Appendix I: PIMA Questionnaire
Planning Sustainable Levels of Public Investment
1. | FISCAL TARGETS AND RULES: Does the government have fiscal institutions to support fiscal sustainability and to facilitate medium-term planning for public investment? |
1.a. | Is there a target or limit for government to ensure debt sustainability? |
1.b. | Is fiscal policy guided by one or more permanent fiscal rules? |
1.c. | Is there a medium-term fiscal framework to align budget preparation with fiscal policy? |
2. | NATIONAL AND SECTORAL PLANNING: Are investment allocation decisions based on sectoral and inter-sectoral strategies? |
2.a. | Does the government prepare national and sectoral strategies for public investment? |
2.b. | Are the government’s national and sectoral strategies or plans for public investment costed? |
2.c. | Do sector strategies include measurable targets for the outputs and outcomes of investment projects? |
3. | COORDINATION BETWEEN ENTITIES: Is there effective coordination of the investment plans of central and other government entities? |
3.a. | Is capital spending by subnational governments (SNGs) coordinated with the central government? |
3.b. | Does the central government have a transparent, rules-based system for making capital transfers to SNGs and for providing timely information on such transfers? |
3.c | Are contingent liabilities arising from capital projects of SNGs, public corporations (PCs), and public-private partnerships reported to the central government? |
4. | PROJECT APPRAISAL: Are project proposals subject to systematic project appraisal? |
4.a. | Are major capital projects subject to rigorous technical, economic, and financial analysis? |
4.b. | Is there a standard methodology and central support for the appraisal of projects? |
4.c. | Are risks taken into account in conducting project appraisals? |
5. | ALTERNATIVE INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCING: Is there a favorable climate for the private sector, public-private partnerships, and PCs to finance infrastructure? |
5.a. | Does the regulatory framework support competition in contestable markets for economic infrastructure (for example, power, water, telecoms, and transport)? |
5.b. | Has the government published a strategy/policy for public-private partnerships and a legal/regulatory framework that guides the preparation, selection, and management of public-private partnership projects? |
5.c. | Does the government oversee the investment plans of PCs and monitor their financial performance? |
1. | FISCAL TARGETS AND RULES: Does the government have fiscal institutions to support fiscal sustainability and to facilitate medium-term planning for public investment? |
1.a. | Is there a target or limit for government to ensure debt sustainability? |
1.b. | Is fiscal policy guided by one or more permanent fiscal rules? |
1.c. | Is there a medium-term fiscal framework to align budget preparation with fiscal policy? |
2. | NATIONAL AND SECTORAL PLANNING: Are investment allocation decisions based on sectoral and inter-sectoral strategies? |
2.a. | Does the government prepare national and sectoral strategies for public investment? |
2.b. | Are the government’s national and sectoral strategies or plans for public investment costed? |
2.c. | Do sector strategies include measurable targets for the outputs and outcomes of investment projects? |
3. | COORDINATION BETWEEN ENTITIES: Is there effective coordination of the investment plans of central and other government entities? |
3.a. | Is capital spending by subnational governments (SNGs) coordinated with the central government? |
3.b. | Does the central government have a transparent, rules-based system for making capital transfers to SNGs and for providing timely information on such transfers? |
3.c | Are contingent liabilities arising from capital projects of SNGs, public corporations (PCs), and public-private partnerships reported to the central government? |
4. | PROJECT APPRAISAL: Are project proposals subject to systematic project appraisal? |
4.a. | Are major capital projects subject to rigorous technical, economic, and financial analysis? |
4.b. | Is there a standard methodology and central support for the appraisal of projects? |
4.c. | Are risks taken into account in conducting project appraisals? |
5. | ALTERNATIVE INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCING: Is there a favorable climate for the private sector, public-private partnerships, and PCs to finance infrastructure? |
5.a. | Does the regulatory framework support competition in contestable markets for economic infrastructure (for example, power, water, telecoms, and transport)? |
5.b. | Has the government published a strategy/policy for public-private partnerships and a legal/regulatory framework that guides the preparation, selection, and management of public-private partnership projects? |
5.c. | Does the government oversee the investment plans of PCs and monitor their financial performance? |
Ensuring That Public Investment Is Allocated to the Right Sectors and Projects
6. | MULTIYEAR BUDGETING: Does the government prepare medium-term projections of capital spending on a full cost basis? |
6.a. | Is capital spending by ministry or sector forecasted over a multiyear horizon? |
6.b. | Are there multiyear ceilings on capital expenditure by ministry, sector, or program? |
6.c. | Are projections of the total construction cost of major capital projects published? |
7. | BUDGET COMPREHENSIVENESS AND UNITY: To what extent are capital spending and related recurrent spending undertaken through the budget process? |
7.a. | Is capital spending mostly undertaken through the budget? |
7.b. | Are all capital projects, regardless of financing source, shown in the budget documentation? |
7.c. | Are capital and recurrent budgets prepared and presented together in the budget? |
8. | BUDGETING FOR INVESTMENT: Are investment projects protected during budget implementation? |
8.a. | Are total project outlays appropriated by the legislature at the time of a project’s commencement? |
8.b. | Are in-year transfers of appropriations (virement) from capital to current spending prevented? |
8.c. | Is the completion of ongoing projects given priority over starting new projects? |
9. | MAINTENANCE FUNDING: Is maintenance receiving adequate funding? |
9.a. | Is there a standard methodology for estimating routine maintenance needs and budget funding? |
9.b. | Is there a standard methodology for determining major improvements, and are they included in national and sectoral investment plans? |
9.c. | Can expenditures relating to routine maintenance and major improvements be identified in the budget? |
10. | PROJECT SELECTION: Are there institutions and procedures in place to guide project selection? |
10.a. | Does the government undertake a central review of major project appraisals before deciding to include projects in the budget? |
10.b. | Does the government publish and adhere to standard criteria, and stipulate a required process for project selection? |
