II Some Economic Consequences of the Civil War
Author:
Mr. Jose Martelino
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Mr. S. Nuri Erbas
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Mr. Adnan Mazarei
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Ms. Sena Eken
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Mr. Paul Cashin
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Language:
English
Keywords:
OP; exchange rate; Lebanese pound; economy; exchange rate movement; currency substitution; net foreign currency position; US$ exchange rate series; Lebanese economy; Exchange rates; Monetary aggregates; Dollarization; Personal income; Middle East; South America; Africa; Europe; trend GDP; growth in Lebanon; real GDP series; value of output; per capita income growth; Income; Human capital; Stocks; Consumption
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Abstract

This section examines the economic costs of the 1975–90 Lebanese civil war and its effects on the country's prospects for growth. The first subsection measures the value of output forgone owing to the war, and the second examines the implications for the path of future Lebanese growth of the drastic war-induced shrinkage of real output. The final subsection analyzes the growth consequences of the wartime destruction of capital, which yielded cross-sectoral imbalances in the stocks of physical and human capital. Four key conclusions arise from this work. First, the loss of output during 1975–93 is at least LL 98 billion at constant 1974 prices, or about 24 times the value of Lebanon's 1993 real GDP (at constant 1974 prices). Second, the length of time it will take Lebanon to reattain its prewar (1974) real per capita output level is partly contingent on the magnitude of the gap between 1993 measured and potential output and on how quickly this gap can be closed. Assuming that half this gap is closed in 1994 and that real per capita GDP will grow by 6 percent a year thereafter, Lebanon could close the remaining gap during the year 2000. Third, the transition from Lebanon's low postwar real per capita income level (estimated for 1993 to be about 48 percent of its 1974 value) to its steady-state level is likely to take several generations to complete, although three-fourths of the initial gap could be closed by about 2023 if high growth rates are achieved. Fourth, given that the civil war destroyed relatively more of Lebanon's stock of physical capital than of its human capital, the potential exists for Lebanon's real per capita income to approach its steady-state level at an even more rapid rate than that given above.

This section examines the economic costs of the 1975–90 Lebanese civil war and its effects on the country's prospects for growth. The first subsection measures the value of output forgone owing to the war, and the second examines the implications for the path of future Lebanese growth of the drastic war-induced shrinkage of real output. The final subsection analyzes the growth consequences of the wartime destruction of capital, which yielded cross-sectoral imbalances in the stocks of physical and human capital. Four key conclusions arise from this work. First, the loss of output during 1975–93 is at least LL 98 billion at constant 1974 prices, or about 24 times the value of Lebanon's 1993 real GDP (at constant 1974 prices). Second, the length of time it will take Lebanon to reattain its prewar (1974) real per capita output level is partly contingent on the magnitude of the gap between 1993 measured and potential output and on how quickly this gap can be closed. Assuming that half this gap is closed in 1994 and that real per capita GDP will grow by 6 percent a year thereafter, Lebanon could close the remaining gap during the year 2000. Third, the transition from Lebanon's low postwar real per capita income level (estimated for 1993 to be about 48 percent of its 1974 value) to its steady-state level is likely to take several generations to complete, although three-fourths of the initial gap could be closed by about 2023 if high growth rates are achieved. Fourth, given that the civil war destroyed relatively more of Lebanon's stock of physical capital than of its human capital, the potential exists for Lebanon's real per capita income to approach its steady-state level at an even more rapid rate than that given above.

Consequences of the War for Output

One useful measure of the direct economic cost of the civil war is the consequent loss of potential output. An estimate of the cumulative loss of output over 1975–93 can be obtained by valuing the deviations of actual real Lebanese GDP from trend real GDP that it is assumed would have been attained in the absence of the war. Saïdi (1984a) documents the relatively rapid rate of growth of the Lebanese economy during 1964–74, calculating a trend rate of real output growth of 5.95 percent a year over this period. In this analysis, a range of possible trend growth rates is utilized.

