

# 1 Introduction

Mounting evidence suggests that the cost of markups is both large and rapidly growing (Edmond et al., 2018; Baqaee and Farhi, 2020). There is far less agreement, however, on the sources and economic importance of the distortions generating these markups. A long-standing tradition, starting with Harberger (1954)'s study of monopolies, holds that such market distortions are no major cause for concern.<sup>1</sup> We revisit this issue by studying one micro origin of competition distortion—collusion—and tracing its aggregate impact on the economy.

This paper builds a bridge from industrial organization to macroeconomics in order to derive implications for economic policy. Motivated by a novel dataset with detailed information on investigated French cartels, we use a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms, oligopolistic competition, and cartels to quantify their impact on aggregate productivity and welfare. In our model, market power varies across firms and markup dispersion gives rise to misallocation even when firms behave competitively. Colluding allows cartel members to charge supracompetitive markups, or overcharges, which can further amplify markup dispersion. By focusing on a specific source of competition distortion that we document with micro data, we are able to assess the gains from eliminating this *additional* misallocation that arises from cartels, thereby providing an estimate on the quantitative importance of competition distortions.<sup>2</sup>

We start by analyzing the antitrust decisions taken by the French Competition Authority over two decades and build a firm-level database on cartels, focusing on firms that have been convicted by the national competition regulator for being part of a cartel.<sup>3</sup> Our cartel dataset extracts the information contained in the sentencing decisions.<sup>4</sup> Specifically, it contains information on the identify of cartel members, the type of infringement, the duration of the cartel, the fines handed down to each firm. We then match this dataset to administrative data on the universe of French firms containing information on their sales, market shares, labor productivities, among others. This allows us to study the characteristics of cartels and how cartel members differ from non-members.

We establish four stylized facts. First, we find that cartels are typically small,

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<sup>1</sup>Harberger (1954) finds that the losses from monopolistic behavior in the US manufacturing sector in the 1930s amount to not more than a tenth of a percent of GDP.

<sup>2</sup>Our estimates capture the static cost of eliminating cartels. As we abstract from the fact that cartels may erect barriers to entry, limit innovation, and that there are many other sources of distortions to competition, we view our approach as conservative.

<sup>3</sup>Our administrative dataset covers 1994–2007. For this reason, our cartel data span the same period. Moreover, as argued in the next section, our focus on domestic cartels arguably underestimates the cost of cartels as international cartels are typically larger than domestic ones (Connor, 2020).

<sup>4</sup>Given that these cartels have been detected, they might not be representative of the latent population of cartels. We discuss how this might bias our results in Section 3.

with the median cartel involving four firms. Moreover, these firms' illegal activities are numerous and all influence prices. These activities include price fixing, sharing their customers and market shares, rigging procurement auctions and sharing confidential information. Second, these cartels are widespread in the economy as they have been detected in almost all sectors. Third, most cartel members are top players in their industry. Indeed, cartel members tend to be much larger and more productive than non-cartel members, even within narrowly defined industries. Finally, we show that cartels are made up of relatively homogeneous firms in terms of productivity and sales.

Motivated by our empirical evidence, we build a static heterogeneous-firm model with oligopolistic competition à la [Atkeson and Burstein \(2008\)](#) and extend it to feature collusive behaviors.<sup>5</sup> We provide a tractable microfoundation based on the cross-ownership framework of [O'Brien and Salop \(1999\)](#). Heterogeneous markups arise endogenously in the model as more productive firms have a large market share, thereby facing a lower demand elasticity and allowing them to charge higher markups in equilibrium.<sup>6</sup> Cartel members deviate from own-profit maximization, as they internalize some of their impact on the profits of other cartel members. In equilibrium, cartel members' demand elasticities thus depend on their own market shares as well as the market share of other cartel members. As a result, they face a lower demand elasticity and charge supracompetitive markups,<sup>7</sup> which affects markup dispersion and the level of the aggregate markup. As our framework naturally nests the [Atkeson and Burstein \(2008\)](#) model, we are able to assess the marginal impact of cartels on aggregate productivity, starting from an environment where there is already substantial markup dispersion.

We find that aggregate TFP would be 2% higher if there were no cartels. Intuitively, because cartel members are the top firms in their industry as documented empirically, breaking down cartels reduces the markup and price of its members, thereby reallocating demand towards these large producers. This decreases markup dispersion and increases aggregate productivity. Second, our framework also has implications in terms of distance to the efficient allocation, where relative prices are aligned with relative marginal costs. We find that eliminating cartels —thereby reducing the extra amount of markup dispersion —would bring the economy 37%

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<sup>5</sup>This model features a continuum of sectors in which a finite number of firms compete with each other à la Cournot and face Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) demand functions. This allows us to have oligopolistic firms in general equilibrium ([Neary, 2003](#)). We also consider a variant of the model with price competition à la Bertrand in the robustness section. This alternative yields similar qualitative results.

<sup>6</sup>This is inefficient as more productive firms are “too small” because of their market power.

<sup>7</sup>Cartels differ from horizontal mergers in which cost synergies might increase the productivity of the firms involved in the merger and dominate the increase in market power as in the classical trade-off model of [Williamson \(1968\)](#).

closer to the efficient allocation. This suggests that eliminating cartels can be an effective way of improving allocative efficiency. Third, the decrease in the *level* of markups leads to a drop in the aggregate markup, which also has welfare implications. We find that eliminating cartels would lead to a consumption-equivalent welfare gain of about 3.5%.

These numbers challenge the received wisdom that the economic cost of distortions to competition might be low, as they are one order of magnitude higher than the estimate provided by Harberger (1954). We show that our model can reproduce Harberger’s estimate when we instead assume a sectoral version of the model with no markup dispersion across firms within industries, or when the demand elasticities are close to unity—as he assumed using sectoral data. This points to the importance of using disaggregated data in which markup dispersion is typically higher, as recently argued by Baqaee and Farhi (2020).<sup>8</sup>

Breaking down cartel would also increase competition through a second, indirect channel. Indeed, the presence of a cartel allows non-cartel members to increase their markups and prices as the prices of cartel members serve as an umbrella. We find that this umbrella pricing effect dampens the aggregate gains to productivity and welfare but that the effect is quantitatively small: not allowing non-cartel members to adjust their markups downwards would lead to a 2.05% increase in aggregate productivity instead of 2.01% for our benchmark results. We also study the welfare gains of competition policy at the intensive margin—i.e. cartel members respond to more vigilant antitrust scrutiny by reducing their collusion intensities.<sup>9</sup> We find that the intensive margin of cartels is important too. A decrease in the collusion intensity parameter of approximately 50% still generates gains to aggregate productivity that are about 1%. Finally, our results are robust to different approaches to recover the intensity of collusion parameter, to using alternative targets for our calibration procedure, to changing the mode of competition to Bertrand competition and to using alternative values for our key parameters.

**Related Literature.** Cartels have not received widespread attention from macroeconomists, despite the rich and vigorous debates among industrial organization scholars.<sup>10</sup> We can think of at least three reasons. First, from a theoretical standpoint, the cost of cartels can be negligible if competitive forces—incentives to defect

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<sup>8</sup>Our numbers are in line with their finding—as well as Edmond et al. (2018)’s—that eliminating markup dispersion would raise aggregate TFP by a much larger amount than what Harberger (1954) found. We highlight the differences with both contributions in the literature review.

<sup>9</sup>For instance, this might be the case if the threat of increased fines if the cartel is detected by antitrust authorities is credible.

<sup>10</sup>Or in Bridgman et al. (2015)’s words: “the idea that cartels might reduce industry productivity by misallocating production from high to low productivity producers is as old as Adam. While the idea has stood the test of time, it has done little else.”

from the collusive agreement (Stigler, 1964)—are strong enough to make cartels unstable and irretrievably short-lived. In contrast, the recent empirical literature has shown that cartels are long-lasting (Levenstein and Suslow, 2006) and that “some forms of collusion are likely to be prevalent in many industries” (Asker and Nocke, 2021). Second, given the secret nature of collusive agreements, cartels are hard to detect. We address this challenge by analyzing cartels that have been detected by the competition authority. Third, the variety of cartel arrangements requires a macroeconomic framework rich enough to accommodate collusive firms of varying sizes, markups, and overcharges alongside firms who behave competitively.<sup>11</sup> We fill this gap by providing a flexible microfoundation of anticompetitive firms in an oligopolistic competition model with heterogeneous firms and markups. As a result, our model allows us to quantitatively integrate the empirical cartel literature with recent macroeconomic studies on the productivity and welfare costs of markups (Edmond et al., 2018; Baqaee and Farhi, 2020).

Misallocation of factors of production is an important source of productivity loss (Restuccia and Rogerson, 2008; Hsieh and Klenow, 2009). We focus on markup dispersion as a source of misallocation, which Edmond et al. (2018) and Baqaee and Farhi (2020) also analyze in important contributions.<sup>12</sup> Our paper differs from theirs in that we focus on a specific type of competition distortion whose economic relevance is documented through the use of novel micro data. Moreover, our main exercise consists in quantifying the gains of going from the cartel allocation to the competitive one, which is still inefficient. This distortion creates extra *size-dependent* markup dispersion and increases the distance to the efficient frontier. While it might be hard to implement policies that fully eliminate markup dispersion, eliminating the extra dispersion caused by the presence of cartels is arguably more easily attainable through competition policy.<sup>13</sup> An important limitation of our approach with respect to Baqaee and Farhi (2020) is that we do not account for input-output linkages, which are found to be important in accounting for the gains from eliminating markups. Markups in their framework are exogenous primitives, however. They are endogenous in our model, which allows us to quantify the gains from increasing competition through stricter antitrust enforcement. Moreover, our model is static

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<sup>11</sup>The variety of possible collusive arrangements, which include price fixing, production limitations or market sharing, are recognized by Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

<sup>12</sup>Edmond et al. (2015) build an open-economy version of the Atkeson and Burstein (2008) model and calibrate it to Taiwanese micro data. They find that international trade reduces misallocation and has significant pro-competitive effects.

<sup>13</sup>Our results further provide a mechanism why measures that increase competition improve productivity as Buccirossi et al. (2013) document for 22 industries in twelve OECD countries over 1995 to 2005.

and abstracts away from entry and exit.<sup>14</sup> For these reasons, we view our contribution and that of [Edmond et al. \(2018\)](#) and [Baqaee and Farhi \(2020\)](#) as complementary. Finally, [Brooks et al. \(2021\)](#) develop a screen for identifying noncompetitive behaviors in China's manufacturing clusters. They find that while firms in clusters charge higher markups, markup dispersion goes down in the industry. The latter effect dominates the former in their welfare calculation, increasing welfare. Our work is different in several regards. While our microfounded framework naturally nests their ad hoc screen, we study the whole economy rather than manufacturing, quantify a model based on actual anticompetitive behaviors and find negative effects of cartels on markup dispersion. The latter result differs from theirs because as we document, cartel members are top firms in their industry.

Our work also relates to recent influential papers that document the rise of markups ([De Loecker et al., 2020](#); [De Loecker and Eeckhout, 2018](#)) and link changes in market concentration to changes in the labor share ([Autor et al., 2020](#); [De Loecker et al., 2021](#)). Although we focus on quantifying the gains from breaking down cartels, our framework also has implications in terms of the relationship between competition and market power over time and across markets. [Gutiérrez and Philippon \(2018\)](#) argue that laxer antitrust enforcement in the US is behind the larger increase in concentration observed in the US compared to Europe. If lax antitrust enforcement allows cartels to develop and prosper, this would reduce competition within sectors, increase the market power of all firms, thereby driving up the aggregate markup and depressing the aggregate labor share.

Our work also builds on recent theoretical and empirical advances on cartels. [Bos and Harrington \(2010\)](#) study cartel formation with heterogeneous firms. They show that larger firms have a strong incentive to form a cartel when they are patient enough, and that smaller firms can increase their prices as the larger firms' prices serve as an umbrella. We provide evidence that discovered cartel members are more productive and are larger than non-cartel members in their industry. The empirical study of cartels and their impact on productivity is limited by the fact that secret agreements are, by definition, hard to observe.<sup>15</sup> It is possible, however, to focus on specific cartels operating in particular industries. [Bridgman et al. \(2015\)](#) estimate that the New Deal sugar cartel tremendously decreased productivity through reallocation of production towards low productivity firms in the beet and cane industries. [Asker et al. \(2019\)](#) focus on the oil industry and quantify the role of market power in generating misallocation. Our paper instead connects the

<sup>14</sup>[Edmond et al. \(2018\)](#) find that the entry margin is almost negligible quantitatively.

<sup>15</sup>[Levenstein and Suslow \(2006\)](#) survey the literature on cartels. Most papers study the impact of cartels on prices or the determinants of cartels' success ([Levenstein and Suslow, 2011](#)). Some papers instead study the impact of cartels on welfare, such as [Röller and Steen \(2006\)](#) in the context of the Norwegian cement industry.

cartel and macroeconomics literature by looking at the aggregate productivity and welfare implications of cartels from a macroeconomic perspective.

The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 details our data. We provide an empirical analysis of cartels in Section 3. Section 4 introduces the model. Section 5 provides more information on the quantification of the model. Our results are presented in Section 6, while robustness experiments are reported in Section 7. Section 8 concludes.

## 2 Data

We build a new firm-level dataset on cartels and anti-competitive practices of French firms over the period 1994-2007, using the written reports of all the antitrust decisions taken by the French Competition Authority (ADLC) over the last decades. In this section, we describe important institutional details, explain how we build our dataset, and combine it with firm-level data on the universe of French firms.

### 2.1 Antitrust Decisions

The French Competition Authority is primarily in charge of investigating and fining companies operating on the French market that are found guilty of engaging in any form of anticompetitive practice, i.e., abuse of dominant position, collusion or predatory pricing.<sup>16</sup> We focus on collusion between firms so that anticompetitive practices will refer to collusion hereafter. Collusive behaviors might involve firms trading information on their prices, imposing standard form contracts, enforcing barriers to entry, imposing exclusive or selective distribution agreements, market sharing, purposely stepping down from calls for bids, or a combination of the above.

There are two tools in ADLC's arsenal: fines and injunctions. Fines are set "according to the seriousness of the facts, the extent of the harm done to the economy, the individual situation of the company that has committed the infringement and of the group to which it belongs to, and whether it is an infringement that has been repeated or not".<sup>17</sup> Fines are capped at "10% of the global turnover of the group to which the company that is being fined belongs to" or at a maximum amount of the fine capped at 3 million euros if the infringement is committed by an entity other than a for-profit firm.<sup>18</sup> Alternatively the ADLC can issue injunctions to formally notify companies to stop anticompetitive behavior.

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<sup>16</sup>Cases spanning multiple countries are handled at the supra-national level by the Directorate-General for Competition of the European Commission.

<sup>17</sup>French Commercial Code, L.420-1 or L.420-2.

<sup>18</sup>French Commercial Code, L.464-2.



Our new database summarizes information contained in the investigation and decisions files published in French on the ADLC website. Crucially, the PDF files contain the name of the firms that are fined for engaging in anticompetitive practices.<sup>19</sup> We also retrieve information on the amount of the fine, the type of anticompetitive practice, the duration of the practice, the cause of breakup, the year the verdict is returned and the starting year of the investigation. We then use the companies' names *and* sales to recover their unique national identification code ("SIREN" code) given by the French National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE). This allows us to match our database to other firm-level production datasets. More details on the construction of the database can be found in Appendix A.<sup>20</sup>

Because our analysis focuses on a single country and because information on market shares of foreign firms on the French market cannot be recovered, international cartels are not included in our data. These cross-country cartels are usually investigated by the European Commission and its Directorate General for Competition (DG Comp), which deals with cases affecting multiple European member states. Given that these private international cartels are typically "the largest, most injurious, and most difficult to prosecute of all price-fixing violations" (Connor, 2020),<sup>21</sup> the estimates we provide based on national cartels will likely *underestimate* the impact of collusion. We eliminate from our dataset cases where single firms were fined for behaving anticompetitively. This is the case if firms abused their dominant position or are repeat offenders, for example. Our final dataset on cartels contains 174 cartels and more than a thousand firms.

## 2.2 Administrative Data

We match our database on anti-competitive firms with firm-level data for France, using the firms' identification number. The datasets that we use contain the universe of French firms over the period 1994-2007. These datasets contain the balance sheets and income statements of all French firms. We keep both large and smaller firms which corresponds to two different tax regimes, the Regime of Normal Real Profits (BRN) and the Simplified Regime for the Self-Employed (RSI), respectively. BRN contains firms with annual sales above 763K euros (230K euros for services)

<sup>19</sup>We make use of an automatic textual analysis to retrieve information on the identity of the firms fined by the antitrust body and then merge it to the other datasets. We do not use information on firms notified by an injunction: often, these firms are fined later on by the ADLC and thus appear in our database.

<sup>20</sup>The number of decisions per year we use and the number of firms involved are reported in Figures A1 and A2. Figure A3 displays a representative report from the ADLC (decision file 17d20). Figure A4 shows that information on the duration of cartel can also be found in these reports, as well as information on the type of infringement as shown in Figure A5.

<sup>21</sup>As Connor (2020) explains, "private cartels are those that are not protected by government sovereignty or by international treaties, like the Organization of Oil Exporting Countries (OPEC)".

whereas smaller firms included in RSI sell at least 76.3K euros (but less than 763K euros) a year and more than 27K euros for services. However, BRN is the most relevant data source given that in 2003, BRN firms' sales share in total sales was 94.3% and is constant over time. This data source has been used in previous studies, for instance in [Di Giovanni et al. \(2014\)](#), and we refer to their paper for more information. Importantly, these exhaustive databases allow us to recover a firm's market share and other variables we use in our empirical analysis. More information on the variables we use can be found in [Appendix A](#).

### 3 Characteristics of Cartels

This section uses the data sources described in the previous section to present stylized facts about the cartels and cartel members detected by the ADLC.

#### 3.1 Cartel Duration and Size

The average duration of a cartel is about 4.5 years ([Table 1](#)), which is close to the average duration reported in [Monnier-Schlumberger and Hutin \(2016\)](#) who report an average duration of five years for their sample of discovered French cartels observed over the period 2003-2015. This also matches the average duration of cartels summarized in [Levenstein and Suslow \(2006\)](#) for a wide range of studies. Our median duration is about 3 years, which is also consistent with what [Monnier-Schlumberger and Hutin \(2016\)](#) report (3.8 years).<sup>22</sup>

The average number of firms per cartel is 6 and the median is 4. While there are extremely large cartels made up of more than 70 firms, this is not the norm as the standard deviation is equal to 7. [Combe and Monnier \(2012\)](#) report an average (median) number of firms per cartel of 7.7 (5), while [Monnier-Schlumberger and Hutin \(2016\)](#) report an average number of cartel members of 10.

We further report a few statistics on the types of cartels. Most firms that are part of a cartel share confidential information, rig procurement auctions, and fix their prices. Communicating seems to be a pervasive feature of cartels. As [Asker and Nocke \(2021\)](#) argue, "across the heterogeneity of cartel forms, a relatively common feature, empirically, of coordinated activity that seems uncontroversially anti-competitive is communication". They also share their customers and their market shares, which has been found to be the type of practice that allows cartels to sustain their illegal activities for a long time ([Combe and Monnier, 2012](#); [Levenstein, 2006](#)).

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<sup>22</sup>[Combe and Monnier \(2012\)](#) find that the average (median) duration of cartels is 7 (6) years for their sample of European cartels detected and fined by the European Commission over 1969-2009.



Table 1: Characteristics of Cartels

	Mean (1)	Std. Dev. (2)	Median (3)	Min (4)	Max (5)
Duration (years)	4.49	5.74	3	1	47
# Firms per cartel	6.3	7.4	4	2	76
Price fixing	0.35	0.48	0	0	1
Market allocation	0.29	0.46	0	0	1
Production quotas	0.04	0.2	0	0	1
Information sharing	0.59	0.49	1	0	1
Repeat offender	0.08	0.27	0	0	1
Bid rigging	0.40	0.49	0	0	1
Dominant leader	0.04	0.2	0	0	1
Abuse of dominant position	0.03	0.18	0	0	1
Guaranteed buy-backs	0.07	0.25	0	0	1
Exclusive dealing contracts	0.18	0.38	0	0	1
# Cartels			174		
# Cartel members			1,037		

**Notes:** The table displays some important characteristics of cartels, using the firm-level database detailed in Appendix A.2. We only consider the decision files involving at least two firms over the period 1994-2007. The duration of the cartel is expressed in years but can be less than a year, in which case it is rounded to one year. The variables (price fixing, market allocation, etc.) that take their values between 0 and 1 are dummy variables.

