



Annex I. Social and Education Indicators

**Social Assistance and Pension Spending, 2015
(percent of GDP)**




Sources: ASPIRE; EPD; and IMF staff estimates.

**Evolution of Population (children and elder), 2001–16
(index, 2011=100)**




Sources: World Development Indicators; and IMF staff estimates.

**Primary Completion Rate, 2015
(percent of relevant age group)**



Sources: World Development Indicators; and IMF staff estimates.

**Primary Completion Rate, 2015
(percent of relevant age group)**



Sources: World Development Indicators; and IMF staff estimates.

GOVERNANCE AND INSTITUTIONS¹

The strength and quality of Togo's public institutions are improving. Togo's governance indicators that were comparable with a typical fragile country in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 15 years ago are approaching SSA and WAEMU averages. The focus on institutional reform has increased further in recent years, mainly through efforts to improve fiscal governance so far. While the priority given to fiscal governance is warranted, more emphasis should be given to enforcement of anti-corruption legislation by effective and independent institutions. This paper provides a brief overview of the strength and weaknesses of Togo's public institutions.²



A. Overall Assessment

1. **While improving, Togo's general governance structures still seem somewhat weaker than the average of WAEMU and SSA.** Starting from a position close to an average fragile SSA country 15 years ago, the World Governance Indicators are now rating Togo more like a low-income country (LIC) and in rule of law an average SSA country (Figure 1). Prevailing weaknesses in fiscal management and other governance challenges continue to constrain the delivery of public goods and services with a plausible negative impact on economic growth and poverty reduction.
2. **People's trust in public institutions is an indicator of the quality and capacity of the institutions.** When the citizens are asked to assess their trust in the state, Togo's score is also weaker than the WAEMU and SSA average. A survey in 2015 reported that 46 percent of respondents in Togo trusted the core state institutions "a lot" or "somewhat" compared with an average of 57 percent for SSA and 65 percent for WAEMU (Text Figure 1).
3. **Dedicated support from the country leadership is essential in the attempt to build strong institutions and combat corruption.** Reducing corruption will be challenging if there is doubt about the political commitment. Corruption is a symptom of a poorly functioning government, addressing it requires change on many various levels. It is, therefore, of some concern that only 31 percent of Togo's citizens in the 2015 survey responded that the government did well in fighting corruption compared with a WAEMU average of 41 percent (Text Figure 2).
4. **In recent years, the government has become increasingly engaged in institutional reforms to strengthen governance and fight corruption.** The public financial management (PFM) system is going through a comprehensive overhaul and Togo has adopted new anti-

¹ Prepared by Lars Engstrom. The author is grateful for comments from colleagues in several departments.

² The paper uses several survey-based perception indicators. Caution is needed when comparing these indicators across countries and over time. See Box 3 for further information.

corruption legislation and established several control and anti-corruption institutions, including the anti-corruption agency HAPLUCIA that became operational in 2017.



B. Fiscal Governance

5. Togo’s fiscal governance seems weaker than the SSA and WAEMU averages. The Worldwide Governance Indicator of government effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressure, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies. While improving, over 2015-17 Togo’s score remained close to fragile and LIC SSA countries and below the average of SSA and WAEMU countries (Figure 1).

6. Directives issued by WAEMU contain many provisions on PFM. The provisions include better access to budget information, multi-year budgeting, results-oriented management, decentralized budget execution, and a new accounting and financial monitoring framework.³ The most recent Public Expenditure and Fiscal Accountability (PEFA) Assessment published in 2016 showed that Togo was either the weakest or one of the weakest in most PFM categories when compared with neighboring WAEMU countries (Table 1).⁴ Against this

³ Directive 06/2009/CM/UEMOA on budget laws; Directive 07/2009/CM/UEMOA on the general public accounting rules; Directives 08/2009/CM/UEMOA on national budget classification; Directive 09/2009/CM/UEMOA on national chart of accounts; and Directive 10/2009/CM/UEMOA on national summary fiscal tables.

⁴ PEFA (2016). Togo is compared with neighboring countries that have completed a PEFA assessment in recent years.

background, the authorities' current ECF supported program has given priority to an ambitious agenda of PFM reforms.

