4 Monetary Operations, Money Markets, and Public Debt Management
Author:
Lorena M. Zamalloa https://isni.org/isni/0000000404811396 International Monetary Fund

Search for other papers by Lorena M. Zamalloa in
Current site
Google Scholar
Close

Abstract

Transition economies have on the whole made good progress in introducing indirect monetary policy instruments, but much still remains to be done to bring monetary operations to modern market standards.

Transition economies have on the whole made good progress in introducing indirect monetary policy instruments, but much still remains to be done to bring monetary operations to modern market standards.

Recent Trends

At present, many transition countries are using monetary programming techniques and adopting monetary operations to foster both market development and monetary control (Table 9). Monetary control is primarily exercised through reserve requirements, refinance facilities that are mainly market based, and, to a limited extent, auctions of treasury bills or central bank liabilities. In addition, outright sales and purchases of government securities in the secondary market are being used in a few countries, but volumes are limited.

Table 9.

Institutional Background for Monetary and Exchange Policy Implementation

article image
article image
article image
article image
article image
article image
article image

Direct instruments are now seldom used. Tajikistan is the only country using bank-by-bank credit ceilings and, together with Uzbekistan, still imposes limits on cash withdrawals. Armenia phased out limitations on cash withdrawals in 1995. In most countries, commercial banks are free to set deposit and lending interest rates. However, in 1994 and 1995 countries such as Belarus, Ukraine, and Turkmenistan reimposed interest rate controls (Table 10). Still in other countries, high real lending rates prompted in part the implementation of indirect measures to control increases in interest rates such as the one introduced in Kazakstan in 1995.10

Table 10.

Money Markets and Interest Rate Management

article image
article image
article image
article image
article image
article image
article image

In spite of good progress, the implementation of monetary policy would benefit from both an improvement in monetary programming and a strengthening of monetary control instruments. In particular, in most countries the coordination of a mix of indirect instruments of monetary policy through a framework for short-term liquidity forecast and active liquidity management remains weak.11 The implementation of such a framework on a day-to-day basis poses a number of problems mainly owing to limited coordination between monetary and foreign exchange operations, and to difficulties in forecasting certain balance sheet items such as net credit to government and net other items. These problems not only make it difficult to have an active liquidity management, but also complicate the determination of central bank interventions consistent with monetary policy targets.

In countries where the interbank market has begun to play a role in allocating resources among financial institutions, reforms tend to aim at linking the rate used in standing facilities with that used in market-based monetary instruments.12 A few countries such as Azerbaijan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, and Russia follow a pure “market-cost” approach by charging a refinance rate based on a market-related rate. While in Russia, the refinance rate is adjusted in line with the interbank market rate,13 in the other countries it is determined at the credit auction. In the latter case, it is adjusted as frequently as credit auctions are scheduled. Other countries (Belarus, Kazakstan, Latvia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan) have adopted a more “interventionist” approach linking the interest rate charged for access to the standing refinance facility to the inflation rate. In some cases, however, such frameworks are not effective in steering market rates to positive levels in real terms owing to the small amount of refinance credit granted by the central bank.

In most countries, reserve requirements play an important role in monetary control; however, compliance problems have partially diminished the effectiveness of this instrument. At least in 1995, the effective reserve ratio was significantly below the required ratio in Moldova and Russia. In all countries except Russia, legal reserve ratios are uniform; these ratios vary from 8 percent in Latvia and Moldova to 30 percent in Uzbekistan (Table 11). Reserve averaging is not yet common.

Table 11.

Instruments and Operating Arrangements

article image
article image
article image
article image
article image
article image
article image
article image
article image
article image
article image
article image
article image
article image

Most countries are phasing out directed credits; more generally, in a number of countries central bank credit to commercial banks actually declined in 1995 (Figure 3). Nevertheless, most central banks have overdraft facilities providing short-term uncollateralized credit at a penalty rate. Some central banks have established or are in the process of establishing other standing facilities such as a Lombard facility to reduce the central bank’s credit risk. Lending through this facility is at a penalty rate, has short maturity, and is usually collateralized with treasury bills. A few countries such as Latvia and the Kyrgyz Republic have emergency lending facilities designed to provide credit to problem banks. In Latvia, the central bank provided limited credit to banks with financial difficulties in the spring of 1995, and in the Kyrgyz Republic, the central bank provides medium-term funding to troubled banks suffering from a liquidity shortage.

Figure 3.
Figure 3.

Monetary Indicators-Changes in Sources of Reserve Money1

(In percent of December 1995 reserve money)

Sources: Country authorities; and IMF staff estimates.1 Based on changes during December 1994–95, except for Armenia, Georgia, Kazakstan, Uzbekistan, which are based on the period September 1994–95, and Tajikistan on June-December 1995. Foreign exchange valued at end of period exchange rates.

