Society, Economic Policies, and the Financial Sector

Y. V. Reddy

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Foreword

The 2012 Per Jacobsson Foundation Lecture, “Society, Economic Policies, and the Financial Sector,” was presented by Y. V. Reddy, Emeritus Professor at the University of Hyderabad, Distinguished Professor at Indian Institute of Technology Madras, and former Governor of the Reserve Bank of India. The lecture was held on June 24 in Basel, Switzerland, in conjunction with the Annual General Meeting of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). The event was moderated by Per Jacobsson Foundation Chair Guillermo Ortiz.

The Per Jacobsson Foundation was established in 1964 to commemorate the work of Per Jacobsson (1894–1963) as a statesman in international monetary affairs. Per Jacobsson was the third Managing Director of the IMF (1956–63) and had earlier served as the Economic Adviser of the BIS (1931–56). Per Jacobsson Foundation lectures and contributions to symposia are expressions of personal views and intended to be substantial contributions to the field in which Per Jacobsson worked. They are distributed free of charge by the Foundation. Further information about the Foundation may be obtained from the Secretary of the Foundation or may be found on the Foundation’s website (www.perjacobsson.org).
Opening Remarks

JAIME CARUANA: Welcome all of you to the BIS on the occasion of the Per Jacobsson Lecture. And it is a particular pleasure to welcome Dr. Reddy back to Basel, where he has so many friends. As you know, Dr. Reddy has a long record dedicated to public service. As a senior official in the Ministry of Finance he took a leading part in the liberalization of the Indian economy that began in the early 1990s. And in later years as Governor of the Reserve Bank, he did much to ensure that the Indian banks avoided these precrisis excesses. And therefore, he knows very well from personal experience how difficult it is to constrain this process, and he showed really great fortitude during this difficult period and under heavy pressure. So after the excellent Per Jacobsson Lecture last year with Andrew Crockett, I think this year we have also an excellent panelist, an excellent presenter.

So before giving the floor to Guillermo Ortiz, I just wanted to give you a few words about practical arrangements. You will note that we are videotaping the proceedings of this morning. The Per Jacobsson Lecture is a semipublic event. The lecture itself will be put on the BIS public website immediately following delivery. Copies of the text will be available when you leave the room, and I understand that the Per Jacobsson Foundation normally publishes at a later stage the question-and-answer (Q&A) portion of the session without identifying who asks the questions. The videotape of the Q&A will be for internal purposes and certainly will not have any kind of distribution.

And with that and welcoming you again, I ask Guillermo to take over. Thank you.

GUILLERMO ORTIZ: Good morning. I’m Guillermo Ortiz, the Chairman of the Per Jacobsson Foundation. Kate Langdon is with us, also, who is the Vice President and Secretary of the Per Jacobsson Foundation. She’s also with the IMF.

So it’s a great pleasure to welcome you to this year’s Per Jacobsson Lecture. And I have today the distinguished honor of complementing Jaime’s presentation of Yaga Venugopal Reddy as the speaker for this occasion with a lecture entitled “Society, Economic Policies, and the Financial Sector.” He is without
a doubt an authority on the subject, and I’m sure his talk will be as inspiring and thoughtful as his professional trajectory has been. And indeed, as most of you know, he has led an exemplary career dedicated to public service.

Dr. Reddy served for five years as governor of the Reserve Bank of India. And as Jaime mentioned, in his position, I think he played a key role in directing India’s financial development and regulating the financial sector in a prudential and thoughtful manner, which doubtless contributed to the country’s strengthening of the macro policy framework and was instrumental in actually driving India through the recent crisis. It’s not an overstatement to say that Dr. Reddy’s contribution to his country’s economic development has been vital in the strong performance of India as exhibited over the last two decades.

Dr. Reddy has also been a chairman of the Bank for International Settlements’ Asian Consultative Council; Executive Director for India at the IMF; chairperson of SAARCFINANCE, a group of governors of the central banks of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation; and an advisor to the World Bank. Dr. Reddy has also held key positions in the Indian government, both at the state and central levels. He served as Secretary for Banking in the Ministry of Finance, Additional Secretary in the Ministry of Commerce, Joint Secretary in the Ministry of Finance in the government of India, and Principal Secretary in the government of Andhra Pradesh.

In academia, Dr. Reddy’s contribution has also been noteworthy. Beyond his publications in the area of finance, he has taught in important universities and research centers. I will skip the rest of his academic background. Let me just say that I had the distinct pleasure of interacting very frequently with Dr. Reddy as former governor of the Bank of India, including in Mumbai and in Mexico City. And I consider him an exemplary central banker and also a very good friend.

So welcome, and we are here to listen to you now.
I am grateful to the Per Jacobsson Foundation, in particular Chairman Ortiz, for conferring on me the honor of delivering the Per Jacobsson Foundation Lecture for 2012. I did not have the good fortune to meet Per Jacobsson, so my familiarity with him is primarily through the references made to him in the second volume of the history of the Reserve Bank of India. He came across as a forceful personality, who had an excellent grasp of India’s economic policies and problems.\footnote{G. Balachandran, \textit{The Reserve Bank of India 1951–1967}, Vol. 2 (Mumbai: Reserve Bank of India and Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 641.} He was obviously a forthright person with impressive foresight. I am wondering what Per Jacobsson would say if he were to comment on recent developments in the financial sector.

The future of finance, and in particular saving it from a popular backlash against the global financial crisis and related crisis management policies, has rightly become a matter of great concern. There is broad agreement that finance has, as in the past, the potential to do good, which should be harnessed by all. However, it is essential to minimize its potential to do harm. In the commendable search for good finance, central bankers have not merely a stake, but also a legitimate role to play. From central bankers’ point of view, there are several issues in this search for good finance for the future, but there are three interrelated issues that I want to comment on today: (a) how to ensure that the financial sector serves the society better, (b) how to integrate financial sector policies bet-
ter with national economic policies, and (c) how to ensure that the financial industry functions as a means and not as an end in itself.