### 3.2 Cartels across Sectors

Cartels are prevalent in France over the period 1994-2007 (Table 2). Detected cartels operate in the manufacturing sector but also in the construction, wholesale and retail and transportation sectors. This confirms findings that cartels affect intermediate good sectors, as well as other sectors such as services (Monnier-Schlumberger and Hutin, 2016). Columns 5 and 6 display the average number of anticompetitive firms in each sector over the period 1994-2007. There are only two sectors in which no firm was convicted, namely the agricultural and the education sectors, which only account for 0.5% of total value-added. Table A1 in the Appendix shows that cartels can be found in a variety of sectors when looking at a given cross-section—here, in 2007.<sup>23</sup>

This finding adds further empirical support to the fact that cartels operate across a wide range of industries and sectors.<sup>24</sup>

Table 2: Cartels by Sector

NAF (1)	Sector (2)	Sales Share (3)	VA Share (4)	# Cartels (5)	# Colluding Firms (6)
01-05	Agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing	0.0013	0.0019		
10-14	Mining and quarrying	0.0033	0.0047	1	2
15-16	Food products, beverages and tobacco	0.0553	0.0534	3	19
17-19	Textiles, leather and footwear	0.0136	0.0143	1	1
20	Wood and wood products	0.0048	0.0051	1	8
21-22	Pulp, paper, publishing and printing	0.0227	0.0260	1	4
23	Coke	0.0237	0.0260	1	4
24	Chemicals	0.0435	0.0403	2	9
25	Rubber and plastics	0.0151	0.0169	2	3
26	Other non-metallic mineral prod.	0.0109	0.0133	3	12
27-28	Basic metals and fabricated metal prod.	0.0362	0.0412	2	9
29	Machinery and equipment n.e.c.	0.0250	0.0265	2	7
30-33	Electrical and optical equipment	0.0378	0.0410	2	4
34-35	Transport equipment	0.0533	0.0406	1	2
36-37	Other manufacturing n.e.c	0.0102	0.0107	2	3
40-41	Electricity, gas and water supply	0.0285	0.0428		
45	Construction	0.0596	0.0758	7	42
50-52	Wholesale and retail	0.3518	0.1872	11	69
55	Hotels and restaurants	0.0198	0.0310	1	3
60-63	Transport and storage	0.0472	0.0552	5	27
64	Post and telecommunications	0.0236	0.0503	1	2
70	Real estate activities	0.0140	0.0222	2	2
71-74	Renting and business activities	0.0722	0.1246	8	16
80	Education	0.0016	0.0029		
85	Health and social work	0.0078	0.0157	1	9
90-93	Other service activities	0.0173	0.0304	3	5

**Notes:** The sales share column represents sector-level sales in total sales over the period 1994-2007. The VA share column represents sector-level value-added in total value-added over the period 1994-2007. The values displayed for the number of cartels and colluding firms in columns (5) and (6) are averages over the period 1994-2007.

Table 3: Anticompetitive Firms are Larger

	Anticompetitive Firms				Competitive Firms			
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Market Share (%)	3.43	10.79	0	100	0.07	0.92	0	100
Sales	295,277	1,851,776	10	36,700,000	2070	56,499	1	45,600,000
Value-added	118,799	988,271	4	18,400,000	599	14,206	1	9,926,973
ln Labor Productivity	3.87	0.65	0.097	8.36	3.49	0.64	-2.8	9.52
Labor	1402	13,014	1	295,030	12	156	1	86,587
ln Wage	3.6	0.4	0.61	7.45	3.2	0.6	-2.4	8.6
ln Capital/Labor ratio	2.25	1.25	-2.04	6.47	1.71	1.24	-2.16	10.3
Intermediates	181,175	1,055,268	4	28,900,000	1479	45,876	1	39,800,000
# Obs.			10,721				12,441,919	
# Firms			907				2,167,168	
# Exporters			613				232,316	

**Notes:** The values displayed are for the period 1994-2007. Sales and value-added are in thousands of euros. Labor productivity is real value-added (deflated by 2-digit price indices) divided by the number of workers. Labor is the number of workers. The capital-labor ratio is expressed in real terms where capital has been deflated. Intermediates is the value of expenditures on intermediate goods in thousands of euros.

### 3.3 Cartel Premia

The findings so far have shown that cartels resort to various strategies to raise their prices and operate across different industries and sectors. We now examine how detected cartel members differ from non-members and provide novel evidence that the former are, on average, larger than the latter.

As reviewed in [Asker and Nocke \(2021\)](#), the theoretical literature on the endogenous choice of cartel formation remains scarce with the recent exception of [Bos and Harrington \(2010\)](#) and [Bos and Harrington \(2015\)](#) who consider cartel formation across firms that are ex ante heterogeneous in their capacities. The important result from this literature is that larger firms are more likely to find it profitable to join a cartel. This is because firms face an interesting trade-off: joining the cartel will allow them to increase their markups and prices but it will also lead to a decrease in their sales. The latter effect is larger for smaller firms with a low capacity, so that “we should not expect a cartel to include very small firms” ([Bos and Harrington, 2010](#)). The work by [Bos and Harrington \(2015\)](#) extends [Bos and Harrington \(2010\)](#) to include a competition authority that can detect and convict cartels. They find that antitrust enforcement deters small firms from joining a cartel.

While we are not aware of any other empirical test of this result using micro data, some authors have found that the cumulative market share of cartel members is extremely large, suggesting that cartel members are the top producers in their industry. For instance, [Combe and Monnier \(2012\)](#) find that the average cartel market share in their sample is 80% and that two-thirds have a cumulated market share

<sup>23</sup>The number of cartel members reported may be equal to one because some cartel members were not matched in the administrative data.

<sup>24</sup>For instance, [Levenstein and Suslow \(2006\)](#) report cartels spanning the beer, bromine, cement, coal, diamonds, electrical equipment, ocean shipping, oil, parcel post, potash, railroad, rayon, steel, sugar and tea industries.

higher than 75%.<sup>25</sup> Similarly, Zimmerman and Connor (2005) report an average cartel market share of 85%, while Combe and Monnier (2012) report an average and a median cartel market share of 75%. Harrington Jr et al. (2015) document that the German cement cartel that operated from 1991 until 2002 was made up of the six largest cement firms which controlled 86% of the market.

Before moving on to our results, we pause to discuss two important caveats regarding the numbers we provide. First, unfortunately, the market share of each cartel member is seldom reported in the decision files. We circumvent this issue by calculating the market share of cartel members and the cartel market share using our administrative micro data. The market shares are defined at the 4-digit level—the highest level of disaggregation in our data—for domestic sales. Second, our sample of cartels consists of *discovered* cartels which may not be representative of the latent population of cartels (Harrington Jr and Wei, 2017). Indeed, there might be a myriad of other cartels and colluding companies that go unnoticed—therefore classifying as competitive—while behaving differently from discovered firms. On the one hand, small undetected cartels might break down quickly because they are “bad” at colluding and do not use compensation schemes, for instance—which are typically found to be important in preventing cartel breakdowns (Levenstein and Suslow, 2011). In this case, our numbers would overestimate the size differences between anticompetitive and competitive firms. On the other hand, very large undetected cartel members might be able to go unnoticed because of their capacity to avoid detection and prosecution. This would lead us to underestimate the size differences between cartel members and competitive firms. Although it is not possible to assess the direction of the bias, the theoretical arguments highlighted above would point in the direction of a downward bias.

With this in mind, Table 3 investigates the characteristics of both colluding firms and firms that classify as competitive. Colluding firms have a much higher market share: their market share averages 3.4% versus 0.07% for non-colluding firms. Colluding firms also sell more, spend more on intermediate goods, have more employees, are more capital-intensive, are more productive—as measured by labor productivity—and are more likely to be exporting firms. These statistics are most likely the result of self-selection into colluding rather than reflecting a treatment effect of colluding, as more productive and larger firms are more likely to find it profitable to join a cartel (Bos and Harrington, 2010).

We provide further evidence of a cartel premium. Each column of Table A2 reports an estimate from a regression of a firm’s observable characteristic on a dummy variable equal to one if that firm behaves anticompetitively. We further test whether

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<sup>25</sup>This sample includes the 48 cartels for which they were able to compute the cumulated cartel market share.

Table 4: Labor Productivity Dispersion: Non-Cartel versus Cartel Members

Moment	Within-industry (no cartels)			Within cartel		
	Mean (1)	Std. Dev. (2)	IQ Range (3)	Mean (4)	Std. Dev. (5)	IQ Range (6)
Median	3.765	0.450	0.482	4.474	0.935	1.133
IQ range	0.722	0.316	0.250	0.389	0.347	0.666
90-10 percentile range	1.463	0.550	0.503	0.531	0.527	0.861
95-5 percentile range	1.971	0.699	0.675	0.572	0.540	0.945

**Notes:** This table summarizes firm-level labor productivity distribution moments across four-digit industries and across cartels. Rows correspond to moments of within-industry and within-cartel producer productivity distributions; columns show the across-industry and across-cartel mean and dispersion of these moments. IQ range is the interquartile range.

the baseline results survive the inclusion of 2-digit sector and 4-digit industry fixed effects. The estimates reported in columns 3, 6, 9 and 12 confirm the idea that anticompetitive firms sell more, have a larger market share, are larger in terms of employment and are more productive, even within narrowly defined industries. Specifically, these results suggest that anticompetitive firms have about 1900% more sales than competitive firms, have a market share higher by 4 percentage points, have 1150% more employment and 37% higher labor productivity. Table A3 in the Appendix shows that the results are robust to restricting the analysis to price fixing cartels that represent a minority of the cartel cases in our database—about 47 out of 174 cartels reported in Table 1. Finally, the results in Table A4 show that firms that are top producers in their sector or industry are more likely to be anticompetitive firms.

### 3.4 Cartel Composition

The findings so far have shown that there exist important size differences between cartel members and non-members. We now document the extent to which firms differ within a cartel.

Table 4 reports different productivity distribution moments for non-cartel members in their 4-digit industries (columns 1 to 3) and for cartel members within their cartel (column 4 to 6) in 2007. The first three columns echo the findings of Syverson (2004), namely, that there are important productivity differences even within narrowly defined industries. For instance, column 1 indicates that the average within-industry interquartile range is about 0.72, which means that firms in the 75th percentile of an industry's productivity distribution are about twice as productive as firms in the 25th percentile. However, this ratio is only 1.4-to-1 across firms within their cartel. Similarly, the average 90-10 and 95-5 percentile productivity ratios across non-cartel members within industries are over 4 to 1 and 7 to 1, respectively. These numbers are 1.7 to one and 1.8 to one, for cartel members.

These results might not seem surprising given the existence of a cartel premium documented above. However, they highlight the fact that productivity differences across cartel members are smaller than those across competitive firms in narrowly defined industries.<sup>26</sup> This finding further extends to sales as shown in Appendix Table A5.

Overall, we have shown that firms within a cartel are relatively homogeneous, which lends empirical credence to the theoretical argument that large cost differences across cartel members might make collusion less easily sustainable (Ivaldi et al., 2007).<sup>27</sup>

## 4 Model

We develop a framework designed to extend the analysis pioneered by Harberger (1954) to a granular economy with heterogeneous firms and cartels that can speak to the stylized facts established in the previous section. We build a static, closed-economy, model in which heterogeneous firms choose their markups endogenously along the lines of Atkeson and Burstein (2008), and where cartels coexist with competitive firms. The model allows for both Cournot and Bertrand competition. The economy is made of a continuum of sectors, but in each sector, only a *finite* number of firms compete with each other.<sup>28</sup> In equilibrium, firms' endogenous markups increase with their market share.

Collusion in turn affects markups. We adopt Harrington Jr (2017)'s definition of collusive behavior: "collusion is when firms in a market *coordinate* their behavior for the purpose of producing a *supracompetitive outcome*" (Harrington Jr, 2017, p.1, emphasis in original). Collusion affects the extent to which firms internalize the impact of their production and pricing decisions on the sectoral output and price level. Therefore, colluding in this framework closely resembles cross-ownership and produces similar competition distortions (O'Brien and Salop, 1999).<sup>29</sup> The most attractive feature of this formulation is that our framework nests several modes of collusion, depending on the value of a single parameter. In addition, it provides tractable micro-foundations to quantify the aggregate productivity gains from eliminating cartels. We further find that collusion unambiguously raises prices and is

<sup>26</sup>As a case study, Appendix Table A6 illustrates this finding for the manufacture of plastic components for construction industry in which two cartels operated in 2007.

<sup>27</sup>This is because large firms might be better protected from retaliation in case they deviate from the collusive equilibrium and because large firms might gain relatively more by cheating. Miklos-Thal (2011) provides an interesting theoretical treatment of price fixing with asymmetric participants.

<sup>28</sup>This setting captures a similar intuition as in Neary (2003), where firms are considered "large in the small and vice versa".

<sup>29</sup>Gilo et al. (2006) and de Haas and Paha (2016) study how common ownership affects collusion.



harmful to consumers.

## 4.1 Environment

An infinitely-lived representative household maximizes a time-separable utility

$$\mathbb{E} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \mathcal{U}(c_t, 1 - l_t) \quad (1)$$

The first-order conditions for the household are standard and yield the familiar intra-temporal tradeoff between consumption and leisure:  $-\frac{\mathcal{U}_{l,t}}{\mathcal{U}_{c,t}} = \frac{W_t}{P_t}$

### 4.1.1 Market Structure

The production side of the economy consists of a continuum of sectors indexed by  $s \in [0, 1]$ . Final consumption  $c$  is produced by a competitive firm that combines the outputs from all the sectors  $y_s$  with a CES technology with elasticity  $\eta$ :

$$c = \left[ \int_0^1 y_s^{\frac{\eta-1}{\eta}} ds \right]^{\frac{\eta}{\eta-1}} \quad (2)$$

The inverse demand function for each intermediate output from sector  $s$  is given by:

$$\frac{P_s}{P} = \left( \frac{y_s}{c} \right)^{-\frac{1}{\eta}} \quad (3)$$

where  $P$ , the price index for final consumption representing the “true cost of living”, is a function of the sectoral prices:

$$P = \left[ \int_0^1 P_s^{1-\eta} ds \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}} \quad (4)$$

Each sector is populated by a finite number of firms  $K_s$  indexed by  $k$ . Because each firm has a non-zero measure, it is therefore “large in the small but small in the large” (Neary, 2003), *i.e.* firms are small with respect to the economy but large in their own sector. The output in sector  $s$  is a composite of the firms’ outputs, combined with a CES technology with elasticity parameter  $\rho$ :<sup>30</sup>

$$y_s = \left[ \sum_{k=1}^{K_s} (q_{sk})^{\frac{\rho-1}{\rho}} \right]^{\frac{\rho}{\rho-1}} \quad (5)$$

<sup>30</sup>Following Atkeson and Burstein (2008), we assume that goods are imperfect substitutes,  $\rho < \infty$ , and more substitutable within than between sectors,  $1 < \eta < \rho$ .

The inverse demand functions within each sector are given by:

$$\frac{P_{sk}}{P_s} = \left( \frac{q_{sk}}{y_s} \right)^{-\frac{1}{\rho}} \quad (6)$$

where the price index  $P_s$  in sector  $s$  is given by

$$P_s = \left[ \sum_{k=1}^{K_s} (P_{sk})^{1-\rho} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\rho}} \quad (7)$$

We consider an industry  $s$  populated by  $K_s$  firms, of which a subset  $\mathcal{C}_s$  forms a cartel, with  $0 \leq |\mathcal{C}_s| \leq K_s$ . For simplicity, we assume that firms form cartels that do not reach across industries and we abstract from vertical arrangements. Moreover, we derive our main results under Cournot competition but our results are qualitatively robust to assuming Bertrand competition as shown in the Appendix and in the robustness section.

#### 4.1.2 Non-Cartel Members

With linear labor costs and heterogenous productivities  $z_{si}$ , any competitive firm that does not belong to the cartel ( $i \notin \mathcal{C}_s$ ) solves the following maximization problem:

$$\max_{q_{si}} \left( P_{si} - \frac{W}{z_{si}} \right) q_{si}, \quad (8)$$

subject to the inverse demand function

$$\left( \frac{P_{si}}{P} \right) = \left( \frac{q_{si}}{y_s} \right)^{-\frac{1}{\rho}} \left( \frac{y_s}{c} \right)^{-\frac{1}{\eta}} \quad (9)$$

Profit-maximization implies that the equilibrium price is a markup  $\mu_{si}$  over the marginal cost of production, where the markup is pinned down by the idiosyncratic demand elasticity  $\varepsilon_{si}$  faced by the firm,

$$\begin{aligned} \mu_{si} &= \frac{\varepsilon_{si}(\omega_{si})}{\varepsilon_{si}(\omega_{si}) - 1} \\ \varepsilon_{si}(\omega_{si}) &= \left[ \frac{1}{\rho} + \left( \frac{1}{\eta} - \frac{1}{\rho} \right) \omega_{si} \right]^{-1} \end{aligned} \quad (10)$$

where  $\omega_{si} := \frac{P_{si}q_{si}}{\sum_{j=1}^K P_{sj}q_{sj}}$  is the sectoral revenue share of firm  $i$ . Firms with larger equilibrium market shares have more market power and therefore charge higher markups. In particular, the CES demand structure implies that the demand elastic-

ity that each firm faces in equilibrium is a harmonic weighted average of the within and between-elasticities.

#### 4.1.3 Cartel Members

Collusion distorts firms' profit incentives. Instead of maximizing their own profits independently, members of the same cartel internalize that their decision impacts the other cartel members. The distorted objective function for cartel member  $k$  takes the following form:

$$\pi_k^{\mathcal{C}} = \pi_k + \sum_{j \in \mathcal{C} \setminus \{k\}} \kappa_{kj} \pi_j \quad (11)$$

where  $\pi_k$  corresponds to firm  $k$ 's own profits and the  $\kappa_{kj}$  parameter captures the intensity of collusion. This flexible formulation allows straightforward analytical derivations of collusive behaviors of various intensities and sizes. In addition, it is consistent with micro-foundations that could cover side payments or ringleaders exerting control over the production decisions of other, often smaller, cartel members.<sup>31</sup>

Cartel members therefore solve the following maximization problem:

$$\max_{q_{sk}} \left[ \left( P_{sk} - \frac{W}{z_{sk}} \right) q_{sk} + \sum_{j \in \mathcal{C} \setminus \{k\}} \kappa_{kj} \left( P_{sj} - \frac{W}{z_{sj}} \right) q_{sj} \right], \quad \forall k \in \mathcal{C}_s \quad (12)$$

subject to

$$\left( \frac{P_{sk}}{P} \right) = \left( \frac{q_{sk}}{y_s} \right)^{-\frac{1}{\rho}} \left( \frac{y_s}{c} \right)^{-\frac{1}{\eta}} \quad (13)$$

Markups take a similar form as in equation (10) but collusion weakens competition thereby yielding lower demand elasticities  $\varepsilon_{sk}^{\mathcal{C}}$  for cartel members:

$$\varepsilon_{sk}^{\mathcal{C}}(\omega_{sk}) = \left[ \frac{1}{\rho} + \left( \frac{1}{\eta} - \frac{1}{\rho} \right) \left( \omega_{sk} + \sum_{j \in \mathcal{C} \setminus \{k\}} \kappa_{kj} \omega_{sj} \right) \right]^{-1} \quad (14)$$

How do cartels change the market structure of this economy? Cartels do not affect fundamentals - firms' productivities - but distort cartel members' production decisions. Because cartel members partially internalize the effect of their own produc-

<sup>31</sup> Let  $\beta_{jl}$  denote the share of firm  $j$ 's operational profits promised as a side-payment to firm  $l$ . The financial profits accruing to firm  $l$ 's shareholders then correspond to the portfolio  $\pi^l = \sum_j \beta_{jl} \pi_j$ . If firm  $k$  is under the influence of other members of the cartels, then the distorted objective function of its managers becomes  $\tilde{\pi}_k = \sum_{l \in \mathcal{C}} \gamma_{kl} \pi^l = \sum_l \gamma_{kl} \sum_j \beta_{jl} \pi_j$  where  $\gamma_{kl}$  denotes firm  $l$ 's control over firm  $k$ 's operational decisions, that forces firm  $k$ 's managers to internalize the impact of their decisions on firm  $l$ 's profits. For the distinction between ownership and control, see [Shleifer and Vishny \(1997\)](#). See [O'Brien and Salop \(1999\)](#), [Azar et al. \(2018\)](#), [Azar and Vives \(2021\)](#), and [Ederer and Pellegrino \(2021\)](#) for related formulations in the common ownership literature. See Appendix E for details.

tion decisions on other members' profits, colluding firms' markups rise. This can be seen from equation (14) in which the market share of other cartel members yields a lower demand elasticity allowing cartel members to charge higher markups.

#### 4.1.4 Types of Collusion

The extent to which colluding firms internalize part of the effect of their decision on the other cartel members' profits depends on the profit weights  $\kappa_{kj}$  they assign to other cartel members' profits. Importantly, our model nests several cases of interest.<sup>32</sup>

**Benchmark competitive economy.** When all the collusion parameters  $\kappa_{kj}$  are set to zero, there are no cartels and the model boils down to a competitive Nash-Cournot model with heterogeneous firms (Atkeson and Burstein, 2008). In this case, firms' markups are given by equation (10), with more productive firms charging higher markups. This is the counterfactual allocation we consider to compute the aggregate gains from eliminating cartels.

**Cartels with symmetric collusion.** The second case we consider is that of imperfect collusion where cartel members partially internalize each other's behavior in a symmetric fashion.<sup>33 34</sup> Markups are given by

$$\mu_{sk}^C = \left[ \frac{\rho - 1}{\rho} + \left( \frac{\eta - 1}{\eta} - \frac{\rho - 1}{\rho} \right) \left( \omega_{sk} + \kappa \sum_{j \in \mathcal{C} \setminus \{k\}} \omega_{sj} \right) \right]^{-1} \quad (15)$$

that is, a sales-weighted harmonic average of the within- and between- markups as in the benchmark case, except that the weight is augmented to reflect the market power of the other firms in the cartel. This effect is more pronounced as collusion intensity,  $\kappa$ , increases.

