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International Monetary Fund. Research Dept.
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Keywords:
War; COVID; inflation; growth; forecast; projections; fragmentation; labor market; interest rates; commodities; debt; pandemic; climate policy; green jobs; trade; global value chains; debt buildup; coverage ratio; household debt accumulation; pollution intensity; cost-effective debt-restructuring program; trade adjustment; Brent crude; federal funds rate; emerging market economy; Emerging and frontier financial markets; Inflation; Employment; COVID-19; Imports; Global; Asia and Pacific; Europe; Africa; Middle East and Central Asia
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Abstract

The war in Ukraine has triggered a costly humanitarian crisis that demands a peaceful resolution. At the same time, economic damage from the conflict will contribute to a significant slowdown in global growth in 2022 and add to inflation. Fuel and food prices have increased rapidly, hitting vulnerable populations in low-income countries hardest. Global growth is projected to slow from an estimated 6.1 percent in 2021 to 3.6 percent in 2022 and 2023. This is 0.8 and 0.2 percentage points lower for 2022 and 2023 than projected in January. Beyond 2023, global growth is forecast to decline to about 3.3 percent over the medium term. War-induced commodity price increases and broadening price pressures have led to 2022 inflation projections of 5.7 percent in advanced economies and 8.7 percent in emerging market and developing economies—1.8 and 2.8 percentage points higher than projected last January. Multilateral efforts to respond to the humanitarian crisis, prevent further economic fragmentation, maintain global liquidity, manage debt distress, tackle climate change, and end the pandemic are essential.

Statistical Appendix

The Statistical Appendix presents historical data as well as projections. It comprises seven sections: Assumptions, What’s New, Data and Conventions, Country Notes, General Features and Composition of Groups in the World Economic Outlook (WEO), Key Data Documentation, and Statistical Tables.

The first section summarizes the assumptions underlying the estimates and projections for 2022–23. The second section briefly describes the changes to the database and statistical tables since the October 2021 World Economic Outlook. The third section offers a general description of the data and the conventions used for calculating country group composites. The fourth section presents selected key information for each country. The fifth section summarizes the classification of countries in the various groups presented in the WEO. The sixth section provides information on methods and reporting standards for the member countries’ national account and government finance indicators included in the report.

The last, and main, section comprises the statistical tables. (Statistical Appendix A is included with the main WEO report; Statistical Appendix B is available in a separate online document at www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO.)

Data in these tables have been compiled on the basis of information available through April 8, 2022. The figures for 2022–23 are shown with the same degree of precision as the historical figures solely for convenience; because they are projections, the same degree of accuracy is not to be inferred.

Assumptions

Real effective exchange rates for the advanced economies are assumed to remain constant at their average levels measured during February 22, 2022–March 22, 2022. For 2022 and 2023 these assumptions imply average US dollar–special drawing right (SDR) conversion rates of 1.394 and 1.409, US dollar–euro conversion rates1 of 1.114 and 1.130, and yen–US dollar conversion rates of 114.7 and 109.5, respectively.

It is assumed that the price of oil will average $106.83 a barrel in 2022 and $92.63 a barrel in 2023.

National authorities’ established policies are assumed to be maintained. Box A1 describes the more specific policy assumptions underlying the projections for selected economies.

With regard to interest rates, it is assumed that the three-month government bond yield for the United States will average 0.9 percent in 2022 and 2.4 percent in 2023, for the euro area will average –0.7 percent in 2022 and 0.0 percent in 2023, and for Japan will average 0.0 percent in 2022 and 0.1 percent in 2023. Further, it is assumed that the 10-year government bond yield for the United States will average 2.6 percent in 2022 and 3.4 percent in 2023, for the euro area will average 0.4 percent in 2022 and 0.6 percent in 2023, and for Japan will average 0.3 percent in 2022 and 0.4 percent in 2023.

What’s New

  • For Ecuador, fiscal sector projections are excluded from publication for 2022–27 because of ongoing program review discussions.

  • Ethiopia’s forecast data, which were previously omitted due to an unusually high degree of uncertainty, are now included.

  • Fiji’s fiscal data and forecasts are now presented on a fiscal year basis.

  • For Tunisia, projections are excluded from publication for 2023–27 because of ongoing technical discussions pending potential program negotiations.

  • For Ukraine, all projections for 2022–27 except Real GDP are omitted due to an unusually high degree of uncertainty. Real GDP is projected through 2022.

  • Venezuela redenominated its currency on October 1, 2021, by replacing 1,000,000 bolívares soberanos (VES) with 1 bolívar digital (VED).

  • Beginning with the April 2022 WEO, the interest rate assumptions are based on the three-month and 10-year government bond yields, which replace the London interbank offered rates. See the Assumptions section for more details.

Data and Conventions

Data and projections for 196 economies form the statistical basis of the WEO database. The data are maintained jointly by the IMF’s Research Department and regional departments, with the latter regularly updating country projections based on consistent global assumptions.

Although national statistical agencies are the ultimate providers of historical data and definitions, international organizations are also involved in statistical issues, with the objective of harmonizing methodologies for the compilation of national statistics, including analytical frameworks, concepts, definitions, classifications, and valuation procedures used in the production of economic statistics. The WEO database reflects information from both national source agencies and international organizations.

Most countries’ macroeconomic data as presented in the WEO conform broadly to the 2008 version of the System of National Accounts (2008 SNA). The IMF’s sector statistical standards—the sixth edition of the Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual (BPM6), the Monetary and Financial Statistics Manual and Compilation Guide (MFSMCG), and the Government Finance Statistics Manual 2014 (GFSM 2014)—have been aligned with the SNA 2008. These standards reflect the IMF’s special interest in countries’ external positions, financial sector stability, and public sector fiscal positions. The process of adapting country data to the new standards begins in earnest when the manuals are released. However, full concordance with the manuals is ultimately dependent on the provision by national statistical compilers of revised country data; hence, the WEO estimates are only partly adapted to these manuals. Nonetheless, for many countries, conversion to the updated standards will have only a small impact on major balances and aggregates. Many other countries have partly adopted the latest standards and will continue implementation over a number of years.2

The fiscal gross and net debt data reported in the WEO are drawn from official data sources and IMF staff estimates. While attempts are made to align gross and net debt data with the definitions in the GFSM, as a result of data limitations or specific country circumstances, these data can sometimes deviate from the formal definitions. Although every effort is made to ensure the WEO data are relevant and internationally comparable, differences in both sectoral and instrument coverage mean that the data are not universally comparable. As more information becomes available, changes in either data sources or instrument coverage can give rise to data revisions that can sometimes be substantial. For clarification on the deviations in sectoral or instrument coverage, please refer to the metadata for the online WEO database.