Major issues confronting the finance industry were articulated by Sir Andrew Crockett in this forum last year. The presentation today is in many ways a supplement to that. Sir Andrew has made an enormous contribution to the global community of central bankers and I would like to dedicate this address to Sir Andrew.

This presentation considers many issues raised on the future of finance. My reflections are molded by not only a decade in central banking, but also many years in macroeconomic management in federal government and the Bretton Woods twins, in addition to a much longer period at provincial and local levels of government dealing directly with the public. Keeping in view the composition of today’s audience and the key role of central banks in finance, I will be exploring select themes of operational significance to central banks at the present juncture.

**SOCIETY AND FINANCE**

An assessment of the impact of the recent global financial crisis on the trust and confidence of society in the financial sector is a useful starting point when considering ways of restoring that trust. A major reason for the erosion of trust may be a sense that there has been a comprehensive capture of regulation of the financial sector by the finance industry, particularly in the leading advanced economies. A demonstrable com-

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mitment to provide reasonable access to essential financial services to all segments of society would reinforce the assertion that finance serves the larger community. This approach, which may broadly be described as inclusive finance, goes beyond the current concerns with providing consumer protection and ensuring systemic stability.

**Restoring Trust**

It is true that the Occupy Wall Street movement directed at the financial sector has petered out. This may signify a lack of popular support for the movement, or equally it may signify a lack of hope that things will change or that better alternatives are on the horizon. A society’s trust and confidence in finance, as in any other sector, is derived partly from formal laws, regulations, and procedures, and partly from the manner in which they are implemented, through both formal and informal channels. Trust is, therefore, difficult to measure, but on the basis of surveys conducted and anecdotes reported in the media, there appears to be an erosion of trust in the financial sector as a whole, and banking in particular, in advanced economies. The perceptions of such an erosion of trust, however, differ.

What are the plausible reasons for the erosion of trust in some jurisdictions? We can only speculate.

First, large sections of the population have been affected by the financial crisis, and they consider themselves innocent victims of the crisis in the financial sector. In particular, they feel that those involved in the financial sector have enjoyed disproportionate gains and shifted the pains of adjustment to the rest of the population.

Second, in the discharge of semifiduciary functions that are critical to the integrity of financial markets, such as the fixing of the London interbank offered rate (LIBOR) and credit rating, the major global players in financial markets discredited themselves by resorting to questionable practices.

Third, when several irregularities in the functioning of large financial intermediaries were found, the regulators reacted to the wrongdoing by imposing penalties. The public at large was often left in the dark about the details of the malfeasance and the losses they had suffered.

Fourth, the shareholders in a few large financial conglomerates are actively questioning the remuneration of senior management in some cases. This is unprecedented, reflecting the loss of trust by shareholders in the management of financial firms.
Fifth, although public policies provided liquidity, extended bailouts in some cases, and in a few cases tax breaks, the much-needed credit from the financial sector to the economies is not forthcoming, even after the muted demand for credit is accounted for.

Finally, there is resistance from finance industry leaders to suggestions for strengthening regulations. In advanced economies, operational details of important reforms in the banking sector, shadow-banking activities, and innovations in financial markets have yet to take a final shape. There is, perhaps, what may be described as unionization of global capital against attempts by public policies to regulate the financial sector effectively.

It is also possible to argue that erosion of trust, if any, may be temporary, as seen in the past when the financial sector faced crises. It is also possible that central bankers have no tools for managing society’s trust except by delivering their mandate through price stability and financial stability consistent with maintaining employment and growth. But it is undeniable that maintaining trust and confidence in finance is essential for the good of society at large.

My submission is that the mandate for maintaining financial stability, which often rests primarily on central banks, has two related dimensions, namely, the avoidance of disruptions in the functioning of the financial system and (more positively) the promotion of trust and confidence in the system. If there is any wing of public policy authority that has a stake in building such trust, it is the central bank. Hence, central banks should be watchful of developments related to trust in their jurisdictions and take a conscious decision whether to monitor and act, as necessary, to ensure continued trust and confidence in the financial sector.

Comprehensive Regulatory Capture

As noted earlier, the decline of trust and confidence is partly the result of the perception that there has been a comprehensive regulatory capture. While the popular explanations for market failure relate to incentives, and possibly greed, the regulators’ failures are generally attributed to misplaced faith in the self-correcting powers of markets, a lack of skills in regulatory agencies, and capture by vested interests. Such capture can be described as comprehensive, particularly in the countries that were most affected during the crisis, in the sense that it was not restricted to the economic concept of regulatory capture, but extended to the overall public policy relating to financial sector.

What could be the reasons for this?
First, the political leadership has a short-term horizon, and financial markets also have a short-term horizon. This creates a natural tendency for their priorities to converge. Available evidence shows that financial contributions to political activity from the financial sector in many affected countries increased significantly in recent years. Moreover, large global financial conglomerates seem to be in a position to influence not only political governance, but also corporate governance, to suit their own interests.

Second, regulators, as part of their public consultation process, often depend on the regulated for consultation, which is a feature common in most industries. But the dominant market shares of the few giants in the finance industry, combined with the characteristic externalities of finance, make a difference to the process and outcomes. In the past, the excessive deregulation of the financial sector was often designed to a significant extent based on the advice of the interested market participants themselves.

Third, in cases in which academics are advising on the design of reforms, they are often finance experts, sometimes engaged with market participants in remunerated advisory or consulting capacities. A large part of economic research on regulation is funded by the financial sector. In fact, most of the analysis of macroeconomic trends available in the public domain is from economists employed by large financial conglomerates. There may be, as a result of several of these factors, a tilt in favor of the financial sector in media coverage too.

