

**WP/21/53**

# IMF Working Paper


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## Pandemics and Inequality: Perceptions and Preferences for Redistribution

by Vybhavi Balasundharam and Era Dabla-Norris

***IMF Working Papers* describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to encourage debate.** The views expressed in IMF Working Papers are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management.

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**IMF Working Paper**

Asia and Pacific Department

**Pandemics and Inequality: Perceptions and Preferences for Redistribution****Prepared by Vybhavi Balasundharam and Era Dabla-Norris\***

Authorized for distribution by Era Dabla-Norris

Februaury 2021

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**Abstract**

This paper uses an individual-level survey conducted by the Edelman Trust Barometer in mid-April for 11 advanced and emerging market economies to examine perceptions of government performance in managing the health and economic crisis, beliefs about the future, and attitudes about redistribution. We find that women, non-college educated, the unemployed, and those in non-teleworkable jobs systematically have less favorable perceptions of government responses. Personally experiencing illness or job loss caused by the pandemic can shape people's beliefs about the future, heightening uncertainties about prolonged job losses, and the imminent threat from automation. Economic anxieties are amplified in countries that experienced an early surge in infections followed by successful containment, suggesting that negative beliefs can persist. Support for pro-equality redistributive policies varies, depending on personal experiences and views about the poor. However, we find strong willingness to provide social safety nets for vulnerable individuals and firms by those who have a more favorable perception of government responses, suggesting that effective government actions can promote support for redistributive policies.

JEL Classification Numbers: D63, D79, D84, I38

Keywords: COVID-19, inequality, perceptions, government, political economy

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## I. Introduction

The disproportionate health and economic effects of COVID-19 on certain demographic groups has elevated concerns that the crisis will exacerbate income inequality. This runs the risk of undermining social cohesion and deepening political polarization in societies.<sup>1</sup> Has the heterogeneous crisis impact influenced perceptions of government responses to mitigate the fallout from the pandemic? How has the crisis impacted beliefs about the future, particularly for those who are personally affected? How has the pandemic shaped preferences for redistributive policies and support for government intervention? Do these attitudes and preferences depend on the level of economic development and country-specific COVID dynamics? Answers to these questions can inform the design of government policy interventions that would garner broad public support.

This paper uses an individual-level, cross-country survey conducted by the Edelman Trust Barometer in mid-April 2020 to examine perceptions of government performance in managing the health and economic crisis, beliefs about the future, and attitudes about redistribution. The survey was conducted for 11 advanced and emerging market economies when most countries in the sample (excluding China and Korea) were facing their first surge in infections and designing and implementing response efforts. This allows us to examine how attitudes and preferences for redistribution were being shaped early on in the pandemic. Our focus lies in understanding the role socio-demographic and occupational characteristics play and examining cross-country drivers.

First, we document systematic differences across gender, employment status, flexibility of work (i.e., whether jobs are tele-workable), region, and income in perceptions of how well governments are handling the economic and health fallout. Women are more likely to have an unfavorable view of government responses compared to men on both the health and economic fronts. This is in line with the evidence that the COVID-19 crisis has had a disproportionate impact on women (Alon et al., 2020). Similarly, non-college educated, the unemployed, and those in jobs that cannot be done from home, who were hit hardest by lockdowns and social distancing measures, perceive the government's performance as less favorable. Compared to their counterparts, urban individuals and those employed in larger firms have a more favorable perception of government responses in handling the health crisis.

While age is generally not a significant determinant of how government responses are perceived, the young have a less favorable perception of the government's health response in emerging market economies. We also find that richer individuals have a more favorable perception of government responses in advanced economies, and in countries where less stringent containment measures were adopted. However, the rich are less supportive of government responses in countries with higher initial levels of inequality.

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<sup>1</sup> See IMF (2020), Adams-Prassl et al. (2020), Brussevich, Dabla-Norris, and Khalid (2020).

Second, we find that compared to their counterparts, older individuals, the economically vulnerable, and those living in urban areas are more worried about the health and economic well-being of vulnerable groups. Individual outlooks on the future are bleak, with heightened anxieties related to prolonged job losses, fears of automation, and harms of capitalism even early-on in the crisis. Decomposing the responses by demographic and occupational characteristics, we find that individuals personally affected by the crisis, either through job loss or those who have had contact with sick people or are personally experiencing symptoms of the disease, hold particularly pessimistic beliefs about the future.

We also find that women are more pessimistic about prolonged job losses in countries where more stringent containment measures were put in place. Concerns about the future are stronger overall for individuals in emerging market economies, despite the lower incidence of COVID-19 cases at the time the survey was conducted. Economic anxieties are also amplified for less-educated and unemployed respondents in countries which saw an initial surge followed by a downward trend in COVID-19 cases at the time of the survey, suggesting that negative beliefs can persist. Overall, these results suggest that policies should take into account the unequal labor market and health impacts of the pandemic to quell economic anxieties and social discontent.<sup>2</sup>

Finally, we shed light into how the crisis has shaped policy preferences for redistribution. Roughly two-thirds of respondents across countries believe that the poor have been unfairly burdened with both illness and economic sacrifice, and that redistribution is necessary as a response. We find that people who believe that the poor are unfortunate are more likely to support pro-equality redistributive policies. In particular, we find systematic support for financial assistance to vulnerable businesses and households among the old, college-educated, and individuals in tele-workable jobs, even controlling for income.

Interestingly, we find less willingness to support redistributive policies by those who suffered an adverse health impact on account of the pandemic. This could be interpreted as the crisis making them more risk-averse and less optimistic about the role of government. Despite expressing strong concerns for the economically vulnerable, individuals in urban areas are also less supportive of government interventions. This is in line with Sands (2017) who finds that exposure to socioeconomic inequality in an everyday setting could negatively impact willingness to publicly support redistributive economic policies. However, we find a strong willingness to provide social safety nets for individuals and firms hit hardest by the crisis by those who have a more favorable assessment of government responses to contain the health and economic crisis. This suggests that appropriate and effective government actions can, in turn, promote support for redistributive policies.

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<sup>2</sup> Liquidity support for the economically vulnerable has been shown to reduce psychological distress and anxieties (Haushofer and Shapiro, 2016; Christian et al., 2019).

Our paper contributes to several strands of the literature. First, this paper contributes to a growing literature that uses cross-country survey data to study trust and perceptions about the government. Both individual and social characteristics such as age, gender, marital status, household size, income, and level of education, employment status are likely to influence trust in the government (Algan et al., 2017; Christensen and Laegreid, 2005; Foster and Frieden, 2017). Using the Worldwide COVID-19 Attitudes and Beliefs dataset, Gozgor (2020) finds that older and healthier individuals tend to trust their governments more, while education is negatively related to trust in governments. Brück et al. (2020) show that those who have had contact with sick people and are unemployed exhibit lower trust in institutions in general. Evidence also suggest that a recent history of misfortune may make people less optimistic about their future and also less likely to trust others (Alesina and Ferrara, 2002; Giuliano and Spilimbergo, 2014). The rapid and widespread impact of COVID-19 crisis compared to more conventional economic downturns can affect support for institutions and belief formation differently. We expand on this literature by documenting individuals' satisfaction with the government's performance during the COVID-19 crisis along both the health and economic dimensions.

Second, we contribute specifically to the literature studying economic anxieties in response to the COVID-19 crisis (Bartik et al., 2020; Binder, 2020; Coibion et al., 2020; Daniele et al. 2020; Fetzer et al., 2020; Hanspal et al., 2020). This has largely focused on advanced economies, particularly the US and on the macroeconomic environment, such as unemployment and inflation expectations. In contrast, we study a wider range of countries and concerns about inequality, capitalism and automation, and explore the role of individual characteristics in shaping these concerns.<sup>3</sup> By understanding the drivers of heterogenous expectations across individuals and countries, the analysis can also shed light on the appropriate design of public policy responses.

Finally, our paper is related to studies that use surveys to elicit policy preferences and beliefs about government effectiveness. Examples include redistribution (Alesina and Giuliano, 2011; Alesina et al. 2018; Kuziemko et al. 2015), austerity (Talving 2017); and welfare spending (Margalit 2013, Algan et al. 2015). There is also a burgeoning literature focusing on trust and compliance with public health measures during COVID-19 (Brodeur et al., 2020; Dabla-Norris, Lima and Khan, forthcoming). Two closely related studies are by Daniele et al. (2020) who study policy preferences regarding taxation for welfare spending in Italy, Germany, Spain and the Netherlands during COVID-19, and Klemm and Mauro (forthcoming) who look at preferences for progress taxation in the US. This paper focuses on preferences for enhancing social safety nets for the vulnerable, in addition to managing the health crisis for a wider set of countries.

This paper is structured as follows. Section II presents the data and methodology, highlighting broad patterns in the data. Section III presents the main findings, and Section IV concludes.

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<sup>3</sup> Other research using data collected before the crisis has discussed channels through which the current crisis may affect workers differently depending on their gender and occupation (Brussevich, Dabla-Norris, and Khalid, 2020; Mongey, Pilossoph, and Wienberg, 2020).

## II. Data and Methodology

We use the 2020 Edelman Trust Barometer Spring update conducted during the pandemic's first wave. The survey is obtained using standardized, representative individual-level data from 11 advanced and emerging countries, with detailed questions on perceptions of COVID-related economic risks, the role of government and other institutions.<sup>4</sup> All fieldwork was conducted between April 15 and April 23, 2020, at least three weeks after stringent containment measures were implemented in most countries in the sample. Each country has around 1,200 observations. All data is nationally representative based on age, region, gender, and additionally in the UK and U.S. by race/ethnicity.

The survey contains information on basic demographic variables of respondents, education, their income quartile (although income and education are not nationally representative for the emerging market countries in the sample, see Table I), occupational characteristics (sector of work, employment status, size of firm worked), their self-reported subjective assessments of the government's policy responses to the COVID-19 pandemic, perceptions of the future, and expectations of government's role in dealing with the crisis.

### Assessment of government performance

The satisfaction with government response to the pandemic is assessed using three measures: *Overall*, *Health* and *Economy*. All measures are defined on an index from 1 to 5, with higher index values indicating a more favorable assessment. The *Overall* measure captures responses to the statement, "Meeting your overall expectations of how the government should be responding", the *Health* measures the response to "Ensuring that medical supplies and good quality medical treatment are available even in the poorest areas", the *Economy* measure is for the statement "Taking the necessary actions to keep the economy from collapsing". Figure 1 reports a summary of respondents' views on government performance by individual characteristics.


