Back Matter
Executive Board Meeting

July 21, 2004
Author:
Mr. David John Goldsbrough
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,
Mrs. Isabelle Mateos y Lago
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Mr. Martin D Kaufman
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,
Mr. Daouda Sembene
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Mr. Tsidi M Tsikata
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,
Mr. Steve K Mugerwa
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Mr. Alex Segura-Ubiergo
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, and
Mr. Jeff Chelsky
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Language:
English
Keywords:
IEOR; IEO; PRSP; policy; PRGF; country; PRS; Board discussion; PRGF-supported program; PRS approach; outturn data; PRSP approach; Poverty reduction strategy; Poverty reduction; Poverty reduction and development; Africa; Global; Sub-Saharan Africa; Middle East; Middle East and Central Asia

Abstract

As part of the OED and IEO evaluations of the PRSP process and the PRGF, a survey of PRSP stakeholders was administered in each of the ten countries where a case study was undertaken. The objective of the survey was to obtain perceptions of the PRSP process and the role of the World Bank and IMF in supporting the initiative.

Annex 1 Survey of PRSP Stakeholders

Global Results

As part of the OED and IEO evaluations of the PRSP process and the PRGF, a survey of PRSP stakeholders was administered in each of the ten countries where a case study was undertaken. The objective of the survey was to obtain perceptions of the PRSP process and the role of the World Bank and IMF in supporting the initiative.

A standard survey of 39 questions was administered in each country. The full questionnaire can be found on both of the evaluation websites: www.worldbank.org/oed/prsp and http://www.imf.org/external/np/ieo/2002/prsp/index.htm. The sur-vey consists of four main components: information on respondents; the PRSP process (covering owner-ship, results orientation, comprehensiveness, partnership orientation, and long-term perspective); World Bank performance; and the role of the IMF. In most cases, respondents were asked to indicate the extent of their agreement with statements on a five-point scale.1 The survey was translated, into local languages, where necessary, and pre-tested. A local consultant with survey experience was en-gaged in each country to assist with administration of the survey. Survey results were coded by the local consultant and sent back to Washington, and an outside contractor, Fusion Analytics, was hired to analyze the data.

The survey was targeted at key groups within the three main categories of PRSP stakeholders: govern-ment, civil society, and international partners.2 Within each group, the survey sought to obtain an institutional view and was targeted at the most knowl-edgeable individuals. Respondents were asked to de-fine the nature of their involvement in the PRSP process, and their level of familiarity with the PRSP document, the Bank, and the IMF. Given the targeted nature of the survey, respondents who were “Not Aware” of the PRSP process were excluded from the results. The specific samples were selected using three main inputs: information gained through the country case study mission; participants listed in the PRSP document; and input from the local consul-tant. In some cases, samples were circulated to ob-tain broader input on their composition. The study teams also identified a set of highly relevant respon-dents in each country for whom a survey response was required. These included core ministries and agencies (such as finance, economy, and central bank), key PRSP-related ministries (such as health, education, agriculture), and major donors. Survey questionnaires were tracked in order to ensure responses were obtained from key groups; however, individual respondents could choose to remain anonymous.

The following section presents aggregate findings from the survey applied in all ten countries. Section A provides an overview of the survey respondents, including the nature of involvement and familiarity with the process. Section B provides an aggregated snapshot of stakeholder perceptions of the PRSP process across each of five main subcategories. Section C provides the mean results for all questions concerning the role and effectiveness of Bank and Fund support. Section D presents results for questions with the most positive and negative responses and questions where there was the greatest consensus or disagreement on issues.

A. Respondent Characteristics

B. The PRSP Process1

C. World Bank and IMF1

D. Composite Results Table

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Note: The percentages of those who “Agree,” are “Neutral,” or “Disagree” relate to the total that responded to each question. The percentage of “Don’t Know or Unsure” is calculated on the basis of the total respondents in the survey (779). “Most Positive” were chosen on the basis of the highest percentage who agreed or completely agreed, picking the top five means—but with the number of respondents in each case determining the ranking. Likewise, “Most Negative” were selected on the basis of the highest percentages who disagreed or completely disagreed and the five lowest means. The “Most Polarized” responses and those indicating “Greatest Consensus” were those with the five highest and lowest standard deviations, respectively. “Most Unfamiliar” were the highest percentage of responses in-dicating that they “Didn’t Know or Were Unsure.”
1

The five-point scales used in most questions offered a range from 1: “Completely Disagree” to 5: “Completely Agree.” Re-spondents could also mark 0 for “Don’t Know or Unsure.”

2

Fourteen stakeholder groups were identified: government—central government, line ministries, and sector agencies, local government, parliament; civil society—local NGOs, business sector, labor unions, academia, media, religious organization, political party; and other international partners—donor, I-NGO. Results at the stakeholder group level will be presented in the ag-gregate analysis across all countries.

1

Based on a five-point scale, where 1: “Completely Disagree” to 5: “Completely Agree.” Respondents could also mark 0 for “Don’t Know or Unsure.”

Annex 2 Results from Survey of IMF Staff1

Methodology

The survey was undertaken during December 2003 and January 2004. It targeted mission chiefs and resi-dent representatives for PRGF-eligible countries. A total of 75 IMF staff responded, about 40 percent of the targeted universe. The questions focused on the formulation of the PRGF-supported program, the role of the Fund in the implementation of the PRSP/PRGF initiatives, JSAs and Bank-Fund collaboration, and internal IMF procedures and incentives.

Main messages

  • While there was broad consensus among staff on the impact of the PRSP/PRGF initiatives on the Fund’s way of doing business, that is, that it meant a better orientation toward poverty reduction (Figure A2.1), positions were generally more divergent with regard to issues of attribu-tion—notably the causes of the policy gaps and slow implementation of the various facets of the new approach.

  • The staff’s overall assessment of the various aspects of the PRSP/PRGF process is positive. However, on a number of issues considered integral to the process, such as a participatory approach or PSIA, IMF staff indicated a lack of clarity as to the level and extent of IMF involvement.

  • Staff perceived that the PRSP/PRGF process had, as a whole, improved the manner in which they conduct Fund business, both within the IMF itself—poverty issues are now highlighted to a greater degree in the process of program de-sign—and in their collaboration with the World Bank and interaction with the broader donor community during program implementation. Notably, the factors driving these processes were seen by staff to be broader than the mere streamlining of conditionality.

  • Respondents indicated that further progress is impeded by the slow change in IMF institutional culture. Missions are still constrained in terms of size and time, and the new approach has not led to more policy space for country-driven op-tions. Generally, respondents did not support the view that the PRSP/PRGF process had led to a significant change in the way initial policy posi-tions are discussed and established within the IMF.

  • JSAs were found by IMF staff to be useful in providing feedback to the authorities and as an independent expert assessment of the PRSP to third parties, notably civil society and donors. Moreover, the majority of staff considered them to be candid.

Figure A2.1.
Figure A2.1.

IMF Staff Responses on the Impact of the Key Features of PRGF-Supported Programs on Their Conduct of Fund Business1

(1=No impact; 5=Highly significant impact)

Source: IMF staff survey database for this evaluation.1 Y-axis represents number of responses.
1

Most questions featured a five-point scale, where 1 was the lowest degree and 5 the highest. A “Don’t Know/Not Applicable” cate-gory was also available for cases where the respondent’s own expe-rience did not allow for a response. This annex summarizes the results. A more detailed presentation will be put on the IEO website as a background document when the main report is published.

Annex 3 PRSP Sourcebook: Does It Provide Adequate Space for Policy Flexibility, and Is It Based on Strong Empirical Evidence?

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The policy prescriptions described here are a summary of those contained in Chapter 12 (“Macroeconomic Issues”) of the PRSP Sourcebook. The policy recommen-dation assessed is the more complete description contained in the Sourcebook and not just the summary given here. Section references are to the Sourcebook chapter.