**Cartels with full collusion.** The case where the profit weights are equal to unity boils down to full collusion where firms maximize their joint profits and equally weight all cartel members' profits. In this case, the markup for a cartel member  $k$  is

<sup>32</sup>The micro-founded model in the appendix details configurations that support the cases detailed below.

<sup>33</sup>In our micro-founded model, this is the case when firms' ownership shares or influence are constant across different firms. See Appendix E.1 for more details.

<sup>34</sup>This is the case considered by Brooks et al. (2021) who study how Chinese industrial clusters affect competition.

given by:

$$\mu_{sk}^{\mathcal{C}} = \left[ \frac{\rho - 1}{\rho} + \left( \frac{\eta - 1}{\eta} - \frac{\rho - 1}{\rho} \right) \sum_{j \in \mathcal{C}} \omega_{sj} \right]^{-1} \quad (16)$$

All colluding firms that belong to cartel  $\mathcal{C}$  charge the same markup that is governed by the combined market share  $\sum_{j \in \mathcal{C}} \omega_{sj}$ . This *reduces* markup dispersion for firms within the cartel. However, markup dispersion at the sectoral level might increase depending on the exact composition of the cartel and the reaction of non-cartel members.

## 4.2 How Collusion Distorts the Market Structure

### 4.2.1 Markups and Collusion

Consider transitioning from the benchmark competitive equilibrium to a collusive equilibrium with a small collusive intensity  $\Delta\kappa$ . For firm  $k$  in the cartel, the log change in markups at the first order is

$$\hat{\mu}_{sk}^{\mathcal{C}} = \underbrace{\Upsilon_{sk} \hat{P}_s}_{\text{Umbrella Pricing}} + \underbrace{\frac{1}{\rho - 1} \frac{\Upsilon_{sk}}{\omega_{sk}} (\omega_{s\mathcal{C}} - \omega_{sk}) \Delta\kappa}_{\text{Cartel Overcharge}} \quad (17)$$

where  $\Upsilon_{sk} := \frac{\omega_{sk}(\rho - 1) \left( \frac{1}{\eta} - \frac{1}{\rho} \right) \mu_{sk}}{1 + \omega_{sk}(\rho - 1) \left( \frac{1}{\eta} - \frac{1}{\rho} \right) \mu_{sk}} \in (0, 1)$  represents the elasticity of the firm's own price with respect to the sectoral price index and  $\hat{P}_s$  is the percentage change of the sectoral price index. The first term is common to all firms in the sector, whether they are part of the cartel or not. It can be interpreted as a form of “umbrella pricing”, reflecting the relaxation of price competition. The second term is specific to cartel members and can be interpreted as the cartel overcharge. The overcharge varies across firms in the cartel and is increasing along both the extensive margin of collusion, i.e. the total market share controlled by the cartel  $\omega_{s\mathcal{C}}$  and the intensive margin  $\Delta\kappa$ .

**Proposition 1** (Prices and Markups under Collusion). *Starting from the competitive equilibrium, symmetric collusion i) increases the sectoral price index and ii) increases the markups of all firms. In particular, iii) for cartel members, the markup increase declines with firm size iv) while for non-cartel members, the markup increase increases with firm size.*

*Proof.* See Appendix E. □

Compared with the competitive Nash-Cournot equilibrium, the cartel equilibrium entails an increase in the markups of *all* firms. This is because the introduction of

cartels and anti-competitive behaviors generates an increase in the sectoral price index, which in turn increases the demand of individual firms that do not belong to a cartel. This allows them to gain market shares and charge higher markups. The framework therefore features an “umbrella pricing” effect, whereby all firms are able to increase their markups. This leads to an increase in the level of the aggregate markup, consistent with recent evidence (De Loecker et al., 2020; De Loecker and Eeckhout, 2018).

**Corollary 1** (Intensive and Extensive Margins of Collusion). *Market distortions arising from collusion are larger i) the more intense the collusion  $\Delta\kappa$  and ii) the larger the market share controlled by the cartel. In particular, the sectoral price increase is*

$$\hat{P}_s = \frac{1}{\rho - 1} \frac{1}{1 - \sum_k \omega_{sk} \Upsilon_{sk}} \sum_{k \in \mathcal{C}} \Upsilon_{sk} (\omega_{s\mathcal{C}} - \omega_{sk}) \Delta\kappa \quad (18)$$

This intuitive result illustrates that both the intensive and extensive margins of the cartel are at play. Equation (18) entails that both an increase in the collusion intensity  $\Delta\kappa$  and a larger market share controlled by the cartel  $\omega_{s\mathcal{C}}$  lead to a higher price index in the sector. The latter directly echoes theoretical findings on heterogeneous cartels.<sup>35</sup>

In addition, firms who are not part of the cartel are also affected:


**Corollary 2** (Market Shares under Collusion). *Non-cartel members all gain market shares. Among cartel members, the evolution of market shares depends on the composition of the cartel. In particular:*

$$\begin{cases} \hat{\omega}_{sk} = (\rho - 1) (1 - \Upsilon_{sk}) \hat{P}_s \\ \hat{\omega}_{sk}^{\mathcal{C}} = (\rho - 1) (1 - \Upsilon_{sk}) \hat{P}_s - \frac{\Upsilon_{sk}}{\omega_{sk}} (\omega_{s\mathcal{C}} - \omega_{sk}) \Delta\kappa \end{cases} \quad (19)$$

Non-colluding firms do not cut their quantities and let their prices rise through the umbrella pricing mechanism, but less than the full magnitude of the sectoral price increase —see Appendix E. Given the nested CES demand structure, this allows them to gain market shares. In contrast, colluding firms tend to raise their prices *more* than the sectoral price increase. Under symmetric collusion, the overcharge tends to be larger for smaller cartel members.<sup>36</sup>



Figure 1: Prices and Markups with and without Cartels



**Notes:** The figure displays firm-level prices and firm-level markups as a function of productivity in a given sector using calibrated parameter values. Firms in the competitive Nash-Cournot (collusive) equilibrium are represented by circles (crosses). Blue (red) firms are non-cartel (cartel) members. The sectoral price index in the competitive (cartel) equilibrium is displayed as a gray (black) dashed line on the left panel.

#### 4.2.2 Illustration: Markups and Harberger Triangles

We illustrate the results of Proposition 1 by tracing the evolution of firm-level prices and markups of all firms in a given sector before and after the cartel is formed. In the absence of cartels, the relationship between firm-level prices and markups and productivity in the competitive equilibrium case is displayed in Figure 1 as circles. Non-cartel members are depicted in blue while cartel members are in red. In equilibrium, more productive firms have lower prices but charge higher markups, resulting from the fact that they have a larger market share. The sectoral price index is displayed as the gray dashed line and is lower than the smallest individual price, reflecting consumers' utility gains from love of variety.


Figure 1 further shows the same sector after a cartel is formed and where firms are now represented by crosses.<sup>37</sup> The cartel translates into an increase in markups and prices of cartel members, thereby leading to an increase in the sectoral price

<sup>35</sup>See Theorem 3 in Bos and Harrington (2010).

<sup>36</sup>This feature follows directly in our framework from the simplifying assumption that the collusion intensity  $\kappa$  is the same across cartel. Alternatively, one can consider arrangements with varying collusion intensity, or, parsimoniously, back-out the firm-specific collusion intensities that deliver the same overcharge for all cartel members, as derived in Appendix E.4.

<sup>37</sup>As explained before, the extent to which cartel members charge a similar markup depends on the collusion intensity parameter  $\kappa$ . We use a value of  $\kappa = 0.7$ , consistent with our baseline estimate.

Figure 2: Harberger Triangles with Firm Heterogeneity and Collusion



**Notes:** Panel a) depicts the welfare loss due to the market power for a monopolist. The inverse demand (blue line) for firm  $k$  in sector  $s$  is  $P_{sk} = q_{sk}^{-1/\rho} P_s y_s^{1/\rho-1/\eta} c^{1/\eta}$ , and thus log linear at the first order, with slope  $-\frac{1}{\rho}$ . Panel b) shows that more productive firms have a lower marginal cost and command a higher markup. Their market power therefore creates a larger welfare loss. In panel c) cartel members' markups increase and converge. Panel d) shows that non-cartel members benefit from umbrella pricing effects.

index. Non-cartel members react to this decrease in competition by increasing their markups and prices. This increase is stronger for less productive cartel members and for more productive non-cartel members, as shown in Proposition 1.

Combined with differences in productivity levels, these markup differences matter for misallocation within the sector. Instead of a single Harberger triangle per sector studied by Harberger (1954),<sup>38</sup> our model features a collection of Harberger triangles in each sector, reflecting heterogeneous firms in oligopolistic competition. To see this, Figure 2 plots the inverse demand function and marginal revenue curves that oligopolists face in our model. The Harberger triangles are formed by the area between the marginal revenue and the marginal cost curves. The deadweight losses

<sup>38</sup>Given data limitations, Harberger (1954) computes deadweight losses by assuming that each sector is populated by a monopolistic firm and that this firm earns a 10% excess profit, on top of servicing a 10% return on capital. See Figure 1 in Harberger (1954).

associated with more productive firms are larger. Failing to account for the dispersion in markups creates a downward bias in the measurement of the impact of cartels on aggregate productivity. In the absence of cartels, all firms' markups are pinned down by the idiosyncratic demand elasticity  $\varepsilon_{si}$  faced by the firm, given in equation (10). In this case, small firms predominantly compete with other firms in the same sector whereas larger firms dominant in their sector internalize some of the substitution effect between sectors. When a firm is so dominant that its market share is close to 1, the markup  $\mu_{sk}$  tends to  $\mu_\eta := \frac{\eta}{\eta-1}$ , the markup associated with the between-sector elasticity of substitution. Conversely, firms whose market share tends to 0 will compete exclusively with firms within their sector and will charge the constant markup  $\mu_\rho := \frac{\rho}{\rho-1}$ , as in the monopolistic competition framework with CES preferences (Melitz, 2003). Collusion distorts production decisions of cartel members, which increases the size of the Harberger triangles (panel c). Finally, relaxed price competition also affects non-cartelized firms. The impact of collusion on the deadweight losses associated with those firms is ambiguous: while their markups increase, they also tend to produce more (panel d).

### 4.3 Aggregate Productivity and Welfare

The model can be aggregated analytically, which yields a transparent analysis of the impact of distortions on productivity and welfare. In particular, output in this economy can be represented by an aggregate production function  $Y = AL$ , where  $A$  measures aggregate productivity and  $L$  is total labor employed in the economy. All aggregate quantities are nested harmonic means of their firm-level counterparts.

#### 4.3.1 Aggregate Productivity

Aggregate productivity follows from the first-order condition for the optimal use of labor combined with the labor market clearing condition:

$$A = \left[ \int_0^1 \left( \sum_{k=1}^{K_s} \frac{y_{sk}}{Y} z_{sk}^{-1} \right) ds \right]^{-1} \quad (20)$$

Aggregate productivity  $A$  is a *quantity*-weighted harmonic average of firm productivities. The aggregate markup in the economy, defined as the ratio of the aggregate price to the marginal cost,  $\mu_{agg} = \frac{P}{W/A}$ , can similarly be expressed as a revenue-weighted harmonic mean of firm-level markups,  $\mu_{agg} = \left[ \int_0^1 \left( \sum_{k=1}^{K_s} \frac{p_{sk} y_{sk}}{PY} \mu_{sk}^{-1} \right) ds \right]^{-1}$ . Alternatively, aggregate productivity can be written in terms of the firm productivity levels and the relative markups  $A = \left[ \int_0^1 \left( \frac{\mu_{agg}}{\mu_s} \right)^\eta z_s^{\eta-1} ds \right]^{\frac{1}{\eta-1}}$  where  $z_s$  is the

sector-level productivity given by:

$$z_s = \left[ \sum_{k=1}^{K_s} \left( \frac{\mu_s}{\mu_{sk}} \right)^\rho z_{sk}^{\rho-1} \right]^{\frac{1}{\rho-1}} \quad (21)$$

and  $\mu_s = \frac{P_s}{W/z_s}$  is the sectoral markup.

Our exercise consists in comparing the aggregate productivity level obtained in the presence of cartels  $A_{\text{Cartel}}$  to the one that would be obtained in the *competitive* Nash-Cournot equilibrium  $A_{\text{Competitive}}$ . Any difference between these two productivity levels arises from changes in markup dispersion. This is different from the exercise done by [Edmond et al. \(2015\)](#) and [Baqaee and Farhi \(2020\)](#) who are instead interested in comparing  $A_{\text{Competitive}}$  to the efficient productivity level  $A_{\text{Efficient}}$  obtained in the *absence* of markup dispersion.<sup>39</sup>

$$A_{\text{Efficient}} = \left( \int_0^1 \left( \sum_{k=1}^{K_s} z_{sk}^{\rho-1} \right)^{\frac{\eta-1}{\rho-1}} ds \right)^{\frac{1}{\eta-1}} \quad (22)$$

### 4.3.2 Collusion and Productivity

How does collusion affect the productive efficiency of the economy? While the effect of cartels on productive efficiency is theoretically ambiguous, collusion likely depresses aggregate productivity in practice because actual cartels tend to be formed by larger firms, as detailed in Section 3. To see this, observe that the change in sectoral productivity is:

$$\hat{z}_s = \sum_k \omega_{sk} \left( \frac{\mu_s}{\mu_{sk}} - 1 \right) \hat{P}_{sk} + (\rho - 1) \sum_k \omega_{sk} \frac{\mu_s}{\mu_{sk}} (\hat{P}_{sk} - \hat{P}_s) \quad (23)$$

The impact on productivity can be decomposed into two channels: a direct price effect and a demand reallocation effect. In the absence of markup dispersion, changes in prices would not directly impact sectoral productivity, as  $\mu_{sk} = \mu_s$  for all  $k$ . In contrast, in the presence of markup dispersion, price increases from high-markup firms reduce sectoral productivity. The second term reflects the changes in market shares. If the cartel is made up of top producers with above average markups, demand is redirected towards less productive firms within that sector and, as a result, sectoral productivity decreases. In contrast, a cartel made up of the smallest firm in that sector would redirect demand towards larger, more productive firms, increas-

<sup>39</sup>In the baseline competitive Cournot framework without collusion, the economy is not at its first-best level because of the markup dispersion arising from firm heterogeneity. Since more productive firms have more market power, they produce less than what is socially optimal, resulting in a suboptimal contribution to aggregate productivity.

ing overall productivity. Empirically, as French cartels tend to be made of top firms (see Section 3) we find a negative relationship between aggregate productivity and collusion intensity, as illustrated in Figure A6.

### 4.3.3 Collusion and Welfare

For the model to generate changes in welfare, we consider a standard extension with capital accumulation and elastic labor supply as in the literature (Edmond et al., 2015, 2018). In this case, the level of the aggregate markup acts as a distortionary wedge. Intuitively, an increase in the aggregate markup induced by the cartelization of the economy reduces the aggregate scale of production and decreases the representative consumer's welfare. In the model, the aggregate markup changes as within-cartelized sectors, cartels generate market share reallocations and all firms experience a markup increase—see Proposition 1. We compute the welfare change in consumption-equivalent units as detailed in Appendix E.7, which takes into account transitional dynamics to the new steady state.

## 4.4 Cartel Overcharge

We conclude the section by discussing the empirical relevance of the mechanism through which cartels amplify existing markup dispersion. In the model, cartel members charge higher markups than they would in a competitive equilibrium, resulting in a price increase and market share reallocations.

Our theoretical framework and estimation strategy builds directly on studies of cartel overcharges. Connor and Bolotova (2006) provide a meta-analysis of 395 cartel episodes over the last 250 years and find that the median (mean) overcharge is 19% (29%).<sup>40</sup> Laborde (2019) analyzes cartel overcharge in a sample of cases judged by European national competition authorities and the European Commission. France is the second most represented country with 46 cases out of 239. The author finds that the median cartel overcharge is 15%. More recently, Laborde (2021) finds that the median cartel overcharge is 10%. Levenstein et al. (2015) provide further evidence on the effect of plausibly exogenous international cartel breakdowns—antitrust enforcement is exogenous to production patterns in their case—on prices and concentration. Focusing on a sample of seven chemical cartels,<sup>41</sup> they find that each cartel breakdown was followed by a large price drop.<sup>42</sup>

<sup>40</sup>Levenstein and Suslow (2006) survey studies having looked at the effect of cartels on prices.

<sup>41</sup>Some of these cartels belong to the class of “supercartels”, mentioned in Connor (2020).

<sup>42</sup>More recently, Asker et al. (2019) find that the OPEC cartel overcharge was higher than 700% in the 1980s. See Asker and Nocke (2021) for a recent survey on the effect of cartels on market performance.

Unfortunately, we cannot directly look at systematic changes in concentration and prices in our 4-digit industries before and after cartel breakdowns to provide motivational evidence in favor of the mechanism of our model for three reasons. First, we do not have firm-level data on prices.<sup>43 44</sup> Second, market concentration is the market outcome of many different supply and demand forces (Syverson, 2019) and cartel breakdowns might themselves be caused by changes in industry performance. As such, changes in concentration may only partially reveal the role played by cartels. Third, exogenous cartel breakdowns cannot be cleanly inferred from our decision files. Indeed, the cause of the breakdown, which is not always reported, is vague. This does not allow us to rely on exogenous antitrust intervention as a shock to competition to look at how cartels affect market concentration.

Our model therefore captures what is arguably the most important feature of cartels, supracompetitive markups, and distorted price schedules that affect aggregate productivity and welfare in return. This framework allows us to generate such cartel overcharges in a tractable manner via changes in the collusion intensity parameter  $\kappa$ .

## 5 Quantification of the Model

We now turn to the description of our calibration strategy. The key parameters determining the extent to which aggregate productivity varies in the presence of cartels are the within and across-sector elasticities of substitution  $\rho$  and  $\eta$ , respectively, and the collusion intensity parameter  $\kappa$ . The gap between  $\rho$  and  $\eta$  pins down how dispersion in market shares translates into markup dispersion. The extent to which cartel members internalize the effect of their decision on other cartel members depends on the parameter  $\kappa$ , which governs the strength of the gains from breaking down cartels: a higher  $\kappa$  leads to larger estimates.

We first describe how we parameterize the model, before describing how we assign values to the parameters. We then discuss the fit of our model.

### 5.1 Parameterization

**Productivity distribution.** We assume that the productivity distribution is Pareto. Firms within a sector draw their productivity  $z$  from a Pareto distribution with

<sup>43</sup>As further discussed in Section 5, this lack of price data also prevents us from estimating firm-level markups (Bond et al., 2021).

<sup>44</sup>For some specific cartels, it is possible to identify a corresponding 6-digit price series. Anecdotal evidence suggests that some of the largest price increases in the sector can be attributed to concerted price increases, as documented in the decision file. See Figure A7.



Table 5: Baseline Calibration

Parameter	Interpretation	Value	Method
$\beta$	Discount factor	0.96	Assigned
$\psi$	Labor supply elasticity	1	Assigned
$\delta$	Capital depreciation rate	0.1	Assigned
$\alpha$	Output elasticity of capital	1/3	Assigned
$\kappa$	Collusion intensity	0.71	Data
$\rho$	Substitution within sectors	11.23	Match data moment
$\eta$	Substitution between sectors	1.50	Match data moment
$\xi$	Pareto shape parameter	7.32	Match data moment
$\sigma$	Geometric parameter firms	0.003	Match data moment
$\zeta$	Geometric parameter cartel members	0.15	Match data moment

**Notes:** The parameters are chosen in order to minimize the distance between model and data moments taken from the French micro data in 2007.

shape parameter  $\xi$ . The draws are i.i.d across firms within their sector. This parameter determines the amount of concentration within sectors.

**Number of firms per sector.** The number of firms per sector is drawn from a geometric distribution with parameter  $\sigma \in (0, 1)$  so that the probability of having  $K_s$  firms is given by  $\sigma(1 - \sigma)^{K_s - 1}$ . The parameter  $\sigma$  pins down the number of firms per sector: for instance,  $1/\sigma$  yields the average number of firms.

**Number of cartel members.** We assume that there can only be one cartel per sector  $s$ . However, not all sectors are cartelized. Given the evidence reported in Section 3, when a sector is cartelized, the cartel members are the top producers in this sector. The number of cartel members is drawn from a geometric distribution with parameter  $\zeta \in (0, 1)$  so that the probability of having  $K_c$  members is given by  $\zeta(1 - \zeta)^{K_c - 1}$ . The parameter  $\zeta$  pins down the number of cartel members: for instance,  $1/\zeta$  yields the average number of cartel members.

## 5.2 Assigned Parameters

We assume that a time period in the model is one year. The inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply is set equal to  $\psi = 1$ . We set the discount factor  $\beta = 0.96$  and the depreciation rate of capital  $\delta = 0.1$ . Finally, the output elasticity of capital is  $\alpha = 1/3$ . These parameters are used to assess the effect of cartels on welfare. The values are reported in Table 5.