Transparency

7. The publication of fiscal data could be more transparent. There are many shortcomings that limit the ability to maintain an effective oversight of government functions. The current presentation of the budget is primarily based on the administrative and economic classification. Key information is missing including: (i) the outcome of the previous budget; (ii) complete data on the debt stock; (iii) comprehensive data on financial assets; (iv) wide-ranging information on budget risks; and (v) a comprehensive analysis of the budget impact from new initiatives and public investment. Significant amounts of public revenue and spending are excluded from the budget, for example data covering: (i) autonomous public institutions; (ii) the social security fund; and (iii) the pension fund. Information about the activity of extrabudgetary units is incomplete. The budget document does not include sufficient information about the expected result and actual outcome of different activities and the data is too aggregated to make it possible to track the allocation of fiscal spending. The public does not have access to several key documents, including regular reports on budget execution and audited financial statements.

8. Recent measures to increase transparency include: (i) estimates of all tax expenditures were attached to the budget for 2019 and (ii) a decision that the budget for 2020 will be presented and adopted based on specific programs in line with the public finance reforms undertaken among WAEMU members.

Revenue

9. While tax and customs administration reforms have advanced in recent years, revenue performance has improved more slowly than expected. The tax and customs administrations were unified when the Togolese Revenue Authority (OTR) was established in 2014 and tax revenues increased from 15.9 percent of GDP in 2013 to 16.9 percent of GDP in 2016 but then fell back to 16.1 percent of GDP in 2017 (a year of political turmoil). Tax revenues recovered to 16.5 percent of GDP in 2018, which is above the SSA and WAEMU averages and about 1½ percent of GDP below the estimated tax frontier (Text Figure 3).


10. Revenue mobilization will be improved further by: (i) broadening the tax base, increasing the efficiency and equity of the tax system, and reducing tax exemptions that amounted to 3.5 percent of GDP in 2016; (ii) strengthening measures to identify tax fraud; and (iii) increasing the recovery of tax arrears. The tax authorities are refining the use of risk-based analysis and reconciliation of different data sources. For example, to identify potential underreporting by taxpayers, procurement data collected by the Public Treasury can be reconciled with turnover data reported to OTR. Procedures for reconciliation of data covering tax assessments, contested tax payments, and recovered tax arrears are also essential and processes to recover payments from declarative defaulters have been made systematic. Online tax

reporting has become mandatory for large companies and customs clearance procedures and related documentation will be gradually digitalized. Custom clearance will be prevented for merchandise of importers with outstanding tax arrears.

Spending and Investment

11. To increase value for money, new measures aim to make the management of public spending and investment more efficient:

- Defective cashflow plans* have triggered cashflow constraints and an increased risk of arrears. Many public arrears have remained unresolved, pending agreements with creditors. In response, the Ministry of Economy and Finance started to prepare monthly procurement and commitment plans consistent with the approved budget in 2018. A major lasting problem for cashflow forecasts is the non-respect of the procurement and commitment plans. Public procurement regulations impose maximum deadlines for the validation of contracts that are not respected in practice. Some credits provided in the cashflow plan are, therefore, not available at the payment stage. Challenges also remain for converting the Treasury settlement account at the central bank (BCEAO) that was opened in 2018 into a functioning Treasury Single Account.
- Spending arrears* will be cleared based on an audit of existing arrears in 2017 and an agreed schedule. The authorities are putting in place a comprehensive system to prevent new arrears.
- Public investment management has been weak* and the 2016 Public Investment Management Assessment (PIMA) ranked Togo in the bottom quartile of countries in the public investment management index (at 0.3 in a scale of 0-1).⁵ Collection of project data by line ministries has been generally poor with sporadic monitoring reports and as a result, public investment projects have been selected based on insufficient technical and financial information. A multi-year program budgeting process is now under preparation and the public investment program (PIP) covering 2019-21 was published as an annex to the 2019 Budget. A circular



⁵ IMF (2016a).

letter issued in December 2018 mandates future investment projects to be selected based on methodological guidance for project selection and to include in the PIP and the budget only those that have been selected accordingly. At the end of each fiscal year, a report for all completed major projects, including ex-ante and ex-post assessments, will be prepared.

