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INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
FISCAL MONITOR
Helping People Bounce Back
2022
OCT
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©2022 International Monetary Fund
Cover: IMF CSF Creative Solutions Division
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Cataloging-in-Publication Data
IMF Library
Names: International Monetary Fund.
Title: Fiscal monitor.
Other titles: World economic and financial surveys, 0258–7440
Description: Washington, DC : International Monetary Fund, 2009- | Semiannual | Some issues also have thematic titles.
Subjects: LCSH: Finance, Public—Periodicals. | Finance, Public—Forecasting—Periodicals. |
Fiscal policy—Periodicals. | Fiscal policy—Forecasting—Periodicals.
Classification: LCC HJ101.F57
ISBN: 979–8-40021–274-1 (paper)
979–8-40021–129-4 (PDF)
979–8-40021–283-3 (ePub)
Disclaimer: The Fiscal Monitor is a survey by the IMF staff published twice a year, in the spring and fall. The report analyzes the latest public finance developments, updates medium-term fiscal projections, and assesses policies to put public finances on a sustainable footing. The report was prepared by IMF staff and has benefited from comments and suggestions from Executive Directors following their discussion of the report on September 29, 2022. The views expressed in this publication are those of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF’s Executive Directors or their national authorities.
Recommended citation: International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2022. Fiscal Monitor: Helping People Bounce Back. Washington, DC: IMF, October.
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Contents
Assumptions and Conventions
Further Information
Preface
Foreword
Executive Summary
Chapter 1. Helping People Bounce Back
Introduction
Fiscal Policy to Build a Resilient Society
Building Resilience for Households against Job or Income Losses
Responses to Surging Food and Energy Prices
Ensuring the Resilience of Firms in Extraordinary Times
Preparing a Strategy Ready to Deploy
Box 1.1. Building a Resilient Future
Box 1.2. Designing Government Support to Firms during a Crisis
References
Economy Abbreviations
Glossary
Methodological and Statistical Appendix
Data and Conventions
Fiscal Policy Assumptions
Definition and Coverage of Fiscal Data
Table A. Economy Groupings
Table B. Advanced Economies: Definition and Coverage of Fiscal Monitor Data
Table C. Emerging Market and Middle-Income Economies: Definition and Coverage of Fiscal Monitor Data
Table D. Low-Income Developing Countries: Definition and Coverage of Fiscal Monitor Data
List of Tables
Advanced Economies (A1–A8)
Emerging Market and Middle-Income Economies (A9–A16)
Low-Income Developing Countries (A17–A22)
Structural Fiscal Indicators (A23–A25)
Selected Topics
IMF Executive Board Discussion of the Outlook, September 2022
Figures
Figure ES.1. National Budget Balances, by Income Group, 2019–22
Figure ES.2. National Gross Debt and Interest Expense, by Income Group, 2014–24
Figure ES.3. Effect of Inflation Shock on the Debt Ratio, Selected Countries, 2022 versus 2020
Figure ES.4. Food and Energy Support Policies, by Income Group
Figure ES.5. Sovereign Spreads, by Income Group, 2020–22
Figure ES.6. Fiscal Impulse, Inflation, and Debt for G20 Countries
Figure 1.1. Fiscal Policy Builds Resilience in Several Critical Areas
Figure 1.2. Fiscal Responses in Large Crises
Figure 1.3. Simulations of the Stabilization of Income and Consumption across EU Countries, 2020
Figure 1.4. Stabilization of Income across EU Countries, by Household Income Groups, 2020
Figure 1.5. Change in Per Capita Income across Household Income Quintiles in Brazil, 2020
Figure 1.6. Evolution of Poverty and Income Inequality during the Pandemic in Brazil, 2019-21
Figure 1.7. US Consumption Growth during the Pandemic, by Income Group, 2019–21
Figure 1.8. Simulated Effects of Discretionary Support and Time-Varying Automatic Stabilizers
Figure 1.9. Recently Announced Measures in Response to High Energy and Food Prices
Figure 1.10. Domestic Consumption by Low-Income Households under Different Energy Subsidy Schemes
Figure 1.11. Estimated Implicit Subsidy and Take-Up of Government Guarantee Programs, 2020-21
Figure 1.1.1. Children Missing Out on Non–COVID-19 Immunization
Figure 1.2.1. Firms Receiving Public Support
Tables
Table 1.1. Selected Examples of Social Spending during the COVID-19 Pandemic in Emerging Market and Developing Economies
Table 1.2. Appropriate Fiscal Tools to Deploy Depend on the Nature of the Adversity of Shocks
Online-Only Annexes
Online Annex 1.1. Countercyclical of Fiscal Policies
Online Annex 1.2. Income Stabilization before and during the COVID-19 Pandemic across EU Countries: A Microsimulation Approach
Online Annex 1.3. Brazil’s Emergency Cash Transfer Program
Online Annex 1.4. Designing Fiscal Tools to Build Resilience: A DSGE-Based Analysis
Online Annex 1.5. Externalities from Energy Pricing Subsidies
Editor’s Note (12/8/22): The reference to Christl and others (2022) was revised after publication to better acknowledge the role of the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission, where most coauthors are affiliated.