Composite data for country groups in the WEO are either sums or weighted averages of data for individual countries. Unless noted otherwise, multiyear averages of growth rates are expressed as compound annual rates of change.3 Arithmetically weighted averages are used for all data for the emerging market and developing economies group—except data on inflation and money growth, for which geometric averages are used. The following conventions apply:

Country group composites for exchange rates, interest rates, and growth rates of monetary aggregates are weighted by GDP converted to US dollars at market exchange rates (averaged over the preceding three years) as a share of group GDP.

Composites for other data relating to the domestic economy, whether growth rates or ratios, are weighted by GDP valued at purchasing power parity as a share of total world or group GDP.4 For the aggregation of world and advanced economies (and subgroups) inflation, annual rates are simple percentage changes from the previous years; for the aggregation of emerging market and developing economies (and subgroups) inflation, annual rates are based on logarithmic differences.

Composites for real GDP per capita in purchasing-power-parity terms are sums of individual country data after conversion to the international dollar in the years indicated.

Unless noted otherwise, composites for all sectors for the euro area are corrected for reporting discrepancies in intra-area transactions. Unadjusted annual GDP data are used for the euro area and for the majority of individual countries, except for Cyprus, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain, which report calendar-adjusted data. For data prior to 1999, data aggregations apply 1995 European currency unit exchange rates.

Composites for fiscal data are sums of individual country data after conversion to US dollars at the average market exchange rates in the years indicated.

Composite unemployment rates and employment growth are weighted by labor force as a share of group labor force.

Composites relating to external sector statistics are sums of individual country data after conversion to US dollars at the average market exchange rates in the years indicated for balance of payments data and at end-of-year market exchange rates for debt denominated in currencies other than US dollars.

Composites of changes in foreign trade volumes and prices, however, are arithmetic averages of percent changes for individual countries weighted by the US dollar value of exports or imports as a share of total world or group exports or imports (in the preceding year).

Unless noted otherwise, group composites are computed if 90 percent or more of the share of group weights is represented.

Data refer to calendar years, except in the case of a few countries that use fiscal years; Table F lists the economies with exceptional reporting periods for national accounts and government finance data for each country.

For some countries, the figures for 2021 and earlier are based on estimates rather than actual outturns; Table G lists the latest actual outturns for the indicators in the national accounts, prices, government finance, and balance of payments indicators for each country.

Country Notes

For Afghanistan, data and projections for 2021–27 are omitted because of an unusually high degree of uncertainty given that the IMF has paused its engagement with the country due to a lack of clarity within the international community regarding the recognition of a government in Afghanistan.

For Argentina, the official national consumer price index (CPI) for Argentina starts in December 2016. For earlier periods, CPI data for Argentina reflect the Greater Buenos Aires Area CPI (prior to December 2013), the national CPI (IPCNu, December 2013 to October 2015), the City of Buenos Aires CPI (November 2015 to April 2016), and the Greater Buenos Aires Area CPI (May 2016 to December 2016). Given limited comparability of these series on account of differences in geographical coverage, weights, sampling, and methodology, the average CPI inflation for 2014–16 and end-of-period inflation for 2015–16 are not reported in the WEO. Inflation projections reflect the upper bound of the program range given recent world commodity price developments. Also, Argentina discontinued the publication of labor market data starting in the fourth quarter of 2015, and new series became available starting in the second quarter of 2016.

Data and forecasts for Bangladesh are presented on a fiscal year basis. However, country group aggregates that include Bangladesh use calendar year estimates of real GDP and purchasing-power-parity GDP.

For Costa Rica, the central government definition has been expanded as of January 1, 2021, to include 51 public entities as per Law 9524. Data are adjusted back to 2019 for comparability.

The fiscal series for the Dominican Republic have the following coverage: public debt, debt service, and the cyclically adjusted/structural balances are for the consolidated public sector (which includes central government, the rest of the nonfinancial public sector, and the central bank); the remaining fiscal series are for the central government.

For Ecuador, fiscal sector projections are excluded from publication for 2022–27 because of ongoing program review discussions. The authorities are undertaking revisions of the historical fiscal data with technical support from the IMF.

India’s real GDP growth rates are calculated as per national accounts: for 1998 to 2011 with base year 2004/05 and, thereafter, with base year 2011/12.

For Lebanon, data and projections for 2021–27 are omitted due to an unusually high degree of uncertainty. At the time of preparation of the WEO database, official GDP numbers were available only through 2019.

Against the backdrop of a civil war and weak capacity, the reliability of Libya’s data, especially regarding national accounts and medium-term projections, is low.

Data for Syria are excluded from 2011 onward because of the uncertain political situation.

For Tunisia, projections are excluded from publication for 2023–27 because of ongoing technical discussions pending potential program negotiations.

For Turkmenistan, real GDP data are IMF staff estimates compiled in line with international methodologies (SNA), using official estimates and sources as well as United Nations and World Bank databases. Estimates and projections of the fiscal balance exclude receipts from domestic bond issuances as well as privatization operations, in line with GFSM 2014. The authorities’ official estimates on fiscal accounts, which are compiled using domestic statistical methodologies, include bond issuance and privatization proceeds as part of government revenues.

For Ukraine, all projections for 2022–27 except real GDP are omitted due to an unusually high degree of uncertainty. Real GDP is projected through 2022. Revised national accounts data are available beginning in 2000 and exclude Crimea and Sevastopol from 2010 onward.

In December 2020 the Uruguay authorities began reporting the national accounts data according to SNA 2008, with the base year 2016. The new series begin in 2016. Data prior to 2016 reflect the IMF staff’s best effort to preserve previously reported data and avoid structural breaks.

Starting in October 2018 Uruguay’s public pension system has been receiving transfers in the context of a new law that compensates persons affected by the creation of the mixed pension system. These funds are recorded as revenues, consistent with the IMF’s methodology. Therefore, data and projections for 2018–21 are affected by these transfers, which amounted to 1.2 percent of GDP in 2018, 1.1 percent of GDP in 2019, and 0.6 percent of GDP in 2020, and are projected to be 0.3 percent of GDP in 2021, and zero percent thereafter. See IMF Country Report 19/64 for further details.5 The disclaimer about the public pension system applies only to the revenues and net lending/borrowing series.