Overall, 46 percent of respondents believed that the government was doing "well" or "very well" in meeting their expectations in handling the crisis. Respondents in Japan had the lowest perceptions of government responses while respondents in Saudi Arabia and India had the most favorable perceptions. Unemployed respondents, women, the less educated, and those working in firms with fewer than 100 employees all significantly held less favorable views of their government performance relative to their respective comparator groups (Figure 1). Urban and young (below 30 years) respondents, and those in tele-workable jobs (using the sector-level measure from Brussevich, Dabla-Norris, and Khalid, 2020) reported more favorable assessments of government responses. With the exception of South Korea and Saudi Arabia, there was

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<sup>4</sup> The survey included 13,200 respondents in 11 countries: Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, UK and the U.S. Summary statistics of individual covariates are in the Annex.



generally a more favorable perception of government responses on the economic compared to the health front.<sup>5</sup>



### Support for the poor and concerns about the future

We use responses on four measures to capture support for the poor and subjective concerns about the future: *Vulnerable more affected*, *Capitalism is harmful*, *Prolonged job losses* and *Threat of automation*. All measures are defined on an index from 1 to 9, with higher values indicating a stronger agreement with the corresponding statement:


- 1) *Vulnerable more affected*: "Those with less education, less money and fewer resources are being unfairly burdened with most of the suffering, risk of illness, and need to sacrifice due to the pandemic."
- 2) *Capitalism is harmful*: "Capitalism as it exists today does more harm than good in the world."
- 3) *Prolonged job losses*: "I am very concerned about job loss due to the pandemic and not being able to find a new job for a very long time."

<sup>5</sup> Differences between the assessment of *Health* and *Economy* are statistically significant for all countries, with the exception of India and Saudi Arabia. China was not surveyed on the assessment of government performance.

- 4) *Fear of automation*: "I worry that the pandemic will accelerate the rate at which companies move to replace human workers with AI and robots."

Overall, 67 percent of respondents believe that those with less education, less money and fewer resources are bearing an unfair burden of the suffering, risk of illness and need to sacrifice in the pandemic. More than half the respondents were worried about long-term, COVID-related job losses and the threat from automation. Further, more than half the respondents shared an unfavorable view of capitalism.

While a majority of the respondents believed that the vulnerable are disproportionately impacted by COVID-19, the unemployed, college-educated and high-income individuals reported greater concern relative to their respective comparator groups. The unemployed and young also displayed greater anxiety about prolonged job losses (Figure 2). Urban residents were generally the more anxious across all four dimensions, while those working in small firms are relatively less pessimistic. Respondents in emerging markets, on average, appeared to be more pessimistic compared to respondents in advanced economies, particularly in China and Mexico. Interestingly, respondents in Germany were less pessimistic about prolonged job losses given early measures implemented to alleviate the employment impact of the crisis.



Source: Edelman Trust Barometer, Spring 2020.


Note: Blue dots represent weighted average of the whole sample to the response on economic anxieties (rated 1-9) by different socio-demographic characteristics. End points represents countries with smallest and largest average concerns for that demographic characteristic. Each individual characteristic variable takes on values 0 or 1, indicating that an individual belongs to that group. \* indicates statistical significance at 1 percent significance level in relation to the comparator group.

## Policy Preferences

Finally, we examine responses to expectations of government's role in addressing the economic and health aspects of the crisis. These responses were recorded as a binary for each topic, with 1 indicating "Yes" for expectation for a leading role in the response and 0 being "No" expected involvement. We focus on the following subjects:

- 1) *Give Financial relief*: "Giving financial relief and support to people who have lost their jobs or livelihood"
- 2) *Help small businesses*: "Helping small businesses survive until they can reopen"
- 3) *Manage the spread*: "Develop and put in place the necessary policies and procedures to slow and control the spread of the virus"
- 4) *Prep for reopening*: "Plan and prepare for how the country will get back to normal after the worst of the pandemic is over."

The majority of respondents expect their governments to take a leading role in providing economic relief and support for affected businesses and individuals while controlling the spread of virus and planning for reopening the country. Compared to their counterparts, less educated, urban, tele-workable individuals, and respondents working in small firms expect the government to play a critical role in providing liquidity support and managing the virus spread (Figure 3). The young are significantly less supportive of government interventions.



### III. Empirical Approach

To formally investigate the relationship between demographic and occupational characteristics and perceptions of government performance and preferences for redistribution, we use a simple fixed effects linear probability model:

$$Y_{ic} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_{ic}^d + \beta_2 X_{ic}^o + \gamma_c + \varepsilon_{ic} \quad (1)$$

where  $Y_{ic}$  is the outcome variables of interest, including assessment of government performance, concerns about the future, and policy preferences. The outcome variables are originally categorical values and are converted to binary indicators.<sup>6</sup>  $X_{ic}^d$  includes individual demographic and socio-economic covariates and  $X_{ic}^o$  are occupational characteristics. Coefficient of interests include  $\beta_1$  and  $\beta_2$ .  $\gamma_c$  are country fixed effects to control for differences across countries. All regressions are weighted by the general public weights provided in the survey and errors are clustered at the country level.

Our first set of controls represents demographic and socio-economic variables. These include a dummy variable that equals 1 for *female* and 0 otherwise; age, where *young* is an indicator that equals 1 for respondents younger than 30 years old and 0 otherwise; and education, captured by a *college* indicator that equals 1 for at least college educated and 0 otherwise. Finally, we control for household income, where *rich* is a dummy that equals 1 for household income above the 75<sup>th</sup> percentile and 0 otherwise.

The second set of controls captures occupational information for a sub sample of working-age individuals. This includes an *unemployed* dummy that equals 1 for unemployed respondents and 0 otherwise. Another indicator captures the “*tele-workability*” of the sector using data from Brussevich, Dabla-Norris, and Khalid (2020). Here, *tele-workability* is a dummy that equals 1 for sectors above the median in ability to work from home, and zero otherwise. We also control for firm size with a *small firm* indicator that equals 1 for being employed in a firm with less than 100 employees.

To identify the effects of being directly impacted by the COVID-19, we exploit two measures in the survey. First, the survey asks if respondents were infected or knew someone close infected by COVID-19. This captures the health impact of the crisis. The survey also identifies those who lost their job or were furloughed due to the COVID-19, which can be used identify the views of those economically affected by the crisis.

Preferences for redistribution and beliefs about the government’s role are also a product of history, culture, and other country-specific characteristics. For instance, societies that prefer an equal distribution of income tend to choose larger, more redistributive governments. In addition,

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<sup>6</sup> For government assessment, the outcome variable is a dummy that equals one for “agree” or “strongly agree” to the government meeting expectations, i.e. at least 4 on a scale of 5. For concerns about the future, the outcome variable is a dummy that equals one for responses that are at least rated 7 out of 9. For policy preferences, the response is already a dummy.

countries chose various approaches to contain the virus and were at different stages of the crisis. To capture the role of underlying macroeconomic conditions and country-specific factors in shaping these views, we consider heterogeneity by country-level variations  $\theta_c$  in the stringency of COVID-19 containment measures, trends in COVID-19 caseloads, and the initial level of inequality (equation 2).

$$Y_{ic} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_{ic}^d \theta_c + \beta_2 X_{ic}^o \theta_c + \gamma_c + \varepsilon_{ic} \quad (2)$$

Specifically, the dummy  $\theta_c$  takes the value of 1 if the country is above the sample median in the Stringency Index from Oxford Covid-19 Government Response Tracker (Hale et al., 2020), if the country experienced an early surge in cases and the number of COVID-19 infections were on a declining trend during the time of survey, and if the country is above the sample median in the Gini Index, and 0 otherwise. We also create dummies for advanced and emerging economies and interact with each individual variable to shed light on the role of economic development.

## IV. Results


### Assessment of Government Performance

We start our analysis by examining the perceptions of government responses to COVID-19. Tables 2-3 report the results of individual characteristics based on equation (1), while Tables 4-7 examine the role of country characteristics based on equation (2).

**Gender:** We find that women, on average, have a less favorable assessment of government performance along all three dimensions, overall, health, and economic (Table 2, Columns 2-6). This result is negative and statistically significant, and likely reflects the disproportionate impact of the crisis on women in many countries.<sup>7</sup> Importantly, this gender gap persists even if we control for job characteristics (employment, part-time work, tele-workability), indicating that other factors indeed play a role. Using the decomposition methodology proposed by Gelbach (2016), we find that the estimated gender gap is robust to the inclusion of additional covariates, but about 7 percent of the gap can be explained by household income. Specifically, women in richer households have a more favorable assessment of the government's performance compared to respondents in poor households. Less favorable perceptions of government responses by women are particularly pronounced in advanced economies (Figure 4, Table 4).

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<sup>7</sup> Adams-Prassl et al. (2020a) find a large gender gap in respondents' ability to work from home using surveys conducted in April. In the US, for instance, women on average report they can do 42 percent of their tasks from home, compared to 53 percent for men.



**Employment:** Unemployed individuals have less favorable perceptions of government performance. Specifically, controlling for the basic individual determinants in column 2 of Table 2, we find those that lost their jobs due to the COVID-19 crisis had less favorable perceptions of government performance in dealing with the health crisis (Table 3). Similarly, those employed in small firms have a less favorable view of the government in dealing with the health crisis. SMEs, particularly in retail and services sectors, have been significantly burdened by the COVID-19 crisis, potentially explaining the unfavorable assessment by workers in such firms. Individuals employed in tele-workable sectors have a more favorable view of the government's overall response as they are less likely to be economically impacted by the COVID-19 crisis in the first place.


**Education:** Even after controlling for income, education enters with a significant and positive coefficient: more educated individuals have a more favorable view of government performance with regards to the economy. But around 50 percent of the gap between college-educated and non-college educated individuals is explained by household income.