Official data on national accounts and prices covering the entire period 1964–93 are not available. The consumer price index used here is a linked index (for 1964—87) of the Beirut Chamber of Commerce and Industry and (for 1988–93) the index prepared by the Consultation and Research Institute for the Trade Union Confederation. Nominal GDP data for 1964–74 are from official sources (Direction Centrale de la Statistique), taken here from Saïdi (1984a). The GDP data for 1975–82 are taken from Bank of Lebanon (BDL)/IMF staff estimates. The GDP estimates for 1983–86 are interpolations, based on indices of electricity production and imports.1 The GDP figure for 1987 is that of Gaspard (1989). GDP estimates for 1988–93 are taken from IMF staff and World Bank calculations, based on a United Nations Development Program study on extrapolations of GDP for 1989–90. It is also important to recognize that during the war years the decline in GDP was most likely more than that of GNP, because of large net factor incomes from abroad.

Values for real Lebanese GDP for 1964–93, derived from a series for nominal GDP and using the consumer price index (1974 = 100) as the deflator, are presented below (Table 1). The resulting real GDP series reveals large falls in economic activity during the banking crisis of 1967 and the war years of 1975–76, 1982, 1986, and 1988–90.2 Calculations using the data contained in Table 1 yield an average annual rate of growth of Lebanon's real GDP of 5.8 percent during 1964–74, which compares with a rate of minus 2.7 percent for 1975–93; in real per capita terms, the relevant growth rates are 3.3 percent and minus 3.0 percent, respectively.

Table 1

Measures of GDP

(In millions of Lebanese pounds)

article image
Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics; Bank of Lebanon; and IMF staff estimates.

In millions of real (constant 1974) Lebanese pounds.

In millions of kilowatt hours.

A range of trend annual growth rates for the period 1975–93 is used to calculate the cost of the war in terms of forgone Lebanese output: the 5.95 percent rate of Saïdi (1984a), 4 percent, and 2 percent (Table 1). Of course, growth in Lebanese output after 1975 may not have continued at its prewar rate of 5.95 percent a year, and for this reason the two alternative growth rates are used. As noted by Saïdi (1984a), Lebanon could have followed the experience in the 1970s and 1980s of industrial countries and shown a decline in average rates of growth of output. However, it could also be argued that in the absence of war, developments in Lebanon would have been strongly influenced by the post-1974 prosperity of the oil producing countries of the region, the strong flow of remittances from Lebanese abroad, and large-scale inflows of Arab capital.

The cumulative sums of the value of the 1975–93 deviations from trend—for trend growth rates of 5.95 percent, 4 percent, and 2 percent—are (in constant 1974 Lebanese pounds): LL 203,257 million, LL 144,444 million, and LL 98,503 million, respectively. Using the most conservative trend growth rate of 2 percent, such an amount represents about 12 times the value of Lebanese GDP in 1974, or about 24 times the value of real 1993 Lebanese GDP (in constant 1974 prices). The equivalent results for the 5.95 percent trend growth rate are about 25 and 50 times the value of 1974 and real 1993 output, respectively. All of the above calculations are likely to underestimate the true economic cost of the war because they fail to account for such indirect costs as the value of loss of life, the cost of disabilities, and accretions in human capital forgone owing to the war, all of which were undoubtedly considerable.3

Table 2 presents an index of real GDP, which reveals a steady increase in real output up to 1974, then a rapid decline in activity in 1976, to only 36 percent of its 1974 level. Interestingly, by 1987 output had recovered to 92 percent of its 1974 level, only to fall again with the active resumption of hostilities to a period low of 33 percent of the 1974 level in 1990, gradually rising thereafter to reach 51 percent of its 1974 level by 1993.4 Despite the resilience of the Lebanese economy, real output has yet to recover from the hostilities that began in 1975. A similar story exists for real per capita GDP, with net emigration during the 1980s raising real per capita GDP slightly during those years, and net immigration during the 1990s lowering real per capita GDP slightly, both relative to the index of real GDP. The index of Lebanese population (1974 = 100) shows that by 1993 Lebanon's population had grown to more than 6 percent above its 1974 level. All three series are depicted in Chart 1.

Table 2

Population and GDP

article image
Sources: Bank of Lebanon; International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics; and IMF staff estimates.

As noted by Saïdi (1986), the chief determinants of Lebanon's failure to retain its real prewar output levels were (1) a large decline in investment, owing to the war-induced heightening of risk, which drastically slowed productivity growth rates; (2) the dislocation of goods and labor markets; and (3) the widespread destruction of physical capital stocks and large-scale emigration of those Lebanese endowed with relatively high levels of human capital. The total damage to physical assets during the war period has been estimated by the United Nations (1991) at $25 billion. In addition, the World Bank (1993) estimates that, during 1975–90, some 200,000 professional and skilled Lebanese sought employment in other countries. This is 7.33 percent of the 1974 population and is reflected in the population index of Table 2. The 1989 signing of the Taïf Accord for National Reconciliation provided the catalyst for an end to hostilities during 1990 and the beginning of efforts to reconstruct the Lebanese economy.