Fourth, in many countries, the finance industry offers prospects of highly paid jobs for those employed in the regulatory agencies and treasuries or ministries of finance.

Finally, finance and its regulatory framework are somewhat intangible and difficult for a common person to fully understand. Hence interested groups can tilt the intended policy changes in their favor by presenting their initiatives to shift equilibria between competing considerations as mere technical issues.

It is possible to argue that capture of regulators is inevitable, and that a case can therefore be made in favor of reducing formal regulation, and encouraging self-regulation and promoting principles-based regulation. On the contrary, there is a widespread feeling that those were the very prescriptions that brought about the global financial crisis. The biggest challenge for the future of finance lies, therefore, in designing governance practices that avoid the dangers of comprehensive regulatory capture.
I would, however, hasten to add that public policy failures cannot at the same time be wished away by placing undue blame on regulatory capture. It is evident that public authorities in major financial centers genuinely believed that the financial system, even in its complex evolution, was contributing to the public good. But this faith ex post proved to be misplaced. Professor Ross Levine observes that the absence of an informed, expertly staffed, and independent institution that evaluates financial regulation from the public perspective is a critical defect in the governance of financial regulation. He suggests establishing a body that would submit a periodic report to the legislative and executive branches of government assessing the impact of financial regulation on the public. The body would be politically independent, independent of financial markets, and staffed with experts, while having no official power over the central bank or other regulatory bodies. This may sound utopian, but is worth trying in the present-day turbulent market environment.

Consideration may also be given to the formulation of a “fair practice code” for finance professionals, regulators, and academia, extending the idea mooted by the American Economic Association on a code of ethics. A similar approach has been suggested by Professor Robert Shiller in the context of financial innovation supporting the stewardship of society’s assets. He observes that “the best way to do this is to build good moral behavior into the culture of Wall Street through the creation and observance of best practices in its various professions—CEOs [chief executive officers], traders, accountants, investment bankers, lawyers, philanthropists.” However, experience suggests that there are limits to the effectiveness of such codes. In fact, ethical behavior can be felt and understood, but it is difficult to formulate it fully in a code intended for day-to-day organizational purposes. Moral behavior, in the final analysis, is a matter of individual choice. But what best practices can do is to exemplify the inherent morality in the individual.

My submission is that serious consideration should be given to evolving trustworthy institutional structures and adoption of best practices to reassure the public that the scope for comprehensive regulatory capture is being minimized. These assurances could be further reinforced through improving the public image of central banks and, in particular, of the governors.

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Inclusive Finance

Inclusive finance implies that the objective of financial sector regulation should be as much about protecting consumers as ensuring the availability of essential financial services to all sections of society, keeping in mind the expectations and needs of the common person. Emphasis by central banks on financial literacy has been advocated to enable consumers to take advantage of competitive efficiency. However, the issue is not one of financial literacy, but of the behavioral patterns of common people dealing with finance. In this regard, it has been rightly observed: “By properly deploying both incentives and nudges, we can improve our ability to improve people’s lives, and help solve many of society’s major problems. And we can do so while still insisting on everyone’s freedom to choose.”6

It is useful to provide a default option of financial products for those large sections of society that have neither the inclination nor the tools to make those choices. It could be argued that a competitive financial system which is well-regulated, keeping in view the needs for stability and consumer protection, would automatically ensure inclusive finance. Experience so far does not support such a view. Public policy in relation to the financial sector therefore needs to consider the expectations of large sections of the community, typically those of a common person. They are bound to be different depending on the society, but a few broad generalizations may be attempted.

First, common people need a place to keep financial savings in safe custody (e.g., wives often need to keep them safe from wayward husbands in rural areas in developing countries). They should be able to place and withdraw such savings with ease and at minimal cost. While a range of instruments with a host of risk-reward profiles may be provided by the financial sector, access to one safe and simple instrument is essential for a common person. Often, this is a deposit in a recognized deposit-taking institution, traditionally a retail bank branch in the neighborhood. The edifice of trust in the financial system, including leverage, is built primarily at this level.

Second, reasonable demand for credit for smoothing consumption between days/periods of income and of expenditure has to be met by the financial system at a reasonable cost. Smoothing of consumption may also be longer term, including over lifetimes.

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Third, remittances or payments may have to be made within families over different locations or for various other purposes, and such services should be available and accessible at affordable cost. These services are often a monopoly of the officially recognized or regulated banking or payment system, and hence regulators need to accept some responsibility for delivery of such services.

Finally, from a common person’s point of view, public policy should ensure the easy availability of simple-to-understand instruments in credit, capital, and insurance markets. Consumer protection is important in the financial sector, but ensuring the supply of simple-to-understand products should be an obligation of regulators; it is an essential step to gain the trust of the common person.

In some advanced economies, regulators are already paying attention to excessive charges on retail financial services, in particular, credit cards. Experience in some developing countries indicates that the involvement of public policy in expanding coverage of finance among the general public has had a beneficial impact. It is true that public policy experience with subsidized credit in some developing economies, and with housing credit in some advanced economies, has not been good. But inclusive finance emphasizes affordable access to simple products, and not excessive leverage or at the cost of prudence. Inclusive finance is not a substitute for the primacy of fiscal policy with regard to social welfare.

My submission is that we are in a world of expanded mandates for central banks, and inclusive finance should not be excluded from such mandates. Perhaps central banks could satisfy themselves and the society at large that, between the markets and regulations, finance is serving the minimum needs of most common people while maintaining efficiency and stability. That would be the cornerstone for restoring trust and confidence in the financial sector. Central banks could explore avenues for using technology and financial innovations that meet the needs of common people.