**Income:** Controlling for education and other demographic and occupational characteristics, perceptions of government performance by income are not statistically significant in the baseline regressions. However, we find that the rich have a more favorable assessment of the government in advanced economies (Table 4, Column 1-2; Figure 4). This is not surprising as lower-income respondents are more likely to lose their job or some portion of their income due to the pandemic and are also less likely to be able to work from home. The favorable assessment of government performance by richer respondents is not shared in emerging market economies. Note that emerging markets in our sample did not have a representative survey in terms of

income, which suggests that the results for these countries need to be interpreted with caution. We also find that the rich are more approving of government performance in countries where less stringent measures were adopted, (Table 5). However, this result is negative and statistically significant in countries with higher initial levels of inequality (Table 7).

### Support for the Poor and Concerns about the Future

Tables 8-9 and Figure 5 report the results for individual characteristics based on equation (1), while Tables 10-13 report the role of country characteristics in shaping individual concerns.



**Gender:** Women are more likely to believe that the vulnerable are more affected by the COVID-19 crisis (Table 8, Column 1). However, this effect disappears once we control for the ability to tele-work in the sample of working age population. In countries where more stringent containment measures were in place at the time of the survey, women report heightened

economic anxieties about the future, particularly concerns about prolonged job losses (Table 11). These results are consistent with women wearing the brunt of the adverse employment impact of lockdowns.

**Age:** Older individuals, who face higher infection risks, are more likely to believe that the vulnerable are more affected by COVID, view capitalism as being harmful, and be more concerned about the threat of automation relative to the young (Figure 5; Table 8). This is consistent with Bui et al. (2020) who shows that older workers over the age of 65, especially older women, are facing higher unemployment in the COVID-19-induced recession compared to previous ones. In emerging market economies, older people are also more likely to report concerns about prolonged job losses (Table 10). Economic anxieties of older respondents are also heightened in countries which saw a surge in cases early in the pandemic (Table 12), suggesting that recent adverse experiences can color people's perspectives about the future.

**Personally affected:** Even after controlling for other demographic characteristics, individuals that have been personally affected by the COVID-19, either suffered a job loss or have been exposed to infections, are more likely to have a more sympathetic attitude toward the vulnerable and report a more bleak outlook toward the future (Table 9). The results are positive and statistically significant across all socio-economic concerns.

**Employment:** As in the case of individuals directly impacted by the pandemic, the unemployed more broadly are more concerned about prolonged job losses, indicating that they expect the downturn to have persistently negative labor market impacts (Figure 5; Table 8). Interestingly, these economic anxieties are amplified for unemployed respondents in countries which saw an initial surge followed by a downward trend in COVID-19 cases at the time of the survey (Table 12). People working in the tele-workable jobs are generally less worried about automation and prolonged job losses. Surprisingly, respondents employed in small firms are also overall less pessimistic. This is despite the evidence of significant impact of COVID-19 crisis on SMEs (Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2020; Bartik et al., 2020).

**Education:** Education alone does not appear to have a statistically significant impact on attitudes about the future once other socio-demographic characteristics are controlled for (Figure 5; Table 9). However, college educated individuals are less anxious about job losses and the threat of automation in countries where COVID-19 cases were already on a downward trend at the time the survey was conducted (Table 12).

**Urban:** We consistently find that urban residents are more pessimistic about the future (Figure 5, Table 9). This pessimism could be partly driven by urban areas facing the brunt of stringent containment measures in the initial stages of the pandemic.

**Income:** We find no statistically significant relationship between income and concerns about the future in the baseline regression reported in Table 8. However, richer households are generally less pessimistic about the future in advanced economies (Table 10).




Overall, we see that economic anxiety was already amplified early on in the crisis, particularly amongst the economically vulnerable such as the unemployed, those in non-tele-workable jobs, and those experiencing illness or job loss caused by the pandemic.<sup>8</sup>

### Policy preferences

Tables 14-16 and Figure 6 report baseline results on individual determinants of preferences for redistribution and the government's role in managing the pandemic, while Tables 17-20 examine how these preferences vary depending on country characteristics. The baseline regressions (Table 14) show that differences across gender and income are not statistically significant in terms of preferences for government support for households and firms, managing the spread of the virus or preparing the economy for reopening (a positive coefficient means a higher preference for government redistribution and government intervention in the economy).

**Age:** Consistent with older people being more anxious about social problems, we find that they tend to favor financial support for households and small businesses compared to the young (Figures 5-6). These results are positive and significant and are consistent with trends noted in Ashok et al. (2015), whereby the elderly have grown more supportive of redistribution policies relative to other groups in developed countries. This result is also consistent with the extensive literature based on answers to surveys (see the review by Alesina and Giuliano, 2011), which shows that people who believe that the poor are unfortunate are much more likely to support redistributive policies. Interestingly, the young favor a role for government in providing relief to affected individuals in emerging market economies compared to advanced economies (Table 16).



<sup>8</sup> These results are robust to controlling for the assessment of government performance (results not reported, but available upon request), which does not have a significant relationship with concerns about social problems.

**Personally affected:** A history of misfortune in the recent past can change people's views of redistribution. We explore this effect in Table 15. As always, we control for the basic individual determinants of column 1 of Table 2. While we find no statistically significant result for government support among those who suffered a job loss on account of the pandemic, and the effect is negative and statistically significant for those who suffered an adverse health impact.<sup>9</sup> This could be interpreted as the crisis making them more risk-averse and less optimistic about the government's role.


**Employment:** The unemployed are keen on the government preparing for reopening, consistent with their concerns that COVID-19 could result in prolonged job losses (Table 14, Column 7), but we find no statistically significant relationship between being unemployed and preferences for supporting vulnerable households and firms. Individuals working in small firms exhibit more support for financial relief, including helping small businesses until they can reopen (Table 14). Individuals working in tele-workable jobs express more support for government role in managing the crisis, specifically in providing liquidity support for those impacted by the crisis.

**Urban:** Urban residents are less supportive of government interventions, although they are more concerned about social problems (Table 14, Figure 6). This is in line with Sands (2017) who shows that exposure to socioeconomic inequality in an everyday setting can negatively affect willingness to publicly support redistributive economic policies. This relationship reverses in emerging markets and in countries with more stringent lockdowns where urban respondents were likely to be more economically impacted themselves (Table 19-20). Using the decomposition method proposed by Gelbach (2016), we breakdown the role of individual covariates in explaining the difference between urban and rural respondents in advanced economies. Being young reduces the negative relationship between urban residence and government provision of financial support by 10 percent. Being in a tele-workable profession weakens the relationship by an additional 5 percent. However, much of the urban-rural divide is unexplained by the individual covariates.

**Income:** Interestingly, individuals with higher household incomes are more likely to support social safety nets and liquidity support for the economically vulnerable (Figure 7). While the rich dummy does not yield significant results in the baseline regressions reported in Table 14, we find a significant positive effect for households in the upper two quartiles and middle two quartiles. This is in line with the extensive experimental literature which shows that preferences for redistribution may be dictated by a sense of fairness or aversion to inequality (see Durante, Putterman and Van der Weele, 2014; Cowell and Schokkaert, 2001).

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<sup>9</sup> This is in contrast to Margalit (2013) who finds that personal experience of economic hardship, particularly the loss of a job, had a major effect on increasing support for welfare spending during the Great Recession. Our results highlight the unique nature of the COVID-19 crisis and could partly be attributed the unprecedented fiscal response in many countries. In fact, Margalit (2013) also finds that personal experience of an economic shock has a sizable yet overall transient effect on policy preferences.



**Perceptions of government performance:** Finally, controlling for demographic and occupational characteristics, individuals who have a more favorable assessment of government performance also expect the government to continue to take a leading role in offering liquidity support, addressing the health crisis and preparing for reopening (Table 18). The size of the government performance coefficient estimates is fairly stable across specifications, and only partially explained by the inclusion of the other variables. This is consistent with Algan et al. (2015) who show that public trust in government has a positive influence on the size of the welfare state.

### Robustness Checks

Our results are robust to a battery of robustness checks. Using the Gelbach (2016) decomposition, we find that the estimated coefficients on the variables of interest are generally robust even after additional covariates are partialled out. While a linear probability specification is used for the main analysis, the results are broadly robust to using probit (Tables 21-23). Since the surveys in emerging economies are not always representative, we check the consistency of our results focusing only on advanced economies. We find that our results on individual determinants are broadly robust to exclusion of respondents from emerging market economies (Table 24-26).

Many Asian countries (e.g., China, Japan, South Korea) saw a surge in infections earlier than in Western and Northern Europe and have weaker automatic stabilizers, which could have a bearing on preferences for redistribution and the role of government. To test whether our results on individual determinants are robust to exclusion of these countries, we estimated the regressions excluding these countries (Tables 27-29). Overall, the results are broadly consistent but concerns about prolonged job losses and threat of automation are not as statistically significant in the truncated sample.

In China, respondents were not surveyed on the assessment of government performance. In Saudi Arabia, while respondents were surveyed, the responses had gaps. We test the robustness of our results dropping these two countries. Our results remain robust to this exclusion (not reported here but available upon request).

The Edelman Survey has additional questions on the assessment of government that capture the health and economic response of the government. For economic, we use the responses to “Taking care of people who are suffering pandemic-related financial hardships” and for health, “Creating a distribution system that ensures that medical and other necessary supplies are getting to where they are needed most.” For policy preferences, we use the following alternatives to capture the economic support and preparation for reopening, respectively: “Keeping the country’s economy running as well as possible” and “Guidelines for when it is okay to start relaxing social distancing requirements so that people can begin returning to work, schools can be reopened, and people can start to engage in group activities again”. Using alternative measures (results available upon request) also yields consistent results. Finally, we include additional covariates such as part-time work. There are no significant differences between part-time and full-time employees once other individual characteristics are controlled for.

## V. Conclusion

We use an individual-level survey for 11 advanced and emerging market economies to empirically examine perceptions of government responses in managing the health and economic fallout of COVID-19, beliefs about the future, and preferences for the government’s role in containing the crisis.

Our results show that perceptions about how well the government has handled the crisis depend on individual characteristics such as gender, age, region, employment and socio-economic status, but they are also a product of recent experiences with adversity. Importantly, our analysis suggests that the economically vulnerable and those hardest hit by the crisis had a much less favorable view of government responses during the early months of the pandemic. We also find evidence that experiencing serious illness or job loss caused by the pandemic can shape people’s beliefs about the future, heightening concerns about prolonged job losses, and the imminent threat from automation. This suggests that policy measures that directly reduce economic hardship and anxiety are essential to contain the fallout from the pandemic. Economic anxieties were heightened in countries that experienced an early surge in infections followed by successful containment, suggesting that negative beliefs can persist.