10.c. | Does the government maintain a pipeline of appraised investment projects for inclusion in the annual budget? |
6. | MULTIYEAR BUDGETING: Does the government prepare medium-term projections of capital spending on a full cost basis? |
6.a. | Is capital spending by ministry or sector forecasted over a multiyear horizon? |
6.b. | Are there multiyear ceilings on capital expenditure by ministry, sector, or program? |
6.c. | Are projections of the total construction cost of major capital projects published? |
7. | BUDGET COMPREHENSIVENESS AND UNITY: To what extent are capital spending and related recurrent spending undertaken through the budget process? |
7.a. | Is capital spending mostly undertaken through the budget? |
7.b. | Are all capital projects, regardless of financing source, shown in the budget documentation? |
7.c. | Are capital and recurrent budgets prepared and presented together in the budget? |
8. | BUDGETING FOR INVESTMENT: Are investment projects protected during budget implementation? |
8.a. | Are total project outlays appropriated by the legislature at the time of a project’s commencement? |
8.b. | Are in-year transfers of appropriations (virement) from capital to current spending prevented? |
8.c. | Is the completion of ongoing projects given priority over starting new projects? |
9. | MAINTENANCE FUNDING: Is maintenance receiving adequate funding? |
9.a. | Is there a standard methodology for estimating routine maintenance needs and budget funding? |
9.b. | Is there a standard methodology for determining major improvements, and are they included in national and sectoral investment plans? |
9.c. | Can expenditures relating to routine maintenance and major improvements be identified in the budget? |
10. | PROJECT SELECTION: Are there institutions and procedures in place to guide project selection? |
10.a. | Does the government undertake a central review of major project appraisals before deciding to include projects in the budget? |
10.b. | Does the government publish and adhere to standard criteria, and stipulate a required process for project selection? |
10.c. | Does the government maintain a pipeline of appraised investment projects for inclusion in the annual budget? |
Delivering Productive and Durable Public Assets
11. | PROCUREMENT: Is procurement based on effective competition and subject to adequate oversight? |
11.a. | Is the procurement process for major capital projects open and transparent? |
11.b. | Is there a system in place to ensure that procurement is monitored adequately? |
11.c. | Is the procurement complaints review process conducted in a fair and timely manner? |
12. | AVAILABILITY OF FUNDING: Is financing for capital spending made available in a timely manner? |
12.a. | Are ministries/agencies able to plan and commit expenditure on capital projects in advance on the basis of reliable cash flow forecasts? |
12.b. | Is cash for project outlays released in a timely manner? |
12.c. | Is external (donor) funding of capital projects fully integrated into the main government bank account structure? |
13. | PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT: Is adequate oversight exercised over implementation of the entire public investment portfolio? |
13.a. | Are major capital projects subject to monitoring during project implementation? |
13.b. | Can funds be reallocated between investment projects during implementation? |
13.c. | Does the government adjust project implementation policies and procedures by systematically conducting ex post reviews of projects that have completed their construction phase? |
14. | MANAGEMENT OF PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION: Are capital projects well managed and controlled during the execution stage? |
14.a. | Do ministries/agencies have effective project management arrangements in place? |
14.b. | Has the government issued rules, procedures, and guidelines for project adjustments that are applied systematically across all major projects? |
14.c. | Are ex post audits of capital projects routinely undertaken? |
15. | MONITORING OF PUBLIC ASSETS: Is the value of assets properly accounted for and reported in financial statements? |
15.a. | Are asset registers updated by surveys of the stocks, values, and conditions of public assets regularly? |
15.b. | Are nonfinancial asset values recorded in the government financial accounts? |
15.c. | Is the depreciation of fixed assets captured in the government’s operating statements? |
11. | PROCUREMENT: Is procurement based on effective competition and subject to adequate oversight? |
11.a. | Is the procurement process for major capital projects open and transparent? |
11.b. | Is there a system in place to ensure that procurement is monitored adequately? |
11.c. | Is the procurement complaints review process conducted in a fair and timely manner? |
12. | AVAILABILITY OF FUNDING: Is financing for capital spending made available in a timely manner? |
12.a. | Are ministries/agencies able to plan and commit expenditure on capital projects in advance on the basis of reliable cash flow forecasts? |
12.b. | Is cash for project outlays released in a timely manner? |
12.c. | Is external (donor) funding of capital projects fully integrated into the main government bank account structure? |
13. | PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT: Is adequate oversight exercised over implementation of the entire public investment portfolio? |
13.a. | Are major capital projects subject to monitoring during project implementation? |
13.b. | Can funds be reallocated between investment projects during implementation? |
13.c. | Does the government adjust project implementation policies and procedures by systematically conducting ex post reviews of projects that have completed their construction phase? |
14. | MANAGEMENT OF PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION: Are capital projects well managed and controlled during the execution stage? |
14.a. | Do ministries/agencies have effective project management arrangements in place? |
14.b. | Has the government issued rules, procedures, and guidelines for project adjustments that are applied systematically across all major projects? |
14.c. | Are ex post audits of capital projects routinely undertaken? |
15. | MONITORING OF PUBLIC ASSETS: Is the value of assets properly accounted for and reported in financial statements? |
15.a. | Are asset registers updated by surveys of the stocks, values, and conditions of public assets regularly? |
15.b. | Are nonfinancial asset values recorded in the government financial accounts? |
15.c. | Is the depreciation of fixed assets captured in the government’s operating statements? |
Appendix II: Indicative Scoring Thresholds
The scoring thresholds in Table II.1 are indicative, and PIMA assessment teams can deviate from these if data are unavailable, inconsistent, or incomplete, or if application of the thresholds would give a misleading assessment of the dimension in question. The effectiveness thresholds provide examples of possible quantitative criteria. These are not binding.