**ECONOMIC POLICIES AND THE FINANCIAL SECTOR**

Experience with the crisis has brought into focus three interconnected complexities that have to be continuously addressed by the financial sector. These are the balance between state and market as appropriate to the financial sector; the balance between real and financial sectors, where the latter should enable the real sector to perform; and finally, the balance between the conduct of macroeconomic policy at the national level and
the dynamics of the global macroeconomic environment. Public policy is conducted at the national level, but at the same time, globalization of economies, often driven by technology, is a reality, and the global macroeconomic environment is an outcome of national policies in a framework of nebulous global governance arrangements. The challenge for national central banks is to find space for the conduct of their own policies in an increasingly interdependent global economy.

**Macroeconomic Policies and the Financial Sector**

It is tempting to debate the pros and cons of developments in the financial sector without full recognition of the macroeconomic environment and of the functioning of product and factor markets. The right balance between free markets and appropriate financial sector regulation is ideally explored in the light of the significant role of macroeconomic policies in maximizing benefits and minimizing costs of the financial sector to development and welfare. During the “Great Moderation,” low and stable inflation was attributed to the success of monetary policy, ignoring the impact of the globalization of trade and, to some extent, immigration in some economies. There was admittedly a spillover effect of monetary policies on stability in the financial sector. There is a realization that, ideally, countercyclical monetary and fiscal policies should supplement countercyclical policies in the regulation of the financial sector in a variety of ways to ensure financial stability. For instance, consideration is being given to taxation of the financial sector, on institutions and on transactions, as a supplement to regulation of the financial sector in the interest of stability, and possibly growth and equity. Further, policies relating to management of public debt have a bearing on the functioning of the financial sector. For example, financial sector entities, particularly banks, either as part of portfolio management or through statutory preemption, hold significant government debt as assets. There is a recognition that large swings in capital flows could have an adverse impact on the financial sector. There is also awareness of the potential use of prudential regulation to manage capital accounts. Persistent and unsustainable current account deficits or surpluses may have the potential for destabilizing the financial sector.

The macro policy framework at the national level, which is admittedly critical for good finance, is determined by the sovereign with legitimacy and accountability to its citizens. But macro policies at the
national level have to take account of the deep and growing linkages between national economies and the global economy. An important issue, therefore, is the scope and limits for international coordination of national economic policies.

It is instructive therefore to briefly analyze the evolution and efficacy of the most recent efforts at global coordination of the macroeconomic environment through the mechanisms of summits of the Group of Twenty (G-20). The initial stage of coordination through the G-20 summits was to avoid collapse in the financial system and to moderate the slide in the global economy through macroeconomic responses, in both monetary and fiscal areas. There were simultaneous actions. The uneven recovery that followed led to differences in short-run policy actions among countries, but this was recognized as inevitable under the circumstances. However, there was an effort to identify long-term structural issues and to attempt to address them. There was some agreement in very broad terms, but differences persist on the sources of global imbalances and the appropriate correctives at the national level.

More recently, country-specific commitments to correct some imbalances have been attempted, but differences in regard to the measurement of needed correctives and the timeliness of actions are stark. A possible reason for these differences is that short-term motivations at the national level seem to run counter to the longer-term interests of the global economy. There are unmistakable signs of diminishing returns from the G-20, despite initial achievements and the promise of greater coherence in future.

One positive development has been that the democratic deficit at the level of global financial architecture has been somewhat narrowed. But there is, as yet, no coherent global macroeconomic policy. The global macroeconomic environment is the result of the interaction between macro policies at the national level and national markets that are at different stages of development and that have differing degrees of integration into global markets.

It is true that successful arrangements for global coordination while retaining space for national public policies are working well in certain sectors, such as aviation, telecoms, and the Internet. But they seem to get into difficulties in regard to macroeconomic policies and finance. Clearly, there is a need to explore why global agreements work reasonably well in some sectors, leading to acceptable and assured outcomes, while when it comes to macro policies and finance such agreements appear difficult to arrive at—and what we can learn from them.
Global Finance and Global Governance

The basic assumption underlying the benefits of globalized finance is the existence of competitive efficiency in global financial markets. The assumption can be, and has been, questioned on several well-known grounds, namely, the lack of a sound international reserve currency system, the absence of credible lender-of-last-resort facilities at the global level, and the dominance of a handful of rating agencies and accounting firms without adequate evidence of market discipline or effective rules for their functioning. The leading rating agencies and accounting firms, along with a few leading business news agencies, have continuous dealings with each other, which tends to reinforce the exercise of their oligopolistic power over markets. Further, operations of international banks/conglomerates specializing in cross-border flows, combining traditional banking and risky investment banking operations, have close business and operational links with rating agencies, accounting firms, etc. The concentration of global financial power in a few entities with close mutual connections has considerable potential to undermine competitive forces.

In assessing the competitive efficiency of global financial markets, it may be useful to make a distinction between the role of multinational banks which have subsidiaries or branches in different countries but predominantly operate in domestic markets and that of international banks which specialize in cross-border financial activities, especially flows on capital accounts, both short term and long term. Experience has shown that multinational structures that relied less on wholesale funding and foreign exchange swap markets have been less vulnerable to crises. International banks are able to operate across different financial markets and countries with significant divergence in fiscal regimes as well as regulatory regimes. They have often been found to deal in financial flows of suspect legality in one country, though not always in both countries involved. International banks have the opportunity and incentive to conduct operations involving tax avoidance. Because of these operations, international banks enjoy significant influence over the political economy in several countries. In the prevailing environment of global financial markets, some large global financial conglomerates are larger and, perhaps, more powerful than some of the central banks.

It is clear from the experience of the euro area that, in effect, the sovereign becomes the source of extraordinary intervention as the ultimate risk bearer in times of crisis. The problem arises when the sovereign’s capacity for such intervention is constrained by globalization: this may be
beneficial in many respects, but it could undermine the capacity of the sovereign to tackle the financial sector problems that arise. The conduct of fiscal policy itself is dominated by consideration of the view of global financial markets on the sovereign’s solvency and its capacity to support the financial sector under distress. Extraordinary intervention by the sovereign and related fiscal measures are thus subject to the credit rating agencies’ appraisal of their solvency.7 These considerations may have a bearing on the conduct of both financial sector regulation and macro policies at the national level.