The coverage of the fiscal data for Uruguay was changed from consolidated public sector to nonfinancial public sector with the October 2019 WEO. In Uruguay, nonfinancial public sector coverage includes central government, local government, social security funds, nonfinancial public corporations, and Banco de Seguros del Estado. Historical data were also revised accordingly. Under this narrower fiscal perimeter— which excludes the central bank—assets and liabilities held by the nonfinancial public sector where the counterpart is the central bank are not netted out in debt figures. In this context, capitalization bonds issued in the past by the government to the central bank are now part of the nonfinancial public sector debt. Gross and net debt estimates for 2008–11 are preliminary.

Projecting the economic outlook in Venezuela, including assessing past and current economic developments as the basis for the projections, is complicated by the lack of discussions with the authorities (the last Article IV consultation took place in 2004), incomplete understanding of the reported data, and difficulties in interpreting certain reported economic indicators given economic developments. The fiscal accounts include the budgetary central government; social security; FOGADE (insurance deposit institution); and a sample of public enterprises, including Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA); and data for 2018–21 are IMF staff estimates. The effects of hyperinflation and the paucity of reported data mean that the IMF staff’s projected macroeconomic indicators need to be interpreted with caution. Public external debt in relation to GDP is projected using the IMF staff’s estimate of the average exchange rate for the year. Wide uncertainty surrounds these projections. Venezuela’s consumer prices are excluded from all WEO group composites.

In 2019 Zimbabwe authorities introduced the Real Time Gross Settlement dollar, later renamed the Zimbabwe dollar, and are in the process of redenominating their national accounts statistics. Current data are subject to revision. The Zimbabwe dollar previously ceased circulating in 2009, and during 2009–19, Zimbabwe operated under a multicurrency regime with the US dollar as the unit of account.

Classification of Countries

Summary of the Country Classification

The country classification in the WEO divides the world into two major groups: advanced economies and emerging market and developing economies.6 This classification is not based on strict criteria, economic or otherwise, and it has evolved over time. The objective is to facilitate analysis by providing a reasonably meaningful method of organizing data. Table A provides an overview of the country classification, showing the number of countries in each group by region and summarizing some key indicators of their relative size (GDP valued at purchasing power parity, total exports of goods and services, and population).

Some countries remain outside the country classification and therefore are not included in the analysis. Cuba and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are examples of countries that are not IMF members, and the IMF therefore does not monitor their economies.

General Features and Composition of Groups in the World Economic Outlook Classification

Advanced Economies

Table B lists the 40 advanced economies. The seven largest in terms of GDP based on market exchange rates—the United States, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Canada—constitute the subgroup of major advanced economies, often referred to as the Group of Seven. The members of the euro area are also distinguished as a subgroup. Composite data shown in the tables for the euro area cover the current members for all years, even though the membership has increased over time.

Table C lists the member countries of the European Union, not all of which are classified as advanced economies in the WEO.

Emerging Market and Developing Economies

The group of emerging market and developing economies (156) includes all those that are not classified as advanced economies.

The regional breakdowns of emerging market and developing economies are emerging and developing Asia; emerging and developing Europe (sometimes also referred to as “central and eastern Europe”); Latin America and the Caribbean; Middle East and Central Asia (which comprises the regional subgroups Caucasus and Central Asia; and Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan, and Pakistan); and sub-Saharan Africa.

Emerging market and developing economies are also classified according to analytical criteria that reflect the composition of export earnings and a distinction between net creditor and net debtor economies. Tables D and E show the detailed composition of emerging market and developing economies in the regional and analytical groups.

The analytical criterion source of export earnings distinguishes between the categories fuel (Standard International Trade Classification [SITC] 3) and nonfuel and then focuses on nonfuel primary products (SITCs 0, 1, 2, 4, and 68). Economies are categorized into one of these groups if their main source of export earnings exceeded 50 percent of total exports on average between 2016 and 2020.

The financial and income criteria focus on net creditor economies, net debtor economies, heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs), low-income developing countries (LIDCs), and emerging market and middle-income economies (EMMIEs). Economies are categorized as net debtors when their latest net international investment position, where available, was less than zero or their current account balance accumulations from 1972 (or earliest available data) to 2020 were negative. Net debtor economies are further differentiated on the basis of experience with debt servicing.7

The HIPC group comprises the countries that are or have been considered by the IMF and the World Bank for participation in their debt initiative known as the HIPC Initiative, which aims to reduce the external debt burdens of all the eligible HIPCs to a “sustainable” level in a reasonably short period of time.8 Many of these countries have already benefited from debt relief and have graduated from the initiative.

The LIDCs are countries that have per capita income levels below a certain threshold (set at $2,700 in 2016 as measured by the World Bank’s Atlas method), structural features consistent with limited development and structural transformation, and external financial linkages insufficiently close for them to be widely seen as emerging market economies.

The EMMIEs group comprises emerging market and developing economies that are not classified as LIDCs.

Table A.

Classification by World Economic Outlook Groups and Their Shares in Aggregate GDP, Exports of Goods and Services, and Population, 20211

(Percent of total for group or world)

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The GDP shares are based on the purchasing-power-parity valuation of economies’ GDP. The number of economies comprising each group reflects those for which data are included in the group aggregates.

Syria and West Bank and Gaza are omitted from the source of export earnings, and Syria is omitted from the net external position group composites because of insufficient data.

Table B.

Advanced Economies by Subgroup

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On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong was returned to the People’s Republic of China and became a Special Administrative Region of China.

On December 20, 1999, Macao was returned to the People’s Republic of China and became a Special Administrative Region of China.

Table C.

European Union

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Table D.

Emerging Market and Developing Economies by Region and Main Source of Export Earnings1

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Emerging and Developing Europe is omitted because no economies in the group have fuel or nonfuel primary products as the main source of export earnings.

Table E.

Emerging Market and Developing Economies by Region, Net External Position, Heavily Indebted Poor Countries, and Per Capita Income Classification

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Dot (star) indicates that the country is a net creditor (net debtor).

Dot instead of star indicates that the country has reached the completion point, which allows it to receive the full debt relief committed to at the decision point.

Dot (star) indicates that the country is classified as an Emerging Market and Middle-Income Economy (Low-Income Developing Country).

Syria is omitted from the net external position group and per capita income classification group composites for lack of a fully developed database.

Table F.

Economies with Exceptional Reporting Periods1

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Unless noted otherwise, all data refer to calendar years.

Table G.

Key Data Documentation

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Note: BPM = Balance of Payments Manual; CPI = consumer price index; ESA = European System of National Accounts; SNA = System of National Accounts.

CB = central bank; Customs = Customs Authority; GAD = General Administration Department; IEO = international economic organization; MEP = Ministry of Economy, Planning, Commerce, and/or Development; MoF = Ministry of Finance and/or Treasury; NSO = National Statistics Office; PFTAC = Pacific Financial Technical Assistance Centre.