Indicative Scoring Thresholds
Indicative Scoring Thresholds
Effectiveness | |||||
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Score | Institutional Design | ||||
1 | 1.a | Low | There is no target or limit to ensure debt sustainability. | Low | No target or limit, or the debt level exceeds the established target or limit and there is no significant improvement over the past 3 years. |
Medium | There is at least one target or limit to ensure central government debt sustainability. | Medium | The debt level exceeds the established debt target or limit, but at least half the gap has been closed over the past 3 years. If the debt level fluctuates around the target, the target should have been met at least once in the past 3 years. | ||
High | There is at least one target or limit to ensure general government debt sustainability. | High | The debt level is within the target or limit. | ||
1.b | Low | There are no permanent fiscal rules. | Low | No fiscal rule or budget balance outturn deviates significantly (more than 1.0 percent of GDP) from fiscal rule. | |
Medium | There is at least one permanent fiscal rule applicable to central government. | Medium | Budget balance outturn deviates somewhat (0.5–1.0 percent of GDP) from fiscal rule. | ||
High | There is at least 1 permanent fiscal rule applicable to central government and a comparable fiscal rule for most of general government. | High | Budget balance outturn is consistent with the fiscal rule. | ||
1.c | Low | No medium-term fiscal framework (MTFF) is prepared before budget preparation. | Low | No capital allocation in MTFF, or approved capital budget deviates significantly (more than 20 percent) higher or lower than the capital allocation in the MTFF. | |
Medium | An MTFF is prepared before budget preparation but it is limited to fiscal aggregates. | Medium | Approved capital budget deviates somewhat from (10–20 percent higher or lower than) the capital allocation in the MTFF. | ||
High | An MTFF is prepared before budget preparation, which distinguishes between current and capital spending and ongoing and new projects. | High | Approved capital budget is consistent with (less than 10 percent higher or lower than) the capital allocation in the MTFF. | ||
2 | 2.a | Low | National or sectoral public investment plans are not published, or major investment projects are not described in national and sectoral plans. | Low | No description of investment projects in plans, budgets for relevant years include few (less than 25 percent) of the investment projects described in national or sectoral plans, or few (less than 25 percent) of the projects described in budgets have been described in national or sectoral plans. |
Medium | Some major investment projects funded by the budget are described in published national and sectoral plans. | Medium | Budgets for relevant years include some (25–75 percent) of the projects that appeared in national or sectoral strategies, or some (25–75 percent) of the projects described in budgets have been described in national or sectoral plans. | ||
High | All major investment projects, regardless of financing source, are comprehensively described in published national and sectoral plans. | High | Budgets for relevant years include most (more than 75 percent) of the projects that appear in national and sectoral plans and strategies, or most (more than 75 percent) of the projects described in budgets have been described in national or sectoral plans. | ||
2.b | Low | There is no costing of investment projects in national and sectoral strategies or plans. | Low | No cost estimates in strategies, or estimates are significantly (more than 50 percent) higher than planned capital expenditure for the same period as the strategy. | |
Medium | There are broad cost estimates for investment projects in national and sectoral plans but | Medium | Cost estimates in strategies are somewhat (10–50 percent) higher than planned capital expenditure for the same period as the strategy. | ||
High | There are broad cost estimates for investment as well as specific cost estimates for major investment projects in national and sectoral plans, and cost estimates are reconciled with available resources. | High | Cost estimates in strategies are consistent with (less than 10 percent higher than) planned capital expenditure for the same period as the strategy. | ||
2.c | Low | There are no measurable targets for public investment in sectoral strategies. | Low | Performance data are used for management in few (less than 25 percent of) major projects. | |
Medium | There are measurable output targets for public investment projects in sectoral strategies. | Medium | Performance data are used for management in some (25–75 percent of) major projects. | ||
High | There are measurable output and outcome targets for public investment projects in sectoral strategies or plans. | High | Performance data, including output and outcome information, are used for management in most (more than 75 percent of) major projects. | ||
3 | 3.a | Low | There is no legal requirement for systematically sharing SNG investment plans with central government. | Low | SNG investment plans submitted to the central government account for few (less than 25 percent of the total value of) SNG public investments. |
Medium | There is a legal requirement for sharing subnational government (SNG) investment plans with central government and for publishing these alongside central government investments. | Medium | SNG investment plans submitted to the central government account for some (25–75 percent of the total value of) SNG public investment. | ||
High | There are legal requirements for sharing SNG investment plans with central government and for systematic coordination of these between central government and SNGs. | High | SNG investment plans submitted to the central government account for most (more than 75 percent of the total value of) SNG public investment. | ||
3.b | Low | There is no legal or regulatory framework that establishes a transparent, rules-based mechanism for capital transfers to SNGs. | Low | No mechanism for predictable transfers, or actual capital transfers deviate significantly from amounts notified to SNGs (by more than 15 percent). | |
Medium | There is a legal or regulatory framework that establishes a transparent, rules-based mechanism for capital transfers to SNGs, with transfer amounts announced less than 6 months before the fiscal year. | Medium | Actual capital transfers deviate somewhat from amounts notified to SNGs (by 5–15 percent) or actual notification is done less than 6 months before the fiscal year. | ||
High | There is a legal or regulatory framework that establishes a transparent, rules-based mechanism for capital transfers to SNGs, with transfer amounts announced at least 6 months before the fiscal year. | High | Actual capital transfers are consistent with amounts notified to SNGs (deviate by less than 5 percent) and actual notification is done at least 6 months before the fiscal year. | ||
3.c | Low | Legal framework does not require reporting of contingent liabilities from SNG, public corporation (PC), and public-private partnership projects. | Low | Few contingent liabilities (less than 25 percent of value) are reported to central government, or contingent liabilities are reported for none or 1 of 3 categories. | |
Medium | Legal framework requires reporting to central government of contingent liabilities from SNG, PC, and public-private partnership projects. | Medium | Some (25–75 percent of) contingent liabilities are reported to central government, or contingent liabilities are reported for 2 of 3 categories. | ||
High | Legal framework requires reporting and public disclosure of contingent liabilities from SNG, PC, and public-private partnership projects in budget documents. | High | Most (more than 75 percent of) contingent liabilities are reported to central government and disclosed in budget documents, or contingent liabilities are reported and disclosed for 3 of 3 categories. | ||
4 | 4.a | Low | There is no legal or regulatory requirement for formal, systematic appraisal of major investment projects. | Low | Few major investment projects (less than 25 percent regardless of funding source) are subject to stringent appraisal. |
Medium | There is a legal or regulatory requirement for formal, systematic appraisal of major investment projects. | Medium | Some major investment projects (25–75 percent regardless of funding source) are subject to stringent appraisal. | ||
High | There is a legal or regulatory requirement for formal, systematic appraisal of major investment projects, including for publication of appraisal results and/or independent review. | High | Most major investment projects (more than 75 percent regardless of funding source) are subject to stringent appraisal, and many (more than 50 percent) have published summary appraisal results and/or undergone independent review. | ||