In brief, my submission is that the prospects for credible and acceptable global governance arrangements to ensure a workable global economic policy and environment within which global finance could contribute to growth and stability do not appear very bright. I am not addressing a more fundamental issue: whether global economic governance, ensuring common economic policies for all nations, would eliminate the benefits of diversity. Too much global policy coordination might lead to the universalization of risks of policy mistakes. The main contention is that good finance is essentially a function of good economic policies, and such good policies are primarily national, though significantly impacted by the global macroeconomic environment—which, as already mentioned, is not a product of design. Approaches to regulation of the financial sector will, therefore, continue to be national, in a global environment that is not necessarily favorable.

REGULATION OF THE FINANCIAL SECTOR

There is a recognition that policies relating to regulation of the financial sector must optimize the benefits of the financial sector while minimizing the costs or risks associated with it. There are several dimensions to striking this balance, which this august audience is well aware of and involved with. I have selected three themes for consideration today: the optimal level of financialization, appropriate innovation in the financial sector, and the effectiveness of financial sector regulation.

Optimal Financialization

Not long ago, many countries recognized the costs of excessive regulation of finance and of financial repression. More recent events seem to


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indicate that excess financialization of an economy may also contribute to crises. It may be that finance is good for economic development over a certain period, but only if practiced in moderation. The idea of optimal financialization seems to have been accepted implicitly by the financial sector reform measures being contemplated in many advanced economies. At the same time, several developing and emerging market economies are considering measures to develop the financial sector, in particular, financial markets. In their quest for optimal financialization, the countries that are attempting further deregulation and development of financial markets would benefit from an understanding of how excess financialization manifests itself. However, the manifestation of excessive financialization may not be confined to finance, and may extend to commodity markets, corporates, and households.

The financialization of commodity markets happens both by virtue of deregulation of trade in commodity market exchanges and by virtue of the excessive liquidity that happens to be readily available. The correctives in public policy with regard to excessive financialization of commodity markets may be at times beyond the scope of financial sector regulation.

During recent years, there has been a significant financialization of household budgets, particularly in advanced economies. The changes in demand for certain goods are often dependent on credit conditions. Future cash flows are often determined by the market value of pension funds and other sources of social security over a lifetime. It is not clear whether limiting the leverage of financial intermediaries would by itself constrain the excess leverage in household budgets.

There has also been financialization of corporates. Corporates are exposed to the financial markets in relation to their underlying operations not only in terms of what they produce or sell, but also in terms of treasury operations.

This excessive financialization occurred in many advanced economies for other reasons. Incentives were created to multiply the transactions in the financial sector in the form of income from commissions related to transactions. Further, complexity was introduced with regard to some of these innovations, often to undermine the regulatory prescriptions regarding transparency or capital adequacy, or to mislead the counterparty. Shadow banking enabled undermining of regulatory prescriptions. Most recent initiatives with regard to reforms in regulation address these issues.

For many developing and emerging market economies, which are progressing on the path towards optimal financialization, it is necessary to avoid excessive financialization, and more importantly to explore the
impact of finance on growth, ideally on the basis of empirical evidence. Research has associated higher growth with the development of the financial sector, but more recent evidence on trade-offs between growth in the real sector and that in the financial sector is equivocal. The experience of Asian emerging market economies so far indicates that the beneficial effects of deregulated finance relative to free trade may be overstated. Further, institutional rigidities and the state of factor and product markets vary between countries, and they do interact with the level of financialization.

This subject is explored in a recent paper titled “Reassessing the Impact of Finance on Growth.”8 The paper investigates how financial development affects growth at both the country and the industry level. The paper shows, based on a sample of developed and emerging market economies, that the level of financial development is good only up to a point, after which it becomes a drag on growth. It also shows that a fast-growing financial sector can be detrimental to aggregate productivity growth. This is a line of inquiry which should be further explored to arrive at what constitutes the optimum level of financialization.

A recent working paper of the International Monetary Fund entitled “Too Much Finance?” seems to confirm some of the broad conclusions of the BIS paper I referred to.9 Let me summarize the main findings.

First, there is a positive and robust correlation between financial depth and economic growth in countries with small and intermediate-sized financial sectors. Second, beyond a threshold there is a negative effect of financial sector; that threshold is when credit to the private sector reaches 100 percent of GDP. Third, the negative effect is not confined to crisis periods, but extends to periods with tranquil conditions also, possibly leading to misallocation of resources. Fourth, it is possible but not clear that bank lending and asset-based lending components of credit will have positive effects. Finally, analysis suggests that there are several countries for which a smaller financial sector would be desirable.

The global financial crisis also brought into focus the downside of excess debt, but then the issue is: What is excess debt? Debt sustainability in terms of sovereign debt has been analyzed extensively in the past, but

the issue is the real effects of debt—not only of sovereign debt, but also of other elements of the national economy. This has been explored by an interesting paper which poses the question, “When does debt go from good to bad?” Using a data set of member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development over thirty years, it concludes that the threshold is around 85 percent of GDP for government debt, 90 percent for corporate debt, and 85 percent for household debt.10 The subject should be researched further, since the issue of excess debt is closely related to excess financialization, and the thresholds for excess debt may be lower for developing and emerging market economies than for advanced economies.

Excessive financialization can also occur due to public policy failures in achieving socioeconomic development, resulting in the passing of an undue burden to the financial sector in the form of generating a range of quasi-fiscal activities. Improvements in overall governance structures and efficiency in the provision of public services can also contribute to limiting excessive financialization outside the fiscal ambit.