Overall, we find support for direct transfers that alleviate economic hardship in the short term and stabilize the economy. Such programs have already been deployed in many advanced and emerging market economies. Support for pro-equality redistributive policies varies, depending on personal experiences and views about the poor. Importantly, preferences for providing financial support to individuals and firms hit hardest by the crisis are also related to whether individuals held a favorable perception of government performance, highlighting the importance of effective containment policies on the health and economic front.

Our analysis is restricted to a single time period relatively early on in the crisis. While we study cross-country heterogeneity based on the stringency of containment measures and timing of surges in COVID-cases, most countries in our sample were dealing with the first wave of infections. Many countries have since had multiple waves, with repeat lockdowns. In addition, countries have deployed large policy packages to smooth the impact on the economically vulnerable. Therefore, the identified relationships, beliefs and preferences could change over time. Further research and the availability of longer panel datasets on attitudes and preferences for redistribution during COVID-19 are needed to better pin down these effects.

Finally, our analysis using survey data has limitations that are common to such studies. The framing of questions on policy preferences can result in different conclusions. For example, the question on financial support for the economically vulnerable and businesses does not include implications of higher taxation in the future. Daniele et al. (2020) find less support for welfare spending through higher taxation whereas Klemm and Mauro (forthcoming) show that those personally affected by the crisis are more supportive of progressive taxation. Self-reported subjective assessments can also be subject to altruism bias that can skew the findings. Given that our results are generally in line with those economically impacted by the crisis responding differently, such concerns are partially alleviated.

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## Annex

**Table 1: Summary Statistics of Individual Covariates by Country**

Country	Male		Median age		Median Household income (in local currency)		Unemployed		College - educated	
	Sample	Population	Sample	Population	Sample	Population	Sample	Population	Sample	Population
United States	0.49	0.48	47	38	62566	64324	0.09	0.15	0.59	0.44
Canada	0.50	0.49	48	41	58439	61400	0.11	0.13	0.42	0.54
China	0.51	0.53	45	38	159900	40658	0.02	0.06	0.46	0.17
Japan	0.49	0.49	52	48	5461817	5602000	0.03	0.02	0.49	0.48
South Korea	0.50	0.50	48	44	42184810	45280934	0.04	0.04	0.67	0.45
India	0.52	0.52	37	27	514852	235275	0.03	0.24	0.82	0.11
United Kingdom	0.49	0.49	48	41	27635	30800	0.09	0.04	0.42	0.42
Germany	0.49	0.49	51	46	29290	27902	0.04	0.04	0.31	0.27
France	0.48	0.48	49	42	23378	21776	0.07	0.09	0.45	0.32
Mexico	0.49	0.48	38	29	146877	235226	0.08	0.05	0.70	0.19
Saudi Arabia	0.58	0.55	35	30	73877	93690	0.07	0.06	0.53	0.22

Note: Mean/Median for the sample weighted by the survey weights.

**Table 2: Assessment of Government Performance – Baseline**

	Overall		Health		Economic	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Female	-0.0218 (0.0124)	-0.0356** (0.0146)	-0.0450** (0.0150)	-0.0577*** (0.0175)	-0.0503*** (0.0126)	-0.0479*** (0.0145)
Young	-0.00236 (0.0161)	0.0173 (0.0115)	-0.00597 (0.0219)	0.00109 (0.0258)	-0.0252 (0.0170)	-0.00385 (0.0170)
College	0.0136 (0.0116)	0.00902 (0.0149)	0.0177 (0.0145)	0.0167 (0.0198)	0.0144 (0.0120)	0.0341* (0.0180)
Urban	0.00621 (0.0109)	0.00826 (0.0202)	0.0399*** (0.00921)	0.0473** (0.0183)	0.0183 (0.0146)	0.0188 (0.0258)
Rich	0.00656 (0.0153)	0.0196 (0.0156)	0.00875 (0.0211)	0.00948 (0.0237)	0.00353 (0.0185)	0.0104 (0.0183)
Unemployed	-0.0469* (0.0215)	-0.0290 (0.0479)	-0.0522** (0.0199)	-0.0536 (0.0312)	-0.0689** (0.0227)	-0.0363 (0.0414)
Small firm		0.00157 (0.0138)		-0.0423* (0.0201)		-0.0151 (0.0223)
Tele-workable		0.0249** (0.00976)		0.0213 (0.0150)		0.0135 (0.0154)
Observations	11,197	6,279	11,197	6,279	11,197	6,279
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Results from Equation (1) where the dependent variable is an indicator that equals 1 for favorable assessment of the government performance (at least 4 on the scale of 1-5 in the survey). Errors are clustered at the country-level and regressions are weighted by public weights provided in the survey. \*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05 and \*p<0.1

**Table 3: Assessment of Government Performance by Personally Affected**

	(1) Overall	(2) Overall	(3) Health	(4) Health	(5) Economic	(6) Economic
Lost Job	-0.0233 (0.0440)		-0.0553* (0.0297)		-0.0475 (0.0395)	
Infected		0.00528 (0.0198)		0.0282 (0.0232)		-0.0134 (0.0246)
Observations	11,197	11,197	11,197	11,197	11,197	11,197
Individual controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Results from Equation (1) where the dependent variable is an indicator that equals 1 for favorable assessment of the government performance. Individual controls include gender, age, urban, education, employment status and household income dummies. Errors are clustered at the country-level and regressions are weighted by public weights provided in the survey. \*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05 and \*p<0.1

**Table 4: Assessment of Government Performance – Advanced vs Emerging Market Economies**

	(4) Overall	(5) Health	(6) Economic
Female	-0.0248 (0.0161)	-0.0544** (0.0177)	-0.0551*** (0.0156)
Young	0.0123 (0.0241)	0.0273 (0.0228)	-0.0266 (0.0198)
College	0.0157 (0.0162)	0.00717 (0.0192)	0.0118 (0.0165)
Urban	0.00511 (0.0106)	0.0397*** (0.0110)	0.00827 (0.0120)
Rich	0.0328*** (0.00533)	0.0432** (0.0169)	0.0295 (0.0173)
Unemployed	-0.0438 (0.0293)	-0.0553** (0.0218)	-0.0803** (0.0290)
Female x EM	0.0163 (0.0254)	0.0354 (0.0307)	0.0205 (0.0235)
Young x EM	-0.0418 (0.0258)	-0.0851** (0.0316)	0.00357 (0.0353)
College x EM	-0.0168 (0.0198)	0.0246 (0.0194)	0.00223 (0.0198)
Urban x EM	0.00863 (0.0398)	-0.00264 (0.0182)	0.0776* (0.0394)
Rich x EM	-0.0847*** (0.0223)	-0.110*** (0.0235)	-0.0877*** (0.0260)
Unemployed x EM	-0.0126 (0.0314)	0.00669 (0.0468)	0.0459 (0.0345)
Observations	11,197	11,197	11,197
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Results from Equation (2) where the dependent variable is an indicator that equals 1 for favorable assessment of the government performance and interaction term *EM* is a dummy that equals 1 for emerging economics and 0 otherwise. Errors are clustered at the country-level and regressions are weighted by public weights provided in the survey. \*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05 and \*p<0.1

**Table 5: Assessment of Government Performance by Stringency of Containment Measures**

	(1) Overall	(2) Health	(3) Economic
Female	-0.0279 (0.0184)	-0.0620*** (0.0190)	-0.0527** (0.0183)
Young	-0.00254 (0.0224)	0.0113 (0.0195)	-0.0340 (0.0212)
College	0.0165 (0.0192)	0.00131 (0.0217)	0.00427 (0.0173)
Urban	0.00588 (0.0126)	0.0378** (0.0127)	0.00831 (0.0141)
Rich	0.0315*** (0.00585)	0.0417* (0.0189)	0.0238 (0.0184)
Unemployed	-0.0507 (0.0348)	-0.0537* (0.0263)	-0.0909** (0.0331)
Female x Stringent	0.0176 (0.0228)	0.0420 (0.0255)	0.00545 (0.0243)
Young x Stringent	-0.00203 (0.0336)	-0.0359 (0.0417)	0.0189 (0.0330)
College x Stringent	-0.00986 (0.0209)	0.0382 (0.0223)	0.0254 (0.0229)
Urban x Stringent	0.00359 (0.0233)	0.00805 (0.0145)	0.0395 (0.0355)
Rich x Stringent	-0.0633** (0.0272)	-0.0840** (0.0333)	-0.0524 (0.0360)
Unemployed x Stringent	0.00954 (0.0380)	0.00184 (0.0396)	0.0577 (0.0357)
Observations	11,197	11,197	11,197
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Results from Equation (2) where the dependent variable is an indicator that equals 1 for favorable assessment of the government performance and interaction term Stringent is a dummy that equals 1 for above the median stringency index in OxCGRT. Errors are clustered at the country-level and regressions are weighted by public weights provided in the survey. \*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05 and \*p<0.1

**Table 6: Assessment of Government Performance by Timing of COVID-19 Spread**

	(1) Overall	(2) Health	(3) Economic
Female	-0.0239 (0.0135)	-0.0461** (0.0167)	-0.0546*** (0.0130)
Young	0.00227 (0.0169)	-0.00463 (0.0241)	-0.0237 (0.0182)
College	0.00959 (0.0120)	0.0116 (0.0146)	0.0118 (0.0130)
Urban	0.00365 (0.0112)	0.0364*** (0.00901)	0.0150 (0.0148)
Rich	0.00462 (0.0169)	0.00931 (0.0236)	0.00669 (0.0203)
Unemployed	-0.0427* (0.0223)	-0.0542** (0.0212)	-0.0621** (0.0229)
Female x Down	0.0255* (0.0135)	0.0118 (0.0167)	0.0441*** (0.0130)
Young x Down	-0.0529** (0.0169)	-0.0106 (0.0241)	-0.0145 (0.0182)
College x Down	0.0399*** (0.0120)	0.0612*** (0.0146)	0.0243* (0.0130)
Urban x Down	0.0383*** (0.0112)	0.0628*** (0.00901)	0.0613*** (0.0148)
Rich x Down	0.0183 (0.0169)	-0.00701 (0.0236)	-0.0352 (0.0203)
Unemployed x Down	-0.0607** (0.0223)	0.0286 (0.0212)	-0.101*** (0.0229)
Observations	11,197	11,197	11,197
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Results from Equation (2) where the dependent variable is an indicator that equals 1 for favorable assessment of the government performance and interaction term Down is a dummy that equals 1 for countries that saw an initial surge followed by a downward trend in COVID-19 cases at the time of survey. Errors are clustered at the country-level and regressions are weighted by public weights provided in the survey. \*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05 and \*p<0.1

