Revenue (excluding privatization receipts)	18348	20042	21372	22787	14019	21474	25312	28688	31195	33755
Tax revenue	13219	14743	15803	16529	10432	15905	18673	21044	22986	24937
Import duties	2487	2799	3122	3411	2096	2591	3019	3398	3814	4102
Airport service charge	538	696	645	731	450	797	893	982	1061	1145
Business profit tax (BPT)	2748	2677	2711	2899	1519	2610	3153	3598	4022	4496
Remittance Tax	15	114	102	103	154	211	223	235	246	258
Goods and services tax (GST)	6249	6882	7686	7748	4778	7912	9393	10625	11453	12347
Of which: General GST	2328	2683	2903	2845	1909	3016	3723	4223	4539	4879
Tourism GST	3921	4199	4783	4903	2869	4897	5670	6402	6915	7468
Tourism tax (\$6 green tax)	623	706	811	851	658	972	1089	1198	1294	1397
Other	560	868	728	786	776	810	903	1008	1096	1191
Nontax revenue	5114	5265	5203	6259	3518	5547	6615	7618	8180	8786
Grants	188	217	820	1138	2157	1387	1002	771	771	771
Expenditure and net lending	24821	24820	26378	28208	25922	28803	31485	33712	35958	38305
Current expenditure	15843	14956	18228	20634	19513	22348	24423	26129	27809	29544
<i>Of which:</i> Salaries and allowances	6962	6972	7677	8293	7388	9072	9847	10532	11208	11929
Administrative Services	1653	1597	1793	1843	1701	2269	2709	3027	3254	3498
Social welfare contributions	2160	1701	2417	3361	3069	2779	2950	3124	3373	3643
Repairs and maintenance	312	212	220	391	261	345	422	473	531	542
Subsidies and transfers	1608	1797	2645	2823	2760	3155	3350	3545	3737	3966
Interest	1271	1097	1440	1535	1332	1723	1960	2134	2268	2375
Other	1878	1580	2036	2389	3002	3006	3186	3292	3438	3591
Capital expenditure	8614	9926	8254	7813	6634	6715	7345	7889	8478	9114
Net lending	364	-62	-104	-75	-306	-329	-353	-380	-408	-438
Overall balance	-6284	-4561	-4186	-4229	-9746	-5942	-5172	-4254	-3993	-3779
Overall balance, excluding grants	-6473	-4778	-5006	-5421	-11903	-7329	-6173	-5025	-4763	-4550
Financing	6284	4561	4186	4229	9746	5942	5172	4254	3993	3779
External	1770	3042	3176	1307	2508	2910	2848	2231	1822	1101
Domestic	4515	1519	1011	2922	7238	3032	2324	2023	2171	2679
of which: SDF contribution 1/	0	-337	-1315	-1315	1620	-700	1232	-400	-400	-300
Financing gap	0	0	0		3518	0	0	0	0	0
Memorandum items:										
Current balance	2505	5366	3144	2153	-5494	-874	888	2559	3386	4211
Primary balance	-5014	-3464	-2746	-2693	-8413	-4219	-3212	-2120	-1725	-1405
Current primary balance	3776	6462	4584	3688	-4162	848	2848	4693	5654	6586

Sources: Maldivian authorities; and IMF staff projections.

1/ Transfers to the Sovereign Development Fund are recorded as negative domestic financing, and withdrawals as positive financing.

**Table 2b. Maldives: Central Government Finances, 2016–25**  
(In percent of GDP, unless otherwise specified)

	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
	Actual	Actual	Actual	Prel.	Projection					
Total revenue and grants	27.5	27.8	27.1	27.3	19.4	23.7	25.1	26.0	26.3	26.4
Revenue (excluding privatization receipts)	27.3	27.5	26.1	25.9	16.9	22.2	24.2	25.3	25.6	25.8
Tax revenue	19.6	20.2	19.3	18.8	12.5	16.5	17.8	18.6	18.9	19.1
Import duties	3.7	3.8	3.8	3.9	2.5	2.7	2.9	3.0	3.1	3.1
Airport service charge	0.8	1.0	0.8	0.8	0.5	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9
Business profit tax (BPT)	4.1	3.7	3.3	3.3	1.8	2.7	3.0	3.2	3.3	3.4
Remittance Tax	0.0	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
Goods and services tax (GST)	9.3	9.4	9.4	8.8	5.7	8.2	9.0	9.4	9.4	9.4
<i>Of which:</i> General GST	3.5	3.7	3.5	3.2	2.3	3.1	3.6	3.7	3.7	3.7
Tourism GST	5.8	5.8	5.8	5.6	3.4	5.1	5.4	5.7	5.7	5.7
Tourism tax (\$6 green tax)	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.8	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.1
Other	0.8	1.2	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9
Nontax revenue	7.6	7.2	6.3	7.1	4.2	5.7	6.3	6.7	6.7	6.7
Grants	0.3	0.3	1.0	1.3	2.6	1.4	1.0	0.7	0.6	0.6
Expenditure and net lending	36.9	34.1	32.2	32.1	31.2	29.8	30.1	29.8	29.6	29.3
Current expenditure	23.5	20.5	22.2	23.5	23.5	23.2	23.3	23.1	22.9	22.6
<i>Of which:</i> Salaries and allowances	10.3	9.6	9.4	9.4	8.9	9.4	9.4	9.3	9.2	9.1
Administrative Services	2.5	2.2	2.2	2.1	2.0	2.4	2.6	2.7	2.7	2.7
Social welfare contributions	3.2	2.3	2.9	3.8	3.7	2.9	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.8
Repairs and maintenance	0.5	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4
Subsidies and transfers	2.4	2.5	3.2	3.2	3.3	3.3	3.2	3.1	3.1	3.0
Interest	1.9	1.5	1.8	1.7	1.6	1.8	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.8
Other	2.8	2.2	2.5	2.7	3.6	3.1	3.0	2.9	2.8	2.7
Capital expenditure	12.8	13.6	10.1	8.9	8.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0
Net lending	0.5	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.4	-0.3	-0.3	-0.3	-0.3	-0.3
Overall balance	-9.3	-6.3	-5.1	-4.8	-11.7	-6.2	-4.9	-3.8	-3.3	-2.9
Overall balance, excluding grants	-9.6	-6.6	-6.1	-6.2	-14.3	-7.6	-5.9	-4.4	-3.9	-3.5
Financing	9.3	6.3	5.1	4.8	11.7	6.2	4.9	3.8	3.3	2.9
External	2.6	4.2	3.9	1.5	3.0	3.0	2.7	2.0	1.5	0.8
Domestic	6.7	2.1	1.2	3.3	8.7	3.1	2.2	1.8	1.8	2.0
<i>of which:</i> SDF contribution 1/	0.0	-0.5	-1.6	-1.5	1.9	-0.7	1.2	-0.4	-0.3	-0.2
Financing gap	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Memorandum items:										
Current balance	3.7	7.0	3.8	2.5	-6.6	-0.9	0.8	2.3	2.8	3.2
Primary balance	-7.4	-4.8	-3.3	-3.1	-10.1	-4.4	-3.1	-1.9	-1.4	-1.1
Current primary balance	5.6	8.5	5.6	4.2	-5.0	0.9	2.7	4.1	4.6	5.0
Public and publicly guaranteed debt	57.7	61.3	71.3	76.9	93.9	87.3	85.4	83.0	80.7	78.1
Domestic	39.2	37.2	35.9	38.6	44.3	40.9	42.9	41.2	40.2	39.6
External (excl. IMF and currency swaps by MMA)	18.5	24.1	35.3	38.3	49.6	46.4	42.6	41.8	40.5	38.5
GDP (in millions of rufiyaa)	67,300	72,873	81,994	87,837	83,179	96,513	104,753	113,181	121,659	130,787

Sources: Maldivian authorities; and IMF staff projections.

1/ Transfers to the Sovereign Development Fund are recorded as negative domestic financing, and withdrawals as positive financing.



**Table 3. Maldives: Monetary Accounts, 2016–25**  
(In millions of U.S. dollars, unless otherwise indicated)

	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
				Prel.	Proj.					
(In millions of rufiyaa, e.o.p.)										
Net foreign assets	7,790	10,292	10,511	16,591	14,034	16,408	17,076	21,048	22,762	23,961
Maldives Monetary Authority, net	5,248	8,603	9,780	11,257	8,624	10,883	11,440	15,299	16,897	17,978
Assets	7,182	9,041	11,686	11,604	8,933	11,158	11,685	15,516	17,091	18,151
Liabilities	-1,934	-438	-1,906	-347	-309	-275	-245	-218	-194	-172
Commercial banks, net	2,542	1,689	731	5,335	5,410	5,524	5,636	5,749	5,865	5,983
Net domestic assets	22,646	21,715	22,577	19,068	19,533	22,540	25,197	24,626	26,332	28,817
Domestic credit	36,002	36,627	38,520	39,991	38,767	42,750	45,329	47,989	50,694	53,613
Public sector	16,981	14,760	14,880	14,567	14,795	15,043	15,314	15,613	15,943	16,305
Central government (net)	13,430	11,722	12,389	12,585	12,786	12,991	13,221	13,456	13,698	13,947
Public enterprises	3,551	3,037	2,492	1,981	2,009	2,052	2,093	2,157	2,244	2,358
Private sector	18,591	21,295	22,969	24,754	23,301	27,037	29,345	31,706	34,080	36,638
Other items (net)	-13,356	-14,911	-15,943	-20,923	-19,235	-20,210	-20,132	-23,364	-24,361	-24,796
Broad money	30,436	32,007	33,088	35,659	33,567	38,948	42,273	45,674	49,095	52,779
Narrow money	13,467	14,471	14,579	15,712	14,790	17,161	18,626	20,125	21,632	23,255
Currency	2,695	2,914	3,057	3,057	3,057	3,057	3,057	3,057	3,057	3,057
Demand deposits	10,772	11,558	11,522	12,655	11,733	14,104	15,569	17,068	18,575	20,198
Quasi-money	16,968	17,536	18,509	19,947	18,777	21,786	23,646	25,549	27,463	29,523
(Annual percentage change, unless otherwise indicated)										
Broad money	-0.2	5.2	3.4	7.8	-5.9	16.0	8.5	8.0	7.5	7.5
Narrow money	1.0	7.5	0.7	7.8	-5.9	16.0	8.5	8.0	7.5	7.5
Domestic credit, net	19.7	1.7	5.2	3.8	-3.1	10.3	6.0	5.9	5.6	5.8
Central government	17.1	-12.7	5.7	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.8	3.6	1.8	1.8
Public enterprises	137.8	-14.5	-18.0	-20.5	1.4	2.1	2.0	3.0	4.1	5.1
Private sector	10.5	14.5	7.9	7.8	-5.9	16.0	8.5	8.0	7.5	7.5
(In percent of GDP)										
Broad money	45.2	43.9	40.4	40.4	40.4	40.4	40.4	40.4	40.4	40.4
Narrow money	20.0	19.9	17.8	17.8	17.8	17.8	17.8	17.8	19.1	20.5
Domestic credit, net	53.5	50.3	47.0	45.3	46.6	44.3	43.3	42.4	44.8	47.4
Central government	20.0	16.1	15.1	14.2	15.4	13.5	12.6	11.9	12.1	12.3
Public enterprises	5.3	4.2	3.0	2.2	2.4	2.1	2.0	1.9	2.0	2.1
Private sector	27.6	29.2	28.0	28.0	28.0	28.0	28.0	28.0	30.1	32.4
(In millions of U.S. dollars)										
Gross foreign assets of MMA	468	588	712	753	580	724	758	1,007	1,110	1,178
Usable reserves	199	207	282	316	151	269	296	499	583	639
Commercial banks NFA	165	110	47	346	351	358	366	373	381	388
Commercial banks forex open position, net	571	536	575	583	591	603	616	628	641	654
Memorandum items:										
Velocity	2.2	2.3	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5
Money multiplier	3.4	3.0	2.9	2.9	2.9	2.9	2.9	2.9	2.9	2.9
Reserve money (in millions of rufiyaa, e.o.p.)	8,978	10,683	11,530	12,426	11,697	13,572	14,731	15,916	17,108	18,392