My submission is that more research is needed on what constitutes optimum financialization and leverage, which could be different for developing and emerging market economies than for advanced economies, despite signs of some convergence in macroeconomic and financial sector issues. In any case, the direction of public policy relating to the financial sector in the near future will be characterized by increasing financialization in some countries which have less-developed finance, and restraining financialization in others where it has gone too far.

**Appropriate Innovation in the Financial Sector**

Operationally, an important issue is the point at which an innovation requires regulators’ attention. Should it be before introduction in the market, or after receiving complaints from an affected party? Or should it rely on monitoring of every innovation and assessing *suo motu* whether there are harmful effects? Often, many innovations look attractive in the short run because risks are back-loaded on some and rewards are front-loaded on others. In finance, pressure on regulators to regulate is also back-loaded, and is often too late. Different industries have different

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approaches to regulating and tools to regulate, and the point at which
regulators’ jurisdiction is activated varies across industries. For example, in
pharmaceuticals, the regulator has to approve ex ante, while in regard to
restrictive trade practices it may be ex post.

In many industries, regulations address issues relating to innovations. For
example, in the pharmaceutical industry, considerable experimentation is
demanded, and ex ante approvals are required for marketing. In engineering
systems, the consistency of innovations with the network in which they are
to be applied is often required to be certified, by either an industry body or
the regulator. In many others, innovations are left to the market test, unless
they happen to have ex post negative effects, in which case public policy
may consider intervening. In brief, there are several industries which have
been subject to different systems of regulation, and they have stood the
test of time. The financial sector should be able to draw lessons from such
experiences, recognizing the unique characteristics of the financial sector.
Such lessons will also help in differentiating between technological, process,
and product innovations.

Markets are, indeed, a source of many innovations, but there are examples
in many industries where the public sector has been active in promoting
innovations. There is merit in central banks’ encouraging innovations in
the financial sector that have the potential to serve the public. I agree with
U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke when he said, referring to
striking the right balance between consumer protection and responsible
innovation, “our goal should be a financial system in which innovation
leads to higher levels of economic welfare for people and communities at all
income levels.”

My submission is that central banks in particular, and regulators in
general, could be more proactive in promoting and incentivizing appropriate
innovations in the financial sector, and drawing on the experience of other
industries may be of considerable value in evolving policies towards financial
innovations.

Effectiveness of Regulation

There is considerable agreement that better and more effective regulation
is of vital importance to the financial sector, and that more regulation is

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11 Ben S. Bernanke, “Financial Innovation and Consumer Protection,” speech at the Federal Reserve
System’s Sixth Biennial Community Affairs Research Conference, Washington, D.C., April 17, 2009;
not necessarily better. At the same time, the experience with self-regulation, principles-based regulation, and the use of internally generated models of risk management has proved to be suboptimal. Hence, there is a need to consider mechanisms to make regulation more effective, to limit unnecessary regulatory burdens, or to contain the cost of compliance with regulators’ prescriptions. I wish to explore some practical ways of enhancing effectiveness.

A possible reason for deficiencies in regulation in the precrisis period may have been the loss of information as part of a process of deregulation and a lack of mechanisms to monitor events in the fast-changing world of finance. Regulatory effectiveness can be improved by enhancing the monitoring of transactions and analyzing them rigorously. No doubt, technology enables market participants to operate in a fraction of a second, but the same technology is available for regulators too, to collect information, monitor, and analyze in an equally fast manner. Modern technology minimizes the costs of reporting and, to some extent, analysis by regulators. Close monitoring by regulators may enhance compliance with regulations and help in fine tuning the regulatory prescriptions on an ongoing and timely basis.

In debates relating to public policy on public utilities, issues of regulation, competition, and ownership were considered in an integrated manner. That used to apply to the finance industry also, before deregulation and privatization became the preferred policies. The global financial crisis is leading to a serious reconsideration of the extent, nature, and effectiveness of regulation. There may be merit in considering, in an integrated fashion, appropriate regulation and its effectiveness in relation to competition and public ownership.

First, there is a recognition of the danger of “too big to fail” and “too powerful to regulate” financial conglomerates. Resolution regimes and the adoption of living wills are being considered to address this issue. It is often argued that it is difficult to unbundle them in a nondisruptive fashion. Under the circumstances, the option of public ownership of those too-big-to-fail institutions could also be reopened, keeping in view the advantages of diversity. Second, the crisis necessitated an increase in public sector ownership in the banking industry, mainly due to large bailouts. The exit from this unintended expansion in state ownership of banks ought to consider the costs and benefits of options that may include divestment or continuing with state ownership along with appropriate participation in management. Third, a case for an approximate mix of public sector and private sector banks in a financial system could be examined. Such a mixed
model for the structure of the banking sector or financial sector in general would lend stability through diversity. Differing priorities and practices enabled public sector institutions to retain a public sector character and not merely to replicate the functioning of private sector counterparts. The problem of information asymmetry may be moderated if public sector banks coexist, assuming that they have fewer incentives to withhold information from regulators, and are often subject to legislation relating to the right to information. It is not necessary that a bank or a nonbank financial entity be owned entirely by government or only by private shareholders. A variety of combinations of public and private ownership and control can be considered.

In revisiting the issue of regulation in conjunction with competition and ownership, it is necessary to recognize the lessons from public sector banking in the 1970s and 1980s, particularly in developing and emerging market economies. The problems in the past with public sector banking were due to financial repression attributable to macroeconomic policies, the lack of appropriate global standards of regulation, the existence of monopoly status, and technological obsolescence, in addition to standards of governance in public systems in general, and public ownership in particular. In the context of the global financial crisis, the practices of some entities that were virtually public sector, such as the U.S. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) and the U.S. Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), do not provide reassurance that public sector character would in itself be benign. Experiences with some banks in the public sector in Europe may also be instructive. The temptation to politicize public sector banking may persist, but the need for professionalization in the public sector should not be underestimated. The new realities consequent upon the crisis indicate the potential for a redefined role for public sector financial institutions, provided that the experience prior to deregulation and privatization, as well as select cases related to the global financial crisis, are also kept in mind.