**Table 7: Assessment of Government Performance by Initial Level of Inequality**

	(1) Overall	(2) Health	(3) Economic
Female	-0.00959 (0.00935)	-0.0362*** (0.00639)	-0.0419** (0.0140)
Young	0.00203 (0.0203)	0.0203 (0.0229)	-0.0233 (0.0203)
College	0.0224 (0.0142)	0.0224 (0.0175)	0.0255 (0.0143)
Urban	0.00216 (0.00973)	0.0358*** (0.0100)	0.0161 (0.0180)
Rich	0.0286*** (0.00879)	0.0253 (0.0210)	0.0139 (0.0218)
Unemployed	-0.0226 (0.0202)	-0.0443** (0.0166)	-0.0656** (0.0241)
Female x Gini	-0.0401 (0.0324)	-0.0306 (0.0479)	-0.0272 (0.0273)
Young x Gini	-0.0173 (0.0303)	-0.0762** (0.0324)	-0.00890 (0.0330)
College x Gini	-0.0272 (0.0206)	-0.0172 (0.0312)	-0.0351 (0.0199)
Urban x Gini	0.0120 (0.0318)	0.0133 (0.0200)	0.00665 (0.0182)
Rich x Gini	-0.0682* (0.0341)	-0.0519 (0.0479)	-0.0312 (0.0409)
Unemployed x Gini	-0.0682* (0.0312)	-0.0255 (0.0443)	-0.0103 (0.0507)
Observations	11,197	11,197	11,197
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Results from Equation (2) where the dependent variable is an indicator that equals 1 for favorable assessment of the government performance and interaction term Gini is a dummy that equals 1 for above median inequality by Gini Index. Errors are clustered at the country-level and regressions are weighted by public weights provided in the survey. \*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05 and \*p<0.1

**Table 8: Beliefs about Social and Economic Concerns– Baseline**

	(1) Vulnerable more affected	(2) Vulnerable more affected	(3) Capitalism is harmful	(4) Capitalism is harmful	(5) Prolonged job losses	(6) Prolonged job losses	(7) Threat of automation	(8) Threat of automation
Female	0.0411** (0.0171)	0.0278 (0.0155)	0.0108 (0.0125)	-0.00377 (0.0162)	0.0178 (0.0155)	0.0162 (0.0224)	0.0107 (0.0141)	0.0114 (0.0169)
Young	-0.0514*** (0.0157)	-0.0317* (0.0147)	-0.0337* (0.0158)	-0.0312* (0.0161)	-0.00986 (0.0213)	0.00122 (0.0253)	-0.0493** (0.0194)	-0.0360 (0.0202)
College	-0.00159 (0.0126)	-0.00506 (0.0142)	-0.0239 (0.0166)	-0.0135 (0.0203)	-0.0118 (0.0169)	-0.00211 (0.0189)	-0.0159 (0.0160)	0.00551 (0.0185)
Urban	0.0458** (0.0193)	0.0596** (0.0259)	0.0273 (0.0233)	0.0370 (0.0278)	0.0455* (0.0211)	0.0620* (0.0287)	0.0593*** (0.0184)	0.0686*** (0.0195)
Rich	0.0178 (0.0214)	0.0170 (0.0206)	-0.00970 (0.0247)	-0.00571 (0.0311)	0.0103 (0.0183)	-0.0112 (0.0231)	0.0175 (0.0273)	0.00586 (0.0284)
Unemployed	0.0656** (0.0210)	0.0693*** (0.0198)	0.0866*** (0.0162)	0.0563 (0.0320)	0.104*** (0.0254)	0.140*** (0.0236)	-0.00637 (0.0215)	-0.0109 (0.0253)
Small firm		-0.0124 (0.0140)		-0.0395** (0.0177)		-0.0328* (0.0177)		-0.0541*** (0.0161)
Tele-work		-0.00424 (0.0138)		-0.0226 (0.0134)		-0.0372* (0.0191)		-0.0257 (0.0184)
Observations	12,398	7,047	12,398	7,047	12,398	7,047	12,398	7,047
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Results from Equation (1) where the dependent variable is an indicator that equals 1 for strong concerns about socio-economic problems (at least 7 on the scale of 1-9 in the survey). Errors are clustered at the country-level and regressions are weighted by public weights provided in the survey. \*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05 and \*p<0.1

**Table 9: Beliefs about Social and Economic Concerns–Effect of Being Personally Affected**

	(1) Vulnerable more affected	(2) Vulnerable more affected	(3) Capitalism is harmful	(4) Capitalism is harmful	(5) Prolonged job losses	(6) Prolonged job losses	(7) Threat of automation	(8) Threat of automation
Lost Job	0.0593** (0.0216)		0.0512* (0.0281)		0.145*** (0.0190)		-0.0194 (0.0224)	
Infected		0.130*** (0.0362)		0.129*** (0.0394)		0.156*** (0.0414)		0.149*** (0.0376)
Observations	12,416	12,416	12,416	12,416	12,416	12,416	12,416	12,416
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Results from Equation (1) where the dependent variable is an indicator that equals 1 for strong concerns about social problems. Individual controls include gender, age, urban, education, employment status and household income dummies. Errors are clustered at the country-level and regressions are weighted by public weights provided in the survey. \*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05 and \*p<0.1

**Table 10: Beliefs about Social and Economic Concerns– Advanced vs Emerging Market Economies**

	(1) Vulnerable more affected	(2) Capitalism is harmful	(3) Prolonged job losses	(4) Threat of automation
Female	0.0188 (0.0123)	0.0299** (0.0122)	-0.00260 (0.0138)	-0.00499 (0.0141)
Young	-0.0440 (0.0276)	-0.0267* (0.0142)	0.0293 (0.0237)	-0.0236 (0.0238)
College	-0.00703 (0.0121)	-0.0206 (0.0149)	-0.0115 (0.0156)	-0.00748 (0.0137)
Urban	0.0463* (0.0236)	0.0312 (0.0281)	0.0454* (0.0245)	0.0572** (0.0204)
Rich	-0.0171 (0.0125)	-0.0473*** (0.0127)	-0.0169* (0.00914)	-0.0341** (0.0108)
Unemployed	0.0798*** (0.0170)	0.0841*** (0.0193)	0.109*** (0.0310)	0.00826 (0.0191)
Female x EM	0.0526 (0.0392)	-0.0589** (0.0218)	0.0486 (0.0323)	0.0330 (0.0311)
Young x EM	-0.0135 (0.0300)	-0.0123 (0.0350)	-0.0838** (0.0332)	-0.0535 (0.0340)
College x EM	0.0165 (0.0304)	8.24e-05 (0.0394)	-0.00174 (0.0381)	-0.0208 (0.0354)
Urban x EM	-0.0175 (0.0267)	-0.0289 (0.0370)	-0.0191 (0.0374)	-0.0114 (0.0402)
Rich x EM	0.0865** (0.0380)	0.102* (0.0460)	0.0666* (0.0346)	0.129** (0.0415)
Unemp x EM	-0.0572 (0.0508)	0.00237 (0.0353)	-0.0265 (0.0520)	-0.0624 (0.0516)
Observations	12,398	12,398	12,398	12,398
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Results from Equation (2) where the dependent variable is an indicator that equals 1 for strong concerns about social problems and interaction term EM is a dummy that equals 1 for emerging economics and 0 otherwise. Errors are clustered at the country-level and regressions are weighted by public weights provided in the survey. \*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05 and \*p<0.1

**Table 11: Beliefs about Social and Economic Concerns by Stringency of Containment Measures**

	(1) Vulnerable more affected	(2) Capitalism is harmful	(3) Prolonged job losses	(4) Threat of automation
Female	0.0250 (0.0142)	0.0227 (0.0151)	-0.00351 (0.0130)	-0.00676 (0.0124)
Young	-0.0394 (0.0272)	-0.0378 (0.0226)	0.00959 (0.0354)	-0.0372 (0.0306)
College	-0.0159 (0.0127)	-0.0279 (0.0191)	-0.0222 (0.0215)	-0.0213 (0.0221)
Urban	0.0603** (0.0229)	0.0448 (0.0260)	0.0588* (0.0268)	0.0711*** (0.0190)
Rich	0.00985 (0.0308)	-0.00891 (0.0333)	0.0143 (0.0268)	0.0118 (0.0338)
Unemployed	0.0901*** (0.0171)	0.0827*** (0.0204)	0.114** (0.0361)	0.0120 (0.0229)
Female x Stringent	0.0433 (0.0387)	-0.0316 (0.0245)	0.0584* (0.0286)	0.0481 (0.0295)
Young x Stringent	-0.0260 (0.0280)	0.00885 (0.0322)	-0.0442 (0.0366)	-0.0278 (0.0352)
College x Stringent	0.0390 (0.0251)	0.0131 (0.0388)	0.0256 (0.0312)	0.0127 (0.0283)
Urban x Stringent	-0.0570* (0.0257)	-0.0628 (0.0396)	-0.0530 (0.0310)	-0.0471 (0.0395)
Rich x Stringent	0.0242 (0.0383)	0.000922 (0.0470)	-0.00991 (0.0323)	0.0170 (0.0563)
Unemp x Stringent	-0.0667 (0.0402)	0.0109 (0.0330)	-0.0283 (0.0480)	-0.0509 (0.0494)
Observations	12,398	12,398	12,398	12,398
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Results from Equation (2) where the dependent variable is an indicator that equals 1 for strong concerns about social problems and interaction term Stringent is a dummy that equals 1 for above the median stringency index in OxCGR. Errors are clustered at the country-level and regressions are weighted by public weights provided in the survey. \*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05 and \*p<0.1