Chart 1
Chart 1

GDP and Population Indices

(1974=100)

Sources: Bank of Lebanon; Saidi (1984a): and IMF staff estimates.

How Fast Can Lebanon Recover?

According to the above estimates, Lebanese real per capita incomes at the end of the 1980s had been reduced to about one-third their level of 1974 as a direct result of the civil war (Table 2). This raises the question of how long it will take Lebanon not only to recover to its 1974 level of per capita income, but also to attain the steady-state (or long-run) real income level it would have realized in the absence of the war. In the analysis below, this question is addressed using the conventional framework of neoclassical growth theory (Solow (1956) and Swan (1956)).

Lebanese real per capita income (in constant 1974 Lebanese pounds) in 1974 was LL 2,981 but, by 1993, had fallen to LL 1,434. Assuming a constant rate of growth of the Lebanese population after 1993 of 2 percent a year (largely driven by high net immigration as the growing economy attracts Lebanese returning from the diaspora), the rate of growth of GDP has implications for the speed with which real per capita incomes return to their prewar level of 1974.5 At the time the postwar reconstruction program was launched, real growth was projected to be 8 percent a year for 1993–96, yielding 6 percent a year real per capita growth rates, given the earlier assumption regarding population growth. Assuming a constant rate of real per capita income growth of 6 percent a year after 1993, Chart 2 shows Lebanon reattaining its 1974 level of per capita income sometime during the year 2006, at 8 percent a year growth sometime during the year 2003, and at 10 percent a year growth sometime during the year 2001.

An important caveat to this analysis is how far measured GDP in 1993 falls short of potential output (using current stocks of capital and labor). To the extent that economic and political stability results in more efficient use of such resources, then there could be a rapid jump in measured output, similar to that which occurred following the 1982 shock to output. It is important to note that the rehabilitation of Lebanon's infrastructure, particularly the normalization of the generation and distribution of power supplies, should also stimulate a jump in both per capita output and the number of hours worked.

Given that the stocks of capital and labor in Lebanon in 1993 are similar to those that existed in 1987, a rapid jump in measured output could be expected in 1994 as actual output begins to approximate potential output. Assuming that per capita output in 1994 jumps to a level that is halfway between the level of output for the previous peak of 1987 and measured output for 1993 (to about LL 2,114 in constant 1974 Lebanese pounds) and then registers a constant rate of real per capita income growth of 6 percent a year after 1994, Chart 2 reveals that Lebanon would reattain its 1974 level of per capita income sometime during the year 2000. For 8 percent a year growth after 1994, the 1974 level of per capita income would be reattained sometime during the year 1999; for 10 percent a year growth after 1994, the 1974 level would be reattained sometime during the year 1998.

Chart 2
Chart 2

Per Capita Real GDP, 1964–2010

(In constant 1974 Lebanese pounds)

Source: IMF staff estimates.1 Real per capita output In 1994 is assumed to jump to halfway between real per capita output for 1987 and 1993, and thereafter to grow at the rates given.2 Future growth rates, for 1993 onward.

Previous cross-sectional analyses of the length of time necessary for the convergence of actual incomes to their steady-state level (called β-convergence in the literature) have elicited a relatively tight range of speeds at which economies travel during their transition to their respective steady-state income levels.6 Barro (1991) analyzed the pattern of growth for 98 countries, including some that are members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), between 1960 and 1985 and found that 1.11 percent of the gap between any given economy's initial level of per capita income and its steady-state level of per capita income was closed every year (that is, β = 0.011). Similar work for the states of the United States between 1880 and 1988 by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992a) yields β = 0.0249; for the prefectures of Japan between 1930 and 1987 by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992b) yields β= 0.034, and between 1960 and 1988 by Shioji (1992) yields β = 0.033; for the regions of European OECD countries between 1950 and 1985 by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992a) yields β = 0.0178; for the provinces of Canada between 1961 and 1991 by Coulombe and Lee (1993) yields β = 0.024; and for the states of Australia between 1861 and 1991 by Cashin (forthcoming, 1995) yields β= 0.0121. Hence, the range of speeds of convergence usually described in the literature centers on β= 0,02, meaning that 2 percent of the gap between an economy's initial and steady-state real per capita income level is closed each year.7