The purpose is not to provide a judgment on the merits of the policy advice per se, but to assess whether it can be interpreted as signaling a reasonable degree of policy flexibility to guide a homegrown policy debate.

In some cases, no entry is made on the “supporting evidence” because the policy prescription in the preceding column is very general and essentially calls for a case-by-case assessment.

Annex 4 Assessment of the Adaptation of the IMF’s Internal Policy Process

Table A4.1.

An Assessment of the Adaptation of the IMF’s Internal Policy Process Between the ESAF and the PRGF Based on Briefing Papers for a Sample of 23 PRGF-Eligible Countries Between 1999 and 2003

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The ranking scheme is based on the degree of consistency with the PRSP/PRGF approach: 1 = Highly inconsistent; 2 = Inconsistent; 3 = Consistent; 4 = Highly con-sistent (see Table A4.2 for the criteria used in the ranking).

Including governance (financial transparency and anticorruption), trade liberalization, and debt sustainability.

Including privatization and SOE reform, public sector reform, private sector development, capacity building, agricultural sector and land reform, forestry sector policy, industrial sector reform, and other reforms.

Table A4.2.

Coding Scheme for the Cross-Country Task on Briefing Papers and Department Reviews1

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The grading scheme had the following scale: 1 = Highly inconsistent; 2 = Inconsistent; 3 = Consistent; 4 = Highly consistent.

Coverage of review department comments will be mainly on the basis of PDR, but comments from other departments (such as PDR, FAD, MFD, and RES) where substantive program design issues are raised are also noted.

“Not applicable” could be used here to indicate that conditionality was not discussed at all.

Annex 5 Modalities of Participatory Processes: How Broad-Based Has Participation Been?

Many of the countries concerned had no tradition of participatory policy formulation (e.g., Albania, Cambodia, and Tajikistan). Others did have a partici-patory tradition or experience, but a separate partici-patory process was launched nonetheless, in order to comply with HIPC/BWI conditionality (e.g., Mozam-bique and Vietnam).

The participatory process was generally orga-nized by the authorities according to modalities of their own choosing. However, in practice, donors—including the World Bank, but not the IMF (which rarely intervened in discussions on modalities of the participatory process) frequently had a strong influ-ence on the process, primarily because they funded it, but sometimes also because the authorities them-selves did not show much interest, at least initially (e.g., Nicaragua and Vietnam), and/or did not know how to proceed, especially in the absence of orga-nized representation of civil society (e.g., Albania, Tajikistan, and Vietnam).

Who Participated?

In all the country case studies, good efforts were made to involve government stakeholders beyond the department coordinating the process, as well as the donor community. The involvement of civil soci-ety was generally more patchy. It is to be expected that country choices vary with respect to the involve-ment of specific interest groups (such as religious organizations and indigenous groups) according to their relevance in each country. However, the follow-ing crosscutting issues surfaced from both our case studies and broader evidence from outside sources:

  1. Parliaments were generally not significantly involved.1

  2. Criteria for selecting civil society representa-tives lacked transparency and/or a clear ratio-nale, giving rise to criticism of poor represen-tativity and pro-government political bias of the stakeholders chosen (especially in Guinea and Mauritania).

  3. The involvement of the business sector was often unsatisfactory, either because they were not called in to participate in the participatory process (in Tajikistan) or because they felt that the modalities of their involvement did not allow them any substantive role (in Albania, Mauritania, and Nicaragua), leading to their withdrawal. In some cases, however (Guinea and Ethiopia), private sector representatives were relatively satisfied with both their involve-ment and their contribution to the process.

  4. Involvement of stakeholders at the decentralized level was sometimes neglected (e.g., in Mauritania).

  5. Also left out of the process in most cases were the poor themselves. As a result, some com-mentators have characterized participatory processes as opening up policy space only to the benefit of a technocratic elite expert in development issues, but little qualified to speak for the poor.2

These limits are echoed by the results of the sur-vey of PRSP stakeholders, with government stake-holders and donors broadly agreeing that their re-spective interest groups were adequately consulted, and civil society in mild disagreement with that view.

How Was Participation Organized?

In most cases, several modalities of consultation were used in combination. The most commonly used format was large attendance workshops and conferences held at the national and, in most cases, also at the regional level, with large variations in stake-holder coverage and number of workshops orga-nized. In several countries, a lot of background work for the PRSP—and some of the material subject to broader consultation—was prepared in working groups involving at least two of the three main stake-holder groups (i.e., government, civil society, and donors). While in Guinea and Mauritania these groups were ad hoc and ceased to meet after the for-mulation of the PRSP, a permanent structure has been put in place in Tanzania, building on the preex-isting PER working groups. In Nicaragua, such a group was recently constituted on an ad hoc basis, to explore tax reform issues.

Table A5.1.

Summary Evaluation of the Types of Participation in Macroeconomic and Related Areas1

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This table summarizes the IEO assessment of the extent to which different types of participation were implemented in each of the case studies. It draws upon the detailed discussion of the participatory process described in the individual country reports, but uses the categories of possible intensities of participation discussed in McGee and Norton (2000). In each case, the assessment is of the extent of participation in macroeconomic and related areas (including the composition of budgetary expenditures). Assessments of the intensity of participation would probably be higher in some social sector policy areas (e.g., health and education).

McGee and Norton (2000) propose a more detailed disaggregation of the stages of the “design” cycle into “Diagnosis,” “Formulation,” and “Approval.” However, the intensity of the participatory process does not seem to have varied widely between such potential subcategories, so we have used a simpler classification.

Includes monitoring and evaluation.

In the case of Mozambique and Nicaragua, information about the fiscal consequences of banking crises—which had important implications for macroeconomic policy design and key trade-offs—were not shared with a broader group of stakeholders.

Consultation on fiscal/monetary policy was limited in Vietnam, but this seems to have partly reflected a mutual agreement that the more pressing issues were elsewhere. Debate on key issues such as pace of state en-terprise reform was significant, but took place within the traditional framework of the party.

We have drawn upon the descriptions in the four country case studies undertaken by the OED alone to make an assessment of the degree of participation in the macroeconomic policy area. However, the summary judgments provided here are the responsibility of the IEO alone. In some instances, there is not enough information in the case study to make such a judgment and these have been indicated as “n.a.”

In Ethiopia, the private sector influenced PRSP implementation via business organizations but there was no institutionalized dialogue mechanism for civil society.

Several countries made attempts to hold direct consultations with NGOs and grassroots organizations, but these efforts were often impaired by the lack of organization of the sector. However, where civil society already had a form of institutional rep-resentation (e.g., miscellaneous government spon-sored NGO umbrella groups in Guinea, CONPES in Nicaragua, and mass organizations in Vietnam) consultation of these institutions formed a core part of the participatory process. In others, such CSO umbrella organizations were established for the oc-casion of the PRSP, either by the government (e.g., in Albania) or independently of it, with donor sup-port (e.g., in Ethiopia, Nicaragua, and Tajikistan). In many of these cases, these (or other) civil society groups managed to prepare substantive inputs into the PRSP. Such inputs, while rarely called for, were welcomed in most cases (though not always taken into consideration). However, in Nicaragua, it was dissatisfaction with the official participatory process that led certain groups (in particular an NGO umbrella group and a group of municipali-ties) to develop their own alternative version of the PRSP.
1

In Ethiopia and Nicaragua, the authorities view parliamentari-ans as key stakeholders, but in the latter case opposition parties refused to engage for political reasons. In Guinea, Tanzania, and Vietnam, parliaments were given an opportunity to review the final document. This finding is consistent with those of external literature (see, for instance, Stewart and Wang, 2003).

2

See, for instance, Bretton Woods Project (2003).

Annex 6 Qualitative Appraisal of Joint



Staff Assessments

The IEO undertook a desk review of the 28 JSAs sents the criteria used in assigning quality ratings to of full PRSPs issued through May 2003, involving a selected aspects of JSAs, as well as the average and systematic analysis of their contents in areas of in-median ratings obtained by JSAs in our sample for terest to the evaluation team. The table below pre-each of these aspects.