National accounts base year is the period with which other periods are compared and the period for which prices appear in the denominators of the price relationships used to calculate the index.

Use of chain-weighted methodology allows countries to measure GDP growth more accurately by reducing or eliminating the downward biases in volume series built on index numbers that average volume components using weights from a year in the moderately distant past.

BCG = budgetary central government; CG = central government; LG = local government; MPC = monetary public corporation, including central bank; NFPC = nonfinancial public corporation; NMPC = nonmonetary financial public corporation; SG = state government; SS = social security fund; TG = territorial governments.

Accounting standard: A = accrual accounting; C = cash accounting; CB = commitments basis accounting; Mixed = combination of accrual and cash accounting.

Base year deflator is not equal to 100 because the nominal GDP is not measured in the same way as real GDP or the data are seasonally adjusted.

Economic Policy Assumptions Underlying the Projections for Selected Economies

Fiscal Policy Assumptions

The short-term fiscal policy assumptions used in the World Economic Outlook (WEO) are normally based on officially announced budgets, adjusted for differences between the national authorities and the IMF staff regarding macroeconomic assumptions and projected fiscal outturns. When no official budget has been announced, projections incorporate policy measures judged likely to be implemented. The medium-term fiscal projections are similarly based on a judgment about policies’ most likely path. For cases in which the IMF staff has insufficient information to assess the authorities’ budget intentions and prospects for policy implementation, an unchanged structural primary balance is assumed unless indicated otherwise. Specific assumptions used in regard to some of the advanced economies follow. (See also Tables B4 to B6 in the online section of the Statistical Appendix for data on fiscal net lending/borrowing and structural balances.)1

Argentina: Fiscal projections are based on the available information regarding budget outturn and budget plans for the federal government, on fiscal measures announced by the authorities, and on IMF staff macroeconomic projections.

Australia: Fiscal projections are based on data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics, the FY2022/23 budget published by the Commonwealth Government in March 2022, the FY2021/22 budget published by each state/territory government, the FY2021/22 budget published by some state governments, and the IMF staff’s estimates and projections.

Austria: Fiscal projections are based on the 2022 budget, the Austria Stability Programme, the Austria National Reform Programme 2021, the new EU recovery funds, and the latest announcement on fiscal measures.

Belgium: Projections are based on the 2021–24 Stability Program, the Draft Budgetary Plan for 2022, and other available information on the authorities’ fiscal plans, with adjustments for the IMF staff’s assumptions.

Brazil: Fiscal projections for 2021 reflect policy announcements.

Canada: Projections use the baseline forecasts from the Economic and Fiscal Update 2021 and the latest provincial budgets. The IMF staff makes some adjustments to these forecasts, including for differences in macroeconomic projections. The IMF staff’s forecast also incorporates the most recent data releases from Statistics Canada’s National Economic Accounts, including quarterly federal, provincial, and territorial budgetary outturns.

Chile: Projections are based on the authorities’ budget projections, adjusted to reflect the IMF staff’s projections for GDP, copper prices, depreciation, and inflation.

China: After a significant tightening in 2021, the pace of fiscal tightening is projected to slow in 2022 based on Article IV consultation findings and public statements by the authorities.

Denmark: Estimates for the current year are aligned with the latest official budget numbers, adjusted where appropriate for the IMF staff’s macro-economic assumptions. Beyond the current year, the projections incorporate key features of the medium-term fiscal plan as embodied in the authorities’ latest budget. Structural balances are net of temporary fluctuations in some revenues (for example, North Sea revenue, pension yield tax revenue) and one-offs (COVID-19–related one-offs are, however, included).

France: Projections for 2022 onward are based on the measures of the 2018–22 budget laws adjusted for differences in revenue projections and assumptions on macroeconomic and financial variables.

Germany: The IMF staff’s projections for 2022 and beyond are based on the provisional 2022 budget, the federal government’s medium-term budget plan, and data updates from the national statistical agency (Destatis) and the ministry of finance, adjusted for differences in the IMF staff’s macro-economic framework and assumptions concerning revenue elasticities. The estimate of gross debt includes portfolios of impaired assets and noncore business transferred to institutions that are winding up as well as other financial sector and EU support operations.

Greece: Data since 2010 reflect adjustments in line with the primary balance definition under the enhanced surveillance framework for Greece.

Hong Kong Special Administrative Region: Projections are based on the authorities’ medium-term fiscal projections of expenditures.

Hungary: Fiscal projections include the IMF staff’s projections of the macroeconomic framework and fiscal policy plans announced in the 2020 budget.

India: Projections are based on available information on the authorities’ fiscal plans, with adjustments for the IMF staff’s assumptions. Subnational data are incorporated with a lag of up to one year; general government data are thus finalized well after central government data. IMF and Indian presentations differ, particularly regarding disinvestment and license-auction proceeds, net versus gross recording of revenues in certain minor categories, and some public sector lending. Starting in FY2020/21 expenditure also includes the of-budget component of food subsidies consistent with the revised treatment of food subsidies in the budget. The IMF staff adjusts expenditure to take out payments for previous years’ food subsidies, which are included as expenditure in budget estimates for FY2020/21.

Indonesia: The IMF staff’s projections are based on moderate tax policy and administration reforms, some expenditure realization, and a gradual increase in capital spending over the medium term in line with fiscal space.

Ireland: Fiscal projections are based on the country’s Budget 2022.

Israel: Projections differ from the authorities’ medium-term budget targets, assuming more modest spending cuts.

Italy: The IMF staff’s estimates and projections are informed by the fiscal plans included in the government’s 2021 budget and amendments. The stock of maturing postal bonds is included in the debt projections.

Japan: The projections reflect fiscal measures already announced by the government, with adjustments for the IMF staff’s assumptions.

Korea: The forecast incorporates the overall fiscal balance in the 2022 annual budget and supplementary budget, the medium-term fiscal plan announced with the 2022 budget, and the IMF staff’s adjustments.

Mexico: The 2020 public sector borrowing requirements estimated by the IMF staff adjust for some statistical discrepancies between above-the-line and below-the-line numbers. Fiscal projections for 2022 are informed by the estimates in the 2022 budget proposal; projections for 2023 onward assume continued compliance with rules established in the Fiscal Responsibility Law.

The Netherlands: Fiscal projections for 2021–27 are based on the IMF staff’s forecast framework and are also informed by the authorities’ draft budget plan and Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis projections.

New Zealand: Fiscal projections are based on the Half Year Economic and Fiscal Update 2021 and the IMF staff’s estimates.