Sources: Maldivian authorities; and IMF staff projections.

**Table 4. Maldives: Balance of Payments, 2016–25**  
(In millions of U.S. dollars, unless otherwise indicated)

	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
			Prel.	Prel.	Proj.					
Current account	-1,032	-1,026	-1,502	-1,498	-1,249	-742	-627	-666	-734	-767
Balance of goods and nonfactor services	-51	-182	-518	-362	-528	278	476	539	549	594
Trade balance	-1,839	-1,908	-2,425	-2,392	-1,429	-1,555	-1,754	-1,980	-2,215	-2,324
Exports (f.o.b.)	256	318	339	361	340	397	440	466	491	518
Domestic exports	140	231	229	217	192	239	272	305	346	396
Re-exports	117	87	110	144	148	158	168	179	191	203
Imports (f.o.b.)	-2,095	-2,227	-2,764	-2,753	-1,768	-1,952	-2,194	-2,447	-2,707	-2,842
Tourism-related	-346	-362	-382	-450	-297	-439	-491	-540	-584	-630
Other	-1,749	-1,864	-2,382	-2,303	-1,471	-1,513	-1,703	-1,906	-2,123	-2,212
Of which: Construction	-282	-336	-451	-406	-231	-232	-266	-299	-337	-366
Nonfactor services, net	1,788	1,726	1,907	2,030	900	1,833	2,230	2,519	2,764	2,918
Of which: Travel receipts	2,506	2,742	2,923	3,375	2,249	3,321	3,720	4,092	4,419	4,772
Income, net	-353	-375	-492	-558	-272	-415	-427	-469	-504	-537
Current transfers, net	-629	-469	-493	-578	-448	-605	-676	-736	-779	-824
Receipts	45	62	72	92	140	90	65	50	50	50
Payments	-674	-531	-564	-671	-588	-695	-741	-786	-829	-874
Capital and financial account	673	913	1,835	1,217	862	886	661	915	837	839
Financial account	673	913	1,835	1,217	862	886	661	915	837	839
Of which: 1/										
Foreign direct investment, net	457	458	576	891	324	532	591	639	687	738
Portfolio investment, net	-132	479	103	-2	50	30	-219	40	0	0
Other investment, net	349	-25	1,156	328	488	324	289	236	150	101
Monetary authorities 2/	99	-100	100	-100	0	0	0	0	0	0
General government	115	332	742	317	372	189	185	145	118	73
Of which: Disbursements of loans	164	397	786	457	446	303	332	304	316	339
Amortization	-49	-65	-44	-140	-73	-114	-148	-159	-198	-267
Banks	105	-488	65	-83	-12	7	7	7	8	8
Other sectors 3/	-110	133	244	205	128	128	97	84	24	20
Errors and omissions	263	234	-207	323	0	0	0	0	0	0
Overall balance	-96	120	125	42	-387	144	34	249	102	72
Gross international reserves (increase: -)	96	-120	-125	-41	173	-144	-34	-249	-102	-69
Use of Fund credit, net	-1	-1	-1	-1	28.7	0	0	0	0	-3
Purchases	0	0	0	0	28.9	0	0	0	0	0
Repurchases	-1	-1	-1	-1	0	0	0	0	0	-3
Exceptional financing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Financing gap 4/	0	0	0	0	213.9	0	0	0	0	0
Of which: IMF	0	0	0	0	28.9	0	0	0	0	0
World Bank	0	0	0	0	17.3	0	0	0	0	0
ADB	0	0	0	0	27.6	0	0	0	0	0
OFID	0	0	0	0	20.0	0	0	0	0	0
IFC	0	0	0	0	50.0	0	0	0	0	0
Other (unidentified)	0	0	0	0	70.1	0	0	0	0	0
Memorandum items:										
Gross international reserves (stock; e.o.p.)	468	588	712	753	580	724	759	1,007	1,110	1,178
In months of GNFS imports	1.6	1.7	2.1	2.9	2.0	2.3	2.2	2.7	2.8	2.8
In percent of short-term debt at remaining maturity	221	209	449	278	272	266	133	290	282	251
Usable reserves (stock; e.o.p.)	199	207	282	316	151	269	297	500	583	639
In percent of short-term debt at remaining maturity	94	73	178	117	71	99	52	144	148	136
Current account (in percent of GDP)	-23.6	-21.7	-28.2	-26.1	-23.1	-11.8	-9.2	-9.1	-9.3	-9.0
GNFS balance (in percent of GDP)	-1.2	-3.9	-9.7	-6.3	-9.8	4.4	7.0	7.3	7.0	7.0
Exports (volume, percent change)	-8.3	21.3	5.0	10.8	4.0	17.3	11.6	6.5	4.6	4.7
Imports (volume, percent change)	16.8	1.1	18.2	-0.2	-30.0	10.3	11.1	10.3	8.9	3.6
Tourism: bednights (percent change)	6.1	10.6	10.2	12.8	-33.4	47.7	12.0	10.0	8.0	8.0
Tourism: travel receipts (percent change)	-2.5	9.4	6.6	15.5	-33.4	47.7	12.0	10.0	8.0	8.0
External debt (in percent of GDP) 5/	27.5	35.6	50.4	54.2	69.0	65.3	61.5	60.6	58.3	55.5
of which: External PPG	18.5	24.1	35.3	38.3	49.6	46.4	42.6	41.8	40.5	38.5
Short-term	2.7	3.5	0.8	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5
Debt service (in percent of domestic GNFS exports)	4.8	5.4	6.9	10.4	11.4	10.4	17.0	10.6	10.9	11.6
Exchange rate (rufiyaa per U.S. dollar; average)	15.4	15.4	15.4	15.4	...	...	...	...	...	...
GDP (in millions of U.S. dollars)	4,367	4,729	5,321	5,734	5,398	6,263	6,798	7,345	7,895	8,487

Sources: Maldivian authorities; and IMF staff projections.

1/ There are no capital transfers.

2/ MMA liabilities include swaps with the RBI.

3/ These flows include external borrowing of the private sector.

4/ Identified amounts are not necessarily fully approved.

5/ Public and private external debt includes IMF, but excludes domestic foreign-currency denominated debt.

**Table 5. Maldives: Selected Financial Soundness Indicators, 2013–2019**  
(In percent, unless otherwise specified)

	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
	(In percent)						
<b>Core FSIs</b>							
Regulatory capital to risk weighted assets	41.1	44.5	37.2	44.5	44.6	44.2	46.8
Regulatory Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets	31.3	34.5	30.0	34.4	36.3	35.9	38.8
Non-performing loans net of provisions to capital	8.0	11.1	3.0	2.4	3.3	2.4	3.4
Non-performing loans to total gross loans	17.6	17.5	14.1	10.6	10.5	8.9	9.4
Return on assets	6.5	4.2	3.4	4.7	3.7	3.7	4.9
Return on equity	30.0	19.7	16.5	19.6	15.3	15.5	19.4
Interest margin to gross income	55.9	65.5	60.7	64.9	64.3	63.3	63
Non-interest expenses to gross income	25.9	26.4	30.1	27.7	30.7	30.7	30.7
Liquid assets to total assets	19.3	43.4	43.1	48.4	44.3	43.1	43.9
Liquid assets to short-term liabilities	25.4	57.6	56.3	66.8	62.3	60.7	61.4
Net open position in FX to capital	34.3	30.9	21.0	13.4	12.0	12.4	...
<b>Sectoral distribution of loans</b>							
Domestic residents	100.0	97.7	96.6	97.0	98.6	99.6	...
Deposit takers	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	...
Central bank	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	...
Other financial corporations	0.6	1.7	1.6	2.1	2.3	2.6	...
General government	3.3	0.8	0.3	0.2	1.8	0.1	...
Nonfinancial corporations	74.9	70.5	67.7	64.1	59.9	58.7	...
Households	21.1	24.7	27.0	30.7	34.6	38.2	...
Nonresidents	0.0	2.3	3.4	3.0	1.4	0.4	...
<b>Additional FSIs</b>							
Capital to assets (leverage ratio)	16.1	21.3	20.5	23.7	24.1	23.9	...
Large exposures to capital	133.3	108.3	126.2	134.3	73.6	74.5	...
Gross assets position in derivatives to capital	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	...
Gross liabilities position in derivatives to capital	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	...
Trading income to total income	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	...
Personnel expenses to total income	0.0	38.3	34.7	36.5	35.7	36.3	...
Customer deposits to total non-interbank loans	0.0	158.8	157.5	143.9	130.4	129.4	...
FX loans to total loans	0.0	57.5	61.3	57.8	52.3	50.2	...
FX liabilities to total liabilities	0.0	58.5	55.7	53.0	53.5	54.2	...