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Annex 7 Determinants of Targeted and Actual Fiscal Adjustment

This annex presents details of regression analyses that underlay some of the results discussed in Chapter 4. The regressions were based on data from 88 new arrangements approved by the IMF under either the ESAF or the PRGF during 1995–2003; 47 of the arrangements were approved as ESAFs and the rest as PRGFs.

Methodology

In order to examine the relative importance of various factors in the setting of targets for fiscal ad-justment in ESAF- and PRGF-supported programs, we estimated a regression model of the size of the targeted change in the government balance exclud-ing grants, over the first and first two years of the program—that is, changes between T–1 and T, and between T–1 and T+1, respectively. We used the fol-lowing as regressors: (i) the initial level of the gov-ernment balance [gbal (T–1)]; (ii) the targeted change in the external current account balance [Δcab]; (iii) the initial level of grants in the govern-ment budget [grants (T–1)]; (iv) the projected change in the level of grants [Δgrants]; and (v) pro-jected growth [growth].1

We postulated a two-way relationship between targeted fiscal adjustment and targeted external current account adjustment, and employed two-stage least squares (with robust standard errors) to account for the endogeneity of the targeted change in the external current account.

We replicated the regressions using outturn data in place of targeted/projected data in order to com-pare the determinants of targeted and actual fiscal adjustment.

Results

We obtained broadly similar results for targeted fiscal adjustment under ESAFs and PRGFs over a two-year horizon: the targeted magnitude of fiscal adjustment was inversely related to the initial level of the fiscal balance and to the projected change in the level of grants (top half of Table A7.1). Specifi-cally, over the two-year horizon, the targeted fiscal adjustment reflected a near-halving of the initial fis-cal deficit and a full adjustment to projected change in the availability of grants.

Table A7.1.

Determinants of Targeted and Actual Fiscal Adjustment in ESAFs and PRGFs

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Note: The asterisks denote levels of statistical significance: * = 10 percent, ** = 5 percent, and *** = 1 percent

The estimations using outturn data indicated sig-nificant influence of the initial fiscal balance and change in the level of grants as determinants of ac-tual fiscal adjustment, but only for the initial program year of ESAFs (bottom half of Table A7.1). The limited number of observations for outturns under the PRGF suggest caution in interpreting the results for the PRGF, but the influence of the initial level of fiscal balance is no longer significant.
1

All variables were measured as ratios to GDP, except growth, which was measured in percent a year.

Annex 8 Composition of Targeted Changes in Expenditures and External Financing in IMF-Supported Programs

The Composition of Programmed Fiscal Adjustment

As discussed in Chapter 4, PRGF-supported programs target, on average, greater increases in revenues and smaller expenditure cuts than their ESAF counterparts. These results are reinforced by looking at the distribution of targeted changes in expenditures in ESAF- and PRGF-supported programs. Figure A8.1 shows that whereas most ESAF arrangements project expenditure reductions (Panel A), a majority of PRGF-supported programs accommodate higher expenditures (Panel B).

Figure A8.1.
Figure A8.1.

Distribution of Programs According to the Targeted Change in Expenditures

Another way of studying the evolution of pro-jected revenues and expenditures in PRGF-sup-ported programs is to regress the programmed change in expenditures (or revenues) on a number of variables that might be expected to affect these tar-gets (i.e., previous expenditure/revenue levels, GDP growth, targeted fiscal adjustment, etc.) and include a dummy variable to measure the impact of PRGF-supported programs. The dummy variable should capture changes in programmed expenditures (or revenues) due to the introduction of the PRGF, con-trolling for other factors that might be expected to influence the setting of expenditure (or revenue) tar-gets. The results of this exercise suggest that, holding all else constant, PRGF-supported programs target total expenditure levels about 1.6 percent of GDP higher than their ESAF counterparts. Simi-larly, controlling for all else, PRGF-supported programs target a similar increase in revenues.

The Availability of External Financing

Figure A8.2 shows that there is a great degree of variability in the projected amounts of net external public sector financing in both ESAF- and PRGF-supported programs. However, the center of the dis-tribution shifts substantially to the right in the case of PRGF-supported programs. On average, while PRGF-supported programs project increases in the availability of external budget financing in the first two program years, they project a strong decline in the third year.

Figure A8.2.
Figure A8.2.

Distribution of Projected Changes in the Availability of Grants and Concessional Loans in ESAF- and PRGF-Supported Programs

Annex 9 Changes in Domestic Policy Processes and Institutions: Evidence from Case Studies

Table A9.1.

What Happened to Domestic Policy Formation Under the PRSP Approach? Some Examples from the Case Studies

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Table A9.2.

Institutional Changes: Evidence from Case Studies

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Statement by the Managing Director

IMF Staff Response

IEO Comments on Management

Staff Responses

Summing Up by the Acting Chair

Statement by the Managing Director on the Independent Evaluation Office Report on the Evaluation of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility

Executive Board Meeting

July 21, 2004

The Independent Evaluation Office is to be com-mended for its wide-ranging and informative report on the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) approach and the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facil-ity (PRGF). The report has generated considerable debate within the Fund and provides useful material for our continuing assessment of effective modes of engagement with low-income countries through the PRSP approach and the PRGF.

Relatedly, earlier this year, Ms. Krueger formed an interdepartmental Committee on Low-Income Country Work (CLICW) to strengthen the Fund’s work on low-income countries. This committee, chaired by her and consisting of Deputy Managing Directors and Department Directors (AFR, FAD, MCD, PDR, RES, WHD), will coordinate further work by staff on these issues, with the aim of prepar-ing concrete proposals for Board consideration at a later date.

I have asked staff to prepare a statement present-ing our views on the IEO report’s recommendations and indicating how we envisage taking up these rec-ommendations subject to the conclusions of the Board discussion. While the staff statement outlines some broad options for modifying the PRSP approach and PRGF, the forthcoming annual Bank-Fund PRSP Progress in Implementation Report will give specifics of these options. Following these Board discussions, staff will come back to the Board with cost estimates of any new initiatives, possible avenues for savings on other Fund outputs, and the appropriate pace of phasing in of any new initiatives.

I look forward to the Board discussion, which will provide an opportunity to explore the options for adapting the Fund’s policies and procedures with respect to the PRSP approach and PRGF, bearing in mind resource costs.

Staff Response to the Independent Evaluation Office Report on the Evaluation of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility

Executive Board Meeting

July 21, 2004

I. Introduction

1. The Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) report offers a trenchant analysis of the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) approach. The report con-cludes that the PRS approach has had some success in improving country ownership, enhancing partici-pation, and providing better quality strategies. Nonetheless, its achievements so far fall short of its potential to deliver credible, effective, and country-owned strategies for growth and poverty reduction. Staff broadly support the IEO’s recommendations, some of which were identified in previous assess-ments by the staff. However, staff differ with the IEO on how best to manage the tensions inherent in the PRSP approach.

2. The IEO report represents a welcome opportunity to reflect on the accomplishments and challenges of the PRSP/PRGF approach. It has generated substantial discussion within the Fund staff about the PRSP as a framework for Fund interaction with low-income countries. In view of the impor-tance and complexity of the questions raised by the IEO, further reflection on these issues will be neces-sary. Given the joint nature of the PRS approach, the Bank and the Fund will need to cooperate closely in moving the initiative forward. The Bank’s Opera-tions Evaluation Department (OED) has completed a parallel review of the PRSP process and the Bank’s role. The OED report, and the response of Bank management, will be discussed by the Committee on Development Effectiveness on July 19, 2004. The next opportunity for the Board to consider related issues will be in September 2004 in the context of its upcoming discussion of the annual Bank-Fund PRSP Progress in Implementation Report.