## 5.3 Collusion Intensity Parameter

### 5.3.1 Model-based estimation

An important parameter in the model is the profit weight  $\kappa$  that determines the extent to which cartel members care about the cartel as a whole. Our model with cartels yields the following equilibrium equation for inverse markups:

$$\frac{1}{\mu_{sk}^C} = \frac{\rho - 1}{\rho} - \left( \frac{1}{\eta} - \frac{1}{\rho} \right) (1 - \kappa) \omega_{sk} - \left( \frac{1}{\eta} - \frac{1}{\rho} \right) \kappa \sum_{j \in \mathcal{C}} \omega_{sj}$$

which delivers the following regression:

$$\frac{Wl_{sk}}{p_{sk}y_{sk}} = a_0 + a_1 \omega_{sk} + a_2 \sum_{j \in \mathcal{C}} \omega_{sj} + \epsilon_{sk} \quad (24)$$

where  $a_0 = \frac{\rho-1}{\rho}$ ,  $a_1 := \frac{(1-\kappa)(\eta-\rho)}{\eta\rho}$  and  $a_2 := \frac{\kappa(\eta-\rho)}{\eta\rho}$ . In the model, a firm's production function is linear in labor, which entails that this firm's markup is inversely related to its labor share. Given the fact that our data do not provide information on firm-level prices, we do not use production function estimation methods to estimate markups (Bond et al., 2021). We instead rely on a firm's labor share as our measure of markup.

The parameter  $\kappa$  can be recovered from the estimated parameters:

$$\hat{\kappa} = \frac{\hat{a}_2}{\hat{a}_1 + \hat{a}_2} \quad (25)$$

The results are provided in Table A7. The first column reports the regression on the sample of colluding firms without controlling for their joint market share. Firms with a higher market share charge higher markups: the point estimate on a firm's own market share is equal to -0.53 while the intercept is given by 0.70.<sup>45</sup> Both estimates are significant at the 1% level. In column 2, we further include the market share of the whole cartel, which includes each firm's own market share as required by the model. The coefficient on a firm's own market share remains negative but is no longer significant. The joint market share coefficient, however, is negative and significant at the 1% level, which is consistent with the theoretical model. The intercept remains positive and significant. The value of  $\kappa$  can be obtained from these point estimates and we find that  $\kappa = 0.7$ . In column 3, we further include year fixed effects to control for time-varying unobserved heterogeneity common across cartel

<sup>45</sup>These values are very close to the ones reported in Edmond et al. (2015) for their sample of Taiwanese firms. They report an intercept for the whole sample of  $\hat{a}_0 = 0.64$  and a slope of  $\hat{a}_1 = -0.50$ .

members. The point estimates and standard errors change very little. We now find that  $\hat{\kappa} = 0.71$  and use this value for our quantitative exercise.

### 5.3.2 Discussion

Our estimating equation (24) is similar to that used by Brooks et al. (2021) to estimate the extent of cooperative pricing in Chinese special economic zones. However, our sample differs in that it is based on firms that actually colluded —as they were detected by the antitrust authority. This could explain the higher value of  $\kappa$  that we find compared to their benchmark value of  $\kappa = 0.3$ . We will provide a robustness test using alternative values of  $\kappa$  including one equal to 0.3 and show that our results remain sizable when allowing the intensity of collusion to be much smaller than our benchmark value of  $\kappa = 0.71$ .

An alternative to estimating  $\kappa$  with micro data consists in bringing additional moments in the method of moments described below. We provide a robustness check in which  $\kappa$  is allowed to vary across cartels in Section 7. These parameters will be chosen to match a given cartel overcharge target consistent with the IO literature reviewed in Section 4.4. This alternative procedure to backing out  $\kappa$  will provide reassuring evidence that the method used to estimate this parameter and its potential heterogeneous value across cartels do not significantly alter our quantitative results.

## 5.4 Calibrated Parameters

Our model has five parameters that need to be estimated:

$$\theta \equiv \{\rho, \eta, \xi, \sigma, \zeta\}$$

where  $\theta$  is the vector of model parameters. These parameters are chosen in order to minimize the following model-data distance function (Acemoglu et al., 2018):

$$\sum_{m=1}^M \frac{|\text{Moment}_m(\text{Data}) - \text{Moment}_m(\text{Model}, \theta)|}{\frac{1}{2}(|\text{Moment}_m(\text{Data})| + |\text{Moment}_m(\text{Model}, \theta)|)}$$

where  $m$  denotes each moment and  $M$  is the total number of moment targets. We now discuss the moments that help us identify our parameters.

**Aggregate markup.** To help us pin down the elasticity of substitution within sectors, we require that our model matches a given aggregate markup value  $\mu_{\text{agg}}$ . We target a value of  $\mu_{\text{agg}} = 1.2$ , consistent with values reported in the recent literature

for France in 2007 (Battiati et al., 2021).<sup>46</sup> We will further provide robustness checks of our quantitative results with two alternative targets for  $\mu_{agg}$ .

**Regression-based restriction.** Equation (24) further implies that the ratio of the sum of the two slope parameters to the constant is  $(a_1 + a_2)/a_0 = (1/\rho - 1/\eta)/((\rho - 1)/\rho)$ . This yields the following equation:<sup>47</sup>

$$\eta = \left( \frac{1}{\rho} - \frac{a_1 + a_2}{a_0} \left( \frac{\rho - 1}{\rho} \right) \right)^{-1} \quad (26)$$

This ratio gives us one additional restriction on the value of the elasticities of substitution, allowing us to determine  $\eta$  given the value of  $\rho$  and vice-versa. We target a value for this ratio equal to  $-0.63$ , as reported in Table A7.

**Distribution of relative sales.** To pin down the Pareto shape parameter  $\xi$ , we follow Edmond et al. (2018) and target several moments of the distribution of relative sales. Relative sales are defined as the ratio of sales of a firm in its 4-digit industry to its industry mean and are pooled across all industries in the baseline year. These data moments are reported in column 2 of Table 6. In panel B, we compute the fraction of firms with relative sales lower than a certain threshold. This distribution is very skewed. For instance, 30.6% of firms have sales that are less than one-tenth of their industry average. However,  $1 - 0.805 = 19.5\%$  of firms have sales higher than their industry average and 0.1% of firms have sales higher than fifty times their industry average. In Panel C, we compute the fraction of overall sales accounted for by these firms. The 30.6% smallest firms account for only 1.2% of total sales, while the 0.1% largest firms that sell more than fifty times their industry average account for  $1 - 0.793 = 20.7\%$  of France's overall sales in 2007.

**Median number of firms per sector.** The median number of firms per 4-digit industry is 237 in our administrative data. The parameter  $\sigma$  directly governs the number of firms operating in each sector and we target a median number of firms per sector equal to 237.

<sup>46</sup>In their Table 2, Bighelli et al. (2021) report an average value of the aggregate markup over 2004-2016 of 1.32 and show that the value of the aggregate markup has increased by 7 percentage points over that period. While we cannot infer a value of  $\mu_{agg}$  for 2007 from these numbers, we will recalibrate the model to match an alternative aggregate markup target of 1.1 and 1.3 in the robustness section.

<sup>47</sup>Edmond et al. (2015) use a similar restriction for their whole sample of firms. We show in Appendix D.1 that one can use this restriction for cartel members or non-cartel members interchangeably. However, we do not rely on the sample of non-cartel members as these firms might be non-detected cartel members, which would affect the estimates of equation (24) and therefore the elasticities of substitution.

Table 6: Model Fit

Moments	Data	Model	Source
Panel A.			
Aggregate markup	1.2	1.2	Literature
Median # firms per sector	237	237	French data
Median # members per cartel	3	3	French data
Ratio of coefficients $((a_1 + a_2)/a_0)$	-0.63	-0.63	French data
Panel B: Fraction of firms with relative sales			French data
$\leq 0.1$	0.306	0.213	
$\leq 0.5$	0.646	0.688	
$\leq 1$	0.805	0.827	
$\leq 2$	0.903	0.916	
$\leq 5$	0.966	0.968	
$\leq 10$	0.987	0.986	
$\leq 50$	0.999	0.999	
$\leq 100$	1.000	1.000	
Panel C: Fraction of sales in firms with relative sales			French data
$\leq 0.1$	0.012	0.019	
$\leq 0.5$	0.098	0.123	
$\leq 1$	0.185	0.190	
$\leq 2$	0.288	0.267	
$\leq 5$	0.435	0.417	
$\leq 10$	0.543	0.537	
$\leq 50$	0.793	0.811	
$\leq 100$	0.867	0.909	

**Median number of cartel members.** In our matched dataset, the median number of cartel members is three. The parameter  $\zeta$  directly governs the number of cartel members in the economy and we target a median number of members per cartel equal to three.

## 5.5 Model Fit

The bottom rows of Table 5 display the parameter values that we obtain. Given that all parameters affect all moments, we provide a discussion of how each parameter affects each moment in Appendix D.2.<sup>48</sup>

First, we note that the elasticity of substitution within sectors  $\rho = 11.2$  is higher than that across sectors  $\eta = 1.50$ , as required by the model. Our values are close to the ones reported in the literature (Atkeson and Burstein, 2008; Edmond et al., 2015, 2018). The Pareto shape parameter  $\xi = 7.32$  is also close to the value reported

<sup>48</sup>To do so, we have computed the Jacobian matrix of the model's moments with respect to each estimated parameter evaluated at the calibrated value of the parameters (see Figure A8).

Table 7: Non-targeted Moments

Moments	Data	Model	Source
Cartel premium (sales)	4.040	3.214	French data
Cartel premium (employment)	3.306	3.006	French data
Cartel premium (labor productivity)	0.478	0.208	French data
Cartel premium (market share)	4.400	5.750	French data
Standard deviation of log sales	1.391	1.366	French data
Standard deviation of log employment	1.165	1.354	French data
Median cartel overcharge (in %)	10-20	12.5	Literature


by [Edmond et al. \(2018\)](#) for their sample of US firms. Finally, we find that the geometric parameters are such that  $\sigma = 0.003$  and  $\zeta = 0.15$ . In the robustness exercises displayed in Section 7, the model will be recalibrated each time.

The model moments are reported in the third column of Table 6. The model produces a median number of firms per sector equal to that in the data. It further matches the aggregate markup and the ratio of coefficients exactly, as well as the median number of cartel members. Panel B and Panel C show that the model is able to reproduce the amount of concentration in sales observed in the data. For example, the fraction of firms selling less than one-tenth of their industry average is 21.3% in the model, close to its data counterpart (30.6%). Moreover, these firms account for 1.9% of total sales in our model, when they represent 1.2% of total sales in the data. Our model matches the amount of sales accounted for by firms selling more than their industry average (81%) and more than ten times their industry average (about 46%). Table 7 reports a number of non-targeted moments. Our model is able to reproduce relatively well the sales, employment, labor productivity and market share premium of cartel members, as well as the standard deviations of log sales and log employment. Finally, our benchmark model generates a median cartel overcharge of about 12.5%, which is in the range of the median cartel overcharge found in the literature and reported in Section 4.4.

**Markup distribution.** Table A9 reports moments of the markup distribution implied by the model. We report moments of the unconditional and sectoral markup distribution in our benchmark model (columns 1 and 3) and in a counterfactual competitive economy with no cartels (columns 2 and 4). The table shows that markups are much higher for top firms in the presence of cartels: the ninety-ninth percentile markup is 1.34 versus 1.15 in the competitive economy. This translates into less markup dispersion within sectors when there are no cartels. Moreover,



Figure 3: Distribution of Cartel Members' Markups



**Notes:** The figure displays the distribution of cartel members' markups for different values of  $\kappa$ . The median value of each distribution is displayed as a vertical line.

markups are also dispersed across sectors as shown in columns 3 and 4.<sup>49</sup> For instance, the ninetieth percentile sectoral markup is 1.31 in the benchmark economy versus 1.26 in the competitive economy. However, what matters for the gains from eliminating cartels is the amount of dispersion within sectors, as the elasticity of substitution across sectors is lower than that within sectors. Finally, Figure 3 illustrates the amount of markup dispersion across cartel members in the case where  $\kappa = 0$ ,  $\kappa = 0.3$  and  $\kappa = 0.71$ . Markups are not common across cartel members when  $\kappa = 0$  because more productive firms are still able to charge higher markups. As the collusion intensity increases, the distribution of markups shifts to the right and becomes more skewed, increasing misallocation.

## 6 Gains from Eliminating Competition Distortions

We present the aggregate productivity and welfare gains from eliminating the competition distortions that arise because of cartels. We then discuss how our results relate to those obtained by Harberger (1954) before exploring alternative quantitative exercises of interest.

<sup>49</sup>This result is consistent with previous findings reported in the case of Taiwan and the US (Edmond et al., 2015, 2018).

Table 8: Aggregate Gains from Breaking Down Cartels

Breaking down:	All cartels (1)	Larger cartels (2)	Smaller cartels (3)
<i>Panel A: Aggregate productivity gains</i>			
$\Delta$ TFP competitive Nash-Cournot (in %)	2.01	1.52	0.48
$\Delta$ TFP efficient allocation (in %)	5.41	5.41	5.41
Distance to efficient allocation (in %)	-37.07	-28.09	-8.91
<i>Panel B: Aggregate welfare gains</i>			
$\Delta$ Aggregate markup (in points)	-1.88	-1.4	-0.51
$\Delta$ C (in %)	4.39	3.31	1.09
$\Delta$ K (in %)	6.35	4.77	1.62
$\Delta$ Y (in %)	4.77	3.60	1.19
$\Delta$ L (in %)	0.98	0.73	0.27
$\Delta$ Welfare (in %)	3.50	2.60	0.84

**Notes:** The table displays the aggregate productivity gains (rows 1 to 3) and the change (in points) in aggregate markups resulting from eliminating cartels (row 4). The figures are obtained by comparing the relevant variables in the cartel equilibrium to that in the competitive Nash-Cournot equilibrium (row 1) and efficient allocation (row 2). The efficient allocation corresponds to the equilibrium without markup dispersion. The distance to the efficient allocation computed in row 3 is the ratio of the first two rows. Column 2 (3) considers the case where only cartels with a cumulated market share higher (lower) than the median cumulated market share of all cartels are eliminated.

## 6.1 Aggregate Productivity Gains

The aggregate productivity gains resulting from eliminating competition distortions are measured by computing the percentage change difference in aggregate productivity obtained in the competitive Nash-Cournot equilibrium and the cartel equilibrium. The results are reported in panel A of Table 8. We find that removing all cartels would increase aggregate productivity by 2%, as shown in column 1. This is because the most productive firms that behave anticompetitively do not maximize their joint profits any longer but instead maximize their own profits. These large firms therefore charge lower markups and prices in the competitive equilibrium than in the cartel equilibrium. This contributes to redirecting demand towards these very productive firms, thereby increasing aggregate productivity.

The second row of the table computes the percentage difference between the cartel equilibrium and the efficient allocation in which there is no markup dispersion—see equation (22). Aggregate productivity would increase by 5.4% if markup dispersion could be fully eliminated, i.e. if the economy was to transition from the cartel equilibrium to the efficient allocation. As the third row shows, eliminating distortions to competition arising from cartels is quantitatively important towards bringing the economy closer to the efficient allocation. Indeed, removing all cartels would bring the economy 37% closer to the efficient allocation.

Finally, we explore whether the gain from breaking down cartels differs across

cartel types. We compute the gain from breaking down large and small cartels, whereby large (small) cartels are defined as cartels with a cumulated market share higher (lower) than the median cumulated market share of all cartels. By construction, breaking down both types of cartels yields the total gain reported in the first row of column 1. Column 2 shows that breaking down larger cartels increases aggregate productivity by 1.5%, about three-quarters of the productivity gains from breaking down all cartels. This would bring the economy 28% closer to the efficient allocation. On the other hand, breaking down smaller cartels would increase aggregate productivity by 0.5% and bring the economy 9% closer to the efficient allocation. Dismantling both types of cartels yields different results because larger cartels charge higher markups, so that dismantling them would reallocate relatively more resources towards more productive firms.

**Comparison with Edmond et al. (2018).** Edmond et al. (2018) build a dynamic model with heterogeneous firms and endogenous markups to study the welfare cost of markups, which can be decomposed into a uniform output tax (aggregate markup), misallocation of factors of production and inefficient entry. Specifically, they find that eliminating size-dependent markup dispersion would increase aggregate productivity by 1%-3%. While our numbers may seem higher than the one they find, our model features *more* markup dispersion than their competitive oligopoly models because we explicitly account for collusion. Indeed, the gains from eliminating markup dispersion are larger than in Edmond et al. (2018) because the aggregate productivity level in the distorted cartel equilibrium is further away from the efficient allocation. Our results, however, are not inconsistent with their findings. Indeed, going from the competitive oligopoly equilibrium to the efficient allocation would yield aggregate productivity gains of 3.4% (5.41% - 2.01%), in line with their upper bound estimate of 3%.

## 6.2 Welfare Gains

We now study the aggregate welfare gains from breaking down cartels.

The first row of panel B of Table 8 investigates how removing cartels impacts the level of the aggregate markup.<sup>50</sup> We find that eliminating all cartels would decrease the aggregate markup by about 1.9 points (column 1). In the model, very productive cartel members charge higher markups than other firms. When cartels are broken down, all firms in the cartelized industries start charging lower markups—including non-cartel members via the umbrella pricing effect. Since larger former cartel members decrease their markup by a larger amount and have a larger mar-

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<sup>50</sup>The aggregate markup is computed using the fact that  $\mu_{agg} = P \times A$ .

Table 9: Differences with **Harberger (1954)**

	Benchmark	Sectoral Level	Unit Elastic Demand
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\Delta$ TFP competitive Nash-Cournot (in %)	2.01	0.17	0.2

**Notes:** The table displays the aggregate productivity gains from going to the cartel equilibrium to the competitive Nash-Cournot equilibrium. Column 1 displays our benchmark results. Column 2 aggregates the model at the sectoral level while unit demand elasticities are used in column 3.

ket share, this has a large impact on sectoral indices and therefore on the aggregate markup. Given that the aggregate labor share in the model is the inverse of the aggregate markup level, changes in the degree of cartelization of the economy further generate changes in the labor share due to changes in market concentration (**Autor et al., 2020; De Loecker et al., 2020**). Finally, the decrease in the level of the aggregate markup has implications in terms of production, consumption, capital accumulation, labor and welfare. The last row shows that breaking down all cartels would lead to a consumption-equivalent welfare gain of 3.5%.

Breaking down large cartels (column 2, panel B) would lead to a 1.4 percentage point decrease in the aggregate markup, whereas eliminating smaller cartels would decrease it by 0.5 percentage points. This would translate into a 2.6% and 0.8% increase in welfare for large and small cartel breakdowns, respectively. This shows that active competition policies targeting very large cartels can yield sizeable gains to aggregate welfare.

### 6.3 Comparison with **Harberger (1954)**

We find that the productivity gain arising from eliminating collusion is one order of magnitude higher than the classic estimate of **Harberger (1954)**, who finds a dead-weight loss of 0.1% of GDP. The larger impact can be attributed to two channels: firm heterogeneity and non-unitary elasticities of substitution. First, our framework models firms and relies on micro-data, which feature more markup dispersion within than across sectors. By contrast, **Harberger (1954)** uses sectoral data. Second, our elasticities of substitution are higher than Harberger's assumption of unit demand elasticities.

Table 9 shows how not accounting for heterogeneity within sectors and how assuming unit demand elasticities affect our results. Column 1 displays our benchmark estimate for aggregate productivity. Column 2 considers a version of the model in which industries contain a single firm charging a markup equal to the harmonic average of all the other firms' markups. This sectoral version of the model yields an estimate closer to that of **Harberger (1954)**. We find that the aggregate productivity gains from eliminating cartels would be 0.17% without properly ac-

Table 10: Importance of the Umbrella Pricing Effect

	Benchmark (1)	No umbrella pricing effect (2)	Difference (in pp) (3)
<i>Panel A: Aggregate productivity gains</i>			
$\Delta$ TFP competitive Nash-Cournot (in %)	2.01	2.05	0.04
$\Delta$ TFP efficient allocation (in %)	5.41	5.41	0
Distance to efficient allocation (in %)	-37.07	-37.96	0.89
<i>Panel B: Aggregate welfare gains</i>			
$\Delta$ Aggregate markup (in points)	-1.88	-1.71	-0.17
$\Delta$ C (in %)	4.39	4.34	-0.05
$\Delta$ K (in %)	6.35	6.14	-0.21
$\Delta$ Y (in %)	4.77	4.70	-0.07
$\Delta$ L (in %)	0.98	0.90	-0.08
$\Delta$ Welfare (in %)	3.5	3.52	0.02

**Notes:** The table displays the aggregate productivity gains (rows 1 to 3) and the change (in points) in aggregate markups resulting from eliminating cartels (row 4). The figures are obtained by comparing the relevant variables in the cartel equilibrium to that in the competitive Nash-Cournot equilibrium (row 1) and efficient allocation (row 2). The efficient allocation corresponds to the equilibrium without markup dispersion. The distance to the efficient allocation computed in row 3 is the ratio of the first two rows. In column 2, the markups of non-cartel members are held constant to their level in the cartel equilibrium. Column 3 reports the difference between column 2 and column 1.

counting for firm heterogeneity within sectors. Finally, to ease the comparison with [Harberger \(1954\)](#), we assume that the demand elasticities in the model are equal to unity.<sup>51</sup> The estimate displayed in column 3 shows that the aggregate productivity gain from breaking down cartels drops to 0.2%. This is because there are very little markup differences across firms when the elasticities of substitution are small, even in the presence of cartels. Eliminating them thus have a very small quantitative effect.