Asset and Debt Management

12. The management of public assets and liabilities needs to be reinforced. The fiscal reporting of public assets is weak and there is currently no administrative structure capable of monitoring public enterprises. While a list of government participation in different companies exist, the monitoring authorities do not receive financial statements on a regular and systematic basis. Reporting by regional authorities and controls of guarantees are insufficient. Monitoring and management of public debt have improved in recent years. The debt management directorate has been reinforced with all debt management functions centralized in one entity. A procedures manual for debt management has been developed. The authorities have also prepared a medium-term debt strategy that will be updated on a regular basis. The situation of Togo's state-owned banks, which have been in repeated financial difficulties and required recapitalization, is discussed further in another selected issues paper.


Procurement

13. The WAEMU countries initiated an extensive process of public procurement reforms in 2005. Transparency was reinforced in Togo by the law on government procurement and contract delegation in 2009. ARMP (*Autorité de Régulation des Marchés Publics*), established in 2009, regulates public procurement and DNCMP (*Direction Nationale du Contrôle des Marchés Publics*) is responsible for the control of public procurement procedures and issues non-objection notices on bidding documents. Calls for bids are published in newspapers and on the DNCMP website. In general, the calls contain specifications and terms of the offer, as well as the evaluation criteria. Companies found guilty of violating procurement regulations are prohibited from participating in future bids and their names are published on the ARMP website. Notwithstanding these positive measures, ministries would generally need stronger procurement capacity, including developing electronic management of tender processes and establishing procurement compliant reviews and auditing mechanisms.

C. Market Regulation

14. Indicators of Togo's regulatory environment give a slightly mixed message. The Doing Business indicators measure the legal/regulatory aspect of the business environment. The 2019 Doing Business report indicates that Togo's regulatory performance is comparable to other WAEMU and SSA countries in most areas (Text Figure 4). Togo is a better performer on getting electricity and weaker than the SSA average in paying taxes and getting credit. At the same time, Togo's regulatory quality is scored significantly lower than other WAEMU countries by the Worldwide Governance Indicators in 2017 (Figure 1). This contradiction might be explained by gains from recent regulatory reforms. For example, Togo has caught up with other WAEMU


countries in registering property, an area in which Togo used to be far behind. The time needed to register property in Togo has dropped from 283 days two years ago to currently 84 days (see next section for more details).



15. A closer analysis of regulations related to foreign trade reveals that there is room for further reforms. The OECD trade facilitation indicators measure the full spectrum of border procedures (Text Figure 5). Togo is far below best practice in all areas and particularly so in:

- *Automation:* Automated procedures are a powerful tool to facilitate trade because it supports implementation of modern customs management practices.
- *Advance rulings:* The time needed for declaration and clearance is reduced when the Customs administration offers binding decisions in advance on the classification, the origin or the Customs value of the goods to be imported or exported.
- *Appeal procedures:* Strong and transparent appeal procedures give the importer and exporter additional guarantees that all actions taken by the border agencies are based on existing laws and regulations.

Text Figure 5. Indicators of Trade Facilitation, 2017
(percent of best practice)



Source: OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators Simulator. <https://sim.oecd.org>

16. While still well below best practice, Togo scored significantly better than other WAEMU countries in governance and impartiality as well as information availability. The border agencies have transparent structures and functions with effective sanctions against misconduct of border agency staff. Information is available on the national customs website, duty rates are published, and required documentation is easily accessible for downloading. Nonetheless, to ensure that the Port of Lomé is competitive and able to defend its position as a regional transportation hub, as envisaged in the National Development Plan, the authorities would be well advised to set ambitious targets and aim for border procedures that are close to best practice in as many categories as possible.

D. Rule of Law



17. Information on the rule of law suggest a divergence between the existing legal framework and what happens in practice. The constitution provides that the judicial branch is independent from the legislative branch and the executive branch. Togo is one of the few francophone countries in Africa where the president does not chair the high judicial council, or an equivalent entity in charge of recruiting, disciplining, and removing judges.⁶ Nonetheless,

⁶ Global Integrity (2016).

(continued)

recent surveys show weak market trust in the judiciary, which undermines the business climate, amidst persistent perception of political interference and corruption:⁷

- The Worldwide Governance Indicator of rule of law captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. Togo's score has improved over time and was close to the average of other WAEMU countries and SSA over 2015-17 (Figure 1).
- Survey data from 2015 indicate weaknesses in the legal framework. When asked if they trusted the judicial courts, only 37 percent of the respondents in Togo answered "a lot" or "somewhat" while the correspondent averages were 53 percent for SSA and 58 percent for WAEMU (Text Figure 6).