4.b | Low | There is no standard methodology or central support for appraisal of investment projects. | Low | There is no standard methodology for analysis of investment projects, or the methodology is fully applied for few (less than 25 percent of) major projects. | |
Medium | There is either a standard methodology or central support for appraisal of investment projects. | Medium | The standard methodology for analysis of investment projects is fully applied for some (25–75 percent of) major projects. | ||
High | There is both a standard methodology and central support for appraisal of investment projects. | High | The standard methodology for analysis of investment projects is fully applied for most (more than 75 percent of) major projects. | ||
4.c | Low | There is no regulatory requirement for analysis of risks related to investment projects. | Low | Few major investment projects (less than 25 percent) include stringent analysis of project risks. | |
Medium | There is a regulatory requirement for analysis of risks related to investment projects. | Medium | Some major investment projects (25–75 percent) include stringent analysis of project risks. | ||
High | There is a regulatory requirement for analysis of risks related to investment projects and for development of risk mitigation plans. | High | Most major investment projects (more than 75 percent) include stringent analysis of project risks and risk mitigation plans. | ||
5 | 5.a | Low | The legal and regulatory framework restricts the provision of economic infrastructure to domestic monopolies or establishes few economic regulators. | Low | Private companies have small market shares (less than 25 percent in 2 major markets). |
Medium | The legal and regulatory framework supports competition in some major infrastructure markets and establishes some economic regulators. | Medium | Private companies have medium market shares (25–75 percent) in at least 2 major markets. | ||
High | The legal and regulatory framework supports competition in most major infrastructure markets, and economic regulators are well established. | High | Private companies have high market shares (at least 75 percent) in at least 2 major markets. | ||
5.b | Low | There is no published strategy/ policy framework for public-private partnerships, and the legal and regulatory framework is weak. | Low | Few (less than 5 percent of) public investments the past 3 years have been implemented as public-private partnerships and are consistent with the public-private partnership policy and legal/regulatory framework. | |
Medium | A public-private partnership strategy/policy has been published, but the legal and regulatory framework is weak. | Medium | Some (5–10 percent of) public investments the past 3 years have been implemented as public-private partnerships and are consistent with the public-private partnership policy and legal/regulatory framework. | ||
High | A public-private partnership strategy/policy has been published, and a strong legal and regulatory framework guides the preparation, selection, and management of public-private partnership projects. | High | Many (more than 10 percent of) public investments the past 3 years have been implemented as public-private partnerships and are consistent with the public-private partnership policy and legal/regulatory framework. | ||
5.c | Low | There is no legal requirement that the government systematically review the investment plans of PCs. | Low | The review process covers few PC infrastructure investments (less than 25 percent of total value) over the past 3 years. | |
Medium | There is a legal requirement that the government reviews the investment plans of PCs but not for publication of a consolidated report on these plans or the financial performance of PCs. | Medium | The review process covers at least the 5 largest PCs measured by assets or some (25–75 percent of) PC infrastructure investments over the past 3 years. | ||
High | There is a legal requirement that the government reviews the investment plans of PCs and publishes a consolidated report on these plans and the financial performance of PCs. | High | The review process covers at least the 10 largest PCs measured by assets or most (75 percent or more of) PC infrastructure investments over the past 3 years. | ||
6 | 6.a | Low | There are no published multiyear estimates for capital spending in budget documentation. | Low | Medium-term capital projections are missing, or approved capital budget allocations deviate significantly (by more than 20 percent) from capital spending projections for the same years. |
Medium | Medium-term projections of aggregate capital spending are published in budget documentation. | Medium | Approved capital budget allocations deviate somewhat (by 10–20 percent) from capital spending projections for the same years. | ||
High | Medium-term projections for capital spending by ministry or sector are published in budget documentation. | High | Approved capital budget allocations are consistent (deviation less than 10 percent) with capital spending projections for the same years. | ||
6.b | Low | There are no multiyear ceilings on capital expenditure by ministry, sector, or program. | Low | No multiyear ceilings, or approved budget amounts for capital spending are significantly (more than 15 percent) higher than the aggregate multiyear ceilings for the same years. | |
Medium | There are indicative multiyear ceilings on capital expenditure by ministry, sector, or program. | Medium | Approved budget amounts for capital spending are somewhat (5–15 percent) higher than the aggregate multiyear ceilings for the same years. | ||
High | There are binding multiyear ceilings on capital expenditure by ministry, sector, or program. | High | Approved budget amounts for capital spending are consistent (less than 5 percent higher) with the multiyear ceilings for the same years. | ||
6.c | Low | There are no published estimates of total construction costs for all major projects in. | Low | Total construction costs for major projects are not included in budget documentation, or total costs are presented but changes in estimates are not identified. | |
Medium | Total construction costs for all major projects are published, but without indication of the distribution of these costs over time. | Medium | Total construction costs for major projects are published in budget documentation, and changes in estimates are recorded and explained. | ||
High | Total construction costs for all major projects are published with indications of the distribution of these costs over a 3–5 year horizon. | High | Total construction costs and the annual breakdown of costs are published, and changes from one budget to the next are identified and explained in a published document. | ||
7 | 7. a | Low | The legal and regulatory framework allows significant capital spending by extrabudgetary entities (EBEs), and there is no legal requirement for authorization or disclosure in budget documents. | Low | Capital spending by EBEs is significant (more than 10 percent of the capital spending in the central government budget), and little extrabudgetary capital spending (less than 75 percent) is authorized or disclosed in the budget. |
Medium | The legal and regulatory framework allows significant capital spending by EBEs, but there is a legal requirement for authorization or disclosure in budget documents. | Medium | Capital spending by EBEs is significant (more than 10 percent of the capital spending in the central government budget), but most (more than 75 percent of) EBE capital spending is disclosed in the budget. | ||
High | The legal and regulatory framework allows little or no capital spending by EBEs, and any such spending should be authorized or disclosed in the budget. | High | Capital spending by EBEs is insignificant (less than 10 percent of the capital spending in the central government budget), and most of this (more than 75 percent) is authorized or disclosed in the budget. | ||
7.b | Low | The legal and regulatory framework requires none or only 1 of the 3 major financing sources (external, public-private partnerships, PCs) to be disclosed in the budget. | Low | None of the 3 sources are disclosed in the budget, or few projects in the listed categories are included in the budget (less than 50 percent of the total investment in these categories is included). | |
Medium | The legal and regulatory framework requires that 2 of the 3 major financing sources are disclosed in the budget. | Medium | At least 2 categories are included in the budget, containing many of the projects in the listed categories (more than 75 percent of the total investment in these categories is included). | ||