Our results thus point to the importance of properly accounting for heterogeneity within sectors and using appropriate demand elasticities, as also shown recently by [Baqae and Farhi \(2020\)](#). While our framework abstracts from input-output linkages, it explicitly generates endogenous markups by modelling oligopolistic competition. Our results thus complement theirs by showing that the gains from eliminating markups in their context or supermarkups in ours are one order of magnitude higher than the estimate of [Harberger \(1954\)](#).

## 6.4 Aggregate Costs of Umbrella Pricing

Following Proposition 1, *all* firms in a cartelized industry experience a decrease in their prices following the cartel breakdown. This implies that some demand could be reallocated towards less productive non-cartel members, thereby dampening the

<sup>51</sup>The result displayed in the table relies on a version of the model in which aggregate consumption  $c$  is a Cobb-Douglas aggregator. In the absence of cartels, the price of a firm  $k$  is now given by  $P_{sk} = \frac{\rho}{(\rho-1) - (\rho-1)\omega_{sk}} \times \frac{W}{z_{sk}}$ . We then assume that  $\rho$  tends to unity. As an alternative, we also considered a version of our baseline model in which both  $\eta$  and  $\rho$  tend towards unity and  $\rho > \eta$ . We find that the gain from eliminating cartels in this case is equal to 0.04%.

effect of cartel breakdowns on aggregate productivity.

Table 10 examines the quantitative importance of this umbrella pricing effect. Specifically, the markups of non-cartel members are now considered to be exogenous primitives and are thus held fixed in both the cartelized and competitive economy. The markups of cartel members, however, are allowed to decrease to their value obtained in the competitive equilibrium. Column 1 reports our benchmark results for sake of comparison. Column 2 shows that not accounting for the endogenous response of non-cartel members to the increase in competition generated by cartel breakdowns yields slightly higher aggregate productivity gains. This represents a 0.04 percentage point difference compared to our benchmark results, as reported in column 3. The effect on aggregate markups, however, is smaller in absolute value because non-cartel members charge higher prices than they would if they were able to react to the change in competition. The level of the aggregate markup is still important and leads to welfare gains close to what we found previously (3.52% versus 3.5%).

In short, the endogenous response of non-cartel members attenuates the impact of cartel breakdowns on aggregate productivity and welfare but the effect is quantitatively small.

## 6.5 Gains from Curbing the Collusion Intensity

In our main quantitative exercise, we have computed the aggregate productivity and welfare gains from *eliminating* cartels. In practice, this goal might be out of reach for antitrust authorities. We now show that antitrust enforcement can nevertheless achieve sizeable gains by reducing collusion intensity in the economy, instead of breaking down all cartels. When  $\kappa$  decreases but remains strictly positive, cartels are not dismantled but cartel members assign a lower weight to each other's profits. We thus think of a decrease in  $\kappa$  as a tougher antitrust environment making it harder for cartel members to sustain high markups.<sup>52</sup>

Column 1 of Table 11 reports our benchmark results while columns 2 to 4 study how changes in the *intensity* of collusion affect aggregate productivity and welfare. Column 2 considers a collusion weight equal to 0.1, while columns 3 and 4 consider a slightly higher weight equal to 0.2 and 0.3, respectively. As we can see, the aggregate productivity gains are still large, ranging from 1.12% to 1.75%, and are decreasing in  $\kappa$ . Even going from our benchmark value of  $\kappa = 0.71$  to  $\kappa = 0.3$  yields

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<sup>52</sup>Firms might be more reluctant to charge higher markups and prices if antitrust authorities can rely on antitrust tools to investigate anticompetitive practices. Specifically, the development of whistle-blower tools or even the threat of increasing fines if customers complain or competition authorities start investigating might deter firms from maintaining the status quo in terms of anti-competitive pricing.



Table 11: Aggregate Gains from Decreasing Internalization Intensity

	Benchmark ( $\kappa \rightarrow 0$ )	$\kappa \rightarrow 0.1$	$\kappa \rightarrow 0.2$	$\kappa \rightarrow 0.3$
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Panel A: Aggregate productivity gains</i>				
$\Delta$ TFP competitive Nash-Cournot (in %)	2.01	1.75	1.44	1.12
$\Delta$ TFP efficient allocation (in %)	5.41	5.41	5.41	5.41
Distance to efficient allocation (in %)	-37.07	-32.31	-26.63	-20.71
<i>Panel B: Aggregate welfare gains</i>				
$\Delta$ Aggregate markup (in points)	-1.88	-1.05	-0.54	-0.25
$\Delta$ C (in %)	4.39	3.40	2.56	1.86
$\Delta$ K (in %)	6.35	4.50	3.13	2.12
$\Delta$ Y (in %)	4.77	3.62	2.67	1.91
$\Delta$ L (in %)	0.98	0.55	0.29	0.13
$\Delta$ Welfare (in %)	3.5	2.87	2.26	1.70

**Notes:** The table displays the aggregate productivity gains (rows 1 to 3) and the change (in points) in aggregate markups resulting from eliminating cartels (row 4). The figures are obtained by comparing the relevant variables in the cartel equilibrium to that in the competitive Nash-Cournot equilibrium (row 1) and efficient allocation (row 2). The efficient allocation corresponds to the equilibrium without markup dispersion. The distance to the efficient allocation computed in row 3 is the ratio of the first two rows. The gains from decreasing the collusion intensity parameter  $\kappa$  from its baseline value of  $\kappa = 0.71$  are displayed in columns 2 to 4.

gains to aggregate productivity one order of magnitude higher than the estimate of [Harberger \(1954\)](#). The distance to the efficient allocation is also largely reduced when  $\kappa$  decreases to 0.3, roughly halving the collusion intensity parameter would bring the economy 21% closer to the efficient allocation. The aggregate markup still decreases when cartel members assign a lower weight to each other but the effect is smaller in absolute value. The welfare gains, however, remain fairly large.

Our results point to the quantitative importance of the intensive margin of cartels. In this sense, a tougher antitrust environment that forces cartel members to decrease their supracompetitive markups yields substantial aggregate gains.


## 6.6 Cartel Formation and Stability

In this section, we analyze profit incentives of firms and relate them to findings from the theoretical literature on cartel formation ([Bos and Harrington, 2010](#)). Our quantitative exercise uses moments from the empirical distribution of detected cartels but has remained agnostic about how cartels form, whether it is rational for a firm to join them, and how collusive arrangements can be sustained over time.

First, consider whether collusion improves the profits of the cartel as a whole. This is likely a necessary condition for the cartel to keep operating, although not sufficient. We find that for sufficiently low levels of collusion, almost all cartels are profitable (Figure 4a). In contrast, for high levels of collusion, the aggregate profits of cartel members is lower than in the baseline. Second, we find that there is substantial heterogeneity across cartels, with a right tail of cartel arrangements that would generate aggregate gains for cartel members even at higher levels of



Figure 4: Profits of Cartels in the Collusive and Competitive Equilibrium



**Notes:** Panel a) displays the p25, median and p75 of the distribution of the growth rate of cartel member's total profits for different values of  $\kappa$ . The growth rate is computed as the difference in total profits for each cartel in each sector before and after colluding. Panel b) displays the distribution of the growth rate of cartels' total profits for different values of  $\kappa$ . The growth rate is computed as the difference in total profits for each symmetric cartel in each sector before and after colluding. As the collusion intensity increases, the distribution of aggregate gains shifts to the left.

collusion (Figure 4b).

The incentives to join a cartel can be derived analytically. Absent side-payments, non-monetary incentives, or threats, the participation constraint for a firm takes the form of an upper-bound on the overcharge  $\Theta_{sk}$  it sets when joining the cartel —see Appendix E.5:

$$\Theta_{sk} < \left[ \frac{\rho - \eta}{\rho - \varepsilon_{sk}} - \Upsilon_{sk} \right] \hat{p}_s^C \quad (27)$$

Note that the term in brackets is decreasing with size, that is, the constraint is less binding for smaller firms. The intuition is that, compared to the initial situation, smaller firms who are mostly price takers stand to gain from the increase in prices triggered by the cartel. However, firms also have an incentive to free-ride on the cartel, that is, benefit from the sectoral price level increase while not charging a collusive overcharge. For a cartel to be sustainable, there must exist a discount factor  $\delta$  such that each firm satisfies the following incentive compatibility constraint:

$$\Theta_{sk} < \left[ \frac{\rho - \eta}{\rho - \varepsilon_{sk}} - \Upsilon_{sk} \right] \left[ \hat{p}_s^C - (1 - \delta) \hat{p}_{sk}^{C \setminus \{k\}} \right] \quad (28)$$

where  $\hat{p}_{sk}^{C \setminus \{k\}}$  is the price level increase if all the other cartel members except for firm  $k$  apply the overcharge. Notice that this constraint is always tighter than the participation constraint<sup>53</sup> and is no longer monotonically decreasing as the term in

<sup>53</sup>In fact, when firms are infinitely patient ( $\delta = 1$ ), it reduces exactly to the participation constraint.

the rightmost brackets increases with size. This reflects the fact that, since larger firms have a larger price impact, the price level increase triggered by the cartel would be relatively much smaller if they opt to free-ride. Conversely, for small firms with little market impact, profit incentives can be insufficient in themselves to induce them to join the cartel, which would be consistent with the use of threats or non-monetary incentives.

## 7 Robustness

In this section, we test the sensitivity of our results to allowing  $\kappa$  to differ across cartels, to alternative target values, parameter values and modes of competition. The results are displayed in Tables 12 and 13. We recalibrate the model for each robustness experiment to match the relevant targets.

### 7.1 Heterogeneous $\kappa$

Given the importance of  $\kappa$ , we now allow it to vary across cartels. To do so, we bring in an additional moment to generate a distribution of intensity of collusion parameters  $\kappa_C$ . Specifically, we model each cartel's intensity of collusion as a random draw from a truncated Normal distribution over the unit interval with mean  $\mu_N$  and variance  $\sigma_N^2$ . The mean parameter  $\mu_N$  is chosen such that the model-generated median cartel overcharge matches its target. In line with the discussion in Section 4.4, we choose three different targets —10%, 15% and 20% —and experiment with two different values of the variance parameter  $\sigma_N^2$ .

Two important results emerge from Panels A and B of Table 12. First, allowing  $\kappa$  to vary across cartels yields aggregate productivity gains of eliminating cartels hovering around 1.9%-3%, close to our benchmark estimate of 2%. The welfare gains range from 3.1% to 4.7%, in line with our benchmark estimate of 3.5%. The reason why these results are not dramatically different from our benchmark estimates is because our benchmark model generates a median cartel overcharge equal to 12.5%, which is not far off the targets used in columns 2-4. Assuming a homogeneous  $\kappa$  parameter across cartels thus appears to be conservative. Second, as reported in both panels, the median collusion intensity parameter obtained in columns 2-4 is close to our baseline value of 0.7, ranging from 0.63 to 0.89, depending on the target chosen and the variance parameter chosen.

Overall, this additional set of results provides reassuring evidence that assuming a homogeneous collusion intensity parameter does not significantly affect our quantitative results. Table 12 further suggests that either estimating  $\kappa$  from the data

Table 12: Aggregate Gains from Breaking Down Cartels: Heterogeneous  $\kappa$ 

<i>Panel A: <math>\sigma_{\kappa}^2 = 1</math></i>				
	Benchmark	Overcharge: 10%	Overcharge: 15%	Overcharge: 20%
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$\Delta$ TFP competitive Nash-Cournot (in %)	2.01	2.11	2.95	2.70
$\Delta$ TFP efficient allocation (in %)	5.41	7.01	8.30	6.94
Distance to efficient allocation (in %)	-37.07	-30.14	-35.56	-38.84
$\Delta$ Aggregate markup (in points)	-1.88	-0.91	-1.06	-1.56
$\Delta$ C (in %)	4.39	3.83	5.21	5.19
$\Delta$ K (in %)	6.35	4.78	6.32	6.81
$\Delta$ Y (in %)	4.77	4.02	5.43	5.51
$\Delta$ L (in %)	0.98	0.47	0.55	0.81
$\Delta$ Welfare (in %)	3.5	3.36	4.68	4.45
P25 $\kappa$	0.71	0.63	0.67	0.74
Median $\kappa$	0.71	0.81	0.83	0.87
P75 $\kappa$	0.71	0.92	0.93	0.95
<i>Panel B: <math>\sigma_{\kappa}^2 = 2</math></i>				
	Benchmark	Overcharge: 10%	Overcharge: 15%	Overcharge: 20%
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$\Delta$ TFP competitive Nash-Cournot (in %)	2.01	1.94	2.55	2.66
$\Delta$ TFP efficient allocation (in %)	5.41	7.52	6.51	6.81
Distance to efficient allocation (in %)	-37.07	-25.75	-39.14	-39.04
$\Delta$ Aggregate markup (in points)	-1.88	-0.88	-1.56	-1.52
$\Delta$ C (in %)	4.39	3.55	4.97	5.11
$\Delta$ K (in %)	6.35	4.46	6.60	6.70
$\Delta$ Y (in %)	4.77	3.73	5.29	5.42
$\Delta$ L (in %)	0.98	0.46	0.82	0.79
$\Delta$ Welfare (in %)	3.5	3.10	4.22	4.38
P25 $\kappa$	0.71	0.37	0.78	0.76
Median $\kappa$	0.71	0.63	0.89	0.88
P75 $\kappa$	0.71	0.83	0.95	0.95

**Notes:** The table displays the aggregate productivity gains (rows 1 to 3) and the change (in points) in aggregate markups resulting from eliminating cartels (row 4). The figures are obtained by comparing the relevant variables in the cartel equilibrium to that in the competitive Nash-Cournot equilibrium (row 1) and efficient allocation (row 2). The efficient allocation corresponds to the equilibrium without markup dispersion. The distance to the efficient allocation computed in row 3 is the ratio of the first two rows. Columns 2 to 4 in Panel A (B) compute the gains from breaking down cartels when  $\kappa$  is drawn from a truncated normal distribution with variance  $\sigma_{\kappa}^2 = 1$  ( $\sigma_{\kappa}^2 = 2$ ). The mean parameter is chosen so as to match an overcharge target of 10%, 15% and 20% in column 2,3 and 4, respectively. Moments of the distribution of  $\kappa$  are reported in the last three rows of each panel.

or calibrating it using moments on the amount of cartel overcharge deliver relatively close values for this parameter.

## 7.2 Alternative Robustness Tests

**Alternative aggregate markup targets.** One important moment is the aggregate markup level, which is set equal to 1.2 for our benchmark results. Given the paucity of estimates for France, we consider two alternative values for this calibration target. The low (high) markup target is set equal to 1.1 (1.3). As shown in columns 1 and 2 of Table 13, the productivity gains from breaking down cartels remain important, ranging from 1.6% to 2.1%. The consumption-equivalent welfare gains range from 2.4% to 4.3%. Targeting alternative aggregate markup values does not yield dramatic differences with our benchmark estimates.

Table 13: Aggregate Gains from Breaking Down Cartels: Robustness Experiments

<i>Panel A: Alternative targets and mode of competition</i>				
	Low markup target	High markup target	Alternative cartel target	Bertrand
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$\Delta$ TFP competitive Nash-Cournot (in %)	1.61	2.13	2.47	0.39
$\Delta$ TFP efficient allocation (in %)	4.87	5.77	6.10	2.42
Distance to efficient allocation (in %)	-33.06	-36.91	-40.48	-16.11
$\Delta$ Aggregate markup (in points)	-0.29	-3.61	-2.28	-2.00
$\Delta$ C (in %)	2.64	5.69	5.38	2.06
$\Delta$ K (in %)	2.96	9.13	7.77	4.15
$\Delta$ Y (in %)	2.71	6.32	5.85	2.47
$\Delta$ L (in %)	0.16	1.72	1.19	1.05
$\Delta$ Welfare (in %)	2.41	4.33	4.33	1.16
<i>Panel B: Alternative parameter values</i>				
	Low $\rho$	High $\rho$	Low $\kappa$	High $\kappa$
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$\Delta$ TFP competitive Nash-Cournot (in %)	1.72	1.83	0.81	2.66
$\Delta$ TFP efficient allocation (in %)	4.94	5.28	4.03	6.22
Distance to efficient allocation (in %)	-34.88	-34.71	-20.10	-42.84
$\Delta$ Aggregate markup (in points)	-4.76	-0.63	-1.56	-1.79
$\Delta$ C (in %)	5.67	3.22	2.37	5.31
$\Delta$ K (in %)	9.78	3.92	4.00	7.18
$\Delta$ Y (in %)	6.36	3.37	2.69	5.68
$\Delta$ L (in %)	2.06	0.35	0.81	0.94
$\Delta$ Welfare (in %)	4.18	2.83	1.65	4.46

**Notes:** The table displays the aggregate productivity gains (rows 1 to 3) and the change (in points) in aggregate markups resulting from eliminating cartels (row 4). The figures are obtained by comparing the relevant variables in the cartel equilibrium to that in the competitive Nash-Cournot equilibrium (row 1) and efficient allocation (row 2). The efficient allocation corresponds to the equilibrium without markup dispersion. The distance to the efficient allocation computed in row 3 is the ratio of the first two rows. The low (high) markup target in column 1 (2) of Panel A is set to 1.1 (1.3). The target for the median number of cartel members is set to four in column 3 of Panel A. In column 4 of Panel A, firms compete in prices (see Appendix). The low (high)  $\rho$  value in column 1 (2) of Panel B is set to 5 (20). The low (high)  $\kappa$  value in column 3 (4) of Panel B is set to 0.3 (1).

**Alternative cartel target.** In our benchmark model, we target a median number of cartel members equal to three, corresponding to the median number of cartel members matched to the administrative data. However, as shown in Table 1, the median number of firms operating in a cartel is four. We thus recalibrate the model to match this new target value and find that the productivity gains are 2.47% (column 3). The consumption-equivalent welfare gain is also larger (4.3%). Since cartel members are larger firms, there are now more industries with a larger number of cartel members. This increases misallocation and thus increases the gains from eliminating cartels.

**Bertrand competition.** In our benchmark model, firms compete à la Cournot. We relax this assumption and instead assume that firms compete in prices. As shown in Appendix E.6, the only point of departure from our benchmark model is that the demand elasticity is now a weighted arithmetic average of  $\rho$  and  $\eta$ . We find that the aggregate productivity gain is equal to 0.4% and is thus smaller than when firms compete in quantities. This is because the model features considerably less markup dispersion when firms compete à la Bertrand. This can also be seen from the fact that the cartelized economy is closer to the efficient allocation than before. Eliminating cartels reduces the distance to the efficient frontier by about 16%. However, the model now generates a larger change in the *level* of the aggregate markup which decreases by 2 percentage points. This translates into a consumption-equivalent

welfare gain of about 1.2%.

**Sensitivity to  $\rho$ .** Our benchmark calibration yields  $\rho = 11.2$ . We test the robustness of our results to changes in the elasticity of substitution within sectors  $\rho$ . To do so, we assign both a low and a high value to this parameter, namely  $\rho = 5$  and  $\rho = 20$ , and we recalibrate all the other parameters to match our calibration targets. We find that the model is not able to match the aggregate markup target with these extreme values for the elasticity of substitution within sectors. Our results suggest that the gains from dismantling cartels remain large, ranging from 1.72% to 1.83% for aggregate productivity and from 2.83% to 4.18% for welfare.

**Sensitivity to  $\kappa$ .** Our estimated gains rely on a value of  $\kappa = 0.71$  as detailed above. Given the importance of this parameter for the quantification of the gains from breaking down cartels, we recalibrate the model with alternative values for the intensity of collusion. Specifically, we report results where  $\kappa$  is assigned a low and a high value. We find that when  $\kappa = 0.3$ , which is roughly half the value we use for our benchmark estimates, aggregate productivity and consumption-equivalent welfare would increase by 0.8% and 1.65%, respectively, if firms were to behave competitively. On the other hand, in the situation where  $\kappa = 1$ , the gains are higher than our benchmark estimates as shown in panel B column 4. The aggregate gains increase in the value of  $\kappa$  because cartel members increase their markups by a larger amount when  $\kappa$  is higher, which increases the amount of misallocation. In short, the gains from dismantling cartels remain sizeable when we consider alternative values for the intensity of collusion.

## 8 Conclusion

We study the impact of collusion on aggregate productivity and welfare. Empirically, we find evidence that cartels are common and show that cartel members are made up of firms that are larger and more productive than non-cartel members. Theoretically, we extend an otherwise standard oligopolistic competition model and show how collusion can amplify misallocation. In addition, we show that mild forms of collusion can be consistent with firms' rational behavior.