Assumptions and Conventions
The following symbols have been used throughout this publication:
… to indicate that data are not available
— to indicate that the figure is zero or less than half the final digit shown, or that the item does not exist
– between years or months (for example, 2008–09 or January–June) to indicate the years or months covered, including the beginning and ending years or months
/ between years (for example, 2008/09) to indicate a fiscal or financial year
“Billion” means a thousand million; “trillion” means a thousand billion.
“Basis points” refers to hundredths of 1 percentage point (for example, 25 basis points are equivalent to ¼ of 1 percentage point).
“n.a.” means “not applicable.”
Minor discrepancies between sums of constituent figures and totals are due to rounding.
As used in this publication, the term “country” does not in all cases refer to a territorial entity that is a state as understood by international law and practice. As used here, the term also covers some territorial entities that are not states but for which statistical data are maintained on a separate and independent basis.
Further Information
Corrections and Revisions
The data and analysis appearing in the Fiscal Monitor are compiled by IMF staff at the time of publication. Every effort is made to ensure their timeliness, accuracy, and completeness. When errors are discovered, corrections and revisions are incorporated into the digital editions available from the IMF website and on the IMF eLibrary. All substantive changes are listed in the Table of Contents of the online PDF of the report.
Print and Digital Editions
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Preface
The projections included in this issue of the Fiscal Monitor are drawn from the same database used for the October 2022 World Economic Outlook and Global Financial Stability Report (and are referred to as “IMF staff projections”). Fiscal projections refer to the general government, unless otherwise indicated. Short-term projections are based on officially announced budgets, adjusted for differences between the national authorities and the IMF staff regarding macroeconomic assumptions. The fiscal projections incorporate policy measures that are judged by the IMF staff as likely to be implemented. For countries supported by an IMF arrangement, the projections are those under the arrangement. In cases in which the IMF staff has insufficient information to assess the authorities’ budget intentions and prospects for policy implementation, an unchanged cyclically adjusted primary balance is assumed, unless indicated otherwise. Details on the composition of the groups, as well as country-specific assumptions, can be found in the Methodological and Statistical Appendix of the October 2022 Fiscal Monitor.
The Fiscal Monitor is prepared by the IMF Fiscal Affairs Department under the general guidance of Vitor Gaspar, Department Director. The project was directed by Paolo Mauro, Deputy Director; and Paulo Medas, Division Chief. The main authors of Chapter 1 in this issue are W. Raphael Lam (team lead) and Roberto Piazza (deputy lead), Fernanda Brollo, Xuehui Han, Gee Hee Hong, Youssouf Kiendrebeogo, Anh Dinh Minh Nguyen, John Ralyea, Alexandra Solovyeva, and Alberto Tumino, with contributions from David Amaglobeli, Carolina Bloch, Nick Carroll, Mengfei Gu, Emine Hanedar, Mauricio Soto, Céline Tévenot, and João Jalles (University of Lisbon), and research support from Andrew Womer and Zhonghao Wei.
The Methodological and Statistical Appendix was prepared by Chenlu Zhang under the guidance of John Ralyea and Alexandra Solovyeva. Meron Haile and Andre Vasquez provided excellent coordination and editorial support. Rumit Pancholi from the Communications Department led the editorial team and managed the report’s production, with editorial assistance from Grauel Group and TalentMEDIA Services.