Although the above models assume closed economies, economists have long recognized that capital mobility accelerates the rate at which an economy can converge to its steady state. Indeed, an open economy with perfect capital mobility should converge at an infinite rate. However, both Cohen (1992) and Barro, Mankiw, and Sala-i-Martin (1992) have demonstrated that if some types of capital (such as human capital) cannot be financed by borrowing on world markets, then an open economy such as Lebanon's will converge to its steady state only slightly faster than the speeds calculated using the closed-economy neoclassical growth model. Partial capital mobility ensures that the credit-constrained open economy resembles a closed economy with a relatively smaller share of broad capital in GDP (denoted α below)—the result is that diminishing returns set in much sooner, and so the speed of convergence is faster. In effect, an open economy with partial capital mobility looks much more like a closed economy than a fully open one.

In Lebanon's case, an implication is that to the extent the civil war destroyed a sizable part of its broad (physical and human) capital stocks (postwar α is low), then its speed along the transition to its steady state (β) will be relatively higher than the examples quoted above. Moreover, if following the war the Lebanese are more willing to substitute intertemporally in consumption, or have lower discount rates or higher postwar rates of depreciation, then β will also be relatively higher. The Lebanese speed of convergence would also be raised by relatively higher rates of population growth and greater exogenous productivity growth rates. However, it is unlikely that the Lebanese would become more patient (lower discount rates) or more willing to substitute consumption intertemporally (lower elasticity of substitution in consumption) in the face of much lower levels of postwar consumption. In addition, to the extent that part of the Lebanese human capital stock returns from overseas, the speed of convergence could be faster than would otherwise be the case.

In the analysis below, it is assumed that Lebanon was at its steady-state level of real per capita income in 1974,8 and then suffered the idiosyncratic shock of the civil war, leaving it with 48 percent of its 1974 steady-state per capita income at the end of 1993 (Table 2).9 If the neoclassical growth model is invoked and the near-universal rate of convergence of economies to their steady state of 2 percent a year is assumed, then the rate of per capita income growth in Lebanon would initially be 1.45 percent greater than the steady-state rate, 1.40 percent greater after five years, 1.33 percent greater after ten years, and still be a sizable 1.21 percent greater after twenty years (see column 2, Table 3).10 Given these assumptions, columns 4 and 5 of Table 3 list the number of years it would take Lebanon to partially converge to its steady-state real per capita income level for a range of speeds of convergence.11 For β = 0.02, it would take Lebanon about 34 years to eliminate half the gap between its actual 1993 and steady-state incomes (that is, to catch up halfway to its steady-state level of per capita income), and about 69 years to eliminate three-fourths of the 1993 gap.12 If the speed of convergence were an extremely fast 5 percent a year, Lebanon's initial rate of per capita income growth would be 3.58 percent higher than its steady-state rate; after five years it would be 3.25 percent higher, after ten years 2.89 percent higher, and after twenty years 2.32 percent higher. Again, even with this extremely rapid speed of convergence, it would still take about 14 years to close half the gap between its actual 1993 and its steady-state per capita income, and 27 years to eliminate three-fourths of the 1993 gap. The relevant information for speeds of convergence of 3 percent and 4 percent a year are also listed in Table 3.13

Table 3

Convergence of Actual to Steady-State Real Per Capita Incomes

article image
Source: IMF staff estimates.

This analysis indicates that economic growth and convergence of per capita incomes usually involve a period of transition lasting several generations. Given that (β*100) percent of the initial gap between actual and steady-state incomes is closed every year, the time taken to close, for example, the last 10 percent of the initial gap is much longer than the first 10 percent, as diminishing returns to capital ensure that the actual rate of growth in the former case is much less than in the latter. While Lebanon's postwar economy may possess some of the attributes required to shrink its period of transition to the steady state, the above calculations from a diverse group of economies indicate the sizable time lags typically involved in attaining the steady-state income.

Does It Matter for Growth What Type of Capital Was Lost?

Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1993) suggest an alternative way to conceptualize the transition along the steady state that is of particular relevance to war-ravaged economies such as Lebanon's. Using two-sector models of endogenous growth (with physical and human capital, for example), they analyzed the implications of deviations from the steady-state ratio of physical (k) and human (h) capital stocks.14 For example, if, starting from a steady-state position, a war destroys a large fraction of an economy's physical capital, leaving its stock of human capital relatively untouched, then that economy will have to reattain its steady-state proportions by higher (lower) than steady-state growth rates for physical (human) capital along the transition to its steady state.

The often complex transitional dynamics of two-sector growth models can be seen in the models of Uzawa (1965) and Lucas (1988), where the transition is influenced by three key factors.15 First, when the actual (postwar) ratio of physical capital to human capital (k/h) is relatively low compared with its steady-state value (k/h)*, then high average returns to investment in physical capital will ensure that the ratio grows rapidly (the Solow-Swan effect). Second, when physical capital is relatively low, the marginal product of labor (real wages) is also low, leading people to substitute away from work toward leisure. Third, there is a wealth- or consumption-smoothing effect that results in a high ratio of consumption to physical capital when physical capital is in relatively short supply.

For plausible parameter values (where the elasticity of substitution in consumption (Ά) is greater than the share of capital in production (α)), the wealth effect dominates.16 Accordingly, an economy that lost relatively more of its physical capital stock than of its human capital stock would raise the former through increased work effort rather than through low consumption in the transition period. As we shall see, such an economy will also enjoy relatively faster growth rates during the transition to the steady state.

The behavior of other key variables along the transition from an arbitrary initial physical-to-human-capital ratio to the steady-state ratio is also of interest. Simulations using reasonable parameter values for the Uzawa-Lucas model (and assuming that Ά>α) yield the following results: (1) real interest rates are high for low values of (k/h) (for values of (k/h) one-half those of (k/h)*, initial real rates are calculated to be about 16 percent) and fall as (k/h) rises; (2) the rate of growth of output exhibits a negative relationship with (k/h);17 (3) savings rates fall along a transition where (k/h) is rising; (4) the growth rates of physical capital stocks and consumption will be positive but falling as (k/h) rises; and (5) the growth rate of human capital stocks will be negative but rising as (k/h) rises. Most important, the time paths for the growth rates of real GDP for an economy whose logarithm of initial postwar (k/h) is half as large as (k/h)* reveal that the subsequent growth rate of real GDP is initially very large, at about 14 percent a year, and then falls smoothly to about 6 percent by the fifth year, reaching its steady-state value of 2 percent a year after about twenty-five years.18

Of most relevance for the growth prospects of Lebanon is the finding that the growth rate of any given economy along the transition path depends importantly on which of the two types of capital is in relatively short supply after an idiosyncratic shock, such as a civil war. If the relative loss of human capital is larger, then the growth rate of the economy will be slow for a long time; if the relative loss of physical capital is larger, then high marginal returns to, and short lead times of, such investment will allow the economy to recover relatively quickly.19 Although Lebanon did indeed lose labor during the net emigration period of the 1980s, it has now more than recovered its 1974 population level (Table 2 and Chart 1). While the case could be made that the education-weighted stock of human capital in Lebanon in 1993 is lower than its 1974 value, it is unlikely that the relative loss to human capital stocks is larger than that to physical capital stocks.20

In a historical context, Lebanon would then be expected to more closely resemble Germany after World War II and the South after the American Civil War (with proportionately less destruction of population than of material resources) than China after the Mongol invasions (with the reverse). Hence, in the presence of continued political and economic stability, the prospect for a relatively fast recovery of the Lebanese economy exists.

1

GDP estimates based on indices of imports could be biased downward in years when sharp exchange rate depreciations reduced the demand for imports.

2

These falls are also reflected in declines in the volume of electricity production in 1976, 1981, 1984, 1986, and 1989–90 (Table 1).

3

While the loss of life has been estimated at over 150,000, casualties were more than double that number (United Nations (1991)).

4

The strong recovery in real GDP in 1987, and its subsequent fall in 1983, could partly reflect the different methodology used for estimating the 1987 GDP.

5

The rate of population growth was 2.16 percent in 1992 and 2.20 percent in 1993. The assumed growth rate could well be an underestimate in the short term, given that many of the returning Lebanese are likely to be in their peak childbearing years, and because the war induced the postponement of marriages and childbearing for those who remained in Lebanon during the hostilities.