3. One overarching implication of the analysis and various recommendations put forward in the IEO report is that staff resources allocated to low-income work are insufficient for the strategic approach endorsed by the Board. Staff agree that theability of the Fund to play a more effective role in low-income countries depends on its staff being able to contribute constructively to the analytical discussion and policy debate in the PRSP process. Any resultant increased demands on staff time will then need to be balanced by more overall resources or a reduction in other activities. Alternatively, the Fund’s role could be adapted to the resource con-straint. At this stage, the IEO’s recommendations are too diffuse to provide estimates of their resource implications, although their resource costs are likely to be sizable based on preliminary reactions of the area departments.

4. The next section summarizes the IEO assess-ment of the PRSP/PRGF approach. Section III gives staff views on the IEO evaluation and recommenda-tions, and Section IV outlines elements of a strategy for moving forward. Section V presents some initial reflections on resource implications of the IEO recommendations.

II. A Summary of the IEO Evaluation of the PRSP/PRGF Approach

5. The IEO report comes out strongly in favor of maintaining the PRS approach, and observes important achievements . . .

  • Ownership of the PRS has improved over previous approaches.

  • Participation in the formulation of PRSPs has been more broadly based than in the past.

  • Compared to previous development strategies, PRSPs provide more comprehensive and inte-grated poverty reduction strategies, with a longer-term perspective. They thus provide a better framework for coordination with donors and civil society.

. . . but also shortcomings.

  • The perception remains widespread that the new approach is externally driven and dominated by document preparation, especially related to the HIPC Initiative.

  • Institutions for policy formulation have not in general been strengthened. Stakeholder and country participation in the formulation of the macroeconomic framework has been narrow.

  • The quality of PRSPs remains weak in many areas. For example, most PRSPs lack a strategic vision, especially in the area of macroeconomic and related structural policies. Many PRSPs avoid confronting strategic choices, such as crit-ical structural reforms and prioritization of spending programs aimed at poverty reduction.

  • The PRS approach has not in general delivered on its promise of improving donor coordination.

  • The Fund’s contribution to the PRSP process has varied considerably across countries, falling short of the goals set in the original policy documents.

  • The role of the Joint Staff Assessment (JSA) is not sufficiently clear. Consequently, JSAs have not always provided effective feedback to the authorities on weaknesses in the PRS; they have had little impact on the broader policy debate, and JSAs do not provide a satisfactory basis for making judgments on lending decisions.

6. The IEO also provides a useful perspective on the PRGF. It finds that program design has improved in many ways . . .

  • fiscal targets are more flexible;

  • projections do not suffer from a systematic “aid pessimism” bias;

  • pro-poor expenditures have increased;

  • there is no evidence of an excessive disinflationary bias.

. . . but concludes that too little has changed.

  • program design has continued to lack an understanding of micro-macro linkages;

  • too few PSIAs have been conducted, and the in-tegration of the results into program design has been too slow;

  • alignment of the PRGF with PRSPs thus far has been limited.

7. The IEO report is more suggestive than pre-scriptive in laying out the operational implications of its recommendations. Nonetheless, a central thrust of the IEO’s recommendations is to clarify and, in staff’s view, to strengthen the links between the Bret-ton Woods institutions’ (BWIs) lending decisions and the PRS framework, while at the same time deepening the reach of the PRS framework into domestic policymaking processes. In particular:

  • Countries should define their own benchmarks for improving their policymaking process. The BWIs should then evaluate progress, and suit-ability for continued lending, based on these benchmarks.

  • The Fund should be more involved in the PRS process, including in the public debate, but with a scope limited to its areas of comparative advantage.

  • The IMF could restructure its conditionality to fit within a broader “partnership” approach to monitoring and assessing progress in implementing the PRS.

III. Views on the IEO Evaluation and Recommendations

8. The IEO’s diagnosis of problems with the implementation of the PRSP approach overlaps substantially with that of previous Board and staff assessments.1 The PRSP is an instrument charged with multiple objectives, which result in tensions—for example, long-term ambition versus immediate bud-get constraints; comprehensiveness in addressing the different dimensions of poverty versus focus and pri-oritization; and meeting the expectations or require-ments of the international community versus country ownership.

9. The Fund shares the broad objectives underlying the IEO’s recommendations, including:

  • Higher quality outputs of the PRS process, par-ticularly in terms of priorities, costing, and policy analysis, and a more constructive Fund role in its areas of competency;

  • Strengthened country ownership and greater inte-gration of the PRS process with domestic politi-cal and policy processes, particularly the budget;

  • Reduced “mismatch of expectations” of various stakeholders (governments, civil society, IFIs, donors) of the PRS approach;

  • Better alignment of the PRGF with the PRSP, and more clarity on what happens if the PRSP is too weak or unrealistically ambitious to serve as a framework for a PRGF;

  • Better fit of the focus and mix of policies in PRGF-supported programs to country circum-stances, based on a deeper understanding of micro-macro linkages.

10. An important consideration for any evaluation of the PRS approach relates to how quickly results from this new approach can be reasonably expected to emerge. The PRS approach attempts to improve the entire framework for, and direction of, policy formulation in low-income countries. This approach is only five years old. Any assessment, and recommendations, should recognize the variety of country experiences, including important successes, the evolving nature of the initiative, the multiplicity of objectives, and the novelty of the approach in a long-established multipartite international setting. The implication is that substantial scope exists for better implementation of the current approach, with appropriate mid-course corrections.

11. In light of the similarity of diagnosis and objectives, Fund staff supports many of the IEO’s sug-gestions. However, in some cases, the objectives are shared, but the staff questions the feasibility of some IEO recommendations. After a discussion of the common ground, the implications of key differences in perspectives are explored. The Appendix provides specific staff reactions to each IEO recommendations. Section IV presents our approach designed to achieve key objectives.

A. Areas of Broad Agreement

12. With respect to the design and implementation of the PRS approach, staff agree that countries should themselves decide how policy formulation, implementation, and monitoring processes will be conducted and built up over time. Countries should also determine the choice of output of the PRS process, in terms of documents and their periodicity, relying as much as possible on domestic institutional arrangements and reporting vehicles (IEO Recom-mendation 1). The key issue is how donors should react in cases where they believe that the country could aim higher, or commitment is insufficient. More candid and graduated assessments by Bank and Fund staff and donors are key for appropriately balancing the need for ownership against the expec-tations of the international community.

13. With respect to the Fund’s role, the staff has been attempting to clarify further the intensity and scope of the IMF’s role in the PRS approach, along the lines of the IEO suggestions and earlier Board guidance. In particular, staff recognizes the need to give more emphasis to Fund staff involvement in the domestic policy debate over macroeconomic policy and to open the rationale for IMF policy recommendations to broader scrutiny (Recommendation 4). The staff is also trying to explore in a more system-atic way the linkages between macroeconomic poli-cies and poverty reduction.

14. One area where progress has been made is in poverty and social impact analysis (PSIA) of proposed policy changes. The Fund’s FY2004/05 bud-get includes dedicated additional budgetary re-sources to broaden and deepen the use of PSIA and to eventually mainstream PSIAs into the design of PRGF-supported programs. Nonetheless, care should be taken to avoid building unrealistic expec-tations as to what the Fund can deliver in PSIA in the near future, in part because of resource limitations discussed below.

15. Staff agree that the Fund should focus on areas in which it has a comparative advantage, that the Fund can play an important but only supporting role in developing alternative aid and policy scenarios, and with the recommendation to avoid undue “on-off” signals from the Fund for donor financing (Recommendations 5 and 6). Strengthening the Fund’s accountability for its own commitments in the context of the PRS process is also an attractive goal, particularly in ensuring the Fund’s contribu-tions are consistent with needs identified in country PRSPs.

B. Differences with IEO Recommendations

16. The most important difference is over managing the tensions between country ownership of the policies and programs in the PRSPs and the need of donors and IFIs for minimum standards. In particu-lar, the donor community wants to use the PRSP as the basis for selectivity of resource allocation.