Inputs, comments, and suggestions were received from other departments in the IMF, including area departments—namely, the African Department, Asia and Pacific Department, European Department, Middle East and Central Asia Department, and Western Hemisphere Department—as well as the Communications Department, Institute for Capacity Development, Legal Department, Monetary and Capital Markets Department, Research Department, Secretary’s Department, Statistics Department, and Strategy, Policy, and Review Department. Chapter 1 of the Fiscal Monitor also benefited from comments by Markus Brunnermeier (Princeton University), Wendy Edelberg (Brookings), Leonardo Iacovone (World Bank), Camille Landais (London School of Economics), Eric Parrado Herrera (Inter-American Development Bank), and Ricardo Reis (London School of Economics and Political Science). Both projections and policy considerations are those of the IMF staff and should not be attributed to Executive Directors or to their national authorities.
Foreword
The global economy is being buffeted by a sequence of disturbances. After unprecedented expansion in 2020, monetary and fiscal policy have pivoted together from expansion to tightening. Debt and deficits fell in 2021 and 2022 but remain above prepandemic levels and projections. These developments reflect mainly the unwinding of pandemic-related measures and surprise inflation. In the context of high inflation, high debt, rising interest rates, and elevated uncertainty, consistency between monetary and fiscal policy is paramount. In most countries, this means keeping the budget on its tightening course.
Inflation surprises are contributing to the reduction of debt and deficits. But we also must recognize that inflation surprises cannot endure. If inflation becomes broad-based and persistent, it will eventually be reflected in inflation expectations. In such a situation, assets that promise nominal returns become less attractive. High and volatile inflation makes credit more expensive and unreliable. There is thus a trade-off between short-run expediency and macroeconomic stability. With inflation elevated and financing conditions tightening, policymakers should prioritize macroeconomic and financial stability above all else. This is especially relevant as recent developments in bond markets show increased market sensitivity to deteriorating (or bad) fundamentals. That raises the prospect of more frequent and more disruptive fiscal crises across the world.
Very high inflation, together with surging food and energy prices, translates into a politically salient cost-of-living crisis. Governments are adopting hundreds of policy actions this year in response to surging food and energy prices. Food spending is proportionately much greater in poorer countries (and poorer households). Hence, in these economies, food is the dominant driver of policy action. In advanced economies energy dominates.
Our report includes the results of a survey of 174 countries covering about 750 measures enacted in the first half of 2022 to counter the food and energy crisis. The most common measures aim at dulling price pass-through and include reductions in consumption taxes, customs duties, and energy price subsidies. Most measures have not been targeted at those most in need.
The rise of extreme poverty and food insecurity that began even before the pandemic is very concerning. Emergency support is necessary. The food crisis should be addressed, at the global level, by a broad set of initiatives including the lifting of restrictions on exports of food and fertilizers. Some emergency financing will be available through the new Food Shock Window under the IMF emergency financing toolkit. But more is needed, including through the voluntary rechanneling of wealthier countries’ allocations of the IMF’s special drawing right (SDR) to poorer countries.
At the national level, countries must prioritize food security. In many cases, binding financing constraints make the trade-offs very painful for countries. Coordinated global action is thus urgent.
Compounding the food plight, the energy crisis— especially in Europe—is proving to be profound, protracted, and is likely to persist. Given the size of the shock, many households and firms require support that facilitates adjustment. It is critical to design the policy response in a way that navigates difficult, but pressing, trade-offs. The price mechanism must play a key role in the allocation of scarce energy resources and targeted measures help to reconcile the imperative of support for the vulnerable with maintaining the budget deficit on a downward path. Facing a shifting landscape, policymakers must stay agile to be able to respond appropriately to the unexpected. Long commitments are not more than a pretense of certainty and can quickly become unafordable.
This Fiscal Monitor takes a deep dive into how fiscal policy can build a resilient society that helps people bounce back from significant adversity. The pandemic has shown that fiscal measures can be swift and impactful in protecting people and firms in difficult times. Governments have used novel and innovative tools, often leveraging digital technology.
These measures can be more efficient if building on a sound pre-existing social protection system when crises strike. The Fiscal Monitor thus stresses the importance of preparing a strategy, making social support readily scalable and better targeted and building fiscal buffers in normal times. These actions would allow governments to respond promptly and flexibly to deliver support to those who really need it. Information, transparency, the institutional capacity will be key—as will managing risks and exiting support measures. This is particularly challenging when facing shocks that are both as far-reaching and persistent as we are witnessing today.