Portugal: The projections for the current year are based on the authorities’ approved budget, adjusted to reflect the IMF staff’s macroeconomic forecast. Projections thereafter are based on the assumption of unchanged policies.

Puerto Rico: Fiscal projections are based on the Puerto Rico Fiscal and Economic Growth Plans (FEGPs), which were prepared in January 2022 and are certified by the Financial Oversight and Management Board. The 2022 Fiscal Plan calls for a series of structural reforms, such as earned income tax credit benefits; the Natural Assistance Program; a lowering of barriers to entry for foreign firms; and investment in education, the power sector, and infrastructure. The new fiscal plan also pays particular attention to allocating strategic investment to emergency response and frontline service delivery, as the island is highly vulnerable to natural disasters and battling an ongoing pandemic. This plan represents an unprecedented level of fiscal support—over 100 percent of Puerto Rico’s gross national product. The Fiscal Plan also focuses on the implementation of fiscal measures (centralization of fiscal authority, improvement of agencies’ efficiency, Medicaid reform, pension reform, reduction of appropriations, enhanced tax compliance, and optimized taxes and fees) that will result in a smaller government deficit in the long term. The IMF staff’s fiscal projections rely on the information presented above as well as on the assumption that the fiscal position will deteriorate over time. Previous WEO submissions (prior to fall 2021) relied on the assumption of fiscal consolidation. Although IMF policy assumptions are similar to those in the FEGP scenario with full measures, the IMF staff’s projections of fiscal revenues, expenditures, and balance are different from the FEGPs’. This stems from two main differences in methodologies: first, while the IMF staff’s projections are on an accrual basis, the FEGPs’ are on a cash basis. Second, the IMF staff and the FEGP make very different macroeconomic assumptions.

Russia: The fiscal rule has been suspended by the government in response to the sanctions imposed after the invasion of Ukraine. The projection assumes an increase in discretionary spending equal to the amount that would otherwise have been saved according to the fiscal rule and a decline in revenues due to the projected deep recession.

Saudi Arabia: The IMF staff’s baseline fiscal projections are primarily based on its understanding of government policies as outlined in the 2022 budget. Export oil revenues are based on WEO baseline oil price assumptions and the IMF staff’s understanding of current oil policy under the OPEC+ (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, including Russia and other non-OPEC oil exporters) agreement.

Singapore: FY2020 figures are based on budget execution. FY2021 projections are based on revised figures based on budget execution through end-2021. FY2022 projections are based on the initial FY2022 budget of February 18, 2022. The IMF staff assumes gradual withdrawal of remaining pandemic-related measures and the implementation of various revenue measures announced in the FY2022 budget for the remainder of the projection period. These include (1) the increase of the Good and Services Tax (GST) from 7 percent to 8 percent on 1 January 2023, and to 9 percent on 1 January 2024; (2) the increase of the property tax in 2023 for non-owner-occupied properties (from 10–20 percent to 12–36 percent) and owner-occupied properties with an annual value in excess of $30,000 (from 4–16 percent to 6–32 percent); and (3) the increase of the carbon tax from S$5 per tonne of CO2 emissions to S$25 per tonne in 2024 and 2025 and $45 per tonne in 2026 and 2027.

South Africa: Fiscal assumptions draw on the 2022 Budget Review. Nontax revenue excludes transactions in financial assets and liabilities, as they involve primarily revenues associated with realized exchange rate valuation gains from the holding of foreign currency deposits, sale of assets, and conceptually similar items.

Spain: Fiscal projections for 2021 include COVID-19–related support measures, the legislated increase in pensions, and the legislated revenue measures. Fiscal projections from 2022 onward assume no policy changes. Disbursements under the EU Recovery and Resilience Facility are reflected in the projections for 2021–24.

Sweden: Fiscal estimates for 2021 are based on preliminary information on the fall 2020 budget bill. The impact of cyclical developments on the fiscal accounts is calculated using the 2014 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development elasticity2 to take into account output and employment gaps.

Switzerland: The authorities’ announced discretionary stimulus—as reflected in the fiscal projections for 2021 and 2022—is permitted within the context of the debt brake rule in the event of “exceptional circumstances.”

Turkey: The basis for the projections in the WEO and Fiscal Monitor is the IMF-defined fiscal balance, which excludes some revenue and expenditure items that are included in the authorities’ headline balance.

United Kingdom: Fiscal projections are based on the latest GDP data published by the Office of National Statistics on February 11, 2022, and forecasts by the Office for Budget Responsibility from October 27, 2021. Revenue projections are adjusted for differences between the IMF staff’s forecasts of macroeconomic variables (such as GDP growth and inflation) and the forecasts of these variables assumed in the authorities’ fiscal projections. Projections assume that there is some additional fiscal consolidation relative to the policies announced to date starting in FY2023/24 with the goal of complying with the new fiscal rules announced at the time of the Spending Review on October 27, 2021, and to secure public debt sustainability. The IMF staff’s data exclude public sector banks and the effect of transferring assets from the Royal Mail Pension Plan to the public sector in April 2012. Real government consumption and investment are part of the real GDP path, which, according to the IMF staff, may or may not be the same as projected by the UK Office for Budget Responsibility. Data are presented on a calendar year basis.

United States: Fiscal projections are based on the July 2021 Congressional Budget Office baseline, adjusted for the IMF staff’s policy and macroeconomic assumptions. Projections incorporate the effects of the proposed American Jobs Plan; the American Families Plan; the Bipartisan Infrastructure Plan; the legislated American Rescue Plan; the Coronavirus Preparedness and Response Supplemental Appropriations Act; the Families First Coronavirus Response Act; the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act; and the Paycheck Protection Program and Health Care Enhancement Act. Finally, fiscal projections are adjusted to reflect the IMF staff’s forecasts for key macroeconomic and financial variables and different accounting treatment of financial sector support and of defined-benefit pension plans, and are converted to a general government basis.

Monetary Policy Assumptions

Monetary policy assumptions are based on the established policy framework in each country. In most cases, this implies a nonaccommodative stance over the business cycle: official interest rates will increase when economic indicators suggest that inflation will rise above its acceptable rate or range; they will decrease when indicators suggest inflation will not exceed the acceptable rate or range, that output growth is below its potential rate, and that the margin of slack in the economy is significant. With regard to interest rates, it is assumed that the three-month government bond yield for the United States will average 0.9 percent in 2022 and 2.4 percent in 2023, for the euro area will average –0.7 percent in 2022 and 0.0 in 2023, and for Japan will average 0.0 percent in 2022 and 0.1 percent in 2023. Further, it is assumed that the 10-year government bond yield for the United States will average 2.6 percent in 2022 and 3.4 percent in 2023, for the euro area will average 0.4 percent in 2022 and 0.6 percent in 2023, and for Japan will average 0.3 percent in 2022 and 0.4 percent in 2023.