Although central bank credit auctions exist in all countries except Tajikistan and countries with a currency board (Estonia, Lithuania), they are actively used in only a few countries. Countries that distribute a substantial portion of refinance credit to banks through credit auctions include Armenia, Moldova, and Ukraine, and more recently Belarus and Uzbekistan.14 In some countries, there has been a trend toward increasing the frequency of credit auctions (Armenia, Latvia, Uzbekistan) and toward reducing the maturity of auctioned credit (Armenia, Latvia, Kazakstan).

Use of collateral for central bank operations has been increasing but is hampered by the low volume of acceptable collateral, as well as by inadequate legislation, which, in some countries (such as Russia), still allows the pledger to remain in possession of the collateral until the loan is in default. Some countries are gradually transforming credit auctions into auctions for repurchase agreement, which solves the collateral problem. For example, in Moldova, Lombard operations are structured in the form of repurchase operations to give the central bank a clear title to the security in the event of default. The trend is more noticeable in countries where programs of treasury bill auctions have been in place and banks are building a stock of riskless collateral (Armenia, Latvia). In addition to treasury bills, central banks also have accepted hard currency deposits (Russia, the Kyrgyz Republic) and fixed assets of commercial banks (Kazakstan) as collateral.

Regarding the primary market for government securities, there have been steady increases in the share of treasury bills to finance the government deficit, but the use of treasury bills for short-term management of bank liquidity has been limited in most countries. For instance, in Russia, about 40 percent of the 1996 government deficit, and in Lithuania, a large part, is expected to be financed with government securities. The Kyrgyz Republic until late 1994 used treasury bills purely as a monetary policy instrument, but more recently, this instrument has been used mainly to finance the government deficit. The Bank of Estonia has issued certificates of deposit, but for money market development purposes rather than for monetary control, which is governed by currency board arrangements. As a ratio to GDP, however, outstanding federal government domestic securities is very low compared with those countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

Most countries are now auctioning treasury bills, but increases in central bank credit to the government are still an important source of reserve money (Figure 3). In all countries except Russia, outstanding volumes of treasury bills are still small. In primary issues, the central bank usually acts as the government agent with the ministry of finance deciding on the timing, volumes, and cut-off price. Given that primary issues of treasury bills are being used primarily for public debt management purposes, central banks temporarily in need of a monetary instrument to absorb liquidity have issued central bank securities (Belarus, Kazakstan, Uzbekistan) or have offered central bank deposits (Latvia, Russia). In most cases, central bank deposits or securities are issued for short maturities of up to one month.

In an effort to develop secondary markets by promoting liquidity, some central banks have started transactions in the secondary market for government securities (Belarus, Kazakstan, Latvia, Russia). In Latvia, the central bank operates a secondary market window for treasury bills; in Belarus, Kazakstan, Latvia, and Russia, the central bank has purchased or sold treasury bills in the secondary market. However, open market operations in the secondary market for government securities play only a limited role in liquidity management due to the lack of depth of secondary markets and, to some extent, to the lack of an institutional framework to conduct repurchase agreements. Moreover, in Russia, central bank interventions have often been directed at managing the yield rather than at influencing liquidity in the system; however, starting in the second half of 1995, more use has been made of those interventions to adjust liquidity. For example, during the interbank market crisis in August 1995, the Central Bank of Russia purchased treasury bills from a select number of banks to ease a shortage of liquidity.

Priorities for Reform

Much remains to be done to bring monetary operations in many of the transition countries to modern market standards.15 Given the structural and liquidity problems in the banking system, central banks in the transition countries need to design lender-of-last-resort facilities under well-defined rules of access and closely linked to the operations of the payments system and strengthen the coordination of different monetary instruments. In addition, central banks need to enhance the efficiency of existing monetary instruments by ensuring compliance with reserve requirements and by introducing reserve averaging,16 and generalizing the use and improving the quality of collateral in central bank operations. Further concomitant reforms in public debt management, government securities markets, and banking soundness and competitiveness are needed to ensure continued progress in market-based monetary management.

Regarding lender-of-last-resort facilities, further progress is needed toward establishing Lombard facilities, which are useful instruments to help banks cope with unexpected end-of-day clearing imbalances that can be caused by weaknesses in payments system arrangements. Delays in transferring funds between banks or within a country, as well as delays in the availability of timely information on the banks’ balances at the central bank, make liquidity management difficult for both the central bank and commercial banks. However, instruments designed to inject liquidity on an emergency basis such as a Lombard window are inadequate to deal with longer-term banking weaknesses. Financial assistance to counter banking weaknesses should be designed as part of a comprehensive bank-restructuring strategy. While direct central bank credit may be necessary in some instances, it should be under government guarantee and replaced as soon as possible with government funds.