Sources: IMF Financial Soundness Indicators, MMA Monthly Statistics for 2019.

**Table 6. Maldives: External Financing Requirements and Sources, 2020–2025**  
(In millions of U.S dollars, unless otherwise indicated)

	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
<b>Financing Requirements</b>	<b>1462.3</b>	<b>945.9</b>	<b>1089.0</b>	<b>975.3</b>	<b>982.0</b>	<b>1086.8</b>
Current account deficit excluding grants	1388.8	831.7	691.9	716.1	784.4	817.2
Public sector loan amortization	73.4	114.1	397.1	259.3	197.6	266.6
of which: Eurobond amortization	0.0	0.0	249.5	99.8	0.0	0.0
Interest and amortization payments on existing Fund loans	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.0
<b>Financing Sources</b>	<b>1248.4</b>	<b>945.9</b>	<b>1089.0</b>	<b>975.3</b>	<b>982.0</b>	<b>1086.8</b>
Capital account balance	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Net foreign direct investment	323.9	532.4	591.4	639.0	686.8	738.4
Portfolio inflows	50.0	30.0	30.5	139.8	0.0	0.0
Public sector grants	140.0	90.0	65.0	50.0	50.0	50.0
Public sector loan disbursements	445.6	303.0	332.5	304.3	315.8	339.5
Other capital flows (net)	115.7	135.0	103.9	91.0	31.6	27.7
Change in reserves (+ decrease)	173.3	-144.5	-34.3	-248.8	-102.3	-68.9
<b>Financing Gap 1/</b>	<b>213.9</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>
Financing from IMF (RCF disbursement)	28.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
World Bank	17.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
ADB	27.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
OFID	20.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
IFC	50.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Other (unidentified)	70.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

1/ Identified amounts are not necessarily fully approved.  
Sources: Maldivian authorities; and IMF staff projections.

Table 7. Maldives: Indicators of Capacity to Repay the Fund, 2020–2030

	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030
<b>Fund obligations based on existing credit</b>											
(in millions of SDRs)											
Principal	0.10	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Charges and interest	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
<b>Fund obligations based on existing and prospective credit</b>											
(in millions of SDRs)											
Principal	0.10	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	2.12	4.24	4.24	4.24	4.24	2.12
Charges and interest	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
<b>Total Fund obligations based on existing credit</b>											
In millions of SDRs	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
In percent of IMF Quota	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
<b>Total Fund obligations based on existing and prospective credit</b>											
In millions of SDRs	21.20	21.20	21.20	21.20	21.20	19.08	14.84	10.60	6.36	2.12	0.00
In millions of USD	28.89	29.42	29.52	29.60	29.68	26.81	20.85	14.89	8.94	2.98	0.00
In percent of government revenue	3.18	2.11	1.80	1.59	1.47	1.22	0.89	0.59	0.33	0.10	0.00
In percent of exports of goods and services	1.12	0.78	0.70	0.64	0.60	0.50	0.36	0.24	0.13	0.04	0.00
In percent of GDP	0.54	0.47	0.43	0.40	0.38	0.32	0.23	0.15	0.08	0.03	0.00
In percent of IMF Quota	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	90.00	70.00	50.00	30.00	10.00	0.00
<b>Memorandum items</b>											
Nominal GDP (millions of USD)	5,398	6,263	6,798	7,345	7,895	8,487	9,129	9,806	10,518	11,260	12,036
Exports of goods and services (millions of USD)	2,588	3,756	4,196	4,602	4,959	5,344	5,752	6,227	6,720	7,222	7,728
Government revenue (millions of USD)	910	1,394	1,643	1,862	2,024	2,190	2,356	2,544	2,738	2,942	3,153
Gross international reserves (millions of USD)	580	724	758	1,007	1,109	1,178	1,131	1,239	1,459	1,571	1,646
IMF Quota (millions of SDR)	21.2	21.2	21.2	21.2	21.2	21.2	21.2	21.2	21.2	21.2	21.2

Source: IMF staff estimates and projections.

## Appendix I. Letter of Intent

Malé, Maldives  
April 16, 2020

Ms. Kristalina Georgieva  
Managing Director  
International Monetary Fund  
Washington, D.C. 20431

Dear Ms. Georgieva,

The Maldives is one of the most exposed countries to the COVID-19 pandemic due to its very high dependence on tourism, with receipts from tourism at about two thirds of GDP. The COVID-19 pandemic outbreak is having an enormous impact on tourism activity, with tourist arrivals and revenues declining sharply, triggering the emergence of urgent balance of payments needs in the Maldives.

The Maldivian and other governments' travel restrictions to contain the pandemic, its impact on the global economy, as well as the heightened global risk aversion to flying is expected to severely cut tourism receipts for the 2020 season. While the adverse impact of the COVID-19 induced shock on the balance of payments will be partly offset by lower global fuel prices and the decline in some imports resulting from the fall in tourism and construction, it will almost certainly be significant. At this point, the BOP financing gap is estimated to amount to US\$214 million for 2020, or about 4 percent of GDP.

In addition to its impact on the balance of payments, the COVID-19 pandemic is expected to have significant adverse impacts on fiscal revenues and economic growth. The decline in tourism is expected to sharply reduce the tourism-related tax revenues and increase the budget deficit. The contraction in tourist arrivals and associated disruptions in domestic activity, as well as disruptions related to government containment measures are projected to result in negative GDP growth of between -7.8 percent to -11.5 percent, compared with 7.5 percent growth before the COVID-19 pandemic. The more protracted the duration of the effects of the global travel restrictions, the more severe will be its impact on the economy.

Against this background, the Government of the Maldives requests emergency financing from the IMF in the equivalent of SDR 21.2 million (about US\$28.9 million), equivalent to a disbursement of 100 percent of quota under the Rapid Credit Facility (RCF). The IMF assistance will help meet the urgent foreign exchange needs stemming from the disruptions to tourism as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, and moderate the immediate pressure on balance of payments. The Fund assistance is also expected to catalyze additional financial assistance in the form of grants and concessional loans from the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank as well as bilateral partners.

We recognize that risks from high public sector debt levels and the large current account deficit, exacerbated by the current shock, require active measures to respond to the outbreak and to achieve debt sustainability. Given the correspondingly limited fiscal space, we will focus our response on providing the necessary funding to contain the spread of the virus and minimize the impact on the economy and the population. We are continuously evaluating our fiscal priorities across current and capital spending, and redirecting the funds as needed to combat the coronavirus and provide temporary support to the most vulnerable households and businesses. At the same time, we will direct our monetary and financial policies to support liquidity and economic activity, while maintaining financial stability and avoiding undermining banking system soundness. These measures will help us advance our poverty reduction and growth objectives.

To contain the spread of the virus, we have recently declared a state of public health emergency. Flights from China were suspended from February 4<sup>th</sup>, followed by restrictions on travelers who have been in Spain, Italy, South Korea, Iran, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and regions in France and Germany. As of March 27, on-arrival visas have been suspended. We are working in close consultation with the WHO to monitor the situation, preparing isolation centers, testing of suspected cases, as well as treating those who are affected.

To minimize the impact on the people of the Maldives due to the COVID-19 virus, we have taken a set of measures on March 20, the Economic Recovery Plan, as well as a more measures in recent days. In this context, the Government of Maldives will:

- Increase the amount of funds allocated to the health sector for the COVID-19 response, by MVR 200 million (0.25 percent of GDP).
- Reduce government non-priority recurrent expenditure by MVR 1 billion (1.2 percent of GDP).
- Reduce capital expenditure initially by MVR 3.1 billion (3.7 percent of GDP), while continuing to rebalance between capital and current expenditure as necessary.
- Ensure, through banks, availability of working capital to businesses.
- Subsidize 40 percent of electricity bills and 30 percent of water bills for the months of April and May, in order to offset the economic shock on the general population, especially the poor.
- Provide special 3-month allowance to those who lose their jobs due to COVID-19.
- Enable that principal and interest amount of loan repayments to the banks will be deferred by 6 months to businesses and persons who have been negatively impacted as a direct result of COVID-19.

For its part, the Maldives Monetary Authority (MMA) stands ready to implement the various policy instruments and measures at its disposal to mitigate the impact of the COVID-19 virus on the

financial system and exchange rate stability. The MMA has been in close contact with the banks to discuss the impact on the domestic financial system and has identified the measures that can be taken to address these in a timely manner. The MMA is also exploring the measures that can be taken through the financial institutions to provide support to those affected by the crisis and to reduce economic disruptions and the loss of jobs and output. The MMA also stands ready to provide liquidity support to banks as needed. Specifically, the MMA has decided to implement the following measures:

- Introduce the necessary regulatory measures to enable a moratorium of 6 months on loan repayments for those impacted by the current situation (customers will need to submit their requests to the banks in order to avail themselves of this moratorium).
- Gradually reduce the Minimum Reserve Requirement (MRR) from 10 percent to up to 5 percent to provide liquidity support to banks, as when needed.
- Make available a short-term credit facility to financial institutions as and when required.
- Increase as needed the MMA's foreign exchange intervention and use other available facilities to maintain the exchange rate peg.
- Seek to obtain a foreign currency swap facility amounting to US\$150 million under the currency swap agreement signed between the MMA and the Reserve Bank of India.

We are confident that these policies will help minimize the disruptions to economic activity and incomes and job losses of the population. We expect the temporary external financing gap to be covered by the RCF and the assistance from other international financial institutions and governments. The currently ongoing expansion of tourism capacity and upgrade of the infrastructure should lay the ground for a quick resumption of strong tourism growth as witnessed before the crisis, which should result in a narrowing of external imbalances and ensuring long-term external debt sustainability.

The Government remains committed to fiscal consolidation to restore fiscal and debt sustainability. On the revenue side, we will monitor the implementation of our new income tax, increase as planned, after the crisis, tourism-related fees and service charges, and consider additional revenue measures as needed to support deficit reduction and to ensure fiscal and external sustainability. Following the completion of the ongoing public sector investment projects as well as the cancellation of some new projects costing 3 percent of GDP in 2020–21, given the changes in domestic and global economic conditions, we expect public investment to further decline from 8.9 percent of GDP in 2019 to 7.2 percent of GDP on average in 2020–25, contributing to an improvement in the primary fiscal balance such that fiscal deficits narrow to levels consistent with public debt sustainability. We will continue to seek concessional finance for previously planned and new infrastructure projects to support our development objectives, as well as increase the resource envelop by further cutting inefficient spending and boosting new revenues. We have already implemented revenue measures that should raise 1 percent of GDP for the exchequer in



2021. Overall, we believe this combination of measures will allow a substantial reduction of the primary fiscal deficit after grants, to 1 percent of GDP by 2025.