High | The legal and regulatory framework requires that all 3 of the major financing sources listed are disclosed in the budget. | High | All 3 categories and most projects in these categories are included in the budget (the value of projects in the budget is more than 75 percent of the total investment in the 3 categories). | ||
7.c | Low | Capital and current budgets are prepared by separate ministries and presented separately. | Low | The current cost impacts of few (less than 25 percent of) capital projects are reviewed by the central budget department during budget preparation. | |
Medium | Budget preparation and presentation are consolidated, but capital and current spending are not combined under a program or functional classification. | Medium | The current cost impacts of some (25–75 percent of) major capital projects are reviewed by the central budget department during budget preparation. | ||
High | Budget preparation and presentation are fully integrated. Current and capital spending are presented according to a program or functional classification. | High | The current cost impacts of most (more than 75 percent of) major capital projects are reviewed by the central budget department during budget preparation. | ||
8 | 8.a | Low | The legal and regulatory framework does not require information on total project costs to be included in the budget documentation. | Low | Budget documentation includes total project costs of few (less than 25 percent of) major projects that are appropriated. |
Medium | The legal and regulatory framework requires that the budget provides information about total project costs. | Medium | Total project costs for some (25–75 percent of) major projects that are appropriated are disclosed in budget documentation. | ||
High | The legal and regulatory framework requires that the budget also provides information about multiyear commitments related to the projects. | High | Total project costs and multiyear commitments for most (more than 75 percent of) major projects that are appropriated are disclosed in budget documentation. | ||
8.b | Low | There are no legal limitations on in-year transfers of appropriations (virement) from capital to current spending. | Low | Virement from capital to current spending is a significant share (more than 15 percent) of the initial capital budget. | |
Medium | Virement from capital to current spending requires approval by the Ministry of Finance (MoF). | Medium | Virement from capital to current spending is a moderate share (between 5 and 15 percent) of the initial capital budget. | ||
High | Virement from capital to current spending requires the approval of the legislature. | High | Virement from capital to current spending has been done with legislative approval and is a low share (less than 5 percent) of the initial capital budget. | ||
8.c | Low | There is no legal or regulatory mechanism that protects funding of ongoing projects. | Low | Some (less than 75 percent of) ongoing projects receive funding as needed, or there are several examples of major projects not receiving sufficient funding. | |
Medium | There is a legal or regulatory mechanism that protects funding of ongoing projects. | Medium | Most (75–90 percent of) ongoing projects receive funding as needed, or there are few examples of major projects not receiving sufficient funding. | ||
High | There is a legal or regulatory mechanism that protects funding for ongoing projects in the annual budget and over the medium term. | High | All (over 90 percent of) ongoing projects receive funding as needed, or there are no examples of major projects not receiving sufficient funding. | ||
9 | 9. a | Low | There are no standard methods for assessing the needs for routine (current) maintenance and its cost for main asset classes (for example, roads, buildings). | Low | Approved budget allocations for current maintenance funding for main asset classes are clearly inadequate (less than 50 percent of assessed maintenance needs). If there are no precise estimates for maintenance needs, maintenance funding is less than 2 percent of estimated asset replacement values. |
Medium | There are standard methodologies for assessing the needs for routine maintenance and its costs for main asset classes (for example, roads, buildings), but there is no formal requirement that the methodologies determine budget submissions for current maintenance. | Medium | Approved budgets for current maintenance funding for main asset classes are somewhat inadequate (50–90 percent of assessed maintenance needs). If there are no precise estimates for maintenance needs, maintenance funding is more than 2 percent of estimated asset replacement values. |
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High | There are standard methodologies for assessing the needs for routine maintenance and its costs for main asset classes (for example, roads, buildings), and there is a formal requirement that the methodologies determine budget submissions for current maintenance. | High | Approved budgets for current maintenance funding for main asset classes are broadly in line with requirements (at least 90 percent of assessed maintenance needs). | ||
9.b | Low | There are no standard methodologies for determining the needs for major improvements (capital maintenance). | Low | Approved budgets for capital maintenance are clearly inadequate (lower than 50 percent of estimated needs). If there are no precise estimates for capital maintenance needs, funding is less than 2 percent of asset replacement values. |
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Medium | There are standard methodologies for determining the needs for improvements (capital maintenance), but these assessments are not reflected in national or sectoral plans. | Medium | Approved budgets for capital maintenance are somewhat inadequate (between 50 and 90 percent of estimated needs). If there are no precise estimates for capital maintenance needs, funding is more than 2 percent of asset replacement values. | ||
High | There are standard methodologies for determining the needs for major improvements (capital maintenance), and these needs are fully reflected in national and sectoral plans. | High | Approved budgets for capital maintenance are broadly in line with requirements (at least 90 percent of estimated needs). | ||
9.c | Low | Routine and capital maintenance cannot be systematically identified in the budget. | Low | Some (less than 75 percent of) estimated maintenance funding is identified in the budget. | |
Medium | Routine and capital maintenance can be systematically identified in the budget documentation using either the budget classif-cation or analytical information regularly provided in budget documentation. | Medium | Most (more than 75 percent of) estimated maintenance funding is identified in the budget. | ||
High | Routine and capital maintenance can be systematically identi-fed and regularly reported in budget documentation with approved budget amounts and actual spending by ministry. | High | Most (more than 75 percent of) estimated maintenance funding is identified in the budget and regularly reported with aggregate actual spending by ministry. | ||
10 | 10.a | Low | There is no formally required central review process for major capital investment projects (including those funded by donors or public-private partnerships) before consideration of inclusion in the budget. | Low | The number of projects rejected or returned for further development is low (less than 5 percent of those submitted). |
Medium | There is a formally required central review process for major capital investment projects (including those funded by donors or public-private partnerships) before consideration of inclusion in the budget. | Medium | The number of projects rejected or returned is medium (from 5 to 10 percent of submitted proposals). | ||
High | There is a formally required central review process for major capital investment projects (including those funded by donors or public-private partnerships) before consideration of inclusion in the budget, and this review includes independent inputs. | High | The number of projects rejected or returned is high (more than 10 percent of submitted proposals), and some (at least 10 percent) of the reviews include independent inputs. | ||
10.b | Low | There are no published, specific criteria for project selection and the project selection process is not defined in law or regulation. | Low | Few (Less than 50 percent of) major projects are selected in accordance with a prescribed process and criteria. | |
Medium | There are published, specific selection criteria, but the project selection process is not clearly defined in law or regulation. | Medium | Many (50–90 percent of) major projects are selected in accordance with the prescribed process and criteria. | ||