Vitor Gaspar
Director of the Fiscal Affairs Department
Executive Summary
Current Developments
Rising inflation and climbing interest rates have supplanted more than a decade of muted inflation and low interest rates in many countries. Recession concerns are surfacing and geopolitical tensions have increased further as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine persists (October 2022 World Economic Outlook). Fiscal policy trade-offs are increasingly difficult, especially for high-debt countries where responses to the COVID-19 pandemic exhausted their fiscal space. Households are struggling with elevated food and energy prices, raising the risk of social unrest.
A Shifting Landscape Puts Pressure on Budgets
In 2021 and 2022, fiscal deficits have fallen sharply in advanced and emerging market economies but remain larger than prepandemic levels across income groups (Figure ES.1). The contraction in the average deficit for advanced economies and emerging market economies (excluding China) is notable, reflecting the unwinding of pandemic-related measures amid rising inflation. In addition, many oil exporters are now running fiscal surpluses because of higher oil revenues. Conversely, China’s deficit is projected to widen in 2022 as growth slows and inflation remains low. For low-income developing countries, which had a relatively mild fiscal response to the pandemic, the average deficit has barely changed. Compared with 2019, the larger deficits in advanced economies and low-income developing countries reflect higher spending than three years ago (partly because of responses to the food and energy crises), whereas in emerging market economies it is mainly because revenues have yet to rebound.
National Budget Balances, by Income Group, 2019–22
(Percent of GDP)
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook database.
National Budget Balances, by Income Group, 2019–22
(Percent of GDP)
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook database.National Budget Balances, by Income Group, 2019–22
(Percent of GDP)
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook database.Global government debt is projected to be 91 percent of GDP in 2022, which is about 7.5 percentage points above the prepandemic levels, despite the recent reduction in the ratio for many countries (Figure ES.2). Debt decreased because of deficit reduction, economic recovery, and inflation shocks (Figure ES.3).
National Gross Debt and Interest Expense, by Income Group, 2014–24
(Percent of GDP, weighted averages)
Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook; and IMF staff calculations.Note: China is excluded. Bars for 2022–24 are projected data.
National Gross Debt and Interest Expense, by Income Group, 2014–24
(Percent of GDP, weighted averages)
Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook; and IMF staff calculations.Note: China is excluded. Bars for 2022–24 are projected data.National Gross Debt and Interest Expense, by Income Group, 2014–24
(Percent of GDP, weighted averages)
Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook; and IMF staff calculations.Note: China is excluded. Bars for 2022–24 are projected data.
Effect of Inflation Shock on the Debt Ratio, Selected Countries, 2022 versus 2020
(Percent of GDP)
Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook database; and IMF staff calculations.
Effect of Inflation Shock on the Debt Ratio, Selected Countries, 2022 versus 2020
(Percent of GDP)
Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook database; and IMF staff calculations.Effect of Inflation Shock on the Debt Ratio, Selected Countries, 2022 versus 2020
(Percent of GDP)
Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook database; and IMF staff calculations.The sharp rise in food and energy prices also puts pressure on government budgets. Food and energy prices remain well above prepandemic levels—the UN Food and Agriculture Organization’s Food Price Index for August 2022 was 45 percent higher than in 2019. Countries have implemented new measures, including price subsidies, tax cuts, and cash transfers, to help households. In most countries, the announced measures cost more than 0.5 percent of GDP (excluding existing subsidies) reflecting in part insufficient targeting. Low-income developing countries have incurred the highest relative cost for new food-related measures (Figure ES.4).
Food and Energy Support Policies, by Income Group
(Percent of GDP, median, 20th and 80th percentiles)
Source: IMF staff estimates.Note: Whiskers reflect the 20th and 80th percentiles. Dots reflect the median and the number of announced measures of each type.