Argentina: Monetary projections are consistent with the overall macroeconomic framework, the fiscal and financing plans, and the monetary and foreign exchange policies under the crawling peg regime.

Australia: Monetary policy assumptions are based on the IMF staff’s analysis and the expected inflation path.

Austria: Monetary growth projections are in proportion to nominal GDP growth.

Brazil: Monetary policy assumptions are consistent with the convergence of inflation toward the middle of the target range by the end of 2023.

Canada: Monetary policy assumptions reflect the latest decision by the Bank of Canada and its updated forecast. In particular, the Bank of Canada has started raising interest rates and confirmed the increasing rate path into the future. The monetary policy response in the current forecast reflects the new data and the war in Ukraine. While the headline inflation is assumed to increase significantly, the policy response is muted due to the forward-looking nature of the monetary policy, reacting mostly to the core inflation at the monetary policy horizon.

Chile: Monetary policy assumptions are consistent with attaining the inflation target.

China: The overall monetary policy stance was moderately tight in 2021, but it is expected to be moderately accommodative in 2022.

Denmark: Monetary policy is to maintain the peg to the euro.

Euro area: Monetary policy assumptions for euro area member countries are in line with market expectations.

Greece: Broad money projections are based on monetary financial institution balance sheets and deposit flow assumptions.

Hong Kong Special Administrative Region: The IMF staff assumes that the currency board system will remain intact.

India: Monetary policy projections are consistent with achieving the Reserve Bank of India’s inflation target over the medium term.

Indonesia: Monetary policy assumptions are in line with inflation within the central bank’s target band over the medium term.

Israel: Monetary policy assumptions are based on gradual normalization of monetary policy.

Italy: The IMF staff’s estimates and projections are informed by the actual outturn and policy plans by the Bank of Italy and the European Central Bank’s monetary policy stance forecast from the IMF’s euro area team.

Japan: Monetary policy assumptions are in line with market expectations.

Korea: The projections assume that the policy rate evolves in line with market expectations.

Mexico: Monetary policy assumptions are consistent with attaining the inflation target.

The Netherlands: Monetary projections are based on the IMF staff’s estimated six-month euro London interbank offered rate projections.

New Zealand: Monetary projections are based on the IMF staff’s analysis and expected inflation path.

Portugal: Monetary policy assumptions are based on the country desk officers’ spreadsheets, given input projections for the real and fiscal sectors.

Russia: Monetary projections assume that the Central Bank of the Russian Federation is adopting a tight monetary policy stance. The IMF staff team regards this as the right policy stance given the hike in inflation.

Saudi Arabia: Monetary policy projections are based on the continuation of the exchange rate peg to the US dollar.

Singapore: Broad money is projected to grow in line with the projected growth in nominal GDP.

South Africa: Monetary policy assumptions are consistent with maintaining inflation within the 3–6 percent target band.

Spain: Monetary growth projections are proportionate to nominal GDP growth.

Sweden: Monetary projections are in line with Riksbank projections.

Switzerland: The projections assume no change in the policy rate in 2022–23.

Turkey: The baseline assumes that the monetary policy stance remains in line with market expectations.

United Kingdom: The short-term interest rate path is based on market interest rate expectations.

United States: The IMF staff expects the Federal Open Market Committee to continue to adjust the federal funds target rate in line with the broader macroeconomic outlook.

1 The output gap is actual minus potential output, as a percentage of potential output. Structural balances are expressed as a percentage of potential output. The structural balance is the actual net lending/borrowing minus the effects of cyclical output from potential output, corrected for one-time and other factors, such as asset and commodity prices and output composition effects. Changes in the structural balance consequently include effects of temporary fiscal measures, the impact of fluctuations in interest rates and debt-service costs, and other noncyclical fluctuations in net lending/borrowing. The computations of structural balances are based on the IMF staff’s estimates of potential GDP and revenue and expenditure elasticities. (See Annex I of the October 1993 WEO.) Estimates of the output gap and of the structural balance are subject to significant margins of uncertainty. Net debt is calculated as gross debt minus financial assets corresponding to debt instruments. 2 Robert Price, Tai-Tanh Dang, and Yvan Guillemette, “New Tax and Expenditure Elasticity Estimates for EU Budget Surveillance,” OECD Economics Department Working Paper 1174 (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2014).

List of Tables1

Balance of Payments and External Financing

Medium-Term Baseline Scenario

Table A1.

Summary of World Output1

(Annual percent change)

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Real GDP.

Excludes euro area countries, Japan, and the United States.

Output per capita is in international dollars at purchasing power parity.

Table A2.

Advanced Economies: Real GDP and Total Domestic Demand1

(Annual percent change)

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In this and other tables, when countries are not listed alphabetically, they are ordered on the basis of economic size.

From the fourth quarter of the preceding year.

Excludes the Group of Seven (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, United States) and euro area countries.

Table A3.

Advanced Economies: Components of Real GDP

(Annual percent change)

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Excludes the Group of Seven (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, United States) and euro area countries.

Changes expressed as percent of GDP in the preceding period.

Table A4.

Emerging Market and Developing Economies: Real GDP

(Annual percent change)

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See the country-specific notes for Afghanistan, India, Lebanon, Libya, Tunisia, Ukraine, Uruguay, and Zimbabwe in the “Country Notes” section of the Statistical Appendix.

Data for Timor-Leste excludes projections for oil exports from the Joint Petroleum Development Area.

Data for 2011 exclude South Sudan after July 9. Data for 2012 and onward pertain to the current Sudan.

Data for Syria are excluded for 2011 onward owing to the uncertain political situation.

Table A5.

Summary of Inflation

(Percent)

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Excludes the United States, euro area countries, and Japan.

Based on Eurostat’s harmonized index of consumer prices.

Excludes Venezuela but includes Argentina from 2017 onward. See the country-specific notes for Argentina and Venezuela in the “Country Notes” section of the Statistical Appendix.

Includes Argentina from 2017 onward. See the country-specific note for Argentina in the “Country Notes” section of the Statistical Appendix.

Table A6.

Advanced Economies: Consumer Prices1

(Annual percent change)

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Movements in consumer prices are shown as annual averages.

Monthly year-over-year changes and, for several countries, on a quarterly basis.

Based on Eurostat’s harmonized index of consumer prices.

Table A7.

Emerging Market and Developing Economies: Consumer Prices1

(Annual percent change)

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Movements in consumer prices are shown as annual averages.

Monthly year-over-year changes and, for several countries, on a quarterly basis.