High | There are published, specific selection criteria, and the project selection process is clearly defined in law or regulation. | High | All (more than 90 percent of) major projects are selected in accordance with the prescribed process and criteria. | ||
10.c | Low | There is no formal requirement for a pipeline of appraised investment projects. | Low | Few (less than 50 percent of) major projects are selected from the pipeline. | |
Medium | There is a pipeline of appraised projects, but no formal requirement that projects be selected only from this pipeline. | Medium | Many (50–90 percent of) major projects are selected from the pipeline. | ||
High | There is a pipeline in place (including those funded by donors or public-private partnerships) and a formal requirement that this pipeline be used to select projects in the annual budget and in the medium term. | High | All (more than 90 percent of) major projects are selected from the pipeline. | ||
11 | 11.a | Low | The legal and regulatory framework does not require competitive procurement of major projects. | Low | Few (less than 50 percent of) major projects are based on effective competitive procurement. |
Medium | The legal and regulatory framework requires competitive procurement of major projects. | Medium | Many (between 50 and 90 percent of) major projects are based on effective competitive procurement. | ||
High | The legal and regulatory framework requires competitive procurement of major projects and publication of complete and timely procurement information. | High | All (more than 90 percent of) major projects are based on effective competitive procurement, and complete and timely procurement information is publicly available. | ||
11.b | Low | There is no procurement database or the information in the database is incomplete or not timely. | Low | There is no database with complete and timely information, or analytical reports are available after more than 6 months, or not at all. | |
Medium | The database has reasonably complete information, but it is not required to produce regular analytical reports. | Medium | The database is reasonably comprehensive, but analytical reports are not available at all or after more than 6 months. | ||
High | The database has reasonably complete information and produces standard analytical reports to support a formal procurement monitoring system. | High | The database is used by a monitoring system that produces monthly or quarterly analytical reports drawing conclusions and making recommendations for improvement. | ||
11.c | Low | The legal and regulatory framework does not require that procurement complaints be reviewed by an independent body. | Low | No independent review body or the average time to decide complaints is long (more than 6 months). | |
Medium | The legal and regulatory framework requires that procurement complaints be reviewed by an independent body, but the recommendations of this body are not required to be produced on a timely basis, nor published, nor rigorously enforced. | Medium | The average time to decide complaints is medium (2–6 months). | ||
High | The legal and regulatory framework requires that procurement complaints be reviewed by an independent body whose recommendations are required to be timely, published, and rigorously enforced. | High | Independent reviews are published and rigorously enforced, and the average time to resolve complaints is short (less than 2 months). | ||
12 | 12. a | Low | There is no legal or regulatory framework for systematic cash flow forecasting. | Low | Cash flow forecasts are missing or not documented, or actual net cash flows on average deviate significantly (more than 10 percent) from forecasts. |
Medium | The legal or regulatory framework requires that cash flow forecasts are at least quarterly and that ministries be provided commitment ceilings at least a quarter in advance. | Medium | Actual net cash flows on average deviate somewhat (by 5–10 percent) from forecasts, and ministries are provided with commitment ceilings at least a quarter in advance. There may be examples of commitment ceilings not funded. | ||
High | The legal or regulatory framework requires that cash forecasts be monthly and that commitment ceilings for the whole fiscal year are provided at the beginning of the year. | High | Actual net cash flows on average deviate little (less than 5 percent) from forecasts, and commitment ceilings for the whole fiscal year are provided at the beginning of the year. There are no examples of commitment ceilings not funded. | ||
12.b | Low | There are no formal mechanisms to ensure timely release of project funds when payments become due. | Low | Not all (less than 75 percent of) invoices for major projects are paid on time. | |
Medium | There are formal mechanisms to ensure timely release of project funds, but they are not sufficiently strong to ensure that funds always are released for payment in line with appropriations. | Medium | Most (75–90 percent of) invoices for major projects are paid on time. | ||
High | There are strong mechanisms to ensure timely release of funds for payment, in line with the annual appropriation. | High | All (more than 90 percent of) invoices for major projects are paid on time, and cash releases are in line with appropriations. | ||
12.c | Low | There is no legal or regulatory requirement that external financing is at the central bank. | Low | The MoF/treasury is informed of the cash payments (date, amount, and related project) for externally financed projects not later than one month from the date of payment. | |
Medium | External financing is required to be held at the central bank but not as part of the main government bank account structure. | Medium | The MoF/treasury is informed of the cash payments (date, amount, and related project) for externally financed projects within a week from the date of payment. | ||
High | External financing is required to be fully integrated in the main government bank account structure. | High | The MoF/treasury is informed in advance of the cash payments (date, amount, and related project) for externally financed projects. | ||
13 | 13.a | Low | There is no legal or regulatory framework for systematic monitoring of major capital projects. | Low | There are only partial data on portfolio delays and cost overruns (covering less than 50 percent of the portfolio), or many (more than 50 percent) of the monitored projects (by value) are behind schedule or over budget. |
Medium | There is a legal or regulatory framework for monitoring annual project costs and physical progress during implementation of major projects. | Medium | There are systematic data on portfolio delays and cost overruns for many projects (more than 50 percent of the portfolio), and some (25–50 percent of) major projects are behind schedule or over budget. | ||
High | There is a legal or regulatory framework for central monitoring of project costs and physical progress during implementation of major projects, including for in-year reports. | High | There are systematic data on portfolio delays and cost overruns for many projects (more than 50 percent of the portfolio), and few (less than 25 percent of) major projects are behind schedule or over budget. | ||
13.b | Low | The legal or regulatory framework does not allow reallocation of funds between projects under different appropriations. | Low | There is no evidence that reallocation has promoted accelerated implementation of projects, or capital budget execution is low (less than 75 percent). | |
Medium | The legal or regulatory framework allows reallocation of funds between projects under different appropriations but does not require that this be based on systematic monitoring and transparent procedures. | Medium | There is some evidence that reallocation has promoted accelerated implementation of projects, and capital budget execution rate is medium (75–90 percent). | ||
High | The legal or regulatory framework allows reallocation of funds between projects under different appropriations and requires that this be based on systematic monitoring and transparent procedures. | High | There is significant evidence that reallocation has promoted accelerated implementation of projects, and capital budget execution rate is high (more than 90 percent). | ||
13.c | Low | There is no formal requirement for ex post reviews for major projects. | Low | Government ex post reviews cover few (less than 10 percent of) major projects. | |
Medium | There is a formal requirement for ex post review of major projects focusing on project costs, deliverables, and outputs. | Medium | Government ex post reviews cover some (10–25 percent of) major projects. | ||