17. The IEO recommends that countries set explicit criteria for judging progress towards key intermediate objectives related to the domestic policy formulation, implementation, and monitoring process, and that BWI staff provide candid assessments of those benchmarks (Recommendations 1 and 2). Donor decisions on the volume of resources pro-vided would then be linked to the progress countries are making under the approach. The IEO contends that the PRSP approach already involves requiring the countries to adopt various changes in their policy processes in return for financing and debt relief, in particular from the Fund and the World Bank. It also suggests that the Fund’s criteria for making such de-cisions are unclear, and in particular are obscured by the focus on documentation requirements. In the concluding section on the role of the Fund, the IEO proposes that the IMF could restructure its condi-tionality to fit within a broader “partnership” approach to monitoring and assessing progress in implementing the PRS. The precise operational modalities are not discussed.

18. Staff agrees that the quality of the PRS approach should be a critical factor in donors’ re-source allocation decisions, in order to enhance aid effectiveness. Such selectivity will appropriately en-courage stronger PRSPs. In our view, however, the IEO recommendations imply excessive Fund involvement in assessing the country’s decision-making processes. The IEO suggests that the BWIs could assess achievement of country-defined process benchmarks. Combined with the suggested tighter link to financing, this could be seen as a kind of process conditionality, which could undermine the legitimacy of these domestic institutions and de-cision-making processes. The IEO report itself un-derscores the costs associated with the perception that the PRSP process is BWI-driven. Moreover, good policymaking processes are no guarantee of good policies.

19. In staff’s view, the BWIs should continue to emphasize the country ownership of the PRS process. It will take time and effort for domestically anchored processes to result in high-quality, priori-tized PRSPs, and the BWIs can and should con-tribute to this institution building. The Fund will continue to work with the World Bank to develop and promote best practices for improving domestic policy processes, but the Fund should stop short of measuring countries against specific benchmarks in this area. Instead, the Fund’s role should focus on as-sessing the quality of macroeconomic frameworks, and in providing advice and support for the development of sound frameworks.

IV. Options for Moving Forward

20. A promising strategy for creating a higher-quality and more fully country-owned PRS approach would be to make the Fund’s contribution more substantive and less procedural. Currently, as the IEO notes, too much emphasis is placed on Fund assessment of PRS documents such as PRSPs and annual performance reports on PRSP implementation (APRs). In our view the direction forward is to lighten reporting requirements, while increasing the scope for the Fund to make substantive contributions. The em-phasis should be on providing more effective advice on the formulation of the macroeconomic strategies underpinning PRSPs, particularly with respect to their budget implications, and on providing frank opinions on such strategies as the PRS process unfolds.

21. The links from the PRS to Fund financing, signaling to donors, and HIPC debt relief could be made more flexible, in order to provide more policy space and development of domestic policy processes. The incentives for the country to produce a good PRSP must come from its benefits in terms of better policy formulation and from donors, including the Fund and the World Bank, respecting the views out-lined in a well-prioritized, domestically-driven PRSP and (in the case of development assistance) al-locating more resources to countries that have high-quality PRSPs.2 This could increase ownership and encourage integration of the PRSP with the budget and other domestic processes while still providing fi-nancial incentives.

A. Improving the PRS Approach

22. As noted above, staff agrees with the IEO that the staffs’ assessments of the countries’ PRSPs need to be more candid and more graduated. The current operational requirement is that the JSA conclude by finding either that the PRSP does or does not provide a credible basis for BWI lending. This can hamstring the potential candor of the assessment and puts all PRSPs into one of two categories (and in practice only one). PRSPs are seen by staff as becoming longer, more detailed, and more resource intensive, while providing little of apparent value to staff, the authorities, or donors.

23. A reformulation of the instrument used by BWIs to assess PRSPs is needed. As noted before, staffs intend to come back to the Board with more specific recommendations in the context of the PRSP annual implementation report, but early Board guidance would be appreciated. Bank and Fund staffs are currently considering three elements of such a reformulation.

  • What is the purpose of the assessment: to shape Fund lending decisions; to provide candid feed-back; and/or to help coordinate with the Bank (and donors)?

  • Who is making the assessment? If the assess-ment is meant to provide a basis for the BWI lending decisions, then presumably Board en-dorsement would be necessary. If it is meant to give candid feedback to the country or to donors, then would it be more appropriately treated in a similar manner to assessment letters and sent to the Board for information? If coordi-nation of donors is an important objective, are there continued benefits to a joint assessment? Could other donors be involved in the assess-ment? What is the role of the low-income coun-try itself?

  • What is being assessed? Should the assessment evaluate the process by which the document was formulated, the policies in the document, the au-thorities commitment to it, and/or the donors’ commitment to financing the strategy?

24. Besides modifying the JSA, the Fund could participate more fully in the PRSP process through providing policy advice and, where appropriate, par-ticipation in the public discussion leading to the for-mulation of PRSPs, particularly encouraging and par-ticipating in discussions of the macroeconomic options and the options for structural reforms that are macro relevant. There are important roles to play both as participants in the public debate, and in helping the government make its case for its macroeconomic policy choices. This would include bringing the results of any relevant poverty and social impact analysis (PSIA) into the discussions of overall macroeconomic frameworks and related policies. In its ultimate as-sessment, however, the Fund should make clear its views on macroeconomic frameworks ultimately in-cluded in PRSPs and be prepared to provide convinc-ing arguments for any proposed revisions.

25. In this context the Fund’s efforts to build capacity and strengthen institutions through technical assistance will be particularly important. Further ef-forts will be needed to provide appropriate advice and technical assistance where required to strengthen bud-get policies and processes aimed at promoting sus-tainable growth and poverty reduction.

26. One underemphasized issue has been the role of building capacity through technical assistance (TA), which is central to the vision of the Fund as a service provider in the context of the PRS approach. In its recent review of TA, the Board pointed to progress in pursuing strategic focus and enhancing effectiveness.3 Nonetheless, further work needs to be done to better coordinate with other TA providers and integrate Fund TA into the broader agenda of the Fund’s relationship with low-income countries. In this regard, AFRITACs (Africa Regional Technical Assistance Centers) and the forthcoming Middle East Technical Assistance Center can play an impor-tant role. Area departments will also need to take a more strategic view of the technical assistance needs of member countries in close consultation with country authorities.

B. Implications for Fund-Supported Programs

27. The Fund Board previously considered issues in working towards a better alignment of PRGF-supported programs with country PRSPs.4 The Board stressed that the process of alignment will need to be implemented pragmatically and flexibly, taking due account of country-specific circumstances and ca-pacity constraints, as well as the need to ensure that PRGF-supported programs continue to be strong and designed to help countries accelerate growth and the pace of progress towards the Millennium Development Goals.5

28.In the staff’s view, a key element in improving the Fund’s contribution to the PRS process is to introduce flexibility in the link between PRGF-supported programs and the PRSPs, based on country-specific circumstances. PRGF-supported programs would continue to be drawn from the macroeconomic frameworks in PRSPs to the extent possible. Where a PRSP provides a good operational road map, the PRGF should be tightly linked to its frame-work. Program and mission cycles should be aligned with the PRSP/budget cycles and other domestic processes as much as possible.

29. However, some countries may not be able to produce operationally viable PRSPs for some time. A PRSP would still be required for Fund (and Bank) financial support, but the emphasis in these cases, for the Fund, would shift from artificially insisting on immediate tight alignment between the PRGF-supported program’s macroeconomic framework and in the PRSP. Rather, Fund staff need to work with countries to strengthen the macroeconomic frameworks in their PRSPs so as to move toward alignment over time. Areas that required work could be clearly highlighted in the assessment of the PRSP. The Fund would still seek to apply the PRSP princi-ples to the Fund’s role. This would include (i) seek-ing to open up the policy debate on a few key prior-ity issues (for example, through analytical inputs and prioritization of PSIA that would be designed to explore various policy options); and (ii) contribu-tions to capacity development that follow country-driven priorities and understandings on what a reasonable road map toward a operationally oriented PRSP would be.