Based on Eurostat’s harmonized index of consumer prices.

See the country-specific notes for Afghanistan, Argentina, Lebanon, Libya, Tunisia, Ukraine, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe in the “Country Notes” section of the Statistical Appendix.

Excludes Venezuela but includes Argentina from 2017 onward. See the country-specific notes for Argentina and Venezuela in the “Country Notes” section of the Statistical Appendix.

Data for 2011 exclude South Sudan after July 9. Data for 2012 and onward pertain to the current Sudan.

Data for Syria are excluded for 2011 onward owing to the uncertain political situation.

Table A8.

Major Advanced Economies: General Government Fiscal Balances and Debt1

(Percent of GDP, unless noted otherwise)

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Note: The methodology and specific assumptions for each country are discussed in Box A1. The country group composites for fiscal data are calculated as the sum of the US dollar values for the relevant individual countries.

Debt data refer to the end of the year and are not always comparable across countries. Gross and net debt levels reported by national statistical agencies for countries that have adopted the System of National Accounts 2008 (Australia, Canada, Hong Kong SAR, United States) are adjusted to exclude unfunded pension liabilities of government employees’ defined-benefit pension plans.

Percent of potential GDP.

Figures reported by the national statistical agency are adjusted to exclude items related to the accrual-basis accounting of government employees’ defined-benefit pension plans.

Nonconsolidated basis.

Includes equity shares.

Table A9.

Summary of World Trade Volumes and Prices

(Annual percent change, unless noted otherwise)

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Average of annual percent change for world exports and imports.

As represented, respectively, by the export unit value index for manufactures of the advanced economies and accounting for 82 percent of the advanced economies’ trade (export of goods)

weights; the average of UK Brent, Dubai Fateh, and West Texas Intermediate crude oil prices; and the average of world market prices for nonfuel primary commodities weighted by their 2014–16

shares in world commodity imports.

Percent change of average of UK Brent, Dubai Fateh, and West Texas Intermediate crude oil prices.

Percent change for manufactures exported by the advanced economies.

Table A10.

Summary of Current Account Balances

(Billions of US dollars)

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Excludes the Group of Seven (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, United States) and euro area countries.

Table A11.

Advanced Economies: Current Account Balance

(Percent of GDP)

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Data corrected for reporting discrepancies in intra-area transactions.

Data calculated as the sum of the balances of individual euro area countries.

Table A12.

Emerging Market and Developing Economies: Current Account Balance

(Percent of GDP)

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See the country-specific notes for Afghanistan, Lebanon, Libya, Tunisia, Ukraine, and Zimbabwe in the “Country Notes” section of the Statistical Appendix.

Data for Syria are excluded for 2011 onward owing to the uncertain political situation.

Table A13.

Summary of Financial Account Balances

(Billions of US dollars)

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Note: The estimates in this table are based on individual countries’ national accounts and balance of payments statistics. Country group composites are calculated as the sum of the US dollar values for the relevant individual countries. Some group aggregates for the financial derivatives are not shown because of incomplete data. Projections for the euro area are not available because of data constraints.

Excludes the Group of Seven (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, United States) and euro area countries.

Table A14.

Summary of Net Lending and Borrowing

(Percent of GDP)

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Note: The estimates in this table are based on individual countries’ national accounts and balance of payments statistics. Country group composites are calculated as the sum of the US dollar values for the relevant individual countries. This differs from the calculations in the April 2005 and earlier issues of the World Economic Outlook, in which the composites were weighted by GDP valued at purchasing power parities as a share of total world GDP. The estimates of gross national savings and investment (or gross capital formation) are from individual countries’ national accounts statistics. The estimates of the current account balance, the capital account balance, and the financial account balance (or net lending/net borrowing) are from the balance of payments statistics. The link between domestic transactions and transactions with the rest of the world can be expressed as accounting identities. Savings (S) minus investment (I) is equal to the current account balance (CAB) (S – I = CAB). Also, net lending/net borrowing (NLB) is the sum of the current account balance and the capital account balance (KAB) (NLB = CAB + KAB). In practice, these identities do not hold exactly; imbalances result from imperfections in source data and compilation as well as from asymmetries in group composition due to data availability.

Excludes the Group of Seven (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, United States) and euro area countries.

Table A15.

Summary of World Medium-Term Baseline Scenario

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Data refer to trade in goods and services.

GDP-weighted average of 10-year (or nearest-maturity) government bond rates for Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

World Economic Outlook Selected Topics

World Economic Outlook Archives

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I. Methodology—Aggregation, Modeling, and Forecasting

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II. Historical Surveys

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III. Economic Growth—Sources and Patterns

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IV. Inflation and Deflation and Commodity Markets

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V. Fiscal Policy

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VI. Monetary Policy, Financial Markets, and Flow of Funds

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VII. Labor Markets, Poverty, and Inequality

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VIII. Exchange Rate Issues

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IX. External Payments, Trade, Capital Movements, and Foreign Debt

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X. Regional Issues

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XI. Country-Specific Analyses

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XII. Climate Change Issues

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XIII. Special Topics

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IMF Executive Board Discussion of the Outlook, April, 2022

The following remarks were made by the Chair at the conclusion of the Executive Board’s discussion of the Fiscal Monitor, Global Financial Stability Report, and World Economic Outlook on April 11, 2022.

Executive Directors broadly agreed with staff’s assessment of the global economic outlook, risks, and policy priorities. They noted that the war in Ukraine has led to a costly humanitarian crisis, with economic and financial repercussions and spillovers—through commodity markets, confidence, trade, and financial channels—that have prompted a downgrade to the global economic outlook and increased inflationary pressures at a time when the global economy has not yet recovered from the COVID-19 crisis. Directors concurred that the sharp increase in uncertainty could make economic projections especially volatile. They agreed that emerging risks—from an intensification of the war, further sanctions on Russia, fragmentation in financial and trade markets, and a sharper-than-expected slowdown in China due to COVID-19 outbreaks—on top of the continued risk of new, more virulent COVID-19 strains have further tilted the balance of risks to the downside. Moreover, Directors noted that the war in Ukraine has increased the likelihood of food shortages and wider social tensions given higher food and energy prices, which would further adversely impact the outlook.

Against this backdrop, Directors agreed that policy priorities differ across countries, reflecting local circumstances and differences in trade and financial exposures. Directors emphasized that the layering of strains—slowing economic growth, persistent and rising inflation pressures, increased food and energy insecurity, continued supply chain disruptions, and COVID-19 fare-ups—further complicates national policy choices, particularly for countries where policy space shrank after the necessary response to the COVID-19 pandemic. At the global level, Directors stressed that multilateral cooperation and dialogue remain essential to defuse geopolitical tensions and avoid fragmentation, end the pandemic, and respond to the myriad challenges facing our interconnected world, particularly climate change.