**Table 12: Beliefs about Social and Economic Concerns by Timing of COVID-19 Spread**

	(1) Vulnerable more affected	(2) Capitalism is harmful	(3) Prolonged job losses	(4) Threat of automation
Female	0.0453** (0.0191)	0.0161 (0.0139)	0.0286 (0.0163)	0.0152 (0.0164)
Young	-0.0619*** (0.0165)	-0.0217 (0.0126)	0.0115 (0.0189)	-0.0328 (0.0188)
College	0.00978 (0.0124)	-0.0132 (0.0167)	0.00485 (0.0141)	0.00193 (0.0111)
Urban	0.0475** (0.0212)	0.0309 (0.0259)	0.0470* (0.0220)	0.0579** (0.0206)
Rich	-0.000600 (0.0167)	-0.0360* (0.0170)	-0.00392 (0.0104)	-0.00265 (0.0238)
Unemployed	0.0612** (0.0230)	0.0760*** (0.0155)	0.0900*** (0.0256)	-0.0184 (0.0213)
Female x Down	-0.0270 (0.0363)	-0.0299 (0.0261)	-0.0523** (0.0209)	-0.0219 (0.0203)
Young x Down	0.0671** (0.0231)	-0.0685 (0.0384)	-0.119*** (0.0240)	-0.0913*** (0.0227)
College x Down	-0.0573*** (0.0124)	-0.0412 (0.0247)	-0.0709** (0.0234)	-0.0803*** (0.0224)
Urban x Down	-0.0160 (0.0353)	-0.0456 (0.0259)	-0.0181 (0.0713)	0.00470 (0.0206)
Rich x Down	0.0935 (0.0556)	0.136** (0.0551)	0.0741 (0.0575)	0.0996 (0.0727)
Unemp x Down	0.0333 (0.0234)	0.0981*** (0.0164)	0.155*** (0.0318)	0.128*** (0.0272)
Observations	12,398	12,398	12,398	12,398
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Results from Equation (2) where the dependent variable is an indicator that equals 1 for strong concerns about social problems and interaction term *Down* is a dummy that equals 1 for countries that saw an initial surge followed by a downward trend in COVID-19 cases at the time of survey. Errors are clustered at the country-level and regressions are weighted by public weights provided in the survey. \*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05 and \*p<0.1

**Table 13: Beliefs about Social and Economic Concerns by Initial Level of Inequality**

	(1) Vulnerable more affected	(2) Capitalism is harmful	(3) Prolonged job losses	(4) Threat of automation
Female	0.0145 (0.0133)	0.0257 (0.0160)	0.00291 (0.0126)	0.00106 (0.0117)
Young	-0.0515* (0.0261)	-0.0201 (0.0167)	0.0175 (0.0236)	-0.0336 (0.0220)
College	-0.0113 (0.0117)	-0.0173 (0.0156)	-0.00670 (0.0175)	-0.0110 (0.0147)
Urban	0.0281* (0.0142)	0.0109 (0.0152)	0.0269 (0.0156)	0.0506** (0.0164)
Rich	-0.00428 (0.0216)	-0.0295 (0.0226)	-0.0136 (0.0110)	-0.00804 (0.0290)
Unemployed	0.0900*** (0.0175)	0.0982*** (0.0188)	0.121*** (0.0304)	0.0148 (0.0209)
Female x Gini	0.0701** (0.0298)	-0.0417* (0.0190)	0.0382 (0.0338)	0.0249 (0.0314)
Young x Gini	0.00102 (0.0291)	-0.0329 (0.0297)	-0.0649 (0.0379)	-0.0371 (0.0371)
College x Gini	0.0204 (0.0295)	-0.0182 (0.0384)	-0.0177 (0.0372)	-0.0157 (0.0362)
Urban x Gini	0.0699 (0.0435)	0.0652 (0.0628)	0.0725 (0.0497)	0.0336 (0.0497)
Rich x Gini	0.0546 (0.0413)	0.0499 (0.0532)	0.0593 (0.0354)	0.0638 (0.0550)
Unemployed x Gini	-0.0604 (0.0407)	-0.0276 (0.0286)	-0.0437 (0.0442)	-0.0561 (0.0443)
Observations	12,398	12,398	12,398	12,398
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Results from Equation (2) where the dependent variable is an indicator that equals 1 for strong concern about social problems and interaction term *Gini* is a dummy that equals 1 for above median inequality as measured by the Gini Index. Errors are clustered at the country-level and regressions are weighted by public weights provided in the survey. \*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05 and \*p<0.1

**Table 14: Policy Preferences, Baseline**

	(1) Give financial relief	(2) Give financial relief	(3) Support small business	(4) Support small business	(5) Manage virus spread	(6) Manage virus spread	(7) Prep for reopening	(8) Prep for reopening
Female	-0.00691 (0.0136)	-0.00306 (0.0178)	-0.00169 (0.0173)	0.00861 (0.0239)	-0.0155 (0.0190)	-0.0213 (0.0270)	-0.00430 (0.0165)	-0.0140 (0.0202)
Young	-0.0533* (0.0285)	-0.0455 (0.0310)	-0.0631** (0.0254)	-0.0471* (0.0248)	-0.0364 (0.0289)	-0.0408 (0.0257)	-0.0445 (0.0345)	-0.0498 (0.0337)
College	0.0332 (0.0229)	0.0240 (0.0227)	0.0365* (0.0192)	0.0214 (0.0204)	0.0430* (0.0195)	0.0394* (0.0190)	0.0438 (0.0253)	0.0505* (0.0264)
Urban	-0.0487** (0.0181)	-0.0764*** (0.0197)	-0.0514** (0.0183)	-0.0821*** (0.0177)	-0.0331 (0.0221)	-0.0551** (0.0241)	-0.0566** (0.0188)	-0.0763*** (0.0232)
Rich	-0.0194 (0.0183)	0.0131 (0.0185)	-0.0182 (0.0163)	0.0100 (0.0179)	-0.00260 (0.0227)	0.0143 (0.0216)	-0.0165 (0.0250)	0.00345 (0.0256)
Unemp	-0.00465 (0.0169)	0.0584 (0.0343)	-0.000478 (0.0160)	0.0443 (0.0309)	0.0116 (0.0156)	0.0442 (0.0263)	0.0365* (0.0197)	0.0536 (0.0345)
Small Firm		0.0906*** (0.0200)		0.0736*** (0.0184)		0.0694*** (0.0194)		0.0794*** (0.0210)
Telework		0.0211* (0.0107)		0.0105 (0.0122)		0.0219 (0.0152)		0.00826 (0.0162)
Observations	12,398	7,047	12,398	7,047	12,398	7,047	12,398	7,047
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Results from Equation (1) where the dependent variable is an indicator that equals 1 for expectation for government playing a leading role in the specified policy measures. Errors are clustered at the country-level and regressions are weighted by public weights provided in the survey. \*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05 and \*p<0.1

**Table 15: Policy Preferences by Personally Affected Individuals**

	(1) Give financial relief	(2) Give financial relief	(3) Support small business	(4) Support small business	(5) Manage virus spread	(6) Manage virus spread	(7) Prep for reopening	(8) Prep for reopening
Lost Job	0.0470 (0.0289)		0.0326 (0.0264)		0.0317 (0.0234)		0.0375 (0.0307)	
Infected		-0.133*** (0.0397)		-0.138*** (0.0322)		-0.126** (0.0441)		-0.179*** (0.0390)
Observations	12,416	12,416	12,416	12,416	12,416	12,416	12,416	12,416
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	0.043	0.047	0.063

Note: Results from Equation (1) where the dependent variable is an indicator that equals 1 for expectation for government playing a leading role in the specified policy measures. Individual controls include gender, age, urban, education, employment status and household income dummies. Errors are clustered at the country-level and regressions are weighted by public weights provided in the survey. \*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05 and \*p<0.1

**Table 16: Policy preferences by Assessment of Government Performance**

	(1) Given financial relief	(2) Support small business	(3) Manage virus spread	(4) Prep for reopening business
Overall Performance	0.0782*** (0.0241)	0.0817** (0.0261)	0.0863*** (0.0248)	0.105*** (0.0264)
Observations	12,398	12,398	12,398	12,398
Individual controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Results from Equation (1) where the dependent variable is an indicator that equals 1 for expectation for government playing a leading role in the specified policy measures. Overall performance is an indicator that equals 1 for favorable assessment of overall government performance during COVID-19 crisis. Individual controls include gender, age, urban, education, employment status and household income dummies. Errors are clustered at the country-level and regressions are weighted by public weights provided in the survey. \*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05 and \*p<0.1

**Table 17: Policy Preferences, Advanced vs Emerging Market Economies**

	(1) Given financial relief	(2) Support small business	(3) Manage virus spread	(4) Prep for reopening
Female	-0.00732 (0.0173)	-0.000552 (0.0206)	-0.0210 (0.0215)	0.00147 (0.0227)
Young	-0.0994*** (0.0195)	-0.0951*** (0.0171)	-0.0750** (0.0296)	-0.101*** (0.0271)
College	0.0144 (0.0135)	0.0294 (0.0170)	0.0283* (0.0143)	0.0296* (0.0151)
Urban	-0.0562** (0.0183)	-0.0660*** (0.0191)	-0.0489** (0.0203)	-0.0717*** (0.0165)
Rich	-0.000498 (0.0175)	-0.00367 (0.0122)	0.0254 (0.0188)	0.0224 (0.0245)
Unemployed	-0.0133 (0.0171)	0.00432 (0.0111)	-0.00146 (0.0145)	0.0147** (0.00548)
Female x EM	0.00166 (0.0283)	-0.00225 (0.0357)	0.0167 (0.0396)	-0.0109 (0.0323)
Young x EM	0.103* (0.0494)	0.0711 (0.0475)	0.0862 (0.0529)	0.124* (0.0596)
College x EM	0.0511 (0.0496)	0.0165 (0.0405)	0.0354 (0.0404)	0.0351 (0.0579)
Urban x EM	0.0545 (0.0414)	0.0856** (0.0299)	0.0973* (0.0515)	0.103** (0.0420)
Rich x EM	-0.0503 (0.0365)	-0.0415 (0.0363)	-0.0777 (0.0445)	-0.104** (0.0370)
Unemployed x EM	0.0417 (0.0413)	-0.00545 (0.0461)	0.0592 (0.0331)	0.0944 (0.0630)
Observations	12,398	12,398	12,398	12,398
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Results from Equation (2) where the dependent variable is an indicator that equals 1 for expectation for government playing a leading role in the specified policy measures and interaction term *EM* is a dummy that equals 1 for emerging economics and 0 otherwise. Errors are clustered at the country-level and regressions are weighted by public weights provided in the survey. \*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05 and \*p<0.1