We find that there are important economic gains from breaking down cartels. Specifically, our results suggest that eliminating cartels would raise aggregate TFP by 2% and welfare by 3.5% in consumption-equivalent terms. In terms of policy, our results suggest that antitrust enforcement and competition laws that aim to break down cartels can yield sizeable gains. Moreover, other policies aiming to promote economic growth such as industrial policies or trade liberalization reforms may also

be accompanied by robust competition laws to ensure that cartels do not form and dampen productivity gains. Although our estimates are sizeable, they arguably understate the true impact of distortions to competition on aggregate productivity. First, our numbers reflect the static cost of cartels. Cartels may impose or reinforce barriers to entry, thereby preventing productive firms from entering an industry, or allowing low-productivity firms to enter industries with low barriers to entry (Carrera and Titov, 2019). They may also reduce the incentive to invest in research and development and innovate. Such dynamic considerations would likely harm productivity. Second, distortions to competition may be the product of other forces such as common ownership (Ederer and Pellegrino, 2021), corporate lobbying or political connections (Akcigit et al., 2018). If large firms are too small because their incentives to compete with their rivals decrease or if being politically connected leads them to innovate less, our numbers would provide a lower bound on the impact of competition distortions more broadly construed on aggregate productivity and welfare.

There are several directions our work could take. First, our framework could be used to study the impact of horizontal M&As on aggregate productivity, by allowing for eventual cost synergies. Second, we focused on product-side distortions created by cartels, while several recent important court cases involve conspiracies involving firms agreeing not to compete on the labor market. Third, it would be valuable to allow cartels to affect the selection of firms via endogenous entry. Fourth, it would be important to test the implications of the model for ex-post cartel detection. In particular, the model delivers a microfounded screen for horizontal cartels, which could help detect collusive behaviors. Finally, incorporating input-output linkages would be an important undertaking to understand how cartelization may affect firms along the supply chain. These important questions are left for future research.

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# Appendix

## *“Macroeconomic Effects of Market Structure Distortions”*

**Flavien Moreau and Ludovic Panon**

This appendix is organized as follows. In Appendix **A** we provide details about the construction of our dataset as well as a historical background on competition regulation in France. In Appendix **B** and Appendix **C** we provide additional Tables and Figures. Details about the identification and estimation can be found in Appendix **D**. In Appendix **E** we provide the mathematical proofs of the results presented in the main text.

### **A Data Appendix**

#### **A.1 Institutional Background**

Despite a strong tradition in industrial policy, antitrust regulation in France has a relatively short formal history. It can be roughly simplified into four periods, during which the competition regulator changed its name several times, and saw its mission successively specified and broadened. First established in 1953,<sup>54</sup> the French Technical Commission for Collusions and Dominant Positions’ main goal was the fight against cartels and widespread price fixing in post-war France. In 1963, the Commission’s objectives were extended to allow the formal investigation of cases of dominant positions.<sup>55</sup> In practice, this Commission would directly notify the Economic Ministry, which would then decide whether to impose fines.

Following the 1973 oil crisis, Prime Minister Raymond Barre and also an economics professor, advocated a stronger control of price fixing arising from anti-competitive behaviors. In 1977, the Commission became the Competition Commission (*Commission de la Concurrence*). In parallel of its mandate of detecting cartel and abuse of dominant positions, the Commission was to advise the French government on all competition-related matters, including on vertical and horizontal mergers and acquisitions.

The period 1986 to 2009 is important as it spans the beginning of our empirical analysis. Over this period, the Commission undergoes important transformations: its name is changed to the Competition Council (*Conseil de la Concurrence*) and the

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<sup>54</sup>Décret n°53-704 du 9 août 1953.

<sup>55</sup>Loi n°63-628 du 2 juillet 1963.

1986 Ordinance introduces several changes. Companies can directly refer cases to the Council. Moreover, the antitrust body becomes more independent, better protects concerned parties' rights and is now able to directly fine the firms found guilty of anti-competitive practices, though this does not apply to merger projects. The 2001 New Economic Regulation Law further introduces leniency and transaction programs to better detect and fight cartels.<sup>56</sup>

Finally, as of 2008, the Competition Council turns into the Competition Authority (*Autorité de la Concurrence* or ADLC, henceforth). The 2008 Law on the Modernization of Economy not only gives the right to the Authority to review merger and acquisitions independently from the Minister of Economy, but also to investigate potential anti-competitive cases on its own.

## A.2 Firm-level Database on Cartels

In order to extract information on the identity of the firms fined by the ADLC we proceed as follows. First, we scrape the website of the ADLC to recover all the decision files over the period 1994-2019. These PDF documents contain information on the situation of the market impacted by anti-competitive behaviors, the notification date of the case to the ADLC, the names of the firms fined for anti-competitive behaviors, the types of infraction they committed, their sales and the duration of the infraction. Some of these files contain information on when the firms were notified by the ADLC that an investigation is going to be launched. Extracting and getting data on the identity of these anti-competitive companies is straightforward to the extent that the layout is relatively similar across decision files. A salient and important example is that of the companies' name which always appear at the end of the PDF right after the word *Décide* ("Decides").

Second, we use Python's textual analysis tools to back out the name of these companies, their sales, the date when the ADLC was first notified of the infraction and the corresponding amount of the fine for each firm. This step requires some manual cleaning as some companies, numbers and cases are misreported. We therefore go through all the files to complement the information extracted from the textual analysis and double check that our newly created dataset is not missing anything that would appear in the original PDF files but that we would miss via the textual analysis exercise. At this stage, the dataset is informative about the identity (name) of the firms that were fined by the French Antitrust Authority, their sales, the case number of the decision, the amount of the fine for each firm and the notification date of the case to the ADLC.

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<sup>56</sup>A firm part of a cartel can go to the authority and report it. Under specific circumstances the firm will receive a more lenient fine than the other members of the cartels or not be fined at all. Large cartels dismantled through a leniency program can be found [here](#).

Third, we make use of Orbis and Python to recover information on the identification number of the firms which will then allow us to match our database to the balance-sheets data. To do so, we upload our temporary database into the Batch Search engine of Orbis to look for the SIREN number of each firm given its name. We complement this information with a Python script that allows us to obtain the SIREN number of firms based on a Bing search of that firm's name.<sup>57</sup> Although these methods are imperfect, they facilitate the matching with FICUS.

Finally, before matching our database with FICUS, we manually verify that the SIREN numbers obtained from Orbis and from our scraping procedure are correct. We do so by making sure that the sales (in euros) of the firm in our database correspond to those reported in FICUS. For the firms that were not matched by any means in our third step, we manually search for them in FICUS using the information on their sales and add their SIREN number directly in our database.

### A.3 List of Variables

We describe below the different variables used in our empirical framework. Note that our main sample consists of observations with strictly positive values for gross value-added, total and domestic sales, number of employees, labor compensation, expenditures on materials and capital.

- **APE Code:** 4-digit industry code. Before 2008, APE codes are available in a 4-digit format corresponding to the NAF Rev. 1 classification. *Source: FICUS and authors' calculation*
- **Capital:** Net book value of capital. We cannot build a capital measure using the perpetual inventory method. We further deflate capital expenditures by sector-level price indices from EUKLEMS (Jäger, 2017). *Source: FICUS and authors' calculation*
- **Colluder:** Dummy variable that takes the value one if the firm engaged in anti-competitive practices in a given year. *Source: Moreau-Panon database*
- **Employment:** Total number of employees working in each firm. *Source: FICUS*
- **Gross Value-Added:** This variable is directly available in FICUS and follows the accounting definition according to which it is equal to total sales minus input expenses taking into account changes in inventories. *Source: FICUS*

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<sup>57</sup>We thank Arthur Guillouzouic Le Corff for sharing his code.

- **Labor Compensation:** This variable is the sum of two components separately available in the fiscal files: salaries and social benefits that are paid by the employer and that benefit the worker in the form of retirement funds, social security funds etc. *Source: FICUS*
- **Market Shares:** A firm's market share is defined at the 4-digit level. We compute market shares by dividing a firm's domestic sales by the total amount sold by all the firms operating in the same market at a point in time. *Source: FICUS and authors' calculation*
- **Materials:** Materials are defined as the sum of expenditures on raw materials, final goods and other categories. We further deflate this expenditure variable by 2-digit sector intermediate goods price indices from EUKLEMS. *Source: FICUS and authors' calculation*
- **NAF Code:** 2-digit sector code according to the NACE Rev. 1 classification. Some sectors are pooled together, depending to the availability of sector-price deflators. *Source: FICUS*
- **Total Sales:** Total sales (domestic sales plus export sales) reported by the firm in thousands of euros. *Source: FICUS*
- **Wages:** Firm-level wages are obtained by dividing labor compensation by employment. *Source: FICUS and authors' calculation*

**Market definition.** We use both 2-digit and 4-digit industry classification. In the FICUS dataset, each firm is assigned a 4-digit principal activity code ("Code APE") by the INSEE and whose aim is to pin down in which industry the firm mostly operates. Because the precise breakdown of sales across products is not available for the French data, the relevant market for a firm is its 4-digit industry code. Therefore, throughout the paper, we will denote a firm's market share by its market share in the relevant 4-digit industry code. Our definition of a sector follows the NAF Rev. 1 classification.



## B Additional Tables

Table A1: Cartels by Sector (2007)

NAF (1)	Sector (2)	Sales Share (3)	VA Share (4)	# Cartels (5)	# Colluding Firms (6)
01-05	Agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing	0.0010	0.0013		
10-14	Mining and quarrying	0.0029	0.0038		
15-16	Food products, beverages and tobacco	0.0458	0.0419	4	24
17-19	Textiles, leather and footwear	0.0087	0.0093		
20	Wood and wood products	0.0043	0.0046		
21-22	Pulp, paper, publishing and printing	0.0173	0.0194	1	1
23	Coke	0.0209	0.0162		
24	Chemicals	0.0405	0.0378		
25	Rubber and plastics	0.0149	0.0151	2	4
26	Other non-metallic mineral prod.	0.0097	0.0113		
27-28	Basic metals and fabricated metal prod.	0.0341	0.0362	1	2
29	Machinery and equipment n.e.c.	0.0245	0.0259	1	2
30-33	Electrical and optical equipment	0.0270	0.0299		
34-35	Transport equipment	0.0554	0.0383		
36-37	Other manufacturing n.e.c	0.0098	0.0090		
40-41	Electricity, gas and water supply	0.0335	0.0350		
45	Construction	0.0693	0.0866	1	1
50-52	Wholesale and retail	0.3473	0.1930	11	22
55	Hotels and restaurants	0.0213	0.0340		
60-63	Transport and storage	0.0511	0.0617	4	20
64	Post and telecommunications	0.0250	0.0468	1	1
70	Real estate activities	0.0187	0.0315		
71-74	Renting and business activities	0.0861	0.1532	2	7
80	Education	0.0020	0.0039		
85	Health and social work	0.0100	0.0209	1	2
90-93	Other service activities	0.0189	0.0334		

**Notes:** The sales share column represents sector-level sales in total sales in 2007. The VA share column represents sector-level value-added in total value-added in 2007. The number of colluding firms in a cartel in column (6) can be equal to one because some firms were not matched to the administrative data and are therefore dropped.

	ln Sales			Market Share			ln Employment			ln Labor Productivity		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
$\mathbb{1}_{\text{Collude}}$	4.040*** (0.092)	3.582*** (0.092)	3.002*** (0.082)	4.400*** (0.548)	4.297*** (0.542)	4.028*** (0.473)	3.306*** (0.084)	2.998*** (0.084)	2.526*** (0.075)	0.478*** (0.027)	0.364*** (0.024)	0.318*** (0.022)
Two-digit Sector $\times$ Year FE	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
Four-digit Industry $\times$ Year FE	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
# Obs.	12,452,544	12,452,544	12,452,544	12,452,544	12,452,544	12,452,544	12,452,544	12,452,544	12,452,544	12,452,544	12,452,544	12,452,544
$R^2$	0.002	0.177	0.315	0.005	0.036	0.198	0.002	0.096	0.215	0.000	0.091	0.152

**Notes:** The values displayed are for the period 1994-2007. Sales and value-added are in thousands of euros. Labor productivity is real value-added (deflated by 2-digit price indices) divided by the number of workers. Labor is the number of workers. The capital-labor ratio is expressed in real terms where capital has been deflated. Intermediates is the value of expenditures on intermediate goods in thousands of euros.

	ln Sales			Market Share			ln Employment			ln Labor Productivity		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
$\mathbb{1}_{\text{Collude}}$	3.912*** (0.149)	3.268*** (0.140)	2.881*** (0.124)	2.923*** (0.397)	2.822*** (0.391)	2.720*** (0.375)	2.940*** (0.131)	2.546*** (0.122)	2.301*** (0.110)	0.575*** (0.037)	0.445*** (0.033)	0.364*** (0.033)
Two-digit Sector $\times$ Year FE	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
Four-digit Industry $\times$ Year FE	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
# Obs.	12,450,922	12,450,922	12,450,922	12,450,922	12,450,922	12,450,922	12,450,922	12,450,922	12,450,922	12,450,922	12,450,922	12,450,922
$R^2$	0.000	0.176	0.315	0.000	0.033	0.199	0.000	0.095	0.215	0.000	0.091	0.151

**Notes:** The values displayed are for the period 1994-2007. Sales and value-added are in thousands of euros. Labor productivity is real value-added (deflated by 2-digit price indices) divided by the number of workers. Labor is the number of workers. The capital-labor ratio is expressed in real terms where capital has been deflated. Intermediates is the value of expenditures on intermediate goods in thousands of euros. Cartels that do not fix prices directly have been dropped from the sample.

Table A4: Anticompetitive Firms and Firm Rank

	Dummy Anticompetitive Firm					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ln Rank Market Share	-0.0003*** (0.0000)	-0.0003*** (0.0000)	-0.0005*** (0.0000)			
$\mathbb{1}_{\text{Top 4 Industry}}$				0.0163*** (0.0015)	0.0163*** (0.0015)	0.0164*** (0.0015)
2-Digit Sector $\times$ Year FE	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
4-Digit Industry $\times$ Year FE	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
# Observations	12,452,544	12,452,544	12,452,544	12,452,544	12,452,544	12,452,544
R-sq.	0.0012	0.0021	0.0186	0.0036	0.0045	0.0209

**Notes:** This table regresses a dummy variable taking the value of one if a firm is anticompetitive on two measures of the rank of firms in their 4-digit industry. ln Rank Market Share is the log rank of the firm in its industry according to its market share.  $\mathbb{1}_{\text{Top 4 Industry}}$  is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm is one the top 4 firms in its industry.

Table A5: Log Sales Dispersion: Non-Cartel versus Cartel Members

Moment	Non-Cartel Members			Cartel Members		
	Mean (1)	Std. Dev. (2)	IQ Range (3)	Mean (4)	Std. Dev. (5)	IQ Range (6)
Median	6.623	1.264	1.56	10.845	2.347	2.311
IQ range	1.989	0.835	0.821	1.197	1.149	1.788
90-10 percentile range	3.774	1.394	1.551	1.562	1.371	2.422
95-5 percentile range	4.828	1.700	1.995	1.625	1.416	2.839

**Notes:** This table summarizes firm-level domestic sales distribution moments across four-digit industries and across cartels. Rows correspond to moments of within-industry and within-cartel producer domestic sales distributions; columns show the across-industry and across-cartel mean and dispersion of these moments. IQ range is the interquartile range.

Table A6: Dispersion within the Manufacture of Plastic Components for Construction

	Labor Productivity		Log Sales	
	Non-Cartel Members	Cartel Members	Non-Cartel Members	Cartel Members
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Median	4.758	5.585	7.695	10.516
IQ range	0.497	0.183	2.140	1.116
90-10 percentile range	0.984	0.183	4.135	1.116
95-5 percentile range	1.404	0.183	5.107	1.116

**Notes:** The industry considered is 252E, which corresponds to “Manufacture of plastic components for construction”. There are two cartels in this industry in 2007 (Decisions “10D39” and “17D20”) The figures are obtained by taking the firm mean of sales, value-added and labor productivity. We then compute the relevant ratios for each cartel case. Labor productivity is the ratio of value-added deflated by 2-digit price indices to the number of employees.

Table A7: Estimation of  $\kappa$ 

	Inverse Markup		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Firm's Market Share	-0.531*** (0.176)	-0.140 (0.188)	-0.130 (0.190)
Cartel's Market Share		-0.320*** (0.052)	-0.326*** (0.051)
Intercept	0.704*** (0.009)	0.729*** (0.008)	0.729*** (0.008)
Implied $\kappa$		0.70	0.71
Sum Coefficients		-0.46	-0.46
Ratio Coefficients		-0.63	-0.63
Year FE	No	No	Yes
# Observations	2,235	2,235	2,235
R-sq.	0.0575	0.1057	0.1147

**Notes:** Standard errors clustered at the firm level. \* significant at 10%, \*\* significant at 5%, \*\*\* significant at 1%. The collusion intensity is estimated following equation (24) described in the text. The dependent variable is the firm's labor share. The cartel market share variable is the sum of the market shares of all firms that belong to the same cartel-industry pair.

Table A8: Estimation of  $\kappa$ : Price-Fixing Cartels

	Inverse Markup		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Firm's Market Share	-0.682*** (0.188)	0.149 (0.325)	0.1598 (0.325)
Cartel's Market Share		-0.320*** (0.162)	-0.496*** (0.163)
Intercept	0.684*** (0.013)	0.706*** (0.014)	0.705*** (0.014)
Implied $\kappa$		1.42	1.48
Sum Coefficients		-0.35	-0.34
Ratio Coefficients		-0.50	-0.48
Year FE	No	No	Yes
# Observations	931	931	931
R-sq.	0.0476	0.0939	0.1022

**Notes:** Standard errors clustered at the firm level. \* significant at 10%, \*\* significant at 5%, \*\*\* significant at 1%. The collusion intensity is estimated following equation (24) described in the text. The dependent variable is the firm's labor share. The cartel market share variable is the sum of the market shares of all firms that belong to the same cartel-industry pair. The sample consists of cartels involved in price-fixing and excludes non price-fixing cartels.

Table A9: Markup Distribution


	Unconditional markup distribution		Sectoral markup distribution	
	Benchmark (1)	Competitive economy (2)	Benchmark (3)	Competitive economy (4)
p50	1.098	1.098	1.177	1.159
p75	1.099	1.099	1.221	1.199
p90	1.102	1.101	1.307	1.261
p95	1.110	1.106	1.381	1.332
p99	1.341	1.151	1.674	1.589
SD log	0.032	0.014	0.090	0.083
log p95/p50	0.011	0.007	0.160	0.139

**Notes:** The table reports moments of the markup distribution. Columns 1 and 2 report moments of the unconditional distribution where markups are pooled over all sectors. Columns 3 and 4 report moments of the markup distribution defined at the sector-level. Columns 1 and 3 report moments for the benchmark economy with cartels whereas columns 2 and 4 consider an economy with no cartels.




## C Additional Figures

Figure A1: Number of Decisions per Year



Data Source: Authors.

Figure A2: Number of Anti-competitive Firms per Year



Data Source: Authors.

Figure A3: Example of Decision File (17d20): Firms' Identity

#### DÉCISION

**Article 1<sup>er</sup>** : Il est établi que les sociétés Tarkett France, Tarkett, Tarkett AB et Tarkett Holding GmbH, Forbo Sarlino, Forbo Participations et Forbo Holding LTD, Gerflor SAS, Midfloor SAS et Topfloor SAS et le syndicat français des enducteurs calandriers et fabricants de revêtements de sols et murs (SFEC) ont enfreint les dispositions de l'article L. 420-1 du code de commerce et du paragraphe 1 de l'article 101 du traité sur le fonctionnement de l'Union européenne en mettant en œuvre les pratiques visées par les trois griefs exposés au paragraphe 408.

**Article 2** : À ce titre, sont infligées les sanctions pécuniaires suivantes :

- à la société Tarkett France, en tant qu'auteur et solidairement avec les sociétés Tarkett, Tarkett AB et Tarkett Holding GmbH, en leur qualité de sociétés mères, une sanction d'un montant de cent soixante-cinq millions d'euros (165 000 000 d'euros) ;

- à la société Forbo Sarlino, en tant qu'auteur et solidairement avec les sociétés Forbo Participations et Forbo Holding LTD, en leur qualité de sociétés mères, une sanction d'un montant de soixante-quinze millions d'euros (75 000 000 d'euros) ;

- à la société Gerflor SAS, en tant qu'auteur et solidairement avec les sociétés Midfloor SAS et Topfloor SAS en leur qualité de sociétés mères, une sanction d'un montant de soixante-deux millions d'euros (62 000 000 d'euros) ;

- au SFEC, en tant qu'auteur, une sanction d'un montant de de trois cent mille euros (300 000 euros).


Figure A4: Example of Decision File (17d20): Duration of Cartel

430. Ces accords et pratiques concertées constituent, par conséquent, une entente unique, complexe et continue dans le secteur de la fabrication et de la commercialisation des revêtements de sols résilients à laquelle Forbo, Gerflor et Tarkett ont participé, de manière continue, entre le 8 octobre 2001 et le 22 septembre 2011.

Figure A5: Example of Decision File (17d20): Type of Infringement


435. Il résulte de ce qui précède, que ces échanges d'informations, mis en œuvre entre 1990 et la fin de l'année 2013, ont été de nature à restreindre la concurrence, en violation du premier paragraphe de l'article 101 du TFUE et de l'article L. 420-1 du code de commerce.

Figure A6: Impact of Collusion on Sectoral Productivity




**Notes:** The figure displays the p25, median and p75 of the distribution of the growth rate of sectoral productivity for different values of  $\kappa$ . The growth rate is computed as the difference in sectoral productivity for each cartel in each sector before and after colluding. For instance, for  $\kappa = 1$ , 75% of cartelized sectors have a productivity growth rate lower than -1.5%.

