© 2008 International Monetary Fund
Production: IMF Multimedia Services Division
Typesetting: Alicia Etchebarne-Bourdin
Figures: Andrew Sylvester
Cataloging-in-Publication Data
IMF support and crisis prevention/Atish Ghosh . . . [et al.]—Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2008.
p. cm.—(Occasional paper; 262)
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Includes bibliographical references.
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ISBN 978-1-58906-709-7
1. International Monetary Fund. 2. Financial crises—Developing countries— Prevention. 3. Economic assistance—Developing countries. I. Ghosh, Atish R. II. International Monetary Fund. III. Occasional paper (International Monetary Fund); 262.
HB3722.I447 2008
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Contents
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Preface
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I Overview
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II Anatomy of Capital Account Crises: Balance Sheet Vulnerabilities and Crisis Triggers
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Balance Sheet Vulnerabilities
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Conclusions
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III Toward Crisis Prevention: Precautionary Arrangements
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Characteristics of Precautionary Programs
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Program Choice
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Market Response
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Conclusions
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IV Programs for Preventing Capital Account Crises
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Theoretical Considerations
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Empirical Analysis
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Conclusions
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References
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Box
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3.1. Are Precautionary Programs “Weaker” Than Drawing Programs?
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Figures
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2.1. Selected Macroeconomic Indicators
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3.1. Nonprecautionary and Precautionary Arrangements: Macroeconomic Developments
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3.2. Nonprecautionary and Precautionary Arrangements: External Sector Developments
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4.1. Selected Economic Indicators: Medians for Capital Account Crisis and Control Group Countries
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4.2. Selected External and Policy Indicators: Medians for Capital Account Crisis and Control Group Countries
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4.3. Probability of a Crisis With and Without IMF Financing
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4.4. Marginal Impact of IMF Financing, Given Country Fundamentals
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Tables
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2.1. Taxonomy of Vulnerability and Triggers in Recent Capital Account Crises
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2.2. Average Corporate Debt-to-Equity Ratios in Selected Countries
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3.1. Characteristics of General Resources Account Arrangements, 1992–2005
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3.2. Initial Conditions
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3.3. Program Choice Model Estimates
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3.4. Determinants of Sovereign Bond Spread
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4.1. Classification of Capital Account Crisis and Control Group Episodes
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4.2. Number of Observations in Each Group
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4.3. Logit Estimation Results
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4.4. IMF Financing Relative to IMF Quota Among Capital Account Crisis Countries
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The following conventions are used in this publication:
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In tables, a blank cell indicates “not applicable,” ellipsis points (. . .) indicate “not available,” and 0 or 0.0 indicates “zero” or “negligible.” Minor discrepancies between sums of constituent figures and totals are due to rounding.
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An en dash (–) between years or months (for example, 2005–06 or January–June) indicates the years or months covered, including the beginning and ending years or months; a slash or virgule (/) between years or months (for example, 2005/06) indicates a fiscal or financial year, as does the abbreviation FY (for example, FY2006).
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“Billion” means a thousand million; “trillion” means a thousand billion.
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“Basis points” refer to hundredths of 1 percentage point (for example, 25 basis points are equivalent to ¼ of 1 percentage point).
As used in this publication, the term “country” does not in all cases refer to a territorial entity that is a state as understood by international law and practice. As used here, the term also covers some territorial entities that are not states but for which statistical data are maintained on a separate and independent basis.
Preface
Emerging market economies that experience financial crises are subject to enormous economic and social costs, highlighting the importance of crisis prevention. While the main defense against a crisis lies in the country’s own policies and institutional framework, the IMF can contribute to these efforts through its surveillance activities, provision of technical assistance, and promotion of standards and codes. In addition, the IMF may be able to support crisis prevention more directly by providing financing, either disbursed or made available contingently. This IMF publication examines the various roles of IMF financing in crisis prevention.
IMF Support and Crisis Prevention was prepared by a staff team from the Policy Development and Review Department led by Atish Ghosh and comprising Bikas Joshi, Jun Il Kim, Uma Ramakrishnan, Alun Thomas, and Juan Zalduendo, assisted by Barbara Dabrowska, Siba Das, Olivia Carolin, and Neri Gomes, and under the overall supervision of Mark Allen and G. Russell Kincaid. Esha Ray of the External Relations Department edited the manuscript and coordinated the production of the publication.
Earlier drafts of the underlying papers were discussed by the IMF’s Executive Board. The opinions expressed in the paper, however, are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of national authorities, the IMF, or IMF Executive Directors.