18. Courts are clearly not an efficient option for creditors who want to enforce a contract. The cost of contract enforcement in Togo is prohibitively high at 48 percent of the claim value according to Doing Business 2019, but this is in fact slightly less than the average of other WAEMU countries at 51 percent of the claim value (Text Figure 7). In response, the government recently decided to create two commercial courts focused on business conflicts. New land registration procedures have reduced the cost of registering property in Togo. The tax authority (OTR) has taken over the responsibility for the land register and it has computerized land titles and launched a nation-wide land census. As a result, the cost of land registration has decreased from previously about 9 percent of the property value to currently just under 6

⁷ See for example Afrobarometer (2017a).

percent, which has reduced the cost of registering property from above to below the average of other WAEMU countries.


E. Control of Corruption

19. The control of corruption in Togo seems weaker than the WAEMU average. The Worldwide Governance Indicator of control of corruption signals that Togo's control of corruption has improved and is better than in SSA fragile and LIC countries, but other WAEMU countries are on average slightly ahead of Togo (Figure 1). A survey in 2015 reported that 26 percent of the Togolese paid a bribe in contacts with public services to be compared with on average 22 percent for SSA and 18 percent for WAEMU (Text Figure 8). Bribes were most common in contacts with the police, courts, utility companies, and when asking for permits or other documents. Bribes were less common in contacts with schools and health services. When asked if they thought that judges were corrupt, 48 percent responded "all" or "most" in Togo, while the corresponding averages were 34 percent for SSA and 37 percent for WAEMU (Text Figure 9).

20. Appropriate criminalization of acts of corruption is essential to strengthen governance and fight corruption. Togo has adopted laws on the prevention, detection, and sanctioning of corrupt practices (Box 1). Corruption is also prohibited in article 46 of the Constitution (*Loi fondamentale*) and Togo ratified the UN Anti-Corruption Convention (UNCAC) in 2005 and the African Union Anti-Corruption Convention in 2009. Togo is preparing to adopt legislation establishing a requirement for all civil servants who are professionally or politically exposed to the risks of corruption to declare their assets. This legislation should clearly identify the assets to be declared which should include assets beneficially owned, and liabilities and interests of high-level officials, establish a mechanism for the publication and verification of submitted declarations, and provide a framework for the application of dissuasive sanctions. Togo would also benefit from establishing clear procedures for the recovery and management of property that has been acquired through illicit activities related to corruption, money laundering, and organized international crime.

Text Figure 8. Bribery Rates, 2015


(percent of respondents who had paid a bribe in contacts with public services during the past 12 months)



Source: Transparency International (2015).

Text Figure 9. Perception of Judicial Corruption, 2015

(percent of respondents who responded that "all" or "most" judges are corrupt)



Source: Afrobarometer (2017a).

Box 1. Governance-Related Legislation

The law on government procurement and contract delegation adopted in 2009 (2009-014).

The law on transparency in public financial management adopted in 2014 (2014-009).


The organic budget law adopted in 2014 (2014-013).

The new Criminal Code (*Code pénale*) adopted in 2015:

- Clarifies (i) the cases of passive corruption (the public official is at the initiative of corruption) or active (the private person is at the initiative of corruption); and (ii) existing offenses considered as corruption.
- Introduces (i) bribery offenses of foreign public officials and international civil servants; (ii) the general offense of bribery in the private sector; (iii) abuse of office as the act of performing or non-performing an action to gain an undue advantage; and (iv) illicit enrichment as the acquisition of property without being able to justify the legal origin of the funds used.
- Defines (i) influence trading as the act of abusing one's real or supposed influence to obtain an undue right; and (ii) the illegal taking of interests as the act of taking or receiving an interest in a transaction that one is responsible for carrying out or monitoring.
- Punishes these acts of corruption severely from 5 to 10 years of criminal imprisonment.

21. Corruption is underreported and often because of fear. According to a 2015 survey, about 85 percent of the respondents in SSA who had been requested to pay a bribe did not report the incident to the authorities—and the main reason was fear of the consequences. On average, 34 percent of the respondents did not report the bribe because of fear of retaliation or other negative consequences and 14 percent (the second-most common reason) believed it was meaningless—nothing would be done anyway. Fear of the consequences of reporting corruption plays an especially large role in Togo (61 percent, Text Figure 10).