We also understand that with already high public debt and additional short-term fiscal pressures arising from the crisis, it is important to ensure a high level of transparency of the government accounts, including the size of contingent liabilities linked to government guarantees and other forms of government support. To this end, we remain committed to working closely with the Fund to ensure that fiscal reporting and transparency meet the latest international standards and best practices, improving our fiscal responsibility framework, as well as strengthening the operation and risk supervision of state-owned enterprises.

The Maldives commits to undergo a safeguard assessment, provide Fund staff with access to its central bank's most recently completed external audit reports, and authorize its external auditors to hold discussions with Fund staff. The Ministry of Finance and the MMA are finalizing a Memorandum of Understanding on their respective roles and responsibilities for servicing financial obligations to the Fund. We are committed to ensuring maximum effectiveness of the COVID-19 measures by targeted assistance programs and strong governance and transparency in their implementation.

The MMA affirms that it will support the recovery efforts, in its capacity as the counterparty for Fund lending to the Maldives. The resources provided under the RCF will be lent to the Treasury. The MMA will avoid monetary financing of government credit operations. The Government does not intend to introduce measures or policies that would exacerbate balance of payments difficulties, including not to introduce or intensify exchange and trade restrictions that would compound these difficulties.

We authorize the Fund to publish this Letter of Intent and the staff report for the request for disbursement under the RCF.

Sincerely yours,

\_\_\_\_\_  
/s/

Mr. Ibrahim Ameer  
Minister of Finance of Republic of Maldives

\_\_\_\_\_  
/s/

Mr. Ali Hashim  
Governor of Maldives Monetary Authority



# MALDIVES

## STAFF REPORT FOR RAPID CREDIT FACILITY REQUEST— DEBT SUSTAINABILITY ANALYSIS

April 16, 2020

Approved By  
**Ranil Salgado** and  
**Marcello Estevão (IDA)**



Prepared by the staffs of the International Monetary Fund and the International Development Association.

<b>Maldives</b>	
<b>Joint Bank-Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis</b>	
<b>Risk of external debt distress:</b>	High
<b>Overall risk of debt distress:</b>	High
<b>Granularity in the risk rating:</b>	Sustainable
<b>Application of judgement:</b>	No

*The Maldives continues to be at high risk of debt distress. As in the 2019 Article IV DSA published on June 2019, all indicators except the debt-to-exports ratio breach their respective thresholds under the baseline scenario but they display medium-term downward trends. In response to the shock to the economy caused by the COVID-19 outbreak, the authorities have taken steps to reduce non-priority recurrent and capital spending as well as rebalance the distribution of available resources. Given the changes in domestic and global conditions, the authorities have committed to reprioritize and cut capital expenditures which are projected to decline in the next few years, helping to put debt on a decreasing path. Rollover risks from the repayment of two outstanding international sovereign bonds are mitigated both by the Sovereign Development Fund (SDF) and by the preemptive voluntary extension of a privately placed US\$100 million bond due in 2023 (now due in 2026). Thus, staff judge public debt in Maldives to be sustainable. This assessment of debt sustainability is predicated on the implementation of the authorities' stated policies which are substantial and require a high level of commitment. The macroeconomic framework reflects currently available information. Updates of the economic impact and policy response to the COVID-19 crisis are rapidly evolving and risks are heavily tilted to the downside.*

## BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENTS ON DEBT


**1. Total public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) debt in Maldives stood at around US\$4.4 billion in 2019, approximately 77 percent of GDP.** About 50 percent of public debt is domestic and denominated in local currency. Domestic debt is held largely by other financial corporations, including the national pension (42 percent), commercial banks (36 percent), and the central bank (21 percent).<sup>1</sup> The increase in public sector debt by about US\$0.6 billion with respect to 2018 levels is broadly in line with the projected increase during the previous 2019 Article IV consultation. This increase in external PPG debt was mostly associated with finalizing existing public housing projects carried out by the Housing Development Corporation (HDC), a state-owned enterprise (SOE). The remainder of the increase in external debt was associated with the airport expansion project and infrastructure projects related to electricity and sanitation. These projects are needed to fill the infrastructure needs of the Maldives as the infrastructure gap remains large. For example, the expansion of the airport will increase the capacity of the Maldives to receive new tourists and meet the demand of airlines wishing to fly to Male but unable to receive a landing slot because of the airport's limited capacity. This excess demand was pre-pandemic, but it is expected to resume after conditions normalize. The airport expansion should contribute positively to GDP growth over the medium and long term.



**2. External PPG debt recorded around US\$2.2 billion in 2019, approximately 38 percent of GDP.** Around 53 percent of external PPG debt consists of debt held by China, followed by commercial debt that includes the only two international sovereign bonds Maldives has issued worth US\$350 million in total. While bilateral debt is contracted largely on semi-concessional terms, multilateral debt is more concessional, with grants elements generally around 20 percent. The increase in external PPG debt was about US\$0.3 billion from the 2018 levels, also in line with the 2019 Article IV projections. Public housing projects have been the largest factor in the increase in guaranteed external debt in recent years. The rest was mostly linked to the expansion of the airport and basic infrastructure in electricity and sanitation.


<sup>1</sup> This debt is a conversion of the outstanding debt held by the MMA in the Ways and Means account into a long-term treasury bond. The bond was issued in December 2014.

**Outstanding External PPG Debt by Creditor, 2019**  
(in percent of total)



Sources: Maldives Ministry of Finance

**External Debt**  
(in percent of GDP)



Sources: Maldives Ministry of Finance and IMF staff projections

Subsectors of the public sector	Sub-sectors covered
Central government	X
State and local government	
Other elements in the general government	
o/w: Social security fund	
o/w: Extra budgetary funds (EBFs)	
Guarantees (to other entities in the public and private sector, including to SOEs)	X
Central bank (borrowed on behalf of the government)	X
Non-guaranteed SOE debt	

The country's coverage of public debt	The central government, central bank, government-guaranteed debt		
	Default	Used for the analysis	Reasons for deviations from the default settings
Other elements of the general government not captured in 1.	0 percent of GDP	0.0	
SoE's debt (guaranteed and not guaranteed by the government) 1/	2 percent of GDP	2.0	
PPP	35 percent of PPP stock	0.0	
Financial market (the default value of 5 percent of GDP is the minimum value)	5 percent of GDP	5.0	
<b>Total (2+3+4+5) (in percent of GDP)</b>		<b>7.0</b>	

1/ The default shock of 2% of GDP will be triggered for countries whose government-guaranteed debt is not fully captured under the country's public debt definition (1.). If it is already included in the government debt (1.) and risks associated with SoE's debt not guaranteed by the government is assessed to be negligible, a country team may reduce this to 0%.

**3. This debt sustainability analysis includes PPG external and domestic debt.** Public debt includes debt of the central government, including guarantees to SOEs, and debt of the central bank. Public debt does not include the non-guaranteed debt of SOEs as some can borrow without the guarantee of the government. External debt is defined by the currency criteria though differences between currency and residency are negligible. As part of the recent government efforts to increase transparency, the information about guarantees to SOEs is now publicly disclosed on the webpage of the Ministry of Finance.

## BACKGROUND ON MACRO FORECASTS

**4. The COVID-19 pandemic shock is severely affecting the outlook for 2020 compared to the last Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA), but the medium term remains similar given the prospects of the tourism sector.**

- **Growth and inflation.** The COVID-19 shock will reverse what was expected to be a promising year for tourism with the opening of the new airport runway and several resorts. Pre-pandemic

GDP growth in 2020 was projected at 7 percent, with the pandemic causing a -15.1 percentage point shock to 2020 growth. The tourism sector directly accounts for -11.7 percentage points of that revision. The spillovers into domestic economy are projected to contribute -3.4 percentage points because of lower tourist arrivals, increased domestic precautions to contain the outbreak, and the delay of construction projects. Growth is expected to resume in 2021 driven by a rebound in tourist arrivals to 2019 levels (a potentially conservative estimate, given that capacity has increased as reflected in the 14 percent increase in arrivals in January 2020 compared to the same month in 2019). Medium-term growth projections are broadly along the lines of the last DSA. The inflation outlook in the medium term is slightly more favorable driven by the decline in oil and food prices.

- Primary fiscal deficit.** Before the pandemic shock, the new government announced plans to increase capital expenditures with the introduction of public sector investment projects (PSIP), including moving the port and building a bridge to it. Given the extraordinary nature of the COVID-19 shock, the authorities have announced a package of fiscal measures. This includes a revision in their capital expenditure plans. Capital expenditure is expected to be reduced from an average of about 12.2 percent of GDP during 2016-19 to 7.2 percent in 2020-25. Additional measures include an 18 percent cut in non-critical recurrent expenditures from the budget. Including the increase in COVID-19 related spending, current spending is still being reduced by over 5 percent. The overall fiscal deficit widens significantly from 2019, to 11.7 percent of GDP as a result of a sharp decline in revenue, despite reductions in some non-priority current expenditure as well as large cuts in capital expenditure compared with the original budget.
- Domestic financing.** As of June 2019, more than 55 percent of domestic financing in the Maldives was short term (maturity of less than one year). Interest rates on short-term debt have ranged between 3.7 and 4.5 percent since December 2016.<sup>2</sup> Over the medium term, we assume a similar share of short-term debt in domestic financing and an interest rate of 4.5 percent for short term-debt. The share of longer-term debt gradually increases over the medium term. Domestic banks and the pension fund are projected to remain the main holders of government debt.
- Non-interest current account deficit (CAD).** The decline in tourist arrivals translates to a loss of around US\$1.46 billion in tourism receipts in 2020, this along with the decline in growth explains the large non-interest CAD in 2020 relative to the previous DSA. Lower imports related to the tourism industry (both goods and services) and construction as well as lower oil prices and lower remittance outflow counterbalance the impact of lower tourism receipts. Over the medium term, the non-interest CAD is elevated relative to the previous DSA because, while import for public-related capital projects have decreased, imports related to private projects remain, interest payments are lower, and the level of GDP does not recover to pre-pandemic levels.