The use of fiscal and related instruments to supplement regulatory effectiveness could be considered in earnest. Information generated for purposes of taxation is likely to be of great practical use for regulators in monitoring financial sector activities. Levying financial transaction taxes could be considered, with rates that discriminate against excessive speculation. The cross-border activities of financial intermediation could be brought within the tax net, and thus the regulatory ambit, by adopting the issuance principle (financial institutions located outside the country would be obliged
to pay the tax if they traded securities originally issued within the country) and the residence principle (instruments issued outside the country but subsequently traded by at least one institution within the country would be liable). Further, evasion could be discouraged by adopting the example of stamp duty in United Kingdom, and of Brazil, where nonpayment of the tax makes legal enforcement of such contracts difficult.

There is also significant merit in considering antiavoidance rules in taxation for regulation of the financial sector as well. Thus, if the sole purpose of an instrument or institution in the financial sector is to avoid a regulation, such transactions can be considered void for the purposes of regulation. Thus, a distinction can be made in financial sector regulation, as in the case of taxation, between planning, avoidance, and evasion. Above all, taxation and the use of information thus acquired for regulation of the financial sector would considerably enhance the effectiveness of both fiscal and financial management.

CONCLUSION

I believe that society expects central banks to ensure trust and confidence in money and finance, and hopes that they avoid the pitfalls of capture, while the common person seeks inclusive finance. It is not easy for central banks to deliver all this, but they should not ignore society’s expectations.

In these efforts, central banks need to preserve space for public policy at the national level consistent with their obligations to the global economy. The financial sector may draw lessons from global coordination in other industries, especially in managing networks.

Global trends in financial sector regulation may see simultaneous re-regulation in some countries and deregulation in others. Innovations, by definition, are difficult to put into preconceived straitjackets, and a disaggregated contextual approach would be appropriate. Above all, better regulation warrants effective regulation. Consideration of regulation, competition, and ownership in an integrated manner, enhanced monitoring of financial market activities, and the use of fiscal tools to supplement regulation could be helpful in this regard.

Friends, society has put its trust in central banks. Central banks have to ensure that bank managements and the financial sector in general serve the masses, and not merely the elite or the financially active. In the ultimate analysis, central banks are trustees, agents to look after the interests of the masses.
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Questions and Answers

Following the formal presentation, Dr. Reddy took questions from the audience.

GUILLERMO ORTIZ: Well, thank you very much, Dr. Reddy. I’m sure that the audience is not disappointed at your incredible breadth and insight that you have brought into this lecture. Let me just make a brief comment, and I think a central point that you made, which is the question of whether there is too much finance or too little finance, and the implications for regulation.

I think that you have pretty much correctly pointed out that there should be a kind of a threshold or a limit of financial development or financial deepening, if you want to call it that. It’s pretty clear what’s going on today in the two worlds, in the developed world where perhaps the expansion of financial capacity went on for too long and that translated, of course, into financial innovation and so on and so forth, and huge financial institutions that eventually got the world in a lot of trouble—not only the institutions, but also, I think it was a failure of regulators, rating agencies, everything that you know—and then you have the world of emerging markets where you have almost 2.7 billion people in the world outside of financial services where financial inclusion is, I would say, the centerpiece of economic policy in many of these countries. And luckily now with the adoption of new technologies and so on, that is to be facilitated.

But then in going back to the regulation part, you have to have a balance in these, because most of the regulation that has been put in place regards precisely the excesses of financial development, financial innovation, how do you reduce systemic risk, and so on and so forth, and too little attention has been paid to the other side of the question, the basic fundamental question: How does finance contribute to the economic world and to economic development? And until we get these two things together—I think the subject of the next panel is what society expects
from the financial sector, how to regain trust in the financial sector—it would be very difficult to point out.

So let me finish here and just use my privilege of the chair and ask you a brief question, the first one: You seem to be charging central banks with a lot of responsibilities. I think that central bankers here are already pretty overwhelmed about all the world that’s falling on their shoulders, and on top of that you also say that central banks have to play a role in restoring confidence in the financial sector. But then you do specifically talk about consumer protection and central banks, and this is a subject that I think there’s a lot of different views on here.

So how do you view the role of central banks in terms, not only of regaining the trust of society, but specifically, should consumer protection be a part of the central bank function? Or should it be a separate entity with some sort of connection to the central bank, and so on? And of course it has to do with new products and the assessment of financial innovation, so should that also be part of the responsibility of the central bank?

Y. V. REDDY: Thank you very much. I think even in India, this whole issue of competition and consumer protection in the financial sector is debated. As we know from experience, the practices vary. Some countries have separate consumer protection agencies, and some countries continue to have consumer protection as part of the banking regulation. So, I think the practices vary, and there is no universal rule on that.

In terms of functioning of the central banks, my submission is that if we look back before the crisis, we have been told to look after only price stability. However, as it turned out, the totality of stability in the financial sector had to be managed by the central banks, because the central bank is the lender of last resort.

So, in a way, therefore, the central bank’s role in this regard is like the default option. When the society doesn’t find anybody specifically responsible for a particular item in the financial sector, it tends to place it at the door of the central bank. So that’s why I would say that society’s trust in the financial sector rests with the central bank, because there’s nobody else who has generally been kept in charge. One institution which is central to financial stability is the central bank, and central banks generally command public trust also. Financial stability has two dimensions: financial stability in terms of systemic stability, and financial stability in terms of extending the financial services widely and getting or maintaining the trust and confidence of the society.
I would say that the maintenance of trust and confidence becomes a subtheme of financial stability if you define financial stability in a broader fashion.