Text Figure 10. Corruption not Reported because of Fear of the Consequences, 2015
(percent of respondents)



Source: Afrobarometer (2017b).

22. Anti-corruption legislation is only credible if enforced by effective institutions.⁸ The Togolese government has established several important institutions designed in part to reduce corruption by eliminating opportunities for bribery and fraud (Box 2). The anti-corruption agency HAPLUCIA became operational in 2017 and started investigating the first corruption cases in late 2018 following a corruption awareness campaign launched in September 2018. Existing institutional weaknesses include insufficient follow-up of audits made by IGE, IGF, and ARMP, and lack of systematic follow-up of the reports by the Auditor General (*Cour des Comptes*). The challenge is now to make these institutions fully operational and address fear of retaliation or negative consequences.

⁸ IMF (2016b).

Box 2. Control Organs and Anti-Corruption Agencies

Inspection Générale d'Etat (IGE): The General Inspectorate of the State supports administrative reforms by undertaking administrative and financial controls of the central government, SOEs, companies with public participation, companies receiving financial assistance from the state, the army, and the judicial system.

Inspection Générale des Finances (IGF): The General Inspectorate of Finance exercises control over the operations carried out by financial controllers of public revenue and public expenditure as well as public accountants.

Autorité de Régulation des Marchés Publics (ARMP): The regulator of public procurement.

Direction Nationale du Contrôle des Marchés Publics (DNCMP): Responsible for the control of public procurement procedures and issues non-objection notices on bidding documents.

Cour des Comptes (CC): The Auditor General is responsible for controlling government accounts, supervising the implementation of budgets, and monitoring public entities.

Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature (CSM): Charged with the appointment, transfer, and dismissal of judges. CSM is chaired by the President of the Supreme Court.

Haute Autorité de Prévention et de Lutte contre la Corruption et les Infractions Assimilées (HAPLUCIA): The anti-corruption agency investigates complaints of corruption and submits cases of alleged corruption to the public prosecutor.

Cellule Nationale de Traitement des Informations Financières (CENTIF): The financial intelligence unit was created in 2009. It receives and analyzes suspicious transaction reports and disseminates financial intelligence to the public prosecutor for investigation and prosecution.

F. Anti-Money Laundering (AML)

23. Reducing illicit financial flows, including the laundering of proceeds of corruption is a challenge for Togo. Togo's porous borders, susceptibility to corruption, and large informal sector create important vulnerabilities to money laundering. In June 2018, the CENTIF launched a national money laundering and terrorism financing assessment which will help authorities gather a comprehensive understanding of threats and vulnerabilities, including with respect to corruption, to better orient their policies and allocate their resources.

24. Strengthening the AML regime would help support Togo's anti-corruption efforts and tackle the laundering of proceeds of corruption. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the international standard setter for anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT), calls for the mobilization of the AML framework to help detect and trace the laundering of proceeds of corruption, and assist in the investigation and prosecution of bribery⁹. Specific elements of the AML/CFT framework are particularly relevant: implementation

⁹ FATF (2013).

of enhanced due diligence requirements for domestic politically-exposed persons (PEPs), including the identification of PEPs that are the beneficial owners behind legal persons, and reporting by financial institutions of transactions when they suspect or have reason to suspect that the funds are the proceeds of criminal activity, including corruption.

25. Togo should ensure the effective implementation of its 2018 AML/CFT law to support its anti-corruption efforts. The new law transposes the uniform WAEMU AML/CFT law into the national legal framework. Togo's AML/CFT regime is scheduled to undergo a mutual evaluation by the Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA) next year, so the authorities should address remaining technical deficiencies in their legal and institutional framework and ensure the AML/CFT regime's effectiveness at mitigating risks related to ML and related predicate crimes, including acts of corruption. In particular, Togo should strengthen its due diligence measures on domestic PEPs, including their family members and close associates, and transparency of beneficial ownership structure should be improved to better allow for the identification of PEP. In addition, banking sector AML supervision by the Banking Commission should be bolstered to ensure that preventive AML measures are effectively implemented¹⁰.

Box 3. Perception Indicators Quoted in the Report

Afrobarometer: Produced by a pan-African research network that conducts public attitude surveys on governance, economic conditions, and related issues in more than 35 countries in Africa. It is carried out through a partnership of research institutions based in Benin, Ghana, Kenya, South Africa, and the United States. The surveys are based on a series of face-to-face interviews with a random sample of either 1,200, 1,600 or 2,400 people in each country.