**Table 18: Policy Preferences by Stringency of Containment Measures**

	(1) Given financial relief	(2) Support small business	(3) Manage virus spread	(4) Prep for reopening
Female	0.00441 (0.0169)	0.0197 (0.0183)	0.00167 (0.0194)	0.0136 (0.0183)
Young	-0.0685 (0.0437)	-0.0716* (0.0351)	-0.0554 (0.0432)	-0.0658 (0.0551)
College	0.0370 (0.0326)	0.0410 (0.0251)	0.0499 (0.0281)	0.0535 (0.0344)
Urban	-0.0569** (0.0206)	-0.0704*** (0.0186)	-0.0447 (0.0253)	-0.0698*** (0.0202)
Rich	-0.0204 (0.0252)	-0.0222 (0.0232)	0.00554 (0.0265)	-0.000896 (0.0348)
Unemployed	-0.0131 (0.0193)	-0.000234 (0.0151)	-0.0153 (0.0167)	0.0130** (0.00557)
Female x Stringent	-0.0312 (0.0265)	-0.0601* (0.0314)	-0.0469 (0.0405)	-0.0482 (0.0323)
Young x Stringent	0.0350 (0.0516)	0.0212 (0.0475)	0.0429 (0.0529)	0.0470 (0.0610)
College x Stringent	-0.00807 (0.0388)	-0.00902 (0.0375)	-0.0167 (0.0326)	-0.0250 (0.0459)
Urban x Stringent	0.0334 (0.0268)	0.0730*** (0.0214)	0.0479 (0.0301)	0.0547** (0.0245)
Rich x Stringent	0.00186 (0.0347)	0.00929 (0.0284)	-0.0241 (0.0479)	-0.0454 (0.0416)
Unemployed x Stringent	0.0247 (0.0378)	0.00244 (0.0371)	0.0740** (0.0281)	0.0649 (0.0477)
Observations	12,398	12,398	12,398	12,398
Country FE	0.052	0.047	0.037	0.050

Note: Results from Equation (2) where the dependent variable is an indicator that equals 1 for expectation for government playing a leading role in the specified policy measures and interaction term Stringent is a dummy that equals 1 for above the median stringency index in OxCGRT. Errors are clustered at the country-level and regressions are weighted by public weights provided in the survey. \*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05 and \*p<0.1

**Table 19: Policy Preferences by Timing of COVID-19 Spread**

	(1) Give financial relief	(2) Support small business	(3) Manage virus spread	(4) Prep for reopening
Female	-0.00979 (0.0152)	-0.00681 (0.0191)	-0.0200 (0.0209)	-0.00924 (0.0198)
Young	-0.0782*** (0.0231)	-0.0840*** (0.0226)	-0.0561* (0.0265)	-0.0743** (0.0268)
College	0.0119 (0.0115)	0.0177 (0.0149)	0.0228* (0.0124)	0.0188 (0.0147)
Urban	-0.0597*** (0.0171)	-0.0552** (0.0183)	-0.0437* (0.0201)	-0.0645*** (0.0169)
Rich	-0.0146 (0.0159)	-0.00936 (0.0110)	0.00156 (0.0236)	-0.00815 (0.0246)
Unemployed	0.000997 (0.0176)	0.00495 (0.0167)	0.0238 (0.0141)	0.0341 (0.0212)
Female x Down	0.00263 (0.0290)	0.0195 (0.0399)	0.0122 (0.0434)	0.0140 (0.0199)
Young x Down	0.141** (0.0552)	0.116** (0.0471)	0.111 (0.0630)	0.166* (0.0817)
College x Down	0.0925 (0.0577)	0.0833** (0.0291)	0.0892** (0.0310)	0.110* (0.0527)
Urban x Down	0.102*** (0.0272)	0.0393 (0.0555)	0.0952 (0.0728)	0.0805 (0.0627)
Rich x Down	-0.0285 (0.0629)	-0.0457 (0.0639)	-0.0256 (0.0682)	-0.0445 (0.0719)
Unemp x Down	-0.0649** (0.0232)	-0.0617* (0.0280)	-0.136*** (0.0283)	0.0219 (0.0482)
Observations	12,398	12,398	12,398	12,398
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Results from Equation (2) where the dependent variable is an indicator that equals 1 for expectation for government playing a leading role in the specified policy measures and interaction term Down is a dummy that equals 1 for countries that saw an initial surge followed by a downward trend in COVID-19 cases at the time of survey. Errors are clustered at the country-level and regressions are weighted by public weights provided in the survey. \*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05 and \*p<0.1

**Table 20: Policy Preferences by Initial Level of Inequality**

	(1) Given financial relief	(2) Support small business	(3) Manage virus spread	(4) Prep for reopening
Female	-0.0169 (0.0145)	-0.00436 (0.0201)	-0.0257 (0.0189)	-0.00893 (0.0207)
Young	-0.0809*** (0.0236)	-0.0894*** (0.0172)	-0.0573 (0.0333)	-0.0687* (0.0314)
College	0.0138 (0.0143)	0.0255 (0.0189)	0.0276 (0.0154)	0.0225 (0.0181)
Urban	-0.0491** (0.0176)	-0.0512*** (0.0160)	-0.0377 (0.0212)	-0.0664*** (0.0177)
Rich	-0.0121 (0.0169)	-0.000599 (0.0125)	0.00637 (0.0136)	-0.00739 (0.0171)
Unemployed	-0.0203 (0.0160)	-9.72e-05 (0.00954)	0.00854 (0.0217)	0.0287 (0.0179)
Female x Gini	0.0266 (0.0304)	0.00807 (0.0376)	0.0272 (0.0425)	0.0115 (0.0352)
Young x Gini	0.0671 (0.0589)	0.0620 (0.0523)	0.0502 (0.0592)	0.0582 (0.0721)
College x Gini	0.0503 (0.0492)	0.0291 (0.0395)	0.0395 (0.0402)	0.0548 (0.0544)
Urban x Gini	0.00414 (0.0520)	-9.27e-06 (0.0580)	0.0197 (0.0648)	0.0415 (0.0591)
Rich x Gini	-0.0188 (0.0427)	-0.0442 (0.0339)	-0.0230 (0.0564)	-0.0235 (0.0606)
Unemployed x Gini	0.0454 (0.0312)	0.00271 (0.0359)	0.0123 (0.0252)	0.0271 (0.0463)
Observations	12,398	12,398	12,398	12,398
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Results from Equation (2) where the dependent variable is an indicator that equals 1 for expectation for government playing a leading role in the specified policy measures and interaction term *Gini* is a dummy that equals 1 for above median inequality as measured by the Gini Index. Errors are clustered at the country-level and regressions are weighted by public weights provided in the survey. \*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05 and \*p<0.1

## Robustness Checks

Table 21: Assessment of Government Performance – Probit model

	(1) Overall	(2) Overall	(3) Health	(4) Health	(5) Economic	(6) Economic
Female	-0.0631* (0.0354)	-0.0996** (0.0401)	-0.130*** (0.0423)	-0.164*** (0.0484)	-0.140*** (0.0351)	-0.134*** (0.0414)
Young	-0.00472 (0.0462)	0.0506 (0.0329)	-0.0170 (0.0645)	0.000397 (0.0748)	-0.0682 (0.0468)	-0.00907 (0.0476)
College	0.0402 (0.0328)	0.0264 (0.0411)	0.0545 (0.0430)	0.0503 (0.0570)	0.0421 (0.0331)	0.0966* (0.0498)
Urban	0.0187 (0.0311)	0.0222 (0.0559)	0.116*** (0.0256)	0.133*** (0.0511)	0.0528 (0.0414)	0.0519 (0.0706)
Rich	0.0178 (0.0435)	0.0560 (0.0446)	0.0221 (0.0601)	0.0229 (0.0679)	0.00873 (0.0506)	0.0292 (0.0513)
Unemployed	-0.133** (0.0622)	-0.0772 (0.131)	-0.153** (0.0604)	-0.150 (0.0928)	-0.190*** (0.0636)	-0.0964 (0.112)
Small Firm		0.00225 (0.0399)		-0.124** (0.0606)		-0.0432 (0.0607)
Tele-workable		0.0689** (0.0272)		0.0581 (0.0425)		0.0348 (0.0418)
Observations	11,197	6,279	11,197	6,279	11,197	6,279
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Probit regressions results from Equation (1) where the dependent variable is an indicator that equals 1 for favorable assessment of the government performance (at least 4 on the scale of 1-5 in the survey). Errors are clustered at the country-level and regressions are weighted by public weights provided in the survey. \*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05 and \*p<0.1

Table 22: Beliefs about Social and Economic Concerns– Probit model

	(1) Vulnerable more affected	(2) Capitalism is harmful	(3) Prolonged job losses	(4) Threat of automation
Female	0.109** (0.0450)	0.0324 (0.0356)	0.0508 (0.0436)	0.0310 (0.0414)
Young	-0.135*** (0.0415)	-0.0918** (0.0426)	-0.0235 (0.0594)	-0.143** (0.0565)
College	-0.00539 (0.0337)	-0.0668 (0.0455)	-0.0352 (0.0484)	-0.0483 (0.0472)
Urban	0.122** (0.0508)	0.0781 (0.0658)	0.138** (0.0625)	0.186*** (0.0564)
Rich	0.0456 (0.0564)	-0.0292 (0.0686)	0.0262 (0.0509)	0.0451 (0.0775)
Unemployed	0.173*** (0.0549)	0.232*** (0.0430)	0.290*** (0.0666)	-0.0171 (0.0635)
Observations	12,398	12,398	12,398	12,398
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Probit regression results from Equation (1) where the dependent variable is an indicator that equals 1 for strong concerns about socio-economic problems (at least 7 on the scale of 1-9 in the survey). Errors are clustered at the country-level and regressions are weighted by public weights provided in the survey. \*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05 and \*p<0.1