High | There is formal requirement for ex post review of major projects focusing on project costs, deliverables, and outputs conducted by independent parties and systematically used to adjust policies and procedures. | High | Government ex post reviews cover many (more than 25 percent of) major projects and the information has been systematically used to adjust policies and procedures. | ||
14 | 14.a | Low | There are no legal or regulatory requirements for either appointment of senior responsible officers or implementation plans before approval of major projects. | Low | Not all (less than 75 percent of) major projects have identified senior responsible officers or project implementation plans before project approval. |
Medium | There are legal or regulatory requirements for appointment of senior responsible officers but not for implementation plans before approval of major projects. | Medium | Most (more than 75 percent of) major projects have identified senior responsible officers or project implementation plans before project approval. | ||
High | There are legal or regulatory requirements for appointment of senior responsible officers and for implementation plans before approval of major projects. | High | Most (more than 75 percent of) major projects have identified senior responsible officers and project implementation plans before project approval. | ||
14.b | Low | There are no standardized rules and procedures for project adjustments. | Low | Project adjustment proposals are not analyzed and documented, or few (less than 10 percent of) projects are subject to formal adjustment over the implementation period. | |
Medium | There are standardized rules and procedures for project adjustments, but these do not require a fundamental review of the project’s rationale, costs, and expected outputs when circumstances change significantly. | Medium | Project adjustment proposals are consistently analyzed and documented, and some (more than 10 percent of) projects are subject to formal adjustment over the implementation period. | ||
High | There are standardized rules and procedures for project adjustments, and these do require a fundamental review of the project’s rationale, costs, and expected outputs when circumstances change significantly. | High | Some major projects are cancelled or substantially redesigned following fundamental review and some (more than 10 percent of) projects are subject to formal adjustment over the implementation period. | ||
14.c | Low | The legal mandate for the external auditor does not cover ex post, external project audits or allow publication of the audit result. | Low | Few (less than 10 percent of) major projects have been subjected to external ex post audit. | |
Medium | The legal mandate for the external auditor covers ex post, external project audits and allows publication of the results of these audits. | Medium | Some (10–25 percent of) major projects have been subjected to external ex post audit. | ||
High | The legal mandate for the external auditor covers ex post, external project audits, and requires that the results be both regularly published and scrutinized by the legislature. | High | Many (more than 25 percent of) major projects have been subjected to external ex post audit. | ||
15 | 15.a | Low | Fixed asset registers are not required by law or regulation to be comprehensive or regularly updated. | Low | There is no centralized register of fixed assets, or fixed asset registers maintained by respective agencies have only partial coverage. |
Medium | Fixed asset registers are required by law or regulation to be either comprehensive or regularly updated. | Medium | The centralized fixed asset register or registers maintained by agencies are regularly updated, cover most (at least 75 percent of) government fixed assets, and are readily accessible. | ||
High | Fixed asset registers are required by law or regulation to be both comprehensive and regularly updated. | High | Fixed asset registers are maintained or consolidated centrally, are verified and updated at least every 2 years, and cover all (at least 90 percent of) government fixed assets. | ||
15.b | Low | There is no legal or regulatory requirement that government financial statements provide systematic information about fixed assets. | Low | Few (less than 25 percent of) government fixed assets are included in the government accounts. | |
Medium | There is a legal or regulatory requirement for inclusion of some fixed assets in the government financial statement, but not for revaluation of these assets on a regular basis. | Medium | Many (25–75 percent of) government fixed assets are included in the government accounts. | ||
High | There is a legal or regulatory requirement that most fixed assets be included in the government financial statements and revalued regularly. | High | Most (more than 75 percent of) government fixed assets are included in the government accounts and revalued regularly. | ||
15.c | Low | There is no legal or regulatory requirement for recording of depreciation of fixed assets in government accounts. | Low | Depreciation is less than 1 percent of fixed assets. | |
Medium | There is a legal or regulatory requirement that depreciation of fixed assets be recorded in government accounts based on statistical estimates. | Medium | Depreciation is 1–2 percent of fixed assets. | ||
High | There is a legal or regulatory requirement that depreciation of fixed assets be recorded in government accounts based on asset-specific assumptions. | High | Depreciation is more than 2 percent of fixed assets. |
Indicative Scoring Thresholds
Effectiveness | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Score | Institutional Design | ||||
1 | 1.a | Low | There is no target or limit to ensure debt sustainability. | Low | No target or limit, or the debt level exceeds the established target or limit and there is no significant improvement over the past 3 years. |
Medium | There is at least one target or limit to ensure central government debt sustainability. | Medium | The debt level exceeds the established debt target or limit, but at least half the gap has been closed over the past 3 years. If the debt level fluctuates around the target, the target should have been met at least once in the past 3 years. | ||
High | There is at least one target or limit to ensure general government debt sustainability. | High | The debt level is within the target or limit. | ||
1.b | Low | There are no permanent fiscal rules. | Low | No fiscal rule or budget balance outturn deviates significantly (more than 1.0 percent of GDP) from fiscal rule. | |
Medium | There is at least one permanent fiscal rule applicable to central government. | Medium | Budget balance outturn deviates somewhat (0.5–1.0 percent of GDP) from fiscal rule. | ||
High | There is at least 1 permanent fiscal rule applicable to central government and a comparable fiscal rule for most of general government. | High | Budget balance outturn is consistent with the fiscal rule. | ||
1.c | Low | No medium-term fiscal framework (MTFF) is prepared before budget preparation. | Low | No capital allocation in MTFF, or approved capital budget deviates significantly (more than 20 percent) higher or lower than the capital allocation in the MTFF. | |
Medium | An MTFF is prepared before budget preparation but it is limited to fiscal aggregates. | Medium | Approved capital budget deviates somewhat from (10–20 percent higher or lower than) the capital allocation in the MTFF. | ||
High | An MTFF is prepared before budget preparation, which distinguishes between current and capital spending and ongoing and new projects. | High | Approved capital budget is consistent with (less than 10 percent higher or lower than) the capital allocation in the MTFF. | ||
2 | 2.a | Low | National or sectoral public investment plans are not published, or major investment projects are not described in national and sectoral plans. | Low | No description of investment projects in plans, budgets for relevant years include few (less than 25 percent) of the investment projects described in national or sectoral plans, or few (less than 25 percent) of the projects described in budgets have been described in national or sectoral plans. |
Medium | Some major investment projects funded by the budget are described in published national and sectoral plans. | Medium | Budgets for relevant years include some (25–75 percent) of the projects that appeared in national or sectoral strategies, or some (25–75 percent) of the projects described in budgets have been described in national or sectoral plans. | ||