Doing Business Indicators: Produced by the World Bank. The indicators provide perceptions of experts based on laws and regulations.

Trade Facilitation Indicators (TFIs): Produced by the OECD. The indicators provide perceptions of experts based on information of border procedures reported in the TFI database.

Transparency International: An international non-government organization based in Berlin, Germany. It publishes the Corruption Perceptions Index that provides perceptions of business people and country experts of the level of corruption in the public sector within the past two years.

Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI): Produced by Daniel Kaufmann, Natural Resource Governance Institute and Brookings Institution, and Art Kraay, World Bank Development Research Group. The dataset summarizes the views on the quality of governance provided by many enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in over 200 countries. These data are gathered from several survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and private sector firms. WGI reports margins of error to encourage caution in making comparisons across countries and across time. Caution is also needed as the quality of underlying data can vary across countries and data sources.

¹⁰ IMF (2019).

G. Summary

26. While improving, Togo's general governance structures seem somewhat weaker than the WAEMU and SSA averages. Against this background, the government has become increasingly engaged in institutional reforms to strengthen governance and institutions. At this time, the authorities would be well advised to focus on:

- *Continuing broad-based fiscal governance reforms.* Publish more transparent fiscal data, deepen revenue reforms and increase the use of risk-based analysis, ensure that public investment projects will be prioritized based on rigorous cost-benefit criteria, strengthen the monitoring of public enterprises, and establish procedures for systematic follow-up of audit reports by the Auditor General (*Cour des Comptes*) and other control organs. Transparent reporting of fiscal data is important because access to information protects results and efficiency and empowers civil society and legislators to be a watchdog with effective oversight of government functions.
- *Strengthening anticorruption measures.* Togo is preparing to adopt an asset declaration legislation for all civil servants who are politically exposed to the risks of corruption. This legislation should aim at meeting international good practices, including on comprehensiveness of disclosed information, its publication and verification. Togo would also benefit from establishing clear procedures for the recovery and management of property that has been acquired through illicit activities as well as strengthening AML tools that support anticorruption measures, such as improving the transparency of legal entities, establishing preventive measures for domestic PEPs and ensuring the implementation through effective supervision.
- *Ensuring a fair and effective execution of existing laws and regulations.* This will require capacity building and avoiding political interference that undermines predictability and effectiveness of the judiciary, anti-corruption institutions, and control organs and impacts negatively on the investment climate. The competition to attract private sector investment is intense and countries with a predictable legal and regulatory environment will be at an advantage when investors decide where to make critical investments.
- *Streamlining border procedures and establishing a more solid regulatory framework for public projects delegated to private-sector providers.* Cost-effective procedures and regulations are always vital and particularly so for a country like Togo, which is aiming for a position as a growing regional transportation hub based on goods shipped through the Port of Lomé.


Figure 1. Governance Indicators

Table 1. Togo: PEFA Assessments

Indicator	Togo 2012-14	Burkina Faso 2014-16	Cote d'Ivoire 2014-16	Mali 2013-15	Niger 2012-14
Budget reliability					
1. Aggregate expenditure outturn					
2. Expenditure composition outturn					
3. Revenue outturn					
Transparency					
4. Budget classification					
5. Budget documentation					
6. Central government operations outside financial reports					
7. Transfers to subnational governments					
8. Performance information for service delivery					
9. Public access to fiscal information					
Asset and liability management					
10. Fiscal risk reporting					
11. Public investment management					
12. Public asset management					
13. Debt management					
Budget strategy and budgeting based on public policies					
14. Macroeconomic and fiscal forecasting					
15. Fiscal strategy					
16. Medium-term perspective in expenditure budgeting					
17. Budget preparation process					
18. Legislative scrutiny of budgets					
Predictability and control of budget execution					
19. Revenue administration					
20. Accounting for revenue					
21. Predictability of in-year resource allocation					
22. Expenditure arrears					
23. Payroll controls					
24. Procurement management					
25. Internal controls on nonsalary expenditure					
26. Internal audit					
Accounting and reporting					
27. Financial data integrity					
28. In-year budget reports					
29. Annual financial reports					
Oversight and external audits					
30. External audit					
31. Legislative scrutiny of audit reports	No score				

Rating

A

B

C

D