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Mr. Marc G Quintyn
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Mr. Michael W Taylor
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Abstract

In nearly every major financial crisis of the past decade-from East Asia to Russia, Turkey, and Latin America-political interference in financial sector regulation helped make a bad situation worse. Political pressures not only weakened financial regulation, but also hindered regulators and supervisors from taking action against troubled banks. This paper investigates why, to fulfill their mandate to preserve financial sector stability, financial sector regulators and supervisors need to be independent-from the financial services industry as well as from the government-as well as accountable.

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Marc Quintyn is a deputy division chief in the IMF’s Monetary and Financial Systems Department. He has published widely in academic and professional journals and contributed to a number of books on monetary policy, financial systems, and European monetary and financial integration. Before joining the IMF, he was with the National Bank of Belgium (Research Department) and taught at the University of Limburg (Belgium). He has a Ph.D. from the University of Ghent (Belgium).

Michael W. Taylor is the Financial Sector Issue Representative in Indonesia of the IMF’s Monetary and Financial Systems Department. He has published numerous articles on financial regulation in academic and professional journals and written and contributed to a number of books, including, in 2002, Building Strong Banks (which was co-edited with Charles Enoch and David Marston and published by the IMF). He previously worked at the Bank of England and has taught at several universities in the United Kingdom. He also edited the journal Financial Regulator and served as assistant editor of the FT Financial Regulation Report. He has a B.A. and a D.Phil. from Oxford University.

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