**Table 23: Policy Preferences, Probit model**

	(1) Give financial relief	(2) Support small business	(3) Manage virus spread	(4) Prep for reopening
Female	-0.0214 (0.0420)	-0.00482 (0.0516)	-0.0447 (0.0527)	-0.0125 (0.0494)
Young	-0.161* (0.0827)	-0.184** (0.0717)	-0.103 (0.0790)	-0.133 (0.0973)
College	0.0977 (0.0650)	0.107** (0.0539)	0.119** (0.0522)	0.128* (0.0706)
Urban	-0.155*** (0.0592)	-0.160*** (0.0573)	-0.0955 (0.0635)	-0.173*** (0.0589)
Rich	-0.0560 (0.0537)	-0.0523 (0.0462)	-0.00696 (0.0628)	-0.0475 (0.0713)
Unemployed	-0.0178 (0.0512)	-0.00444 (0.0478)	0.0317 (0.0445)	0.109* (0.0604)
Observations	12,398	12,398	12,398	12,398
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Probit regression results from Equation (1) where the dependent variable is an indicator that equals 1 for expectation for government playing a leading role in the specified policy measures. Errors are clustered at the country-level and regressions are weighted by public weights provided in the survey. \*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05 and \*p<0.1

**Table 24: Assessment of Government Performance – only Advanced Economies**

	(1) Overall	(2) Overall	(3) Health	(4) Health	(5) Economic	(6) Economic
Female	-0.0285 (0.0189)	-0.0389 (0.0218)	-0.0574** (0.0215)	-0.0649* (0.0297)	-0.0622** (0.0167)	-0.0507* (0.0207)
Young	0.0235 (0.0258)	0.0335 (0.0197)	0.0359 (0.0261)	0.0563** (0.0212)	-0.0240 (0.0235)	0.00444 (0.0200)
College	0.00952 (0.0180)	-0.000434 (0.0211)	-0.00424 (0.0187)	-0.0105 (0.0246)	0.00680 (0.0191)	0.0192 (0.0259)
Urban	0.00164 (0.0109)	0.00247 (0.0228)	0.0354** (0.0113)	0.0389 (0.0204)	0.00391 (0.0121)	0.000760 (0.0273)
Rich	0.0344*** (0.00614)	0.0516*** (0.0123)	0.0503** (0.0194)	0.0544* (0.0250)	0.0385* (0.0187)	0.0418 (0.0226)
Unemployed	-0.0376 (0.0321)	0.00119 (0.0681)	-0.0581* (0.0245)	-0.0508 (0.0446)	-0.0718* (0.0313)	-0.00824 (0.0540)
Small Firm		0.00527 (0.0230)		-0.0298 (0.0331)		0.0146 (0.0299)
Tele-workable		0.0271 (0.0143)		0.0392* (0.0176)		0.0172 (0.0220)
Observations	6,662	3,404	6,662	3,404	6,662	3,404
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Results from Equation (1) where the dependent variable is an indicator that equals 1 for favorable assessment of the government performance (at least 4 on the scale of 1-5 in the survey). The sample only includes Advanced Economies. Errors are clustered at the country-level and regressions are weighted by public weights provided in the survey. \*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05 and \*p<0.1

**Table 25: Beliefs about Social and Economic Concerns – Only Advanced Economies**

	(1) Vulnerable more affected	(2) Capitalism is harmful	(3) Prolonged job losses	(4) Threat of automation
Female	0.0264* (0.0116)	0.0326* (0.0148)	0.00780 (0.0116)	0.000264 (0.0160)
Young	-0.0571 (0.0298)	-0.0266 (0.0168)	0.0456* (0.0216)	-0.0124 (0.0251)
College	0.00104 (0.0108)	-0.0198 (0.0177)	-0.00743 (0.0176)	-0.00143 (0.0146)
Urban	0.0514 (0.0260)	0.0333 (0.0313)	0.0520 (0.0262)	0.0555* (0.0226)
Rich	-0.0215 (0.0147)	-0.0588*** (0.00827)	-0.0144 (0.0113)	-0.0389** (0.0123)
Unemployed	0.0785** (0.0197)	0.0763** (0.0199)	0.0946** (0.0320)	0.00118 (0.0195)
Observations	6,662	6,662	6,662	6,662
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Results from Equation (1) where the dependent variable is an indicator that equals 1 for favorable assessment of the government performance (at least 4 on the scale of 1-5 in the survey). The sample only includes Advanced Economies. Errors are Note: Results from Equation (1) where the dependent variable is an indicator that equals 1 for strong concerns about social problems (at least 7 on the scale of 1-9 in the survey). The sample only includes Advanced Economies. Errors are clustered at the country -level and regressions are weighted by public weights provided in the survey. \*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05 and \*p<0.1

**Table 26: Policy Preferences in Advanced Economies**

	(1) Give financial relief	(2) Support small business	(3) Manage virus spread	(4) Prep for reopening
Female	-0.00405 (0.0203)	0.00341 (0.0245)	-0.0161 (0.0255)	-0.00127 (0.0274)
Young	-0.108*** (0.0204)	-0.103*** (0.0177)	-0.0777* (0.0353)	-0.109** (0.0305)
College	0.0168 (0.0162)	0.0275 (0.0205)	0.0257 (0.0169)	0.0295 (0.0181)
Urban	-0.0598** (0.0199)	-0.0632** (0.0209)	-0.0482* (0.0223)	-0.0704** (0.0180)
Rich	-0.00979 (0.0189)	-0.00994 (0.0133)	0.0183 (0.0223)	0.0175 (0.0298)
Unemployed	-0.00939 (0.0186)	0.00553 (0.0122)	0.00874 (0.0115)	0.0117* (0.00557)
Observations	6,662	6,662	6,662	6,662
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Results from Equation (1) where the dependent variable is an indicator that equals 1 for expectation for government playing a leading role in the specified policy measures. The sample only includes Advanced Economies. Errors are clustered at the country-level and regressions are weighted by public weights provided in the survey.

\*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05 and \*p<0.1

**Table 27: Assessment of Government Performance, Dropping Asian Countries**

	(1) Overall	(2) Overall	(3) Health	(4) Health	(5) Economic	(6) Economic
Female	-0.0270 (0.0170)	-0.0411* (0.0198)	-0.0506* (0.0209)	-0.0603** (0.0244)	-0.0604*** (0.0154)	-0.0552** (0.0169)
Young	-0.00178 (0.0211)	0.0208 (0.0136)	-0.00646 (0.0308)	0.000969 (0.0350)	-0.0383 (0.0199)	-0.0131 (0.0188)
College	0.0108 (0.0149)	-0.000383 (0.0166)	0.00478 (0.0177)	0.00379 (0.0237)	0.00666 (0.0156)	0.0251 (0.0222)
Urban	-0.00363 (0.0129)	-0.00520 (0.0241)	0.0404*** (0.0101)	0.0429* (0.0204)	0.000125 (0.0115)	-0.00682 (0.0270)
Rich	0.00329 (0.0221)	0.0210 (0.0184)	0.0193 (0.0294)	0.0229 (0.0299)	0.00969 (0.0235)	0.0129 (0.0177)
Unemployed	-0.0431 (0.0255)	-0.0164 (0.0548)	-0.0513* (0.0228)	-0.0552 (0.0361)	-0.0591* (0.0256)	-0.0138 (0.0427)
Small firm		0.0125 (0.0178)		-0.0376 (0.0289)		-0.0150 (0.0328)
Tele-workable		0.0377*** (0.00851)		0.0201 (0.0194)		0.0143 (0.0171)
Observations	7,856	4,494	7,856	4,494	7,856	4,494
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Results from Equation (1) where the dependent variable is an indicator that equals 1 for favorable assessment of the government performance (at least 4 on the scale of 1-5 in the survey). The sample excludes Asian countries. Errors are clustered at the country-level and regressions are weighted by public weights provided in the survey.

\*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05 and \*p<0.1

**Table 28: Beliefs about Social and Economic Concerns, Dropping Asian Countries**

	(1) Vulnerable more affected	(2) Capitalism is harmful	(3) Prolonged job losses	(4) Threat of automation
Female	0.0536* (0.0227)	0.0200 (0.0115)	0.0314 (0.0204)	0.0191 (0.0211)
Young	-0.0652** (0.0209)	-0.0296* (0.0126)	0.0108 (0.0240)	-0.0319 (0.0246)
College	0.0157 (0.0139)	-0.00918 (0.0204)	0.0112 (0.0143)	0.00939 (0.0121)
Urban	0.0537* (0.0272)	0.0262 (0.0339)	0.0460 (0.0291)	0.0483 (0.0252)
Rich	-0.00723 (0.0138)	-0.0512*** (0.0120)	-0.000354 (0.0105)	-0.0232 (0.0197)
Unemployed	0.0631** (0.0250)	0.0778*** (0.0160)	0.0968** (0.0281)	-0.0195 (0.0236)
Observations	7,856	7,856	7,856	7,856
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Results from Equation (1) where the dependent variable is an indicator that equals 1 for strong concerns about socio-economic problems (at least 7 on the scale of 1-9 in the survey). The sample excludes Asian countries. Errors are clustered at the country-level and regressions are weighted by public weights provided in the survey. \*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05 and \*p<0.1

**Table 29: Policy Preferences, Dropping Asian Countries**

	(1) Give financial relief	(2) Support small business	(3) Manage virus spread	(4) Prep for reopening
Female	0.000289 (0.0162)	-0.00130 (0.0224)	-0.0233 (0.0251)	0.00271 (0.0221)
Young	-0.0859** (0.0282)	-0.0828** (0.0294)	-0.0603* (0.0291)	-0.0871** (0.0302)
College	0.0162 (0.0137)	0.0228 (0.0182)	0.0256 (0.0149)	0.0250 (0.0168)
Urban	-0.0674** (0.0188)	-0.0605** (0.0232)	-0.0506* (0.0248)	-0.0726*** (0.0184)
Rich	-0.0141 (0.0210)	-0.0140 (0.0142)	0.00791 (0.0306)	-0.00309 (0.0321)
Unemployed	-0.000969 (0.0191)	0.00399 (0.0177)	0.0119 (0.0107)	0.0260 (0.0194)
Observations	7,856	7,856	7,856	7,856
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Results from Equation (1) where the dependent variable is an indicator that equals 1 for expectation for government playing a leading role in the specified policy measures. The regressions exclude Asian countries. Errors are clustered at the country-level and regressions are weighted by public weights provided in the survey. \*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05 and \*p<0.1