<sup>2</sup> Public Debt Bulletin, June 2019, Maldives Ministry of Finance. Previous DSAs were not calibrated with actual data, and default interest rates of around 6 percent were assumed.

Change in Macroeconomic Assumptions								
	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	26-38
Real GDP growth (in percent change)								
Current	5.7	-8.1	13.2	6.4	5.9	5.4	5.4	4.7
Previous	6.5	6.0	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5
Inflation								
Current	1.3	1.5	1.5	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0
Previous	2.0	2.4	2.5	2.5	2.3	2.0	2.0	2.0
Primary fiscal deficit (in percent of GDP)								
Current	3.9	10.1	4.4	3.1	1.9	1.4	1.1	0.4
Previous	3.0	3.2	2.6	2.2	1.8	1.4	1.4	-0.2
Non-interest current account deficit (in percent of GDP)								
Current	24.6	22.2	10.5	7.9	7.8	8.1	7.8	5.0
Previous	18.0	13.0	11.2	9.3	8.0	5.1	7.5	3.5
Grants (in percent of GDP)								
Current	1.6	2.6	1.4	1.0	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.4
Previous	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.3
Capital Expenditures (in percent of GDP)								
Current	9.5	8.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0
Previous	9.5	9.6	9.0	8.6	8.3	8.1	8.1	7.8
Public Debt (in percent of GDP)								
Current	76.9	93.7	87.0	85.2	82.8	80.5	78.0	63.9
Previous	76.8	80.7	83.1	81.5	81.4	83.8	83.2	68.8

**5. Realism tools suggest that the macroeconomic projections are reasonable and consistent with historical patterns and those observed in other low-income countries (LICs).** The projected three-year change in the primary balance is around the 60<sup>th</sup> percentile of adjustments undertaken by LICs under an IMF program. Baseline growth is far below what is suggested by a multiplier approach owing to the nature of the COVID-19 shock which has severely impacted the tourism sector in 2020. Public investment is lower than what was projected in the last DSA because of the authorities' revised capital expenditure plans in response to the shock to tourism. The contribution of capital investment to growth is in line with the decline in capital spending and is proportional to historical contributions.

**6. External debt dynamics in the Maldives have been driven predominantly by the current account deficit.** Major infrastructure projects relating to housing, a hospital, a bridge, and the expansion of the new airport have taken place over the last 5 years and were financed predominantly with external debt. A large fraction of the materials and services for these projects were imported and led to an expansion of the current account deficit. Public debt dynamics have been driven by the primary deficit. The large residual is because of the activity of SOEs which is not part of the budget. As in the past DSA, debt dynamics continue to be generally favorable owing to strong growth prospects and loan terms which are usually semi-concessional.

## EXTERNAL AND PUBLIC DEBT SUSTAINABILITY

**7. The debt carrying capacity of the Maldives remains weak.** The Maldives' Composite Indicator (CI) score is calculated at 2.47, and the country has 'weak debt carrying capacity'. CI is based on a weighted average of several factors such as the country's real GDP growth, remittances, international reserves, and world growth and the CPIA score, and the calculation of the CI is based on 10-year averages of the variables, across 5 years of historical data and 5 years of projection, and the corresponding CPIA.

Components	Coefficients (A)	10-year average values (B)	CI Score components (A*B) = (C)	Contribution of components
CPIA	0.385	3.170	1.22	49%
Real growth rate (in percent)	2.719	6.096	0.17	7%
Import coverage of reserves (in percent)	4.052	17.987	0.73	29%
Import coverage of reserves <sup>2</sup> (in percent)	-3.990	3.235	-0.13	-5%
Remittances (in percent)	2.022	0.670	0.01	1%
World economic growth (in percent)	13.520	3.499	0.47	19%
<b>CI Score</b>			<b>2.47</b>	<b>100%</b>
<b>CI rating</b>			<b>Weak</b>	
Final	Classification based on current vintage	Classification based on the previous vintage	Classification based on the two previous vintages	
Weak	Weak 2.47	Weak 2.52	Weak 2.48	

**8. External debt sustainability.** As in the previous DSA, the PV of external PPG debt-to-GDP ratio breaches its threshold under the baseline scenario. The PV of external PPG debt-to-GDP stood at an estimated 33 percent in 2019. It is projected to increase to around 43 percent of GDP in 2020 owing both to the sharp contraction in GDP growth and to disbursements related to existing projects. Over the medium-term, the PV of external PPG debt-to-GDP ratio is projected to gradually decline to 34 percent in 2025 and to 24 percent in 2030. The PV of debt-to-exports ratio is below its threshold under the baseline and is projected to continue to decline. Debt service-to-exports breaches its threshold in 2022 when the maiden US\$250 million sovereign bond is due. The repayment schedule for the second international bond (US\$100 million privately placed with Abu Dhabi) was extended to 2026 from 2023. The authorities have set-up a sovereign development fund (SDF) to accumulate funds for payment and mitigate rollover risks. The SDF is financed mainly by an airport development fees and other services offered at the Velanaa international airport. As of end-2019, the SDF had accumulated over US\$200million. The authorities decided to hold the SDF account in domestic currency and converted US\$120 million with the Maldives Monetary Authority (MMA). The converted funds are included in domestic financing of the budget in 2020. As a result of the COVID-19 shock, further accumulation is not expected in 2020. It is expected that accumulation of foreign exchange resources during 2021 and the first-half of 2022 will be about US\$168 million, bringing the balance to about US\$250 at the end of June 2022. The projected accumulation from June 2022 to 2026 would approach the amount due in 2026. Hence, staff is of the view that the SDF mitigates rollover risks associated with the sovereign bonds. Staff judge external debt in the Maldives to be sustainable. The most extreme shock to external debt is the shock to exports. For debt service-to-revenue, the most extreme shock is that of a one-time depreciation.

**9. Overall public debt sustainability.** The PV of public debt-to-GDP ratio stood at an estimated 72 percent in 2019 and is above the indicative threshold, as in the 2019 DSA. Domestic public debt is an important source of financing in the Maldives and is projected to remain so. PV of public debt-to-GDP will reach 87.5 percent of GDP in 2020 owing to the growth shock and will gradually decline to around 63 percent of GDP by 2030. This decline in public debt mainly reflects the authorities' scaled down capital expenditure program. The most extreme shock to public debt indicators is the shock to growth. Staff recommends developing the domestic debt market by lengthening debt maturity and minimizing rollover risks from short-term debt. Currently around half of domestic debt is short term with interest rates of around 4.5 percent. The Ministry of Finance is committed to transparency and along these lines, formulates and publishes its medium-term debt strategy on its website annually and publishes a public debt bulletin annually.

**10. Tailored stress tests for natural disasters, contingent liabilities, and market financing are relevant for the Maldives.** The Maldives is susceptible to rising sea levels and has issued two sovereign bonds (amounting to US\$350 million). Risks from the non-guaranteed SOE debt are covered by the contingent liability shock. The tailored stress tests were kept to their pre-set, default calibrations as these are appropriate for the Maldives. The tailored stress tests are not the most extreme shocks for any of the indicators. The most extreme shocks are the combination shock and the shock to exports for the PPG external debt indicators, and the shock to growth and exports for the public debt indicators.

## ASSESSMENT


**11. The Maldives has a high risk of external debt distress and a high overall risk of debt distress.** As in the previous DSA, three out of four external debt indicators breach their respective thresholds under the baseline scenario, and public debt is above its indicative threshold. Rollover risks from the repayment of two outstanding international sovereign bonds are mitigated by the SDF and the extension of the maturity of one bond. The risk of debt distress will remain high pending the sustained implementation of a more prudent expenditure policy and new revenue measures introduced in the 2020 budget including the personal income tax. These risks will be further mitigated by an effort to obtain the most concessional terms available for contracting external debt and to seek grant financing to the extent possible. The sustainability of debt is predicated on the implementation of the authorities' stated policies, which are substantial and require a high level of sustained commitment.

## AUTHORITIES' VIEWS

**12. The authorities recognize that the Maldives has a high level of debt and is at a high risk of debt distress.** The authorities reiterated that the SDF significantly mitigates the rollover risk from their sovereign bonds coming due, and they highlighted the extension of the maturity of the US\$100 million bond allows more space between repayments and further mitigation of rollover risk. The significant reduction in the capital spending plans will put debt on a declining path and reducing risks posed by high debt levels.



**Figure 1. Maldives Indicators of Public and Publicly Guaranteed External Debt Under Alternatives Scenarios, 2020–2030**



Customization of Default Settings		
	Size	Interactions
<b>Tailored Stress</b>		
Combined CL	No	
Natural disaster	No	No
Commodity price	n.a.	n.a.
Market financing	No	No

Note: "Yes" indicates any change to the size or interactions of the default settings for the stress tests. "n.a." indicates that the stress test does not apply.


Borrowing assumptions on additional financing needs resulting from the stress tests*		
	Default	User defined
<b>Shares of marginal debt</b>		
External PPG MLT debt	100%	
<b>Terms of marginal debt</b>		
Avg. nominal interest rate on new borrowing in USD	3.7%	3.7%
USD Discount rate	5.0%	5.0%
Avg. maturity (incl. grace period)	15	15
Avg. grace period	2	2

\* Note: All the additional financing needs generated by the shocks under the stress tests are assumed to be covered by PPG external MLT debt in the external DSA. Default terms of marginal debt are based on baseline 10-year projections.

Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections.

1/ The most extreme stress test is the test that yields the highest ratio in or before 2030. The stress test with a one-off breach is also presented (if any), while the one-off breach is deemed away for mechanical signals. When a stress test with a one-off breach happens to be the most extreme shock even after disregarding the one-off breach, only that stress test (with a one-off breach) would be presented.

2/ The magnitude of shocks used for the commodity price shock stress test are based on the commodity prices outlook prepared by the IMF research department.