Directors concurred that, in many countries, fiscal policy is operating in a highly uncertain environment of elevated inflation, slowdown in growth, high debt, and tightening borrowing conditions. While acknowledging that fiscal policy has a role to play in moments of large adverse shocks, Directors considered that, particularly for countries with tighter budget constraints, fiscal support should focus on priority areas and target the most vulnerable. They emphasized that, in countries where economic growth is strong and where inflation is elevated, fiscal policy should phase out pandemic-related exceptional support, moving toward normalization. Directors acknowledged that many emerging markets and low-income countries face difficult choices given limited fiscal space and higher demands on governments due to energy disruptions and the pressing need to ensure food security. In this context, they underscored that a sound and credible medium-term fiscal framework, including spending prioritization and measures to raise revenues, can help manage urgent needs while ensuring debt sustain-ability. Directors stressed that short-term measures to mitigate high food and energy prices should not undermine actions to ensure greater resilience through investment in health, food, and cleaner energy sources.

Directors concurred that monetary authorities should act decisively to prevent inflationary pressures from becoming entrenched and avoid a de-anchoring of inflation expectations. They noted that central banks in many advanced and emerging market economies need to continue tightening the monetary policy stance to bring inflation credibly back to target and preserve hard-built policy credibility. Directors stressed that transparent, data-driven, and clearly communicated monetary policy is critical to avoid financial instability. They considered that, should global financial conditions tighten suddenly, emerging and developing economies could face capital outflows and should be ready to use all available tools, including foreign exchange interventions and capital flow management measures, when needed and in line with the Fund’s Institutional View on the Liberalization and Management of Capital Flows and without substituting for exchange rate flexibility and warranted macroeconomic adjustments.

Directors agreed that the war in Ukraine will test the resiliency of the financial system. They noted that, although no systemic event has materialized so far, financial stability risks have risen along many dimensions while global financial conditions have tightened significantly. Directors concurred that, in those emerging markets where the sovereign-bank nexus could pose vulnerabilities, it should be closely monitored. They also noted risks of fragmentation of capital markets and payment systems, the creation of blocks of central bank digital currencies, a more widespread use of crypto assets, and more frequent cyberattacks. Directors recommended tightening selected macroprudential tools to tackle pockets of elevated vulnerabilities while avoiding procyclicality and a disorderly tightening of financial conditions. They also called for comprehensive global standards and a multifaceted strategy for crypto assets and for a more robust oversight of fintech firms and decentralized finance platforms.

Directors agreed that strong multilateral cooperation is essential to respond to existing and unfolding humanitarian crises, safeguard global liquidity, manage debt distress, ensure food security, mitigate and adapt to climate change, and end the pandemic. Noting that many countries are coping with higher volatility, increased spending from the pandemic and humanitarian crises, and tightening financial conditions, Directors called on the Fund and other multilateral institutions to stand ready to provide financial support. At the same time, they noted that prompt and orderly debt restructuring, particularly by improving the G20 Common Framework, will be necessary in cases where liquidity support is insufficient. Directors noted that increasingly dire climate change developments heighten the urgency for tangibly advancing the green economic transformation. They stressed the importance of intensifying efforts to implement the COP26 roadmap together with appropriate measures to address energy security concerns. Directors considered that international cooperation in corporate taxation and carbon pricing could also help mobilize resources to promote the necessary investments and reduce inequality. As the pandemic persists, Directors underscored that prompt, equitable, and wider access to vaccinations, testing, and treatments remains a key priority. They also reiterated that measures to address the scars from the pandemic remain crucial to boost long-term prospects and create a more resilient and inclusive global economy. Above all, Directors called for a peaceful resolution of the war in Ukraine, an end to the resulting humanitarian crisis, and a return to the rules-based international order that helped lift millions out of poverty over the past decades.

1

In regard to the introduction of the euro, on December 31, 1998, the Council of the European Union decided that, effective January 1, 1999, the irrevocably fixed conversion rates between the euro and currencies of the member countries adopting the euro are as described in Box 5.4 of the October 1998 WEO. See Box 5.4 of the October 1998 WEO as well for details on how the conversion rates were established. For the most recent table of fixed conversion rates, see the Statistical Appendix of the October 2020 WEO.

2

Many countries are implementing the SNA 2008 or European System of National and Regional Accounts (ESA) 2010, and a few countries use versions of the SNA older than that from 1993. A similar adoption pattern is expected for the BPM6 and GFSM 2014. Please refer to Table G, which lists the statistical standards each country adheres to.

3

Averages for real GDP, inflation, GDP per capita, and commodity prices are calculated based on the compound annual rate of change, except in the case of the unemployment rate, which is based on the simple arithmetic average.

4

See Box 1.1 of the October 2020 WEO for a summary of the revised purchasing-power-parity-based weights as well as “Revised Purchasing Power Parity Weights” in the July 2014 WEO Update, Appendix 1.1 of the April 2008 WEO, Box A2 of the April 2004 WEO, Box A1 of the May 2000 WEO, and Annex IV of the May 1993 WEO. See also Anne-Marie Gulde and Marianne Schulze-Ghattas, “Purchasing Power Parity Based Weights for the World Economic Outlook,” in Staff Studies for the World Economic Outlook (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, December 1993), 106–23.

5

Uruguay: Staff Report for the 2018 Article IV Consultation, Country Report 19/64 (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, February 2019).

6

As used here, the terms “country” and “economy” do not always refer to a territorial entity that is a state as understood by international law and practice. Some territorial entities included here are not states, although their statistical data are maintained on a separate and independent basis.

7

During 2016–20, 35 economies incurred external payments arrears or entered into official or commercial bank debt-rescheduling agreements. This group is referred to as economies with arrears and/or rescheduling during 2016–20.

8

See David Andrews, Anthony R. Boote, Syed S. Rizavi, and Sukwinder Singh, “Debt Relief for Low-Income Countries: The Enhanced HIPC Initiative,” IMF Pamphlet Series 51 (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, November 1999).

1

When countries are not listed alphabetically, they are ordered on the basis of economic size.

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Cover World Economic Outlook, April 2022
World Economic Outlook, April 2022
War Sets Back the Global Recovery
Author:
International Monetary Fund. Research Dept.
ISBN:
9781616359423
ISSN:
0256-6877
Publication Date:
19 Apr 2022
Publisher:
International Monetary Fund
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5089/9781616359423.081
Pages:
199