Yes, it is a wide mandate, but when we did not have a wide mandate and when we looked only at price stability, we ended up with a problem. So a wide mandate is part of life, I suppose, especially when there is nobody else in charge. Nature abhors a vacuum, as you know.

GUILLERMO ORTIZ: Thank you, Dr. Reddy. So let me open this to the floor for questions. Maybe we should pick up two or three and then have Dr. Reddy answer them. Please.

QUESTIONER: Thank you, first of all, for an excellent presentation, Dr. Reddy. My question relates to an area that you covered very aptly. I agree fully that the authority and the powerful rating agencies have elevated themselves into an era that is very important for influencing the banking sector. They’re also the only agencies that are not regulated.

How would you propose that accountability be set for these rating agencies and the business groups that they’re intertwined with? And how would you set up a regulatory framework so that they may be regulated themselves?

GUILLERMO ORTIZ: Thank you. Please.

QUESTIONER: First, thank you very much, Y. V., for such a wide-ranging and insightful presentation. Obviously, a lot has gone wrong in the financial sector in the last several years, and you referred to the excessive financialization and various other aspects. Faced with those kinds of failures, there are essentially two differentiated conceptual responses. One is to say, let’s try and make markets work better and rely on markets as the best mechanism there is for effective regulation, competition, allocation of resources, and to deal with the problems that have arisen as a result of market failures. Another is to say, this is an area in which the market never will work perfectly and therefore we need regulation in order to suppress market forces or to supplant market forces.

Given that kind of optic, what would you consider to be the most appropriate way of dealing with these problems that have arisen? How far is regulation, in your view, there to supplant market practices that will never reform and how far should it be used to strengthen market functioning?

GUILLERMO ORTIZ: Thank you. Perhaps take a last question. Please.
QUESTIONER: Thank you. Sir, you did mention that some of the macro regulations, such as risk weights, do have a redistributive power, therefore inviting some lobbying pressures. My question is, Should the responsibility for redistribution or redistributive policies rest with the central banks or with elected fiscal authorities? And do you think that taking too much of redistributed power will put in danger the central bank’s independence?

Y. V. REDDY: Thank you. Thank you very much. On the issue of rating agencies, the basic point I would submit is that, to the extent regulators are using rating in their regulation, they have a responsibility to ensure that the rating agencies are functioning effectively by including, if necessary, monitoring of matters related to governance in their operations.

You have two types of rating agencies which are relevant to the regulators, namely, national rating agencies and international rating agencies. But as long as the regulator is using rating by an agency for the purpose of regulation, the rating agency becomes, though indirectly, an official agent of the regulator, and the regulator cannot disclaim responsibility for the failures of the rating agency. That is my limited point. The agent, namely, the rating agency, should be continuously monitored by the regulator, taking some responsibility for the conduct of the rating agencies.

If the regulators are not using the rating by the agencies, it is different, but regulators are using the rating for a variety of purposes, whether it is risk assessment or whether it is for permitting investments.

Second, the questioner has raised a very interesting issue about the markets and regulation. My submission is that traditionally we have focussed on state versus market, but actually the issue is a lot more about the relationship between the state and the market. That has come to the fore during the crisis. It is not that the state always functions in a particular manner, or that markets always function in a particular manner. So the relationship between the state and markets has become more important in determining the ideal mix of relative roles of the state and market.

In the financial sector, in particular, there are two types of relations: one is the relationship between the state and the market, and the other is the relationship between the real sector and financial sector. So we may have to slightly restate the current debate: in regard to financial markets, some regulation is required. If some regulation is required, the issue is how to make the relationship between regulation and markets or the balance as well as the relationship optimal. Let me put it this way. The issue is not only a continuous view of the balance between state and market in finance, but a continuous view of the balance in the context of the rela-
tionship between the real and financial sectors. That is the only submission I am making.

The third, with regard to redistributive policies, the questioner’s statement is absolutely right. There is no question about the redistributive policies being ultimately a fiscal responsibility. It is not a monetary responsibility. But if the financial sector regulation itself is generating redistributive forces, one cannot be indifferent. For instance, if you get a semimonopoly for certain financial services and those services are being provided at an exorbitant cost for poorer people, it is a matter of concern for regulation. The regulator who has licensed these institutions cannot disclaim responsibility. I would like to repeat: inclusive finance is not there to subsidize credit for some; inclusive finance is not at the cost of prudence; inclusive finance is not simply provision of credit; inclusive finance means that the regulator takes responsibility for ensuring that the services are available at an affordable price for all. What is advocated is inclusive finance, not subsidized finance.

GUILLERMO ORTIZ: Well, thank you very much, Dr. Reddy. Let me bring this session to a close and thank the audience and thank Dr. Reddy for his wonderful lecture.
Y. V. REDDY

Dr. Yaga Venugopal Reddy was Governor, Reserve Bank of India, from 2003 to 2008. Subsequently, he was a member of the UN Commission of Experts to the President of the UN General Assembly on Reforms of the International Monetary and Financial System. Dr. Reddy was also a member of an informal international group of prominent persons on international monetary reforms (Palais Royal Initiative). He is Professor Emeritus at the University of Hyderabad and Distinguished Professor at the Indian Institute for Technology (IIT) Madras, as well as an honorary fellow of the London School of Economics and Political Science, and is on the Advisory Board of the Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET).

Prior to his service as Governor, Dr. Reddy was an Executive Director at the IMF, and before that, he was Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank of India for six years.

Dr. Reddy was honored with India’s second-highest civilian award, the Padma Vibhushan, in 2010. His book *India and the Global Financial Crisis: Managing Money and Finance* has been among India’s best sellers. His most recent (2011) publication is *Global Crisis, Recession and Uneven Recovery*, and he is a coeditor of another recent (2012) volume, *Of Economics, Policy and Development: An Intellectual Journey*.
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