**Figure 2. Maldives: Indicators of Public Debt Under Alternatives Scenarios, 2020–2030**





Borrowing assumptions on additional financing needs resulting from the stress tests*	Default	User defined
<b>Shares of marginal debt</b>		
External PPG medium and long-term	36%	36%
Domestic medium and long-term	29%	29%
Domestic short-term	31%	34%
<b>Terms of marginal debt</b>		
<b>External MLT debt</b>		
Avg. nominal interest rate on new borrowing in USD	3.7%	3.7%
Avg. maturity (incl. grace period)	15	15
Avg. grace period	2	2
<b>Domestic MLT debt</b>		
Avg. real interest rate on new borrowing	5.3%	5.3%
Avg. maturity (incl. grace period)	4	4
Avg. grace period	1	1
<b>Domestic short-term debt</b>		
Avg. real interest rate	2.4%	2.4%

\* Note: The public DSA allows for domestic financing to cover the additional financing needs generated by the shocks under the stress tests in the public DSA. Default terms of marginal debt are based on baseline 10-year projections.


Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections.

1/ The most extreme stress test is the test that yields the highest ratio in or before 2030. The stress test with a one-off breach is also presented (if any), while the one-off breach is deemed away for mechanical signals. When a stress test with a one-off breach happens to be the most extreme shock even after disregarding the one-off breach, only that stress test (with a one-off breach) would be presented.

**Figure 3. Maldives: Realism Tools**



**Figure 4. Maldives: Drivers of Debt Dynamics – Baseline Scenario**



1/ Difference between anticipated and actual contributions on debt ratios.

2/ Distribution across LICs for which LIC DSAs were produced.


3/ Given the relatively low private external debt for average low-income countries, a ppt change in PPG external debt should be largely explained by the drivers of the external debt dynamics equation.

**Figure 5. Maldives: Market Financing Risk Indicators**

	GFN	1/	EMBI	2/
Benchmarks	14		570	
Values	14		n.a.	
Breach of benchmark	No		n.a.	
Potential heightened liquidity needs	Moderate			

1/ Maximum gross financing needs (GFN) over 3-year baseline projection horizon.

2/ EMBI spreads correspond to the latest available data.



Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections.

**Table 1. Maldives: External Debt Sustainability Framework, Baseline Scenario, 2017–2040**

(In percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)

	Actual			Projections							Average 8/ Historical Projections		
	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2030	2040	Historical	Projections
<b>External debt (nominal) 1/</b>	<b>35.6</b>	<b>50.4</b>	<b>54.2</b>	<b>69.0</b>	<b>65.3</b>	<b>61.5</b>	<b>60.6</b>	<b>58.3</b>	<b>55.5</b>	<b>40.5</b>	<b>28.9</b>	<b>35.9</b>	<b>54.3</b>
<i>of which: public and publicly guaranteed (PPG)</i>	<i>24.1</i>	<i>35.3</i>	<i>38.3</i>	<i>49.6</i>	<i>46.4</i>	<i>42.6</i>	<i>41.8</i>	<i>40.5</i>	<i>38.5</i>	<i>27.4</i>	<i>20.6</i>	<i>25.0</i>	<i>37.7</i>
Change in external debt	8.2	14.7	3.9	14.8	-3.8	-3.8	-0.9	-2.3	-2.8	-2.2	-0.5		
<b>Identified net debt-creating flows</b>	<b>9.9</b>	<b>11.6</b>	<b>7.0</b>	<b>21.8</b>	<b>-4.5</b>	<b>-3.3</b>	<b>-3.0</b>	<b>-2.4</b>	<b>-2.6</b>	<b>-1.9</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.7</b>	<b>-0.8</b>
<b>Non-interest current account deficit</b>	<b>21.1</b>	<b>24.9</b>	<b>24.6</b>	<b>22.2</b>	<b>10.5</b>	<b>7.9</b>	<b>7.8</b>	<b>8.1</b>	<b>7.8</b>	<b>5.4</b>	<b>3.6</b>	<b>13.6</b>	<b>8.4</b>
Deficit in balance of goods and services	3.9	7.9	6.3	9.8	-4.4	-7.0	-7.3	-7.0	-7.0	-7.4	-7.0	-5.0	-5.7
Exports	70.2	69.2	65.2	48.0	60.0	61.7	62.7	62.8	63.0	64.2	63.4		
Imports	74.0	77.1	71.5	57.7	55.5	54.7	55.3	55.9	56.0	56.8	56.3		
Net current transfers (negative = inflow)	9.9	9.3	10.1	8.3	9.7	9.9	10.0	9.9	9.7	7.6	5.8		
<i>of which: official</i>	<i>0.0</i>	<i>0.0</i>	<i>0.0</i>	<i>0.0</i>	<i>0.0</i>	<i>0.0</i>	<i>0.0</i>	<i>0.0</i>	<i>0.0</i>	<i>0.0</i>	<i>0.0</i>		
Other current account flows (negative = net inflow)	7.3	7.7	8.2	4.1	5.3	5.0	5.2	5.1	5.1	5.1	4.8	<b>9.6</b>	<b>9.0</b>
<b>Net FDI (negative = inflow)</b>	<b>-9.7</b>	<b>-10.8</b>	<b>-15.5</b>	<b>-6.0</b>	<b>-8.5</b>	<b>-8.7</b>	<b>-8.7</b>	<b>-8.7</b>	<b>-8.7</b>	<b>-6.2</b>	<b>-3.0</b>	<b>-10.6</b>	<b>-7.8</b>
<b>Endogenous debt dynamics 2/</b>	<b>-1.5</b>	<b>-2.4</b>	<b>-2.1</b>	<b>5.6</b>	<b>-6.5</b>	<b>-2.5</b>	<b>-2.1</b>	<b>-1.8</b>	<b>-1.7</b>	<b>-1.1</b>	<b>-0.5</b>		
Contribution from nominal interest rate	0.6	1.5	1.5	0.9	1.4	1.3	1.2	1.3	1.3	0.8	0.6		
Contribution from real GDP growth	-1.7	-2.2	-2.6	4.7	-7.9	-3.8	-3.4	-3.0	-2.9	-1.9	-1.2		
Contribution from price and exchange rate changes	-0.4	-1.8	-1.0	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...		
<b>Residual 3/</b>	<b>-1.8</b>	<b>3.1</b>	<b>-3.1</b>	<b>-7.0</b>	<b>0.7</b>	<b>-0.5</b>	<b>2.1</b>	<b>0.2</b>	<b>-0.3</b>	<b>-0.3</b>	<b>-0.5</b>	<b>0.3</b>	<b>-0.5</b>
<i>of which: exceptional financing</i>	<i>0.0</i>	<i>0.0</i>	<i>0.0</i>	<i>0.0</i>	<i>0.0</i>	<i>0.0</i>	<i>0.0</i>	<i>0.0</i>	<i>0.0</i>	<i>0.0</i>	<i>0.0</i>		
<b>Sustainability indicators</b>													
<b>PV of PPG external debt-to-GDP ratio</b>	<b>...</b>	<b>...</b>	<b>32.8</b>	<b>43.1</b>	<b>40.6</b>	<b>37.1</b>	<b>36.6</b>	<b>35.5</b>	<b>33.8</b>	<b>23.7</b>	<b>17.7</b>		
<b>PV of PPG external debt-to-exports ratio</b>	<b>...</b>	<b>...</b>	<b>50.4</b>	<b>90.0</b>	<b>67.7</b>	<b>60.0</b>	<b>58.5</b>	<b>56.6</b>	<b>53.7</b>	<b>36.8</b>	<b>27.9</b>		
<b>PPG debt service-to-exports ratio</b>	<b>2.8</b>	<b>3.4</b>	<b>6.1</b>	<b>4.8</b>	<b>6.1</b>	<b>12.5</b>	<b>6.7</b>	<b>7.1</b>	<b>8.1</b>	<b>5.4</b>	<b>4.0</b>		
<b>PPG debt service-to-revenue ratio</b>	<b>7.2</b>	<b>9.1</b>	<b>15.5</b>	<b>13.7</b>	<b>16.4</b>	<b>31.9</b>	<b>16.6</b>	<b>17.3</b>	<b>19.8</b>	<b>13.4</b>	<b>9.5</b>		
Gross external financing need (Million of U.S. dollars)	805.2	1112.5	882.4	1143.2	537.9	678.7	490.9	546.4	614.0	539.1	983.3		
<b>Key macroeconomic assumptions</b>													
Real GDP growth (in percent)	6.8	6.9	5.7	-8.1	13.2	6.4	5.9	5.4	5.4	4.8	4.2	<b>6.2</b>	<b>4.9</b>
GDP deflator in US dollar terms (change in percent)	1.4	5.3	2.0	2.4	2.5	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	<b>3.1</b>	<b>2.1</b>
Effective interest rate (percent) 4/	2.3	4.9	3.3	1.6	2.3	2.2	2.1	2.2	2.3	2.1	2.3	<b>1.9</b>	<b>2.2</b>
Growth of exports of G&S (US dollar terms, in percent)	5.4	10.9	1.6	-30.8	45.1	11.7	9.7	7.7	7.8	7.0	6.4	<b>8.4</b>	<b>8.1</b>
Growth of imports of G&S (US dollar terms, in percent)	9.5	17.1	0.0	-24.0	11.6	7.0	9.2	8.5	7.7	7.0	6.7	<b>11.2</b>	<b>5.3</b>
Grant element of new public sector borrowing (in percent)	...	...	...	15.0	14.3	14.4	13.9	15.7	15.7	14.7	13.3	...	<b>15.0</b>
Government revenues (excluding grants, in percent of GDP)	27.5	26.1	25.7	16.9	22.2	24.2	25.3	25.6	25.8	26.2	26.8	<b>24.6</b>	<b>24.6</b>
Aid flows (in Million of US dollars) 5/	14.1	53.2	92.3	238.0	156.6	138.1	116.9	119.5	124.7	125.8	179.0		
Grant-equivalent financing (in percent of GDP) 6/	...	...	...	4.1	2.2	1.7	1.3	1.3	1.2	0.9	0.6	...	<b>1.5</b>
Grant-equivalent financing (in percent of external financing) 6/	...	...	...	32.9	32.5	27.4	24.8	27.2	26.5	25.1	19.3	...	<b>27.5</b>
Nominal GDP (Million of US dollars)	4,729	5,321	5,734	5,398	6,263	6,798	7,345	7,895	8,487	12,036	22,639		
Nominal dollar GDP growth	8.3	12.5	7.8	-5.9	16.0	8.5	8.0	7.5	7.5	6.9	6.3	<b>9.4</b>	<b>7.1</b>
<b>Memorandum items:</b>													
PV of external debt 7/	...	...	48.8	62.6	59.5	56.0	55.4	53.4	50.7	36.8	26.0		
In percent of exports	...	...	74.8	130.5	99.2	90.7	88.4	85.0	80.6	57.3	41.0		
Total external debt service-to-exports ratio	7.9	9.9	9.7	10.4	10.2	16.6	10.7	11.0	11.8	8.3	6.0		
PV of PPG external debt (in Million of US dollars)	...	...	1882.8	2328.6	2541.5	2519.0	2690.5	2805.1	2868.1	2846.8	3999.7		
(Pvt-Pvt-1)/GDPt-1 (in percent)	...	...	7.8	3.9	-0.4	2.5	1.6	0.8	0.3	1.0	1.0		
Non-interest current account deficit that stabilizes debt ratio	13.0	10.1	20.7	7.4	14.3	11.7	8.8	10.3	10.6	7.5	4.1		

Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections.