6

Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1994) provide a summary of the major economic growth theories. The intuition behind the convergence implication of the Solow-Swan neoclassical growth model is that, owing to diminishing returns to capital, each incremental addition to the stock of capital generates large (small) accretions in output when the stock of capital is small (large).

7

As noted above, there is a nontrivial probability that Lebanese real output is measured with error, which typically results in biased estimates of the speed of convergence. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992a) test the implications of measurement error with their data on the states of the United States and find that such errors are unlikely to have a major influence on measured convergence speeds because of offsetting biases in the typical growth regression equation.

8

If not. then the time periods indicated in this analysis would be further lengthened.

9

It is also assumed that there is no initial jump in measured output in 1994.

10

The equation for the excess of the actual growth rate of per capita income over the steady-state growth rate is given by

γ = γ*-[(1 - e-βT)/T] log (y/y*),

where γ is the actual growth rate of per capita income;

γ* is the steady-state growth rate of per capita income;

β is the speed of convergence to the steady-state level;

T is the number of years since 1993; and

y/y* is the ratio of 1993 per capita income to its steady-state value.

11

Speeds of convergence of real per capita incomes represent the rate at which a given economy catches up to its steady-state level, given some initial level of income. For Cobb-Douglas technology and assuming a constant gross saving rale, the speed of convergence (β) is given by β = (1 - α)•(ξ + η + δ), where α is the capital share of GDP, ξ is the exogenous rate of labor-augmenting technical progress, η is the rate of growth of population, and δ is the rate of depreciation of the capital stock. Most important, β is a decreasing function of the capital share, α. Therefore, β is invariant to the level of technology used, as improvements in technology raise proportionately the steady-state and actual values of per capita income.

12

The half-life of the convergence process (t*) is given by the following: t* = log(½)/log (1 - β), where β is the speed of convergence.

13

To see the quantitative implications of the parameters that enter into the equation for the speed of transition, β = (1 - α)-(ξ + η + δ) assume that ξ = 0.02 a year, η = 0.025 a year, and δ = 0.05 a year (which are reasonable values for a peacetime economy), but that α = 0.6 (which would be regarded as low for a peacetime economy but is likely to be more accurate for an economy recently at war). This set of parameters generates β = 0.038 a year, so the case for expecting a relatively more rapid transition for Lebanon can indeed be made.

14

Transitions arise in the neoclassical model because the actual levels of capital diverge from their steady-state values; here they can arise from intersectoral imbalances in stocks of capital.

15

The Uzawa-Lucas model has a production function for education that uses only human capital as an input.

16

It is usually regarded in the literature that θ > 1, and it is known that α <1, so therefore θ>α. The higher the value of θ, the more agents in the economy dislike increasing savings in response to a relative shortage of physical capital (that is. the wealth- or consumption- smoothing effect is stronger).

17

This is an important implication of the transition for Lebanon, as it means a country that sustains significant losses in its stock of physical (human) capital on account of a war can feasibly make a relatively fast (slow) recovery.

18

The key parameters in the Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1993) simulation had the following values: Ά = 2: the share of physical capital in GDP = 0.5; the rate of time preference = 0.04; γ* = 0.015 a year; and the rate of depreciation of both physical and human capital = 0.05 a year.

19

Moreover, the nature of the physical capital loss during the war could also affect the growth rate of an economy along its transition path.

20

Saïdi (1984a) estimated that in 1983 Lebanon's real physical capital stock was 50 percent of its 1974 level and that during 1975–83 the loss of physical capital was more than twice that of effective labor. There is little evidence that similar ratios would be inappropriate for the full 1974–93 period.

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Cover Economic Dislocation and Recovery in Lebanon
Economic Dislocation and Recovery in Lebanon
Author:
Mr. Jose Martelino
,
Mr. S. Nuri Erbas
,
Mr. Adnan Mazarei
,
Ms. Sena Eken
, and
Mr. Paul Cashin
ISBN:
9781557754592
ISSN:
0251-6365
Publication Date:
01 Dec 1995
Publisher:
International Monetary Fund
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5089/9781557754592.084
Pages:
71
Chart 1

GDP and Population Indices

(1974=100)
Chart 2

Per Capita Real GDP, 1964–2010

(In constant 1974 Lebanese pounds)

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