30. In such cases, the PRGF-supported programs would provide additional coherence, precision, and clarity to the authorities’ policy intentions, and staff would need to affirm that the authorities’ commitment to the resulting framework is nonetheless adequate. Rather than derailing the incipient participatory processes by integrating them into PRGF-supported program discussions, in this manner the Fund could continue to seek to approve arrangements with such countries on the basis of adequate PRGF-supported programs that would still be linked to PRSPs, albeit with clearly explained modifications.

31. The introduction of such flexibility in the link between the PRSP and PRGF is seen as a way to strengthen the Fund’s involvement in the formulation and implementation of macroeconomic policies in the PRS approach. Making the Fund’s concerns with the PRSP macroeconomic framework transparent in the assessment will give the authorities and their development partners a more precise and nuanced assessment of the country’s macroeconomic challenges. It will also underscore the evolving nature of the macroeconomic framework in the PRGF-supported programs, which are inherently dependent on shorter-term con-siderations such as availability of donor financing. Of course risks will also need to be addressed. In particu-lar, the existence of different macroeconomic frame-works in the PRSP and the PRGF-supported program could be seen as evidence of Fund intrusion in domes-tic policy setting or of the Fund undermining of the PRSP process. Thus, the government should clearly demonstrate its ownership of the program, and the Fund its commitment to the PRS process, by explain-ing clearly their position to other development part-ners and domestic stakeholders.

32. As part of the effort to strengthen its involvement in the PRS process, the Fund will also continue to seek ways in which to improve PRGF-supported program design. More can be done, and the Fund will take due consideration of the IEO’s report in its forthcoming work on the design of PRGF-supported programs. This review of program design will seek to provide recommendations on how to increase these programs’ effectiveness in enhancing growth and reducing poverty. In this regard, it is important that the Fund be sufficiently selective in its alloca-tion of PRGF resources. Areas where the design of PRGF-supported programs might be refined include:

  • ways in which programs, along with TA, can help build the institutions necessary to underpin sustainable growth, particularly in the monetary and fiscal areas most directly related to the Fund’s comparative advantage;

  • appropriate strategies to facilitate development of the private sector, including monetary frameworks for facilitating higher private sector credit growth;

  • means by which macroeconomic frameworks can best accommodate higher aid inflows.

V. Resource Implications

33. In considering the IEO recommendations, resource constraints must be taken into account. The Fund’s participation in the PRS approach can, de-pending on its nature, require substantial Fund re-sources, including staff time and travel, in addition to that necessary to carry out the Fund’s other re-sponsibilities. These demands have a tendency to crowd out critical analytic and substantive work.

34. Many of the IEO recommendations would increase Fund responsibilities considerably.6 The IEO suggests that staff become more systematically and directly involved in the PRS process, including in the public debate surrounding the PRSP and APR. In countries where policy formulation procedures are weak, considerable additional Fund resources would be needed to deepen the policy dialogue. In such cases, the IEO recommendations would represent a major additional demand on staff time. Thus, internal Fund discussion is needed on how to balance these needs against other priorities. The suggestions in Section IV are formulated in part with a view to reducing the procedural burden on staff of the PRS process.

35. The staff resource implications of deeper substantive involvement in the PRS process would need to be considered carefully. In the context of a desire to maintain closer and more informal con-tacts with a large number of stakeholders, one question is whether, as the IEO has suggested, con-sideration should be given to adjusting somewhat the mix of headquarters and resident staff. In par-ticular, the role of the resident representatives re-quires careful consideration.

Staff Views on the Specific IEO Recommendations

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1

“Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers – Progress in Implementation” (SM/02/250 and SM/03/279), “Review of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper Approach—Early Experience with In-terim PRSPs and Full PRSPs” (SM/02/54, 3/27/02); “Aligning the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) Approach: Issues and Options” (SM/03/94); “Role of the Fund in Low-Income Mem-ber Countries Over the Medium Term—Issues Paper for Discus-sion” (SM/03/257); “Review of the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility—Issues and Options” (SM/03/51, 3/15/02); “The Fund’s Support of Low-Income Member Countries—Considerations on Instruments and Financing”(SM/04/53, 2/24/2004); and “Fund Assistance for Countries Facing Exoge-nous Shocks” (SM/03/288, 8/11/2003).

2

This idea was at the origin of the PRSC, which was originally thought of in part as a vehicle to reward countries with suffi-ciently good PRSPs with an appropriate reduction in traditional red tape and conditionality.

3

“Review of Technical Assistance” (SM/04/41, 2/17/04).

4

“Aligning the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) Approach: Issues and Options” (SM/03/94).

5

“Concluding Remarks by the Acting Chair, Aligning the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) Approach—Issues and Op-tions” (BUFF/03/55).

6

The IEO considers that none of its proposals are outside the original framework of the PRSP approach as reflected in the Board documents.

Independent Evaluation Office Comments on Management/Staff Responses to the Evaluation of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility

Executive Board Meeting

July 21, 2004

The comprehensive nature of the management/staff responses is welcome. They provide a basis for a substantive debate on the major issues raised in the evaluation. The staff has noted a number of areas where it broadly agrees with the messages and rec-ommendations contained in the evaluation report, but also areas of disagreement. Since the evaluation and the management/staff response inevitably cover a lot of ground it might be useful to highlight a few key questions of particular interest:

  • Whether and how to modify the design of the PRS approach to give more emphasis to the intermediate objective of improving domestic processes for policy formulation, implementation and monitoring, in a way and at a pace that best fits each country’s circumstances.

  • Whether and how to ensure that incentives faced by participating countries—especially those re-sulting from BWI procedural requirements, as-sessment procedures, and provision of assis-tance—are aligned with this objective and are transparent.

  • How the BWIs should assess PRSPs and the na-ture of the instrument they should use. (In this context, we think the questions posed by the staff in para. 23 are the right ones.)

  • How to clarify or adjust expectations about the extent and nature of the IMF’s involvement in the PRS process, and ensure that commitments are consistent with available resources.

  • How the IMF’s “way of doing business,” includ-ing in the context of the PRGF, needs to be mod-ified in support of the PRS approach, both in rel-atively mature cases and in those “difficult” cases where the PRSP is unlikely to provide an effective operational road map for the foresee-able future.

To facilitate this discussion, our comments will focus on a few issues where we see the messages emerging from the evaluation as somewhat differ-ent than those emphasized by the staff and will re-spond to several concerns raised about our recom-mendations. Paragraph references are to the staff comments.

The staff observes (para. 8) that the IEO diagnosis of problems with implementation of the PRSP approach overlaps substantially with those of earlier internal reviews. In our view, the evaluation raises two issues that are more fundamental than those raised in previous assessments and that will not be resolved merely by allowing more time for the approach to have an impact. First, some significant de-sign problems have emerged as the approach has been implemented. While some of the tensions that gave rise to these problems (e.g., between country ownership and BWI/donor selectivity) have been ac-knowledged previously, how best to deal with them has not been adequately addressed. Second, the IMF “way of doing business” in low-income countries has not adapted sufficiently to the implications of the PRS approach—an issue that goes beyond resource availability.

We agree, however, that the issue of staff resources is a critical one. What the IMF is expected to contribute to the PRS approach needs to be tailored to fit the resources that can reasonably be ex-pected to be available. Contrary to the staff’s obser-vation (para. 34), none of our recommendations involve an expansion of the IMF’s “responsibilities” beyond what was indicated in the original policy pa-pers establishing the PRSP and the PRGF. The dis-cussion in [the section “What Was Expected of the IMF Under the New Initiative?”] of the evaluation report illustrates how bold were the original expec-tations on the IMF’s role. If these expectations are now judged to have been too ambitious, it would be better to clarify that role explicitly. But whether a “larger” or a “smaller” role for the IMF is expected in low-income countries in the future, it should not be a “business as usual” role; if the PRS approach is to be the key framework for IMF involvement in low-income countries, IMF activities will need to adapt accordingly.