1/ Includes both public and private sector external debt.

2/ Derived as  $[r - g - \rho(1+g)] / (1+g+\rho+g)$  times previous period debt ratio, with  $r$  = nominal interest rate;  $g$  = real GDP growth rate, and  $\rho$  = growth rate of GDP deflator in U.S. dollar terms.

3/ Includes exceptional financing (i.e., changes in arrears and debt relief); changes in gross foreign assets; and valuation adjustments. For projections also includes contribution from price and exchange rate changes.

4/ Current-year interest payments divided by previous period debt stock.

5/ Defined as grants, concessional loans, and debt relief.

6/ Grant-equivalent financing includes grants provided directly to the government and through new borrowing (difference between the face value and the PV of new debt).

7/ Assumes that PV of private sector debt is equivalent to its face value.

8/ Historical averages are generally derived over the past 10 years, subject to data availability, whereas projections averages are over the first year of projection and the next 10 years.

Definition of external/domestic debt	Currency-based
Is there a material difference between the two criteria?	No





Table 2. Maldives: Public Sector Debt Sustainability Framework, Baseline Scenario, 2017–2040

(In percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)

	Actual			Projections								Average 6/	
	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2030	2040	Historical	Projections
Public sector debt 1/	61.3	71.3	76.9	93.9	87.3	85.4	83.0	80.7	78.1	66.7	51.4	59.6	78.4
of which: external debt	24.1	35.3	38.3	49.6	46.4	42.6	41.8	40.5	38.5	27.4	20.6	25.0	37.7
Change in public sector debt	3.6	10.0	5.7	17.0	-6.7	-1.9	-2.4	-2.3	-2.5	-1.9	-1.6		
Identified debt-creating flows	1.8	-1.0	1.0	16.8	-6.3	-1.9	-2.4	-2.3	-2.5	-1.8	-1.6	0.9	-0.9
Primary deficit	4.8	3.3	3.9	10.1	4.4	3.1	1.9	1.4	1.1	0.4	-0.2	4.8	2.3
Revenue and grants	27.8	27.1	27.3	19.4	23.7	25.1	26.0	26.3	26.4	26.6	27.0	25.4	25.4
of which: grants	0.3	1.0	1.6	2.6	1.4	1.0	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.4	0.2		
Primary (noninterest) expenditure	32.6	30.4	31.2	29.6	28.1	28.2	27.9	27.7	27.5	27.0	26.9	30.2	27.7
Automatic debt dynamics	-2.9	-4.3	-2.9	6.7	-10.7	-4.9	-4.3	-3.7	-3.6	-2.3	-1.4		
Contribution from interest rate/growth differential	-2.9	-3.6	-2.9	6.7	-10.7	-4.9	-4.3	-3.7	-3.6	-2.3	-1.4		
of which: contribution from average real interest rate	0.7	0.3	0.9	-0.1	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.9	0.8		
of which: contribution from real GDP growth	-3.7	-4.0	-3.8	6.8	-11.0	-5.2	-4.8	-4.2	-4.1	-3.1	-2.2		
Contribution from real exchange rate depreciation	0.0	-0.7	0.0	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—		
Other identified debt-creating flows	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.5	0.0
Privatization receipts (negative)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
Recognition of contingent liabilities (e.g., bank recapitalization)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
Debt relief (HIPC and other)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
Other debt creating or reducing flow (please specify)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
Residual	1.7	10.9	4.7	0.2	-0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.1	0.0	1.9	-0.1
<b>Sustainability indicators</b>													
PV of public debt-to-GDP ratio 2/	...	...	71.5	87.5	81.5	79.9	77.8	75.7	73.4	62.9	48.4		
PV of public debt-to-revenue and grants ratio	...	...	261.5	449.7	344.0	318.1	298.9	288.2	278.0	236.5	179.1		
Debt service-to-revenue and grants ratio 3/	10.4	12.4	17.2	15.0	24.3	42.8	36.8	36.9	41.2	46.0	27.3		
Gross financing need 4/	7.7	6.7	8.6	13.0	10.1	13.8	11.5	11.1	12.0	12.7	7.2		
<b>Key macroeconomic and fiscal assumptions</b>													
Real GDP growth (in percent)	6.8	6.9	5.7	-8.1	13.2	6.4	5.9	5.4	5.4	4.8	4.2	6.2	4.9
Average nominal interest rate on external debt (in percent)	3.5	7.2	4.7	2.3	3.2	3.1	3.1	3.2	3.3	3.1	3.3	2.8	3.1
Average real interest rate on domestic debt (in percent)	1.1	-2.2	0.2	-0.9	-0.9	-0.4	0.1	0.1	0.2	1.5	1.7	-0.4	0.3
Real exchange rate depreciation (in percent, + indicates depreciation)	0.1	-2.9	0.1	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	-1.3	...
Inflation rate (GDP deflator, in percent)	1.4	5.3	2.0	2.4	2.5	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	5.0	2.1
Growth of real primary spending (deflated by GDP deflator, in percent)	-0.6	-0.1	8.5	-13.0	7.4	6.9	4.8	4.6	4.5	4.6	4.4	5.6	3.6
Primary deficit that stabilizes the debt-to-GDP ratio 5/	1.2	-6.6	-1.8	-6.9	11.0	4.9	4.3	3.7	3.6	2.4	1.4	-2.4	3.2
PV of contingent liabilities (not included in public sector debt)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		

Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections.

1/ Coverage of debt: The central government, central bank, government-guaranteed debt. Definition of external debt is Currency-based.

2/ The underlying PV of external debt-to-GDP ratio under the public DSA differs from the external DSA with the size of differences depending on exchange rates projections.

3/ Debt service is defined as the sum of interest and amortization of medium and long-term, and short-term debt.



4/ Gross financing need is defined as the primary deficit plus debt service plus the stock of short-term debt at the end of the last period and other debt creating/reducing flows.

5/ Defined as a primary deficit minus a change in the public debt-to-GDP ratio (-): a primary surplus, which would stabilize the debt ratio only in the year in question.

6/ Historical averages are generally derived over the past 10 years, subject to data availability, whereas projections averages are over the first year of projection and the next 10 years.

Definition of external/domestic debt	Currency-based
Is there a material difference between the two criteria?	No

Public sector debt 1/



**Table 3. Maldives: Sensitivity Analysis for Key Indicators of Public and Publicly Guaranteed External Debt, 2020–2030**  
(In percent)

	2020	2021	2022	2023	Projections 1/					2030	
	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030
<b>PV of debt-to-GDP ratio</b>											
<b>Baseline</b>	43	41	37	37	36	34	31	28	27	25	24
<b>A. Alternative Scenarios</b>											
A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2020-2030 2/	43	44	43	45	46	47	46	46	47	47	47
<b>B. Bound Tests</b>											
B1. Real GDP growth	43	47	44	43	42	40	36	34	32	30	28
B2. Primary balance	43	42	41	41	40	38	35	33	31	30	28
B3. Exports	43	58	75	74	71	65	59	53	49	44	40
B4. Other flows 3/	43	45	46	45	43	41	37	34	32	29	27
B5. Depreciation	43	51	46	45	44	42	38	35	33	31	29
B6. Combination of B1-B5	43	68	66	65	62	58	52	48	44	40	37
<b>C. Tailored Tests</b>											
C1. Combined contingent liabilities	43	43	40	40	39	38	35	33	31	29	28
C2. Natural disaster	43	45	42	42	41	38	36	35	33	32	32
C3. Commodity price	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
C4. Market Financing	43	45	41	41	40	38	34	31	29	28	26
<b>Threshold</b>	30	30	30	30	30	30	30	30	30	30	30
<b>PV of debt-to-exports ratio</b>											
<b>Baseline</b>	90	68	60	58	57	54	48	45	42	39	37
<b>A. Alternative Scenarios</b>											
A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2020-2030 2/	90	73	70	72	74	74	73	73	74	74	73
<b>B. Bound Tests</b>											
B1. Real GDP growth	90	68	60	58	57	54	48	45	42	39	37
B2. Primary balance	90	69	66	65	63	61	56	52	49	46	44
B3. Exports	90	140	199	192	183	169	152	137	124	113	103
B4. Other flows 3/	90	75	74	72	69	65	58	54	49	46	43
B5. Depreciation	90	68	59	57	56	53	48	44	41	38	36
B6. Combination of B1-B5	90	134	89	128	122	114	102	93	85	78	72
<b>C. Tailored Tests</b>											
C1. Combined contingent liabilities	90	72	65	64	62	60	55	51	48	46	44
C2. Natural disaster	90	75	69	68	67	65	61	58	55	52	51
C3. Commodity price	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
C4. Market Financing	90	68	60	59	57	54	48	44	41	39	36
<b>Threshold</b>	140	140	140	140	140	140	140	140	140	140	140
<b>Debt service-to-exports ratio</b>											
<b>Baseline</b>	5	6	12	7	7	8	10	6	6	6	5
<b>A. Alternative Scenarios</b>											
A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2020-2030 2/	5	6	13	7	8	9	11	8	8	8	8
<b>B. Bound Tests</b>											
B1. Real GDP growth	5	6	12	7	7	8	10	6	6	6	5
B2. Primary balance	5	6	13	7	8	9	10	7	7	6	6
B3. Exports	5	9	22	15	18	23	25	19	18	17	16
B4. Other flows 3/	5	6	13	7	8	10	11	8	7	7	6
B5. Depreciation	5	6	12	7	7	8	9	6	6	6	5
B6. Combination of B1-B5	5	9	20	12	15	16	18	13	13	12	11
<b>C. Tailored Tests</b>											
C1. Combined contingent liabilities	5	6	13	7	7	8	10	7	6	6	6
C2. Natural disaster	5	6	13	7	8	9	10	7	7	6	6
C3. Commodity price	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
C4. Market Financing	5	6	13	7	8	9	9	6	6	6	5
<b>Threshold</b>	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
<b>Debt service-to-revenue ratio</b>											
<b>Baseline</b>	14	16	32	17	17	20	23	16	15	14	13
<b>A. Alternative Scenarios</b>											
A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2020-2030 2/	14	17	34	18	19	22	27	20	20	20	20
<b>B. Bound Tests</b>											
B1. Real GDP growth	14	19	38	20	21	24	28	19	18	17	16
B2. Primary balance	14	16	32	17	18	21	25	17	17	16	15
B3. Exports	14	16	35	22	27	35	37	29	27	26	24
B4. Other flows 3/	14	16	33	18	20	23	26	19	18	17	16
B5. Depreciation	14	21	40	21	22	25	29	19	18	17	17
B6. Combination of B1-B5	14	19	42	23	29	32	36	26	25	23	22
<b>C. Tailored Tests</b>											
C1. Combined contingent liabilities	14	16	32	17	18	20	24	16	15	15	14
C2. Natural disaster	14	16	32	17	18	21	24	17	16	15	14
C3. Commodity price	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
C4. Market Financing	14	16	32	18	20	22	23	14	14	14	13
<b>Threshold</b>	14	14	14	14	14	14	14	14	14	14	14

Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections.

1/ A bold value indicates a breach of the threshold.

2/ Variables include real GDP growth, GDP deflator (in U.S. dollar terms), non-interest current account in percent of GDP, and non-debt creating flows.

3/ Includes official and private transfers and FDI.



**Table 4. Maldives: Sensitivity Analysis for Key Indicators of Public Debt, 2020–2030**  
(In percent)

	Projections 1/										
	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030
<b>PV of Debt-to-GDP Ratio</b>											
<b>Baseline</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>63</b>
<b>A. Alternative Scenarios</b>											
A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2020-2030 2/	87	85	83	81	79	77	76	75	74	73	72
<b>B. Bound Tests</b>											
B1. Real GDP growth	87	97	102	104	106	107	109	110	112	113	115
B2. Primary balance	87	84	88	85	83	81	78	76	73	71	69
B3. Exports	87	99	118	115	111	105	99	94	89	84	80
B4. Other flows 3/	87	86	89	86	84	80	77	74	72	69	67
B5. Depreciation	87	89	85	80	76	72	68	64	60	57	53
B6. Combination of B1-B5	87	85	88	88	87	86	85	84	83	82	82
<b>C. Tailored Tests</b>											
C1. Combined contingent liabilities	87	88	86	84	82	79	77	74	72	70	68
C2. Natural disaster	87	93	91	89	87	84	82	80	78	76	74
C3. Commodity price	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
C4. Market Financing	87	81	80	78	76	73	71	68	66	64	63
<b>TOTAL public debt benchmark</b>	35	35	35	35	35	35	35	35	35	35	35
<b>PV of Debt-to-Revenue Ratio</b>											
<b>Baseline</b>	<b>450</b>	<b>344</b>	<b>318</b>	<b>299</b>	<b>288</b>	<b>278</b>	<b>269</b>	<b>260</b>	<b>251</b>	<b>243</b>	<b>237</b>
<b>A. Alternative Scenarios</b>											
A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2020-2030 2/	450	358	329	311	301	294	289	283	279	275	273
<b>B. Bound Tests</b>											
B1. Real GDP growth	450	404	405	398	402	405	411	414	419	425	431
B2. Primary balance	450	356	349	328	317	305	296	286	277	268	261
B3. Exports	450	416	470	441	421	397	375	354	334	316	299
B4. Other flows 3/	450	363	353	331	318	305	293	281	270	260	251
B5. Depreciation	450	376	338	309	290	273	257	241	227	213	201
B6. Combination of B1-B5	450	360	351	336	331	326	322	317	313	309	306
<b>C. Tailored Tests</b>											
C1. Combined contingent liabilities	450	373	344	323	312	301	291	281	272	264	257
C2. Natural disaster	450	390	362	341	330	320	311	302	294	286	279
C3. Commodity price	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
C4. Market Financing	450	344	318	299	289	278	268	259	250	242	235
<b>Debt Service-to-Revenue Ratio</b>											
<b>Baseline</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>46</b>
<b>A. Alternative Scenarios</b>											
A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2020-2030 2/	15	25	43	36	36	39	45	42	43	43	46
<b>B. Bound Tests</b>											
B1. Real GDP growth	15	28	55	53	58	68	79	79	84	88	93
B2. Primary balance	15	24	47	46	45	49	55	50	51	52	52
B3. Exports	15	24	45	42	46	56	61	56	57	57	57
B4. Other flows 3/	15	24	43	38	39	45	50	46	47	48	48
B5. Depreciation	15	26	51	42	40	46	52	46	46	47	47
B6. Combination of B1-B5	15	25	48	49	50	57	65	60	61	62	62
<b>C. Tailored Tests</b>											
C1. Combined contingent liabilities	15	24	53	43	43	47	52	47	48	48	49
C2. Natural disaster	15	25	58	47	47	52	56	52	52	53	53
C3. Commodity price	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
C4. Market Financing	15	24	43	38	40	43	47	42	44	45	46

Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections.  
1/ A bold value indicates a breach of the benchmark.  
2/ Variables include real GDP growth, GDP deflator and primary deficit in percent of GDP.  
3/ Includes official and private transfers and FDI.

**Statement by Hazem Beblawi, Executive Director for Maldives;  
and Maya Choueiri, Senior Advisor to Executive Director  
April 22, 2020**

1. On behalf of our Maldivian authorities, we are grateful to staff and management for the expeditious response to the Maldives' request for financial support under the Rapid Credit Facility (RCF). We also thank Executive Directors for their promptness in enhancing Fund support to the membership in these exceptional times.

**The COVID-19 Pandemic and its Economic Impact**

2. Maldives has been a development success, largely due to the expansion of a dynamic high-end tourism sector. The country enjoyed robust growth, considerable development in infrastructure and connectivity, and provided high quality public services for its people, resulting in impressive health and education indicators. Tourism contributed to two-thirds of GDP, 80 percent of exports and 40 percent of fiscal revenues, which makes the Maldives one of the most exposed countries to the COVID-19 pandemic. The economy is projected to contract by 8.1 percent in 2020, about 15 percentage points below pre-pandemic projections. The COVID-19 pandemic has also led to an urgent balance of payments need and a sizeable fiscal financing gap.

**Policy Response to the Crisis and Beyond**

3. The Government of the Maldives has been proactive in containing the spread of the virus and in scaling up health care spending. Flights from affected countries were suspended on February 4 and the Government declared its first ever state of public health emergency on March 12. The authorities are working in close consultation with the WHO, including by preparing isolation centers, intensifying screening, conducting contact tracing, testing of suspected cases as well as treating the affected.

4. To mitigate the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, the authorities have adopted fiscal, monetary, and financial sector measures, including in the context of the Economic Recovery Plan. They increased funding to the health sector, reduced non-priority expenditures, and provided a three-month allowance to those who lost their jobs due to the pandemic.

5. The Maldives Monetary Authority (MMA) considers the banking sector to be in good health and able to withstand a temporary shock to tourism and growth. Nevertheless, MMA adopted measures to prevent a tightening of liquidity conditions and minimize economic disruptions. It introduced a regulation enabling a 6-months moratorium on loan repayments. It also decided to gradually reduce the Minimum Reserve Requirement from 10 to 5 percent, made available a short-term credit facility to financial institutions, and increased its foreign exchange intervention and use of available facilities, as needed, to maintain the exchange rate peg.

6. The authorities are confident that these policies will help minimize disruptions to economic activity. At this critical juncture, they expect that emergency financial assistance from

the Fund and other multilateral and bilateral agencies will help cover the temporary external financing gap. They also expect that the ongoing expansion of tourism capacity (more than 116 islands will be available for development during the next 10 years) and the upgrades in infrastructure (notably a new airport runway and terminal) should lay the groundwork for a quick resumption of tourism activity, as witnessed before the crisis.

7. The Government remains committed to fiscal consolidation to restore fiscal and debt sustainability. On the revenue side, the authorities will monitor the implementation of the newly introduced personal income tax. Once the crisis is overcome, they will also carry out the planned increases in airport development fees and airport service charges, as well as in other fees (import duty-related fees and foreign workers' registration fees). They will consider additional measures, as needed, to shore up revenues. Following the completion of the ongoing public sector investment projects and the cancellation of new projects costing 3 percent of GDP in 2020-21, the authorities expect public investment to further decline to 7.2 percent of GDP on average over the medium term, contributing to an improvement in the primary fiscal balance that is consistent with public debt sustainability. The Government's debt management strategy has been active, as reflected in the preemptive voluntary extension of the US\$100 million privately placed bond in Abu Dhabi by three years to 2026. The Government also welcomes and hopes to benefit from the coordinated approach agreed upon by the G20 and the Paris Club, supported by the Fund and World Bank, toward a time-bound suspension by bilateral official creditors of debt service payments for the poorest countries who request forbearance, as well as the call on private creditors to participate in the initiative on comparable terms.

8. With already high public debt and additional short-term fiscal pressures arising from the crisis, the authorities are fully aware of the importance of ensuring a high level of transparency of government accounts, including the size of contingent liabilities linked to government guarantees and other forms of government support. They appreciate staff's acknowledgement of the positive momentum to strengthen regulations and institutions, fight corruption, and improve fiscal transparency. They will continue to work closely with the Fund to enhance their fiscal responsibility framework and strengthen the operation and risk supervision of state-owned enterprises.

### **Financing Request Under the RCF**

9. Against this background, the Government of the Maldives requests emergency financing from the Fund in the equivalent of SDR 21.2 million, equivalent to 100 percent of quota under the RCF. The Fund's assistance will help meet the urgent balance of payments need stemming from the disruptions to tourism as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. The authorities are confident that Fund assistance will contribute to attenuating the adverse impact of the ongoing shock on the economy. The Fund's assistance is expected to catalyze additional financial support in the form of grants and concessional loans from the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, as well as bilateral partners.