Food and Energy Support Policies, by Income Group
(Percent of GDP, median, 20th and 80th percentiles)
Source: IMF staff estimates.Note: Whiskers reflect the 20th and 80th percentiles. Dots reflect the median and the number of announced measures of each type.Food and Energy Support Policies, by Income Group
(Percent of GDP, median, 20th and 80th percentiles)
Source: IMF staff estimates.Note: Whiskers reflect the 20th and 80th percentiles. Dots reflect the median and the number of announced measures of each type.Budget constraints are tightening as global financial conditions become more challenging (October 2022 Global Financial Stability Report). Many emerging market economies and low-income developing countries have been managing surging spreads in 2022; the median spread for low-income developing countries has increased over 50 percent in the past year (Figure ES.5). Interest expense relative to GDP is projected to rise over the coming years even as debt stabilizes. If inflation becomes more volatile, borrowing costs could rise further as investors require a higher premium for long-term debt. Also, revenue could fall if higher interest rates reduce central bank profits and the related dividend payments to governments. Moreover, almost 60 percent of the lowest-income economies are already in or at high risk of debt distress, highlighting the need for a robust Common Framework for debt relief.
Sovereign Spreads, by Income Group, 2020–22
(Basis points)
Source: JPMorgan Emerging Market Bond Index.Note: Lines are median and shaded areas are interquartile ranges for a sample of 49 emerging market economies and 9 low-income developing countries.
Sovereign Spreads, by Income Group, 2020–22
(Basis points)
Source: JPMorgan Emerging Market Bond Index.Note: Lines are median and shaded areas are interquartile ranges for a sample of 49 emerging market economies and 9 low-income developing countries.Sovereign Spreads, by Income Group, 2020–22
(Basis points)
Source: JPMorgan Emerging Market Bond Index.Note: Lines are median and shaded areas are interquartile ranges for a sample of 49 emerging market economies and 9 low-income developing countries.The global economy is slowing amid continued tight financing conditions. A sharp downturn would further accentuate trade-offs among competing priorities of demand management, debt stabilization, protection of vulnerable populations, and investment for the future.
Fiscal Policy Needs to Adjust
Defining a consistent medium-term policy framework for the postpandemic world is crucial. Relying on repeated inflation surprises to reduce public debt is not a viable strategy and will lead to spending pressures (for example, wages and cost of services). Reducing deficits, as many advanced and emerging markets are projected to do (Figure ES.6), is necessary to help tackle inflation and address debt vulnerabilities. Fiscal consolidation sends a powerful signal that policymakers are aligned in their fight against inflation, which, in turn, would reduce the size of required policy rate increases to keep inflation expectations anchored and keep debt servicing costs lower than otherwise. Many countries are also revamping their fiscal rules to anchor policies. While politically difficult, gradual and steady fiscal tightening is less disruptive than an abrupt fiscal pullback brought on by loss of market confidence.
Fiscal Impulse, Inflation, and Debt for G20 Countries
(Percent of GDP)
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook database.Note: Includes Spain; excludes Argentina, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Türkiye. Fiscal impulse is measured by the change in the cyclically adjusted primary balance. The size of the bubble reflects the inflation rate.
Fiscal Impulse, Inflation, and Debt for G20 Countries
(Percent of GDP)
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook database.Note: Includes Spain; excludes Argentina, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Türkiye. Fiscal impulse is measured by the change in the cyclically adjusted primary balance. The size of the bubble reflects the inflation rate.Fiscal Impulse, Inflation, and Debt for G20 Countries
(Percent of GDP)
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook database.Note: Includes Spain; excludes Argentina, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Türkiye. Fiscal impulse is measured by the change in the cyclically adjusted primary balance. The size of the bubble reflects the inflation rate.Prioritizing policies and programs is increasingly vital as governments operate within tighter budgets. To p priorities are to ensure everyone has access to affordable food and to protect low-income households from rising inflation.
Faced with long-lasting supply shocks and broad-based inflation, attempts to limit price increases through price controls, subsidies, or tax cuts will be costly to the budget and ultimately ineffective. Governments should allow prices to adjust and provide temporary targeted cash transfers to the most vulnerable. Price signals are critical to promote energy conservation and encourage private investment in renewables. Public investment in critical areas should be safeguarded. As part of the prioritization effort, countries may need to raise additional revenues and contain the growth of other expenditures, including public wages, both of which could help contain overall wage and price pressures. In the dwindling number of countries with fiscal space, and where inflation is under control, automatic stabilizers should operate fully.