In this context, the most effective approach to matching expectations with resources is to introduce greater scope for customization of the IMF’s role to country needs, building on the twin principles of pri-oritization and partnership. Prioritization implies that the key deliverables from the IMF (e.g., for ana-lytical work to strengthen the broader policy debate or assistance with capacity building) should them-selves be derived—to the extent possible—from the country-driven PRS strategies. This would then feed into more transparent budgetary choices within the IMF and realistic indications of what can and cannot be delivered. The partnership element means that strong coordination with other donors is needed, built around the country-driven strategy and priori-ties, and that “stand alone” approaches should be re-sisted, even if they appear administratively easier in the short run.

The staff agrees that managing the tension between ownership and selectivity is a central one for the design of the PRS approach but disagrees with the approach proposed in the evaluation report (paras. 17–19). Clearly, different solutions to this problem are possible, but we would like to emphasize two points. First, the solution proposed in the report is based on (i) greater scope for, and openness to, country-driven choices on the road map for implementing the core principles of the PRS approach; (ii) trans-parency about the choices (so other stakeholders, in-cluding civil society, can contribute and indicate where they disagree) along with clear country-driven benchmarks for monitoring progress; (iii) candid assessments by the BWIs of the country-driven choices and progress made; and (iv) transparent BWI and donor decisions on financing selectivity, drawing inter alia on these assessments. We do not propose an approach based on universal minimum standards, for reasons given in the report. Second, we are not sug-gesting that the IMF (or World Bank) artificially force the pace of reforms of domestic processes through conditionality; on the contrary, the thrust of our rec-ommendations is to allow greater scope for country diversity, recognizing the wide divergence in starting conditions and political structures. While we agree that our proposal could be seen as a kind of “process conditionality” (para. 18), this is inherent to the whole approach of requiring countries to produce a PRSP. Our proposal has the merit of allowing greater customization of the process to country needs and cir-cumstances. While everyone recognizes that country ownership is critical, a candid discussion is needed of how best the design of the approach can manage operationally the tensions between ownership, BWI as-sessments, and selectivity in financing decisions. As illustrated in the report, such judgments are obviously made in practice, but in a manner that is less transpar-ent than under our proposal, and that gives too much weight to meeting BWI procedural requirements rather than more fundamental improvements in do-mestic policy processes.

We agree that a key challenge for the IMF is how to apply PRS principles in “difficult” cases, includ-ing those where there is not yet an operationally vi-able PRSP. The particular steps mentioned by the staff in para. 29—opening up the policy debate on a few key priority issues, including through PSIA de-signed to explore various policy options, and con-tributing to capacity development following country-driven priorities—follow the thrust of our recommendations and would be very helpful. How-ever, it is important that PRSP and PRGF-related ac-tivities not be seen as proceeding on separate tracks, as the staff’s proposal in para. 30 seems to imply. In particular, we do not see how efforts to better inte-grate the two sets of activities would risk “derailing the incipient participatory process.” Quite the con-trary, the aim should be to seek opportunities to use the PRS principles, including through informing a broader policy debate, to ease political economy constraints that have made progress so difficult in such cases. Otherwise, there is a serious risk that delinking PRSP and PRGF activities would elimi-nate a key incentive—both for countries and for the Fund as an institution—to make progress on the PRSP front, while reverting to a “business as usual” mode on the PRGF side.

The Acting Chair’s Summing Up Evaluation Report of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility by the Independent Evaluation Office

Executive Board Meeting

July 21, 2004

General Remarks

Executive Directors welcomed the timely report of the Independent Evaluation Office (IEO). The report has a number of constructive recommendations, which will require careful further follow-up and implementation with a view toward strengthening the PRSP approach, clarifying the Fund’s role in this approach, and enhancing the Fund’s advice and assis-tance to low-income countries. More broadly, the IEO report is a valuable contribution to the ongoing review of how to improve the effectiveness of the Fund’s engagement with low-income countries.

Most Directors considered that the PRS approach has had a positive impact on economic policy design and implementation in low-income countries. It has helped to improve country ownership, enhance par-ticipation, and provide better-quality strategies, and it is generally evolving in the right direction. At the same time, Directors stressed that substantial scope exists for better implementation of the current approach, based on the evolving experience and the di-rections for change identified in the IEO report. In this context, Directors noted that the report found that PRSPs suffer from a multiplicity of objectives, which contribute to significant weaknesses in their implementation, observing that: the approach is per-ceived to be externally driven; participation some-times has been narrow, particularly in formulation of the macroeconomic framework underlying the PRSP; and that PRSPs often have lacked opera-tionally viable strategies. At the same time, Direc-tors cautioned against drawing premature conclu-sions about the ultimate success of the PRSP approach based on only five years of experience with its implementation. It was noted that resolving the mismatch between the ambitions of this approach and what can realistically be achieved will continue to remain a challenge. In light of this, the staff should draw on the IEO’s recommendations in various aspects of its work on the role of the Fund in low-income countries to deepen and refine its analy-sis on ways to enhance the effectiveness of the PRSP approach. In particular, the upcoming Annual Bank-Fund PRSP Progress in Implementation Report, and forthcoming discussions on the role of the Fund in low-income countries, will offer such opportunities.

Directors agreed that the report provides a useful perspective on the PRGF. They were encouraged that PRGF-supported programs increasingly are being aligned with the country-owned PRSP, even though such alignment is still somewhat limited. They welcomed the finding that the design of these programs has improved in a number of ways. For ex-ample, fiscal targets have become more flexible to accommodate increased expenditures on pro-poor programs, and there is no evidence of an excessive disinflationary bias. At the same time, Directors noted the challenge of basing Fund-supported programs on a full understanding of micro-macro link-ages, which are by their nature quite complex. Di-rectors also considered that more should be done to integrate the results of poverty and social impact analysis. They noted that, as is the case with the PRSP process, the Fund’s adaptation of its programs and policy advice in low-income countries toward growth and poverty reduction is an evolutionary process. In this context, they looked forward to the recommendations of the management-led Committee on Low-Income Country Work to provide new impetus and focus to Fund work on low-income countries. Directors also considered that further staff analysis will be needed on improving the design of PRGF-supported programs, and gearing them to ad-dress macroeconomic policy challenges of achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

Directors welcomed the IEO report’s discussion of the broader implications of the PRS approach for the Fund’s role in low-income countries. They looked forward to work on refining the role of the Fund in low-income countries, including the paper on instruments and financing in August, and better defining the Fund’s strategy to help low-income countries make progress toward meeting the MDGs. The joint paper with the Bank on aid, aid effectiveness, and financing of the MDGs will dis-cuss how aid might be better mobilized. The up-coming discussion on PRGF financing and instru-ments will consider how to finance PRGF operations beyond 2005 and will discuss proposals for instruments to allow the Fund to respond more effectively to low-income countries faced with shocks. The Board will also have an opportunity after the Annual Meetings to discuss the Fund’s role in providing appropriate signals about low-in-come members’ macroeconomic policies in the ab-sence of a need for Fund financing.

Individual Recommendations

Recommendation 1. Introduce greater flexibility in the implementation of the PRS approach to better fit the needs of countries at different stages of the process and with different capacities and political and administrative systems.

Directors agreed that the PRS approach will need to be implemented pragmatically and flexibly, taking due account of country-specific circumstances and capacity constraints as well as the need to ensure that Fund-supported programs continue to be designed to assure macroeconomic stability and help members accelerate the pace of progress towards the MDGs. In this regard, it will be important to have a clear idea of the core objectives of the PRS approach.

