Front Matter
Author:
International Monetary Fund
Search for other papers by International Monetary Fund in
Current site
Google Scholar
Close

Abstract

Banking crises have led many countries to consider deposit insuranceschemes to protect depositors and the banking system itself from the impact of bank failures. But should society be unconditionally responsible for underwiting banking decisions, even those imprudentlytaken? This paper considers the fine line that government authorities must tread between assuring the health of the banking system and encouraging recklessness on the part of individual banks by overprotecting deposits.

© 1997 International Monetary Fund

ISBN: 9781557756428

ISSN: 1020-5098

Published July 1997

To order IMF publications, please contact:

International Monetary Fund, Publication Services

700 19th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20431, U.S.A.

Tel.: (202) 623-7430 Telefax: (202) 623-7201

E-mail: publications@imf.org

Internet: http://www.imf.org

Preface

The Economic Issues series aims to make available to a broad readership of nonspecialists some of the economic research being produced in the International Monetary Fund on topical issues. The raw material of the series is drawn mainly from IMF Working Papers, technical papers produced by Fund staff members and visiting scholars, as well as from policy-related research papers. This material is refined for the general readership by editing and partial redrafting.

The following paper draws on material originally contained in IMF Working Paper 96/83, “Deposit Insurance: Obtaining the Benefits and Avoiding the Pitfalls,” by Gillian Garcia of the IMF’s Monetary and Exchange Affairs Department. Alfred Imhoff prepared the present version. Readers interested in the original Working Paper may purchase a copy from IMF Publication Services ($7.00).

  • Collapse
  • Expand