Helping People Bounce Back
Government policies foster resilience by helping households and firms recover from or adjust to adversity. In advanced economies, fiscal actions were swift and forceful to protect people’s livelihoods from the outset of the COVID-19 pandemic and laid the foundation for a quick bounceback. Such measures also involved fiscal costs and risks, with implications for policies going forward. Fiscal responses were more diverse among emerging markets and developing economies, with many economies financially constrained throughout the pandemic.
Building a resilient society requires government actions to protect households and firms against large losses of real income and employment—the focus of this Fiscal Monitor. It also requires actions in other intertwined areas, including (but not limited to) health care and pandemic preparedness, adaptation to climate changes and natural disasters, and equitable access to opportunities. For example, a society with strong social safety nets and equitable access to health care and education helps ensure that individuals who lose their jobs do not suffer lasting setbacks in their well-being or lifetime earnings. The COVID-19 pandemic (and the global financial crisis a decade and a half ago) led to innovative and forceful discretionary fiscal responses, against the backdrop of constrained monetary policy with interest rates near zero or negative, in many advanced economies. The ensuing reassessment of the appropriate size and mix of policy tools in response to large crises can inform the response to current challenges, including the cost-of-living squeeze associated with spikes in food and energy prices, and can help governments prepare for future adversities:
Social protection systems help people bounce back from unemployment, sickness, or poverty, making them resilient to a broad set of negative shocks. As demonstrated during the pandemic, social safety nets or broad-based cash transfers can be expanded quickly, often by leveraging new technologies. But preparation is necessary to make such systems more readily scalable and better targeted, to limit unnecessary spending, and to deliver support to those who truly need it. Reducing informality in the economy—a challenge in many low-income and developing economies— would allow people and firms to benefit from better protection when crises strike.
Job-retention schemes provided strong income stabilization and were largely well targeted. They are a useful part of the fiscal toolbox alongside unemployment income support, particularly in situations in which layoffs would curb labor productivity.
To cushion the blow from high food and energy prices, policies should in general avoid price subsidies or controls that are costly and ineffective, and instead target support to low-income households through social safety nets. Countries without strong safety nets can expand social programs (for example, school feeding and public transportation) or lump-sum discounts on utilities. For low-income developing countries, food security should be prioritized within the existing fiscal envelope.
Exceptional financial support to firms averted an economy-wide implosion in recent crises but needs to be restricted to major crisis situations in which severe negative externalities, such as risks of widespread bankruptcies, are evident. Public interventions to support viable firms are risky because many countries have weak governance and limited capacity to assess or monitor firms’ viability. To manage the fiscal risks from measures without immediate budget impact, such as direct lending and public guarantees, governments should focus on transparency, quantification of risks, good governance, and enlisting private sector expertise to assess firms’ viability.
Building on the experience of the pandemic, policymakers can now develop tools that can be readily deployed and prepare strategies that set out desirable policy responses under various scenarios.
Where protection systems are well developed, and high-frequency economic indicators are reliable, prelegislated actions conditional on previously specified triggers may be considered (such as expanded unemployment insurance following consecutive employment drops). Encouraging the private sector to build its own resilience through insurance or having workers acquire new skills can reduce the need for government intervention, which can be devoted to protecting the most vulnerable households.
Policy trade-offs are at the forefront when designing fiscal strategies. To respond flexibly during adverse events, governments need to gradually build fiscal buffers in normal times (preferably in the context of a medium-term fiscal framework) and preserve debt sustainability and access to financing. Macroeconomic trade-offs also imply that when inflationary pressures are high, fiscal policy should protect the most vulnerable while pursuing a tightening stance to avoid overburdening monetary policy in the fight against inflation. Building buffers and tightening fiscal policy require prioritizing spending among competing needs and mobilizing revenues in a growth-friendly way. These trade-offs are stark for low-income countries that face adverse shocks while pursuing development goals—similarly important elements of resilience.
Domestic measures need to be complemented by global cooperation to foster resilience. Global synergies on pandemic preparedness and vaccine deployment were evident during the pandemic. Investing in climate adaptation can benefit from cooperation among countries. For emerging markets and developing economies that are at risk of a food crisis and have limited resources or capacity, greater global efforts can provide emergency financing, humanitarian assistance, and unhindered trade.