Figure A7: Price Fixing in the Ball Bearing Industry, 1993-2003



**Notes:** Black vertical lines correspond to the instances of concerted price increases among the cartel members, as documented by the French competition authority in its decision. The dark gray area represents the  $\pm 2$  standard deviations of the mean monthly price change. The red vertical line corresponds to the date when the Competition Authority gave its sentence.

Figure A8: Parameter Identification



**Notes:** This figure shows the sensitivity of moments to parameters. The numbers are obtained by computing the elasticity of moments with respect to parameters, evaluated at the calibrated parameters.

## D Identification and Estimation

### D.1 Restriction on Parameters

The sum of the two slopes from equation (24) is:

$$a_1 + a_2 = \frac{1}{\rho} - \frac{1}{\eta}$$

To see why the restriction reported in equation (26) also applies to non-cartel members, let us write the corresponding estimating equation for non-cartel members:

$$\frac{Wl_{si}}{p_{si}y_{si}} = b_0 + b_1\omega_{si} + \varepsilon_{si}$$

where  $b_0 = \frac{\rho-1}{\rho}$  and  $b_1 := \frac{\eta-\rho}{\eta\rho}$ . We can see that:

$$b_1 = \frac{1}{\rho} - \frac{1}{\eta} = a_1 + a_2$$

Given that  $a_1 + a_2 = b_1$  and that  $b_0 = a_0$ , one can express  $\eta$  as a function of the ratio  $b_1/b_0$  and  $\rho$ :

$$\eta = \left( \frac{1}{\rho} - \frac{b_1}{b_0} \left( \frac{\rho-1}{\rho} \right) \right)^{-1}$$

which is the restriction reported in Edmond et al. (2015).

This shows that one can either project non-cartel members' markup on their own market share to match the ratio  $b_1/b_0$ , or project cartel members' markup on their own market share and their cartel's market share to match the ratio  $(a_1 + a_2)/a_0$ . However, because non-cartel members may be cartel members that have not been detected by the competition authority, we choose to rely on equation (24), thereby departing from the approach used by Edmond et al. (2015).

## D.2 Identification of Model Parameters

To better understand whether the chosen moments help us identify the model parameters, we compute the Jacobian matrix of the baseline model. Each entry of the matrix reports the percentage change in each moment following a one percentage point increase in the value of each parameter. These changes are evaluated at the baseline calibration values. The matrix is displayed in Figure A8. We now discuss how the moments react to different parameter changes:

- (i) An increase in the elasticity of substitution within sectors  $\rho$  increases the relative demand of more productive firms that charge lower prices, which increases their market share and increases the aggregate markup.
- (ii) The ratio of estimated coefficients from equation (24) helps us identify the elasticity of substitution across sectors  $\eta$ . Equation (26) shows that an increase in  $\eta$  leads to an increase in this ratio of parameters, everything else equal. A higher  $\eta$  implies increased relative demand for more productive firms in other sectors that might be cartelized, allowing these firms to charge higher markups and strengthening the positive relationship between market shares and markups.
- (iii) The sales concentration data moments are sensitive to a change in the Pareto shape parameter  $\xi$ . When  $\xi$  increases, the productivity distribution becomes less skewed and firms are therefore more homogeneous. This decreases the fraction of firms selling less than their industry average and increases the fraction of total sales captured by relatively more productive firms.
- (iv) The geometric parameter  $\sigma$  is identified by matching the median number of firms per sector. When  $\sigma$  increases, the number of firms decreases, which ends up affecting sales concentration and the aggregate markup.
- (v) The geometric parameter  $\zeta$  is identified by matching the median number of cartel members. When this parameter decreases, the median number of cartel members increases, thereby affecting sales concentration.

## E Mathematical Appendix

### E.1 Cartels and market structure.

This section derives equilibrium conditions when a subset of firms in each sector  $s$  belong to a cartel  $\mathcal{C}$ :  $\mathcal{C}_s \subseteq K_s$  and non-cartel members behave competitively.

**Cartels and cross-ownership** The simple form of collusion analyzed in the main text is meant to capture a large range of cartel arrangements and is also consistent with the profit distortions created by cross-ownership. To see this, consider an industry with  $K$  firms, let  $\Pi_k$  denote the profit function of firm  $k$ . Let  $\beta_{jl}$  denote the share of firm  $j$  which is owned by firm  $l$  and  $\gamma_{lj}$  firm  $l$ 's control or influence over firm  $j$ 's decisions. The financial profits accruing to firm  $l$  correspond to the portfolio  $\pi^l = \sum_j \beta_{jl} \pi_j$ , where  $\pi_l$  are the profits generated by firm  $l$ 's operations. However, because other firms can influence firm  $k$ 's operations, and that their shareholders' interests are not perfectly aligned, the managers of firm  $k$  maximize a weighted average,  $\tilde{\pi}_k$ , of the firm's shareholders portfolios, where the weights depend on the controlling shares. The objective function of firm  $k$  is given by:

$$\tilde{\pi}_k = \sum_l \gamma_{kl} \pi^l = \sum_l \gamma_{kl} \sum_j \beta_{jl} \pi_j \quad (29)$$

Taking  $\pi_k$  out of the second summation and normalizing by  $\sum_l \gamma_{kl} \beta_{kl}$  so as to isolate  $\pi_k$ , we can rewrite the objective function as (dropping the sectoral index  $s$ ):

$$\tilde{\pi}_k \propto \pi_k + \sum_{j \in \mathcal{C} \setminus \{k\}} \frac{\sum_l \gamma_{kl} \beta_{jl}}{\sum_l \gamma_{kl} \beta_{kl}} \pi_j = \pi_k + \sum_{j \in \mathcal{C} \setminus \{k\}} \kappa_{kj} \pi_j \quad (30)$$

Equation (30) makes it clear that firm  $k$  maximizes its own profits given by  $\pi_{sk}$  and other firms' profits. Moreover, the profit weights are *firm-specific*.<sup>58</sup> Cartel members therefore solve the following maximization problem:

$$\max_{P_{sk}, q_{sk}} \left[ \left( P_{sk} - \frac{W}{z_{sk}} \right) q_{sk} + \sum_{j \in \mathcal{C} \setminus \{k\}} \kappa_{kj} \left( P_{sj} - \frac{W}{z_{sj}} \right) q_{sj} \right], \quad \forall k \in \mathcal{C}_s \quad (31)$$

subject to the inverse demand function obtained by combining equations (3) and (6):

$$\left( \frac{P_{sk}}{P} \right) = \left( \frac{q_{sk}}{y_s} \right)^{-\frac{1}{\rho}} \left( \frac{y_s}{c} \right)^{-\frac{1}{\eta}} \quad (32)$$

<sup>58</sup>We note that these profit weights can be larger than one, in which case a firm values other firms' profits more than its own. Such a case is studied in Backus et al. (2019). We deem this case to be implausible in the case of cartels and do not consider it.

and where  $\kappa_{kj} := \frac{\sum_l \gamma_{kl} \beta_{jl}}{\sum_l \gamma_{kl} \beta_{kl}}$  is the firm-specific weight assigned to other cartel members' profits.

**Non-cartel members.** Competitive firms that do not belong to the cartel ( $i \notin \mathcal{C}_s$ ) instead maximize their own profits. Their prices  $P_{si}$  and quantities  $q_{si}$  solve the following maximization problem:

$$\max_{P_{si}, q_{si}} \left[ \left( P_{si} - \frac{W}{z_{si}} \right) q_{si} \right], \quad \forall i \notin \mathcal{C}_s \quad (33)$$

subject to (32):

$$\left( \frac{P_{si}}{P} \right) = \left( \frac{q_{si}}{y_s} \right)^{-\frac{1}{\rho}} \left( \frac{y_s}{c} \right)^{-\frac{1}{\eta}} \quad (34)$$

**Equilibrium prices and markups.** Under Nash-Cournot competition, the equilibrium prices  $\tilde{P}_{sk}$  of each cartel member and  $P_{si}$  of each non-cartel member are characterized by

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{P}_{sk} &= \tilde{\mu}_{sk} \frac{W}{z_k}, \quad \forall k \in \mathcal{C} \\ P_{si} &= \mu_{si} \frac{W}{z_i}, \quad \forall i \notin \mathcal{C} \end{aligned} \quad (35)$$

where firm-level markups are given by

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{1}{\tilde{\mu}_{sk}} &= \frac{\rho-1}{\rho} + \frac{\eta-\rho}{\eta\rho} \left( \omega_{sk} + \sum_{j \in \mathcal{C} \setminus \{k\}} \kappa_{kj} \omega_{sj} \right), \quad \forall k \in \mathcal{C} \\ \frac{1}{\mu_{si}} &= \frac{\rho-1}{\rho} + \frac{\eta-\rho}{\eta\rho} \omega_{si}, \quad \forall i \notin \mathcal{C} \end{aligned} \quad (36)$$

and where  $\omega_{sk}$  is the market share of firm  $k$  in its sector  $s$ :

$$\omega_{sk} := \frac{P_{sk} q_{sk}}{\sum_{j=1}^K P_{sj} q_{sj}} = \left( \frac{P_{sk}}{P_s} \right)^{1-\rho} \quad (37)$$

To see this, given the definition of sectoral output  $y_s$  in equation (5) and the inverse demand function (32), prices  $P_{sk}$  can be rewritten as:

$$P_{sk} = P c^{\frac{1}{\eta}} q_{sk}^{-\frac{1}{\rho}} y_s^{\frac{\eta-\rho}{\eta\rho}} = P c^{\frac{1}{\eta}} q_{sk}^{-\frac{1}{\rho}} \left( \sum_{k=1}^{K_s} (q_{sk})^{\frac{\rho-1}{\rho}} \right)^{\frac{\eta-\rho}{\eta(\rho-1)}} \quad (38)$$

Using the previous equation in the maximization problems detailed in equation (33)



yields:

$$\max_{q_{sk}} \left[ P c^{\frac{1}{\eta}} q_{sk}^{\frac{\rho-1}{\rho}} \left( \sum_{k=1}^{K_s} (q_{sk})^{\frac{\rho-1}{\rho}} \right)^{\frac{\eta-\rho}{\eta(\rho-1)}} - \frac{W}{z_{sk}} q_{sk} \right], \quad \forall k \notin \mathcal{C}$$

Firms do not internalize the effect of their decision on  $c$  and  $P$  and take wages and productivity levels as given. The first-order condition with respect to  $q_{sk}$  yields:

$$P_{sk} \frac{\rho-1}{\rho} + \frac{q_{sk}^{\frac{\rho-1}{\rho}}}{\sum_{j=1}^{K_s} q_{sj}^{\frac{\rho-1}{\rho}}} \frac{\eta-\rho}{\eta\rho} P_{sk} - \frac{W}{z_{sk}} = 0$$

Given the CES inverse demand functions given in equation (6), the market share of a firm in its sector  $\omega_{sk}$  can be expressed as  $\omega_{sk} = \frac{q_{sk}^{\frac{\rho-1}{\rho}}}{\sum_{j=1}^{K_s} q_{sj}^{\frac{\rho-1}{\rho}}}$ . Using this expression and rearranging the first-order condition yields:

$$P_{sk} = \left[ 1 - \frac{1}{\rho} (1 - \omega_{sk}) - \frac{1}{\eta} \omega_{sk} \right]^{-1} \times \frac{W}{z_{sk}} \quad (39)$$

Defining the demand elasticity as  $\varepsilon(\omega_{sk}) = \left[ \frac{1}{\rho} (1 - \omega_{sk}) + \frac{1}{\eta} \omega_{sk} \right]^{-1}$  and rearranging the previous equation yields equation (35) for non-cartel members.

Similarly, the problem solved by cartel members in equation (31) can be written as:

$$\max_{q_{sk}} \left[ P c^{\frac{1}{\eta}} q_{sk}^{\frac{\rho-1}{\rho}} \left( \sum_{k=1}^{K_s} (q_{sk})^{\frac{\rho-1}{\rho}} \right)^{\frac{\eta-\rho}{\eta(\rho-1)}} - \frac{W}{z_{sk}} q_{sk} + \sum_{j \neq k} \kappa_{kj} \left( P c^{\frac{1}{\eta}} q_{sj}^{\frac{\rho-1}{\rho}} \left( \sum_{k=1}^{K_s} (q_{sk})^{\frac{\rho-1}{\rho}} \right)^{\frac{\eta-\rho}{\eta(\rho-1)}} - \frac{W}{z_{sj}} q_{sj} \right) \right]$$

Taking the derivative of this equation with respect to  $q_{sk}$  yields:

$$\frac{\partial \tilde{\pi}_{sk}}{\partial q_{sk}} = \frac{\partial \Pi_{sk}(q_{sk}, q_{s-k})}{\partial q_{sk}} + \sum_{j \neq k} \kappa_{skj} \frac{\partial \Pi_{sj}(q_{sk}, q_{s-k})}{\partial q_{sk}}$$

The first term is exactly the same as in the FOC without collusion while the second term is the additional term created by the cartel, whereby a firm internalizes only partially the positive externality on the other members of the cartel. This can be rewritten as:

$$\frac{\partial \tilde{\pi}_{sk}}{\partial q_{sk}} = \left[ 1 - \left\{ \frac{1}{\rho} + \left( \frac{1}{\eta} - \frac{1}{\rho} \right) \omega_{sk} \right\} \right] P_{sk} - \frac{W}{z_{sk}} + \sum_{j \neq k} \kappa_{skj} \frac{\partial P_{sj}}{\partial q_{sk}} q_{sj}$$

where

$$\frac{\partial P_{sj}}{\partial q_{sk}} q_{sj} = \left( \frac{1}{\rho} - \frac{1}{\eta} \right) P_{sk} \omega_{sj} \quad (40)$$

Collecting the terms and rearranging yields the equilibrium price of cartel members shown in equation (35) with the equilibrium markups expressed as in equation (36). The parameter  $\kappa_{kj}$  controls the degree of symmetry of the cartel agreement. If  $\kappa_{kj} = 1$  then a member of the cartel cares equally about her own-profits than that of other members of the cartel. In this extreme case, all the members of the cartels set the same markup, that depends only on the sum of the equilibrium market shares of the cartel members. Conversely,  $\kappa_{kj} = 0$  corresponds to the competitive Nash-Cournot equilibrium.

**Full symmetric collusion.** Consider the case where the profit weights are equal to unity  $\kappa_{kj} = 1$ . This is the case, for example, when the share of two different rival firms  $j$  and  $k$  owned by investor  $l$  is the same, i.e.  $\beta_{jl} = \beta_{kl}$ . This also arises when the control shares are the same across firms  $\gamma_{kl} = \gamma_k$ .<sup>59</sup> The case where the profit weights are equal to unity boils down to full collusion where firms maximize their joint profits and equally weight all cartel members' profits. Cartel member  $k$ 's markup is given by:

$$\frac{1}{\tilde{\mu}_{sk}} = \frac{\rho - 1}{\rho} + \frac{\eta - \rho}{\eta \rho} \sum_{j \in \mathcal{C}} \omega_{sj} \quad (41)$$

All colluding firms that belong to  $\mathcal{C}$  charge the same markup that is governed by the combined market share  $\sum_{j \in \mathcal{C}} \omega_{sj}$ .

**Partial symmetric collusion.** Consider the case where the profit weights differ from unity but are *constant* across cartel members. This is the case when firms' ownership shares are constant across different firms so that  $\beta_{jl} = \beta_j$  and  $\beta_{kl} = \beta_k$ . These shares can vary so that  $\beta_j \neq \beta_k$  as long as certain parametric restrictions are satisfied. For instance, if  $\beta_j \propto \kappa^{\zeta_j}$ ,  $\beta_k \propto \kappa^{\zeta_k}$  and  $\zeta_j - \zeta_k = 1$ , the profit weights are equal to  $\kappa$ . We assume that  $\kappa \in (0, 1)$ ,  $\zeta_j > 0$ ,  $\zeta_k > 0$ . In this case  $\kappa_{kj} = \frac{\sum_l \gamma_{kl} \beta_{jl}}{\sum_l \gamma_{kl} \beta_{kl}} = \frac{\beta_j}{\beta_k} = \frac{\kappa^{\zeta_j}}{\kappa^{\zeta_k}} = \kappa$  where the last step follows from  $\zeta_j - \zeta_k = 1$ . Markups are given by:

$$\frac{1}{\tilde{\mu}_{sk}} = \frac{\rho - 1}{\rho} + \frac{\eta - \rho}{\eta \rho} \left( \omega_{sk} + \kappa \sum_{j \in \mathcal{C} \setminus \{k\}} \omega_{sj} \right) \quad (42)$$

Equation (42) generates markup dispersion as each cartel member's decision's impact on other cartel members' profits is not fully internalized. As a result, markups depend on both the firm's own market share and the combined market share of the

<sup>59</sup>The profit weights also equal unity in this case as  $\sum_l \beta_{jl} = 1$ .

cartel. Markup dispersion across cartel members is higher in this case than in the full collusion case, as the weights assigned to other cartel members are not necessarily equal to one.

## E.2 Proof of Proposition 1

**Proposition 1.** (Reminded) *Starting from the competitive equilibrium, symmetric collusion i) increases the sectoral price index and ii) increases the markups of all firms. In particular, iii) for cartel members, the markup increase declines with firm size iv) while for non-cartel members, the markup increase increases with firm size.*

*Proof.* We study the economy as it transitions from the competitive Nash-Cournot equilibrium at time  $t$  to a small level of collusion  $\Delta\kappa$  at time  $t + \Delta t$ . For any variable  $x_t$ , we let  $x$  denote the value of the variable in the initial equilibrium and  $\hat{x}$  denote the log change between time  $t$  and  $t + \Delta t$ , that is,

$$\hat{x}_{sk} := \log x_{sk,t+\Delta t} - \log x_{sk,t} \quad (43)$$

and we drop the time index henceforth to simplify notations.

For non-cartel members, differentiating the markup equation around the competitive equilibrium, we have

$$\hat{\mu}_{sk} = \mu_{sk} \left( \frac{1}{\eta} - \frac{1}{\rho} \right) \left( \omega_{sk} \hat{\omega}_{sk} \right) \quad (44)$$

Using equation (37), the response of market shares to relative price changes, at the first order, is equal to

$$\hat{\omega}_{sk} = (1 - \rho) (\hat{P}_{sk} - \hat{P}_s) \quad (45)$$

Because there are no shocks to fundamental productivities, prices only change because of a change in markup,  $\hat{P}_{sk} = \hat{\mu}_{sk}$ . Combining with equation (44), we obtain the price response:

$$\hat{P}_{sk} = \mu_{sk} \left( \frac{1}{\eta} - \frac{1}{\rho} \right) \left( \omega_{sk} (\rho - 1) (\hat{P}_s - \hat{P}_{sk}) \right) \quad (46)$$

Collecting the terms we obtain

$$\hat{P}_{sk} = \Upsilon_{sk} \hat{P}_s \quad (47)$$

where we define

$$\Upsilon_{sk} := \frac{\omega_{sk} (\rho - 1) \left( \frac{1}{\eta} - \frac{1}{\rho} \right) \mu_{sk}}{1 + \omega_{sk} (\rho - 1) \left( \frac{1}{\eta} - \frac{1}{\rho} \right) \mu_{sk}} \quad (48)$$

to denote the umbrella pricing effect. Note that since this effect is of the form  $x \rightarrow \frac{ax}{1+ax}$  with  $a > 0$ , this umbrella pricing effect is increasing with firm size. The change in market shares for non-cartel firms can be expressed as:

$$\hat{\omega}_{sk} = (\rho - 1) (1 - \Upsilon_{sk}) \hat{P}_s \quad (49)$$

Note that if the price level increases, all non-cartel members increase their market shares. This increase is higher for smaller firms, as  $\Upsilon_{sk}$  increases with size.

For cartel members, equilibrium markups at the first-order are as follows:

$$\hat{\mu}_{sk}^C = \mu_{sk} \left( \frac{1}{\eta} - \frac{1}{\rho} \right) \left( \omega_{sk} \hat{\omega}_{sk} + \Delta\kappa \sum_{j \in \mathcal{C} \setminus \{k\}} \omega_{sj} + \kappa \sum_{j \in \mathcal{C} \setminus \{k\}} \omega_{sj} \hat{\omega}_{sj} \right) \quad (50)$$

as markups are distorted by the collusive behavior. Now, since  $\kappa = 0$  at  $t$  we have:

$$\hat{P}_{sk}^C = \mu_{sk} \left( \frac{1}{\eta} - \frac{1}{\rho} \right) \left( \omega_{sk} (\rho - 1) (\hat{P}_s - \hat{P}_{sk}) + \Delta\kappa \sum_{j \in \mathcal{C} \setminus \{k\}} \omega_{sj} \right) \quad (51)$$

and therefore

$$\hat{P}_{sk}^C = \Upsilon_{sk} \hat{P}_s + \frac{1}{\rho - 1} \frac{\Upsilon_{sk}}{\omega_{sk}} (\omega_{s\mathcal{C}} - \omega_{sk}) \Delta\kappa \quad (52)$$

where  $\omega_{s\mathcal{C}} := \sum_{j \in \mathcal{C}} \omega_{sj}$  is the total market share controlled by the cartel. Note that the first term is similar to that of non-cartel members. It captures the umbrella channel from higher prices in the sector, while the additional term captures the distortion arising from collusion. This distortion is larger the larger the cartel, and the more intense the collusion. The associated change in market shares is:

$$\hat{\omega}_{sk}^C = (\rho - 1) (1 - \Upsilon_{sk}) \hat{P}_s - \frac{\Upsilon_{sk}}{\omega_{sk}} (\omega_{s\mathcal{C}} - \omega_{sk}) \Delta\kappa \quad (53)$$

As we have seen, non-cartel firms are all gaining market shares. Therefore, by construction, some cartel members must be losing market shares.