High | All major investment projects, regardless of financing source, are comprehensively described in published national and sectoral plans. | High | Budgets for relevant years include most (more than 75 percent) of the projects that appear in national and sectoral plans and strategies, or most (more than 75 percent) of the projects described in budgets have been described in national or sectoral plans. | ||
2.b | Low | There is no costing of investment projects in national and sectoral strategies or plans. | Low | No cost estimates in strategies, or estimates are significantly (more than 50 percent) higher than planned capital expenditure for the same period as the strategy. | |
Medium | There are broad cost estimates for investment projects in national and sectoral plans but | Medium | Cost estimates in strategies are somewhat (10–50 percent) higher than planned capital expenditure for the same period as the strategy. | ||
High | There are broad cost estimates for investment as well as specific cost estimates for major investment projects in national and sectoral plans, and cost estimates are reconciled with available resources. | High | Cost estimates in strategies are consistent with (less than 10 percent higher than) planned capital expenditure for the same period as the strategy. | ||
2.c | Low | There are no measurable targets for public investment in sectoral strategies. | Low | Performance data are used for management in few (less than 25 percent of) major projects. | |
Medium | There are measurable output targets for public investment projects in sectoral strategies. | Medium | Performance data are used for management in some (25–75 percent of) major projects. | ||
High | There are measurable output and outcome targets for public investment projects in sectoral strategies or plans. | High | Performance data, including output and outcome information, are used for management in most (more than 75 percent of) major projects. | ||
3 | 3.a | Low | There is no legal requirement for systematically sharing SNG investment plans with central government. | Low | SNG investment plans submitted to the central government account for few (less than 25 percent of the total value of) SNG public investments. |
Medium | There is a legal requirement for sharing subnational government (SNG) investment plans with central government and for publishing these alongside central government investments. | Medium | SNG investment plans submitted to the central government account for some (25–75 percent of the total value of) SNG public investment. | ||
High | There are legal requirements for sharing SNG investment plans with central government and for systematic coordination of these between central government and SNGs. | High | SNG investment plans submitted to the central government account for most (more than 75 percent of the total value of) SNG public investment. | ||
3.b | Low | There is no legal or regulatory framework that establishes a transparent, rules-based mechanism for capital transfers to SNGs. | Low | No mechanism for predictable transfers, or actual capital transfers deviate significantly from amounts notified to SNGs (by more than 15 percent). | |
Medium | There is a legal or regulatory framework that establishes a transparent, rules-based mechanism for capital transfers to SNGs, with transfer amounts announced less than 6 months before the fiscal year. | Medium | Actual capital transfers deviate somewhat from amounts notified to SNGs (by 5–15 percent) or actual notification is done less than 6 months before the fiscal year. | ||
High | There is a legal or regulatory framework that establishes a transparent, rules-based mechanism for capital transfers to SNGs, with transfer amounts announced at least 6 months before the fiscal year. | High | Actual capital transfers are consistent with amounts notified to SNGs (deviate by less than 5 percent) and actual notification is done at least 6 months before the fiscal year. | ||
3.c | Low | Legal framework does not require reporting of contingent liabilities from SNG, public corporation (PC), and public-private partnership projects. | Low | Few contingent liabilities (less than 25 percent of value) are reported to central government, or contingent liabilities are reported for none or 1 of 3 categories. | |
Medium | Legal framework requires reporting to central government of contingent liabilities from SNG, PC, and public-private partnership projects. | Medium | Some (25–75 percent of) contingent liabilities are reported to central government, or contingent liabilities are reported for 2 of 3 categories. | ||
High | Legal framework requires reporting and public disclosure of contingent liabilities from SNG, PC, and public-private partnership projects in budget documents. | High | Most (more than 75 percent of) contingent liabilities are reported to central government and disclosed in budget documents, or contingent liabilities are reported and disclosed for 3 of 3 categories. | ||
4 | 4.a | Low | There is no legal or regulatory requirement for formal, systematic appraisal of major investment projects. | Low | Few major investment projects (less than 25 percent regardless of funding source) are subject to stringent appraisal. |
Medium | There is a legal or regulatory requirement for formal, systematic appraisal of major investment projects. | Medium | Some major investment projects (25–75 percent regardless of funding source) are subject to stringent appraisal. | ||
High | There is a legal or regulatory requirement for formal, systematic appraisal of major investment projects, including for publication of appraisal results and/or independent review. | High | Most major investment projects (more than 75 percent regardless of funding source) are subject to stringent appraisal, and many (more than 50 percent) have published summary appraisal results and/or undergone independent review. | ||
4.b | Low | There is no standard methodology or central support for appraisal of investment projects. | Low | There is no standard methodology for analysis of investment projects, or the methodology is fully applied for few (less than 25 percent of) major projects. | |
Medium | There is either a standard methodology or central support for appraisal of investment projects. | Medium | The standard methodology for analysis of investment projects is fully applied for some (25–75 percent of) major projects. | ||
High | There is both a standard methodology and central support for appraisal of investment projects. | High | The standard methodology for analysis of investment projects is fully applied for most (more than 75 percent of) major projects. | ||
4.c | Low | There is no regulatory requirement for analysis of risks related to investment projects. | Low | Few major investment projects (less than 25 percent) include stringent analysis of project risks. | |
Medium | There is a regulatory requirement for analysis of risks related to investment projects. | Medium | Some major investment projects (25–75 percent) include stringent analysis of project risks. | ||
High | There is a regulatory requirement for analysis of risks related to investment projects and for development of risk mitigation plans. | High | Most major investment projects (more than 75 percent) include stringent analysis of project risks and risk mitigation plans. | ||
5 | 5.a | Low | The legal and regulatory framework restricts the provision of economic infrastructure to domestic monopolies or establishes few economic regulators. | Low | Private companies have small market shares (less than 25 percent in 2 major markets). |
Medium | The legal and regulatory framework supports competition in some major infrastructure markets and establishes some economic regulators. | Medium | Private companies have medium market shares (25–75 percent) in at least 2 major markets. | ||
High | The legal and regulatory framework supports competition in most major infrastructure markets, and economic regulators are well established. | High | Private companies have high market shares (at least 75 percent) in at least 2 major markets. | ||
5.b | Low | There is no published strategy/ policy framework for public-private partnerships, and the legal and regulatory framework is weak. | Low | Few (less than 5 percent of) public investments the past 3 years have been implemented as public-private partnerships and are consistent with the public-private partnership policy and legal/regulatory framework. | |
Medium | A public-private partnership strategy/policy has been published, but the legal and regulatory framework is weak. | Medium | Some (5–10 percent of) public investments the past 3 years have been implemented as public-private partnerships and are consistent with the public-private partnership policy and legal/regulatory framework. | ||
High | A public-private partnership strategy/policy has been published, and a strong legal and regulatory framework guides the preparation, selection, and management of public-private