In the context of increased credit risks because of systemic banking weaknesses, the requirement for collateral to access central bank refinance facilities (including credit auctions) is crucial. As noted above, uncollateralized credit auctions should be transformed into repurchase auctions. Not only will this protect the central bank’s net worth assets, it will also enhance financial discipline in the system. Moreover, such reforms are necessary to encourage collateralization of interbank market transactions and stimulate markets for the underlying instrument (typically treasury bills, or government securities generally). These reforms are also urgent for containing settlement risks and market segmentation caused by the weaknesses in the banking system.

Adequate institutional arrangements need to be in place to ensure that sterilization costs are rapidly transferred to the budget. Using central bank securities or deposit auctions to sterilize capital inflows, for instance, raises concern about the cost of sterilization and its impact on the central bank’s balance sheets due to the generally high interest rates on short-term securities compared with interest income on the central bank’s assets. If the central bank’s profits are regularly transferred to the government, the budget would absorb the increased financial costs through forgone revenue. However, should this cause losses to the central bank, it could undermine monetary management. Alternatively, special arrangements with the ministry of finance could ensure that treasury bills are also issued for monetary purposes.

The development of secondary markets in government securities will enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of central bank operations in this market. Adjustments may be needed in certain elements of the market microstructure—including the trading arrangements, regulatory environment, and clearing and settlement procedures. In particular, an institutional framework to conduct repurchase agreements needs to be developed setting guidelines on these operations and providing the lender a perfected title to the security used as collateral.

Progress in enhancing the liquidity of the money market, and in particular of the interbank market, is critical to the development of market-based monetary instruments, open market operations, as well as refinance instruments. However, in a context of widespread unsoundness of banks and lack of collateral, further development of the interbank market is an arduous and stage-by-stage process. The central bank can play an active role not only from the general point of view of capital market development, but also by making the interbank market an appropriate locus to conduct monetary operations. As already noted, collateralization of monetary operations can help develop interbank markets by containing settlement risk and market segmentation. Also an efficient interbank settlement system and timely information on loro account balances held at the central bank will allow banks to trade their liquidity position on a daily basis, fostering the development of interbank markets.

There is also a need to better integrate monetary and foreign exchange policies and operations. In this regard, an important task is to develop a monitoring framework to guide the central bank in its day-to-day operations consistent with the annual monetary program. For example, a five-day reporting system in Russia and a daily projection of banks’ correspondent accounts in Belarus allow the central banks of these countries to monitor banks’ liquidity. Lately, however, the National Bank of Belarus has put more emphasis on targeting the exchange rate than in complying with net international reserve targets. In some countries, additional staffing to process the existing data may be required. At the institutional level, coordination with government institutions and within the central bank needs to be strengthened.

A comprehensive framework for public debt management is yet to emerge. The development of the government securities market faces major challenges: to extend the maturity profile of debt, to involve the household savings market, and to adjust trading arrangements. Regarding the first issue, countries such as Russia and Turkmenistan have attempted to extend the maturity profile of the debt by issuing indexed or floating rate instruments (Table 10). While this attempt was not successful in Turkmenistan, the results were more encouraging in Russia; as of March 29, 1996, outstanding volumes of floating rate instruments in Russia were about 1 percent of GDP.

Regarding household savings, the possibility of introducing household savings instruments has not been fully explored. However, this important source of noninflationary budget finance should not be ignored. Finally, to further develop secondary markets, a system of primary dealers could be introduced. Some transition countries have plans to establish over-the-counter dealer markets with specialized primary dealers that are required to provide continuous quotations in government securities (Kyrgyz Republic, Russia).17

Supporting structural reforms in banking, including bank supervision and bank restructuring, and in the payments area is needed to enhance the implementation of market-based monetary policy. Weaknesses in banks’ loan portfolios or management can make banks unresponsive to interest rate signals and lead to less liquid and segmented money markets because of a loss of confidence. This, in turn, can increase noncompliance with reserve requirements and frequent recourse to standing facilities (Lombard or discount window), weakening the effectiveness of market-based instruments. Also, a strict central bank policy stance is weakened if ailing banks receive large amounts of liquidity support from the central bank. Dealing with problem banks will make these banks more responsive to interest rate signals, will set the basis for the growth of the interbank market, and will improve the effectiveness of monetary control. Reforms in the payments area such as implementing a large-value transfer system for same-day or real-time settlements and the use of required reserves to provide intraday or intraweek liquidity, will facilitate banks’ liquidity management and market development.18

  • Collapse
  • Expand