Given the definition of the sectoral price index, its first-order approximation yields:

$$\hat{P}_s = \sum_k \omega_{sk} \hat{P}_{sk} \quad (54)$$

Thus, aggregating price changes for both non-cartelized firms (eq. 47) and cartelized firms (eq. 52) the sectoral price is:

$$\hat{P}_s = \sum_{k \notin \mathcal{C}} \omega_{sk} \Upsilon_{sk} \hat{P}_s + \sum_{k \in \mathcal{C}} \omega_{sk} \Upsilon_{sk} \hat{P}_s + \sum_{k \in \mathcal{C}} \Upsilon_{sk} \frac{1}{\rho - 1} (\omega_{s\mathcal{C}} - \omega_{sk}) \Delta\kappa \quad (55)$$

or

$$\hat{P}_s = \hat{P}_s \sum_k \omega_{sk} \Upsilon_{sk} + \sum_{k \in \mathcal{C}} \Upsilon_{sk} \frac{1}{\rho - 1} (\omega_{s\mathcal{C}} - \omega_{sk}) \Delta\kappa$$

Solving for  $\hat{P}_s$  yields:

$$\hat{P}_s = \frac{1}{1 - \sum_k \omega_{sk} \Upsilon_{sk}} \frac{1}{\rho - 1} \sum_{k \in \mathcal{C}} \Upsilon_{sk} (\omega_{s\mathcal{C}} - \omega_{sk}) \Delta\kappa \quad (56)$$

The sectoral price change is therefore a weighted average of the firms' overcharges, up to a multiplier effect via umbrella pricing, captured by the first fraction before the sum. Since  $0 < \Upsilon_{sk} < 1$  for all  $s, k$ , and  $\sum_k \omega_{sk} = 1$ , we have  $0 < \sum_k \omega_{sk} \Upsilon_{sk} < 1$ . Therefore the price change is positive, which proves the first result. The second result follows from equations (47) and (52). As  $P_s$  increases, all prices go up, both for cartel and non-cartel firms. The third result follows from the fact that  $\Upsilon_{sk} \in (0, 1)$  increases with firm size. Finally, for cartel members, notice that  $\frac{\Upsilon_{sk}}{\omega_{sk}}$  decreases with size. To see this, let  $a := (\rho - 1) \left( \frac{1}{\eta} - \frac{1}{\rho} \right)$  so that:

$$\frac{\Upsilon_{sk}}{\omega_{sk}} = \frac{a\mu_{sk}}{1 + a\omega_{sk}\mu_{sk}} \quad (57)$$

Therefore:

$$\frac{\partial \frac{\Upsilon_{sk}}{\omega_{sk}}}{\partial \omega_{sk}} = \frac{a \frac{\partial \mu_{sk}}{\partial \omega_{sk}} (1 + a\omega_{sk}\mu_{sk}) - a\mu_{sk} \times a \left( \mu_{sk} + \omega_{sk} \frac{\partial \mu_{sk}}{\partial \omega_{sk}} \right)}{(1 + a\omega_{sk}\mu_{sk})^2} \quad (58)$$

$$\frac{\partial \frac{\Upsilon_{sk}}{\omega_{sk}}}{\partial \omega_{sk}} = \frac{a \left( \frac{\partial \mu_{sk}}{\partial \omega_{sk}} - a\mu_{sk}^2 \right)}{(1 + a\omega_{sk}\mu_{sk})^2} \quad (59)$$

Now recall that  $\frac{\partial \mu_{sk}}{\partial \omega_{sk}} = \mu_{sk}^2 \left( \frac{1}{\eta} - \frac{1}{\rho} \right)$  and therefore:

$$\frac{\partial \frac{\Upsilon_{sk}}{\omega_{sk}}}{\partial \omega_{sk}} = \frac{a\mu_{sk}^2 \left( \frac{1}{\eta} - \frac{1}{\rho} \right) (2 - \rho)}{(1 + a\omega_{sk}\mu_{sk})^2} < 0 \quad (60)$$

Therefore  $\frac{\Upsilon_{sk}}{\omega_{sk}}$  is decreasing with firm size if and only if  $\rho > 2$ . This is the case in all our quantitative analysis.

The proof of corollary 1 simply follows from the fact that in equation (56) the impact on the price index is larger the more intense the collusion and the larger the market share controlled by the cartel.

The proof of corollary 2 follows from equation (53). Notice that, everything else equal, as  $\omega_{sk}$  tends to 0 the first term tends to  $(\rho - 1) \hat{P}_s > 0$  while the second term tends to  $-\left(\frac{\rho}{\eta} - 1\right) \omega_{s\mathcal{C}} \Delta\kappa < 0$ . Depending on the composition of the cartel,

$\lim_{\omega_{sk} \rightarrow 0} \hat{\omega}_{sk}^C$  can be either positive or negative. This is confirmed in our quantitative exercise.  $\square$

### E.3 Collusion and Misallocation

The sectoral change in productivity is, by definition,

$$\hat{z}_s = \hat{\mu}_s - \hat{P}_s$$

Recall that  $\mu_s = \left( \sum_k \omega_{sk} \mu_{sk}^{-1} \right)^{-1}$  and that  $P_s = \left[ \sum_{k=1}^{K_s} (P_{sk})^{1-\rho} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\rho}}$ . Therefore at the first order we have

$$\hat{z}_s = \sum_k \omega_{sk} \frac{\mu_s}{\mu_{sk}} (\hat{\mu}_{sk} - \hat{\omega}_{sk}) - \sum_k \omega_{sk} \hat{P}_{sk} \quad (61)$$

As there is no technological shocks at the firm level  $\hat{\mu}_{sk} = \hat{P}_{sk}$  for all  $s, k$  and from equation (45) we have  $\hat{\omega}_{sk} = (1 - \rho) (\hat{P}_{sk} - \hat{P}_s)$ . The impact of collusion on sectoral productivity is

$$\hat{z}_s = \sum_k \omega_{sk} \frac{\mu_s}{\mu_{sk}} [\hat{P}_{sk} - (1 - \rho) (\hat{P}_{sk} - \hat{P}_s)] - \sum_k \omega_{sk} \hat{P}_{sk} \quad (62)$$

Thus, rearranging the terms we have

$$\hat{z}_s = \sum_k \omega_{sk} \frac{\mu_s}{\mu_{sk}} [\rho \hat{P}_{sk} - (\rho - 1) \hat{P}_s] - \sum_k \omega_{sk} \hat{P}_{sk} \quad (63)$$

$$\hat{z}_s = \sum_k \omega_{sk} \left( \frac{\mu_s}{\mu_{sk}} - 1 \right) \hat{P}_{sk} + (\rho - 1) \sum_k \omega_{sk} \frac{\mu_s}{\mu_{sk}} (\hat{P}_{sk} - \hat{P}_s) \quad (64)$$

### E.4 Alternative Collusion Arrangements and Overcharges

As previously shown, in the case of symmetric collusion, distortions in both prices and quantities are larger for smaller cartel members. This is because, with a uniform collusion intensity, larger firms carry a relatively larger influence on the pricing decisions of the small firms. This effect can be obtained by considering alternative collusion forms. Recall that more generally the inverse markup is

$$\frac{1}{\tilde{\mu}_{sk}} = \frac{\rho - 1}{\rho} + \left( \frac{1}{\eta} - \frac{1}{\rho} \right) \left( \omega_{sk} + \kappa_k \sum_{j \in C \setminus \{k\}} \omega_{sj} \right) \quad (65)$$

where  $\kappa_k$  for  $k \in \mathcal{C}$  is a collection of collusive intensities. And therefore for small given changes of collusion intensity  $\Delta\kappa_k$  we have

$$\hat{\mu}_{sk} = \mu_{sk} \left( \frac{1}{\eta} - \frac{1}{\rho} \right) \left( \omega_{sk} \hat{\omega}_{sk} + \Delta\kappa_k \sum_{j \in \mathcal{C} \setminus \{k\}} \omega_{sj} \right) \quad (66)$$

Price changes take the general form

$$\begin{cases} \hat{P}_{sk} = \Upsilon_{sk} \hat{P}_s + \Theta_{sk} \\ \hat{\omega}_{sk} = (\rho - 1) (1 - \Upsilon_{sk}) \hat{P}_s - (\rho - 1) \Theta_{sk} \end{cases} \quad (67)$$

where the overcharge is

$$\Theta_{sk} = \frac{1}{\rho - 1} \frac{\Upsilon_{sk}}{\omega_{sk}} (\omega_{s\mathcal{C}} - \omega_{sk}) \Delta\kappa_k \quad (68)$$

if firm  $k$  joins the cartel and 0 otherwise. Notice that the sectoral price change is a weighted average of overcharges, times a multiplier

$$\hat{P}_s = \frac{1}{1 - \sum_k \omega_{sk} \Upsilon_{sk}} \sum_{k \in \mathcal{C}} \omega_{sk} \Theta_{sk} \quad (69)$$

Consider a more general class of collusion arrangements of the form

$$\Delta\kappa_k = \psi(\omega_{sk}) \psi_{\mathcal{C}} \Delta\kappa \quad (70)$$

where  $\Delta\kappa$  controls the intensive margin of the collusion,  $\psi(\omega_{sk})$  controls the “slope” of the effort sharing across members depending only on a member’s initial market share, and  $\psi_{\mathcal{C}}$  is a scaling factor common to all cartel members. For uniform symmetric collusions,  $\psi(\cdot)=1$  and  $\psi_{\mathcal{C}} = 1$ . Now consider a specific collusion arrangement characterized by

$$\begin{cases} \psi(\omega_{sk}) = \frac{\omega_{sk}}{\Upsilon_{sk}(\omega_{s\mathcal{C}} - \omega_{sk})} \\ \psi_{\mathcal{C}} = \sum_{k \in \mathcal{C}} \Upsilon_{sk} \frac{(\omega_{s\mathcal{C}} - \omega_{sk})}{\omega_{s\mathcal{C}}} \end{cases} \quad (71)$$

It follows from equation (69) that such a cartel would increase the sectoral price level by exactly the same amount as a symmetric cartel with  $\Delta\kappa$  as shown in equation (56). As a result, it would have the exact same impact on non-cartel members. In addition, under such an arrangement, there will be less disparity in distortions within the cartel, as prices and quantities are now

$$\begin{cases} \hat{P}_{sk} = \Upsilon_{sk} \hat{P}_s + \frac{1}{\rho - 1} \psi_{\mathcal{C}} \Delta\kappa \\ \hat{\omega}_{sk} = (\rho - 1) (1 - \Upsilon_{sk}) \hat{P}_s - \psi_{\mathcal{C}} \Delta\kappa \end{cases} \quad (72)$$

Under this arrangement, the change in prices for cartel members is now increasing with the size of the firm but the bulk of the overcharge,  $\frac{1}{\rho-1}\psi_C\Delta\kappa$ , is the same across the cartel. Therefore, such cartels operate closer to the “fairness” principle considered in [Bos and Harrington \(2010\)](#).

## E.5 Collusion and Cartel Stability

While collusion can raise cartel members’ profits, the presence of short gains from defecting from the cartel arrangement threaten the ability of the cartel. Cartels can nevertheless be stable in a repeated game settings when participants can credibly threaten to punish defection ([Abreu, 1988](#)). We show in this section that our framework lends itself to the canonical analysis of cartel stability in a repeated game and we derive conditions i) for profits to increase after joining the cartel and ii) for stability when firms are patient enough.

Consider the change in log profits after a cartel  $C$  is formed

$$\hat{\Pi}_{sk}^C = \log \Pi_{sk,t+dt}^C - \log \Pi_{sk,t} \quad (73)$$

where there is no collusion at  $t = 0$ . We first show that there exist incentives to deviate, that is,  $\hat{\Pi}_{sk}^{C \setminus \{k\}} > \hat{\Pi}_{sk}^C$ . As there are no productivity shocks, and since profits can be written  $\Pi_{sk} = (\mu_{sk} - 1) \frac{W}{z_{sk}} q_{sk}$ , after taking logs and differentiating, we have

$$\hat{\Pi}_{sk}^C = \frac{\mu_{sk}}{\mu_{sk} - 1} \hat{\mu}_{sk} + \hat{q}_{sk} \quad (74)$$

On the other hand combining equations (3) and (6) and taking log changes we have

$$\hat{q}_{sk} = \rho \left( \hat{P}_s^C - \hat{P}_{sk} \right) - \eta \hat{P}_s^C \quad (75)$$

Therefore the change in profits is

$$\hat{\Pi}_{sk}^C = \varepsilon_{sk} \hat{\mu}_{sk} + \rho \left( \hat{P}_s^C - \hat{P}_{sk} \right) - \eta \hat{P}_s^C \quad (76)$$

Finally, as  $\hat{\mu}_{sk} = \hat{P}_{sk}$  in the absence of technological shocks and using the notation for the overcharge introduced in equation (68) we have

$$\hat{\Pi}_{sk}^C = \left[ \rho - \eta - \Upsilon_{sk} (\rho - \varepsilon_{sk}) \right] \hat{P}_s^C - (\rho - \varepsilon_{sk}) \Theta_{sk} \quad (77)$$

Notice that, for a given sectoral price increase, as the term in brackets decreases with size, the upper bound gets tighter the larger the firm.



**Participation constraint.** For non-cartel members, the change in log profits is always positive, as  $\Upsilon_{sk} < 1$  and  $\varepsilon_{sk} \in (\eta, \rho)$  for all  $k$ , we have

$$\hat{\Pi}_{sk} = \left[ \rho - \eta - \Upsilon_{sk} (\rho - \varepsilon_{sk}) \right] \hat{P}_s^C > 0 \quad (78)$$

In addition, as both  $\Upsilon_{sk}$  and  $\rho - \varepsilon_{sk}$  are increasing with size, the term in brackets decreases with size, that is, smaller non-cartel firms exhibit a larger proportional increase in umbrella profits when the cartel forms.

For cartel members, recall that from equation (77), the change in profits is

$$\hat{\Pi}_{sk}^C = \left[ \rho - \eta - \Upsilon_{sk} (\rho - \varepsilon_{sk}) \right] \hat{P}_s^C - (\rho - \varepsilon_{sk}) \Theta_{sk}$$

Two channels are affecting profit changes: i) by joining the cartel, firm  $k$  contributes to further raising the price level, increasing its profits; at the same time, ii) this increase comes at a personal cost in terms of lost market shares. The first term capture the first channel and is decreasing with size. Regarding the second term, the factor in front of the overcharge is increasing with size. Firm  $k$  profits from joining the cartel compared to the baseline equilibrium if and only if

$$\Theta_{sk} < \left[ \frac{\rho - \eta}{\rho - \varepsilon_{sk}} - \Upsilon_{sk} \right] \hat{P}_s^C \quad (79)$$

**Incentive compatibility.** The cartel is sustainable under a punishment trigger strategy if there exists  $\delta$  such that

$$\frac{1}{1 - \delta} \hat{\Pi}_{sk}^C > \hat{\Pi}_s^{C \setminus \{k\}} \quad (80)$$

To analyze the incentives for firms to join the cartel, suppose that the cartel is not viable if firm  $k$  does not join. Then the counterfactual is the initial oligopolistic equilibrium, that is, profits do not change. If the cartel is viable without firm  $k$  joining, then the counterfactual profit is

$$\hat{\Pi}_{sk}^{C \setminus \{k\}} = \left[ \rho - \eta - \Upsilon_{sk} (\rho - \varepsilon_{sk}) \right] \hat{P}_s^{C \setminus \{k\}} \quad (81)$$

Notice that

$$\hat{\Pi}_{sk}^C = \hat{\Pi}_{sk}^{C \setminus \{k\}} \frac{\hat{P}_s^C}{\hat{P}_s^{C \setminus \{k\}}} - (\rho - \varepsilon_{sk}) \Theta_{sk} \quad (82)$$

Therefore colluding profit incentives require

$$\Theta_{sk} < \left[ \frac{\rho - \eta}{\rho - \varepsilon_{sk}} - \Upsilon_{sk} \right] \left[ \hat{p}_s^{\mathcal{C}} - (1 - \delta) \hat{p}_{sk}^{\mathcal{C} \setminus \{k\}} \right] \quad (83)$$

This constraint is therefore always more binding than the participation constraint derived above. In fact this constraint converges to the participation constraint from below as cartel members become infinitely patient, i.e.  $\delta \rightarrow 1$ . Conversely, if cartel members are perfectly impatient, the term in the right bracket reduces to the sectoral price increment due to member  $k$  joining the cartel:

$$\hat{p}_{sk}^{\mathcal{C}} - \hat{p}_{sk}^{\mathcal{C} \setminus \{k\}} = \frac{1}{\rho - 1} \frac{1}{1 - \sum_k \omega_{sk} \Upsilon_{sk}} \left[ \Upsilon_{sk} (\omega_{s\mathcal{C}} - \omega_{sk}) + \omega_{sk} \sum_{j \in \mathcal{C} \setminus \{k\}} \Upsilon_{sj} \right] \Delta \kappa \quad (84)$$

This additional price increase is decomposed into two channels: i) the influence of other cartel members on firm  $k$  and ii) the influence of firm  $k$  on each other cartel member  $j \in \mathcal{C} \setminus \{k\}$ . Finally, notice that this upper bound is always strictly positive and that the constraint is no longer necessarily monotonous but will depend on how collusive effort is shared in the cartel.

## E.6 Bertrand Competition

We can alternatively solve the model under the assumption that firms engage in a static game of Bertrand Competition. One can combine the inverse demand functions (3) and (6) which yields the combined inverse demand function:

$$q_{sk} = P_{sk}^{-\rho} \left( \sum_k P_{sk}^{1-\rho} \right)^{\frac{1}{\eta} - \frac{1}{\rho}} c P^\eta$$

The firm chooses its prices subject to the above constraint. This yields the first-order condition:

$$q_{sk} + \left( P_{sk} - \frac{W}{z_{sk}} \right) \frac{\partial q_{sk}}{\partial P_{sk}} = 0 \quad (85)$$

The derivative of the constraint with respect to the firm's price gives:

$$\frac{\partial q_{sk}}{\partial P_{sk}} = -\rho \frac{q_{sk}}{P_{sk}} + (\rho - \eta) \omega_{sk} \frac{q_{sk}}{P_{sk}}$$

Plugging this equation back into (85) and rearranging yields:

$$P_{sk} = \frac{\rho - (\rho - \eta)\omega_{sk}}{\rho - (\rho - \eta)\omega_{sk} - 1} \frac{W}{z_{sk}} \quad (86)$$

In the competitive Nash-Bertrand case, the demand elasticities are given by

$$\varepsilon(\omega_{sk}) = \rho - (\rho - \eta)\omega_{sk} \quad (87)$$

The elasticities are now sales-weighted arithmetic means instead of sales-weighted harmonic means as in the Cournot case. In the cartel equilibrium, the demand elasticities of the cartel members are given by:

$$\varepsilon(s) = \rho - (\rho - \eta) \left( \omega_{sk} + \sum_{j \in \mathcal{C} \setminus \{k\}} \kappa_{kj} \omega_{sj} \right) \quad (88)$$

We obtain qualitatively similar effects but slightly different magnitudes. Because the firm-specific demand elasticities are now arithmetic means instead of harmonic means, they are at least as large as in the Cournot case. The markups in the Bertrand setting are thus typically smaller than in the Cournot setting.

## E.7 Consumption-Equivalent Welfare

The lifetime utility of the representative consumer in the cartelized economy is given by:

$$W \equiv \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t U(C_t, L_t) = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left( \ln C_t - \frac{L_t^{1+\psi}}{1+\psi} \right) \quad (89)$$

where  $\beta$  is the discount factor,  $C_t$  denotes the consumption of the household in period  $t$ ,  $L_t$  is its labor supply and  $\psi$  is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. Capital is accumulated following the standard law of motion  $K_{t+1} = K_t(1 - \tau) + I_t$  where  $\tau$  is the depreciation rate of capital and  $I_t$  is investment.

The consumption-equivalent welfare change is the change in consumption  $\Delta C$  that is necessary to keep the consumer indifferent between the cartelized allocation and the competitive allocation. It is such that:

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t U(C_t^{\text{Cartels}}(1 + \Delta C), L_t^{\text{Cartels}}) = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t U(C_t^{\text{Competitive}}, L_t^{\text{Competitive}}) \quad (90)$$

Given the utility of the consumer,  $\Delta C$  is given by:

$$\Delta C = \exp \left( (W^{\text{Cartels}} - W^{\text{Competitive}})(1 - \beta) \right) - 1 \quad (91)$$

This welfare measure takes into account the cost of the transition to the competitive Nash-Cournot steady-state.