Directors noted that the PRGF should be linked tightly to PRSPs that provide a sound operational road map. However, where PRSPs are not yet opera-tionally viable, the Fund should not insist on immedi-ate tight alignment between the PRSP and the PRGF-supported program. Instead, Fund staff should work with these members to strengthen the macroeconomic frameworks in their PRSPs so as to move to-ward eventual alignment. In this context, Directors noted that the Fund’s efforts to build capacity and strengthen institutions through country-driven and properly targeted technical assistance to these mem-bers will be particularly important. At the same time, Directors cautioned that increased flexibility should not imply delinking the PRGF from the PRSP process, and noted that the Fund would still seek to apply the PRSP principles in its program work. Moreover, maintaining a link between the PRGF and the PRSP provides a key incentive for members and the Fund to improve the PRSP process.

Recommendation 2. Shift the emphasis of the initiative from the production of documents to the development of sound domestic policy formulation and implementation processes.

Directors agreed that the PRS approach has the potential to encourage the development of country-owned and credible long-term strategies for growth and poverty reduction. To accomplish this objec-tive, there should be less emphasis on document preparation, and more emphasis on improving the capability of countries to develop and implement policies supportive of growth and poverty reduction. Directors underlined that governments are ex-pected to be in control of the development process and policy options.

Directors noted that managing the tension be-tween country ownership of the policies and programs and donor selectivity is central to the design of the PRS approach. Some Directors agreed with the report’s recommendation that countries should set explicit criteria for judging progress towards key intermediate objectives related to the domestic policy formulation, implementation, and monitoring process for their PRSPs, and that Fund and Bank staff should provide candid assessments of those benchmarks. Many Directors cautioned, however, that this could imply excessive Fund involvement in assessing the country’s decision-making processes, and establish an unwarranted direct linkage between such assessments and the Fund’s lending decisions. They believed that the use of such conditionality by the Fund to improve domestic policy processes is in-appropriate because it could undermine the legiti-macy of domestic institutions and processes. Direc-tors noted that further reflection and discussion will be needed on how the Fund should react in cases where it believes that the member could aim higher, or where the pace of progress chosen is not ambi-tious enough.

Recommendation 3. Clarify the purpose of the JSA and redefine the vehicle accordingly.

Directors emphasized the need for a reformula-tion of the Joint Staff Assessment—the instrument used by the Fund and the Bank to assess PRSPs, with an emphasis on graduated rather than binary as-sessments. Many Directors noted that the purpose of the staff assessment of PRSPs should be to provide candid feedback to countries and to help coordinate with the Bank. They believed that not using the assessment to shape Fund lending decisions and removing the requirement of Board endorsement would help enhance country ownership of PRSPs. In the absence of any other coordination vehicle, Directors favored keeping a joint instrument for the assessment. They noted that any reformulation of the assessment instrument should reflect and maintain the two institutions’ commitment to the PRSP initiative, while reducing the documentation requirements for the PRSP process and utilizing the limited staff resources more effectively. Directors looked forward to discussing specific recommendations by the staff on options for the assessment instrument in the con-text of the Annual Bank-Fund PRSP Progress in Implementation Report.

Recommendation 4. Clarify what the PRS approach implies for the IMF’s own operations and strengthen the implementation of the agreed role.

Directors agreed that the Fund needs to set out more clearly its own role in the PRS approach in each country, based on the Fund’s core mandate in macro-economic and related structural policy issues, and use the tools—including surveillance and other monitoring mechanisms—that are best suited to the individ-ual case. In doing so, the Fund would need to con-tinue to strengthen its collaboration with the World Bank and other donors. While Directors welcomed the streamlining of Fund conditionality, some stressed that aggregate Fund-Bank conditionality needs to be monitored and reduced as well.

Many Directors also supported a more active role for the Fund in the public debate on macroeconomic policy design and implementation—especially re-garding assumptions, alternative policy scenarios, and trade-offs. This role could be facilitated through Fund analysis and research, the Article IV consultation process, the provision of technical assistance, and a better-defined and enhanced role of resident represen-tatives. These Directors believed that such a role should be fully compatible with country ownership of programs and policies. However, other Directors were of the view that a more proactive public role could be seen as influencing the political decision-making process, which is not part of the Fund’s mandate. Some of these Directors also commented on the limi-tations of the participatory approach, including a ten-dency to produce broad and unfocused documents.

Recommendation 5. Strengthen the prioritization and accountability on what the IMF is supposed to deliver within the broader partnership framework, built around the priorities emerging from the PRS process, and ensure resources match commitments.

Directors welcomed the IEO report’s emphasis on the need to define priorities for the work of the Fund in low-income countries in the context of its re-source constraints. In this regard, the prioritization of budget resources must be guided by the Fund’s overall mandate. Directors called for a careful as-sessment of the resource implications of adapting the Fund’s role along the lines of the report’s recom-mendations. Some Directors felt that many of the report’s specific recommendations—in particular, more direct and deeper involvement in the PRSP processes—would increase the call on the Fund’s staff resources considerably, and would require bal-ancing these additional demands against other prior-ities. Some others thought that the report’s recom-mendations would not involve an expansion of the Fund’s responsibilities beyond what was indicated in the original policy papers establishing the PRSP and the PRGF. They noted the need to discuss the extent to which the original expectations for the Fund’s role were too ambitious. Several Directors felt that there is scope for changing the Fund’s way of doing busi-ness in low-income countries within existing re-source constraints. Directors looked forward to staff views on ways to improve the Fund staff’s involve-ment in the PRSP in the forthcoming Annual Bank-Fund PRSP Progress in Implementation Report and in the review of the resident representative program.

Recommendation 6. The IMF should encourage a strengthening of the framework for establishing the external resources envelope as part of the PRS approach.

Directors stressed that adequate, timely, and pre-dictable donor support is crucial to the success of the PRS approach and the Fund should play a supportive role with donors and low-income members to help ensure adequate provision of aid to achieve the MDGs. In this regard, the Fund needs to consider how its signals can be clear and useful to its mem-bers. In particular, Fund signals should not lead to the inappropriate interruption of long-term development and poverty reduction finance. The Fund should also work with the donor community to en-hance aid coordination and encourage medium-term support linked more effectively to country-owned poverty reduction strategies.

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Cover Evaluation of the IMF's Role in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility
Evaluation of the IMF's Role in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility
ISBN:
9781589063679
ISSN:
2617-670X
Publication Date:
30 Sep 2004
Publisher:
International Monetary Fund
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5089/9781589063679.017
Pages:
129
Figure A2.1.

IMF Staff Responses on the Impact of the Key Features of PRGF-Supported Programs on Their Conduct of Fund Business1

(1=No impact; 5=Highly significant impact)
Figure A8.1.

Distribution of Programs According to the Targeted Change in Expenditures
Figure A8.2.

Distribution of Projected Changes in the Availability of Grants and Concessional Loans in ESAF- and PRGF-Supported Programs

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  • Whaites, Alan, Kelly Currah, Haidy Ear-Dupuy, and Brett Parris, 2003, “Promoting Growth for Poverty Reduction: The Role of IMF Lending Advice,” Policy Paper (London: World Vision International).

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  • World Bank and International Monetary Fund, 1999b, “Building Poverty Reduction Strategies in Developing Countries,” background document, Annual Meetings of the World Bank and the IMF, September (Washington: World Bank and International Monetary Fund).

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  • World Bank and International Monetary Fund, 2001c, “IMF–World Bank Collaboration on Program Conditionality,” July (Washington: World Bank and International Monetary Fund).

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  • World Bank and International Monetary Fund, 2003a, “Achieving the MDGs and Related Outcomes—A Framework for Monitoring Policies and Actions,” Paper Prepared by the staffs of the Fund and the World Bank for Consideration by the Committee of the Whole for the Development Committee, EB/CW/DC/03/3, February (Washington: World Bank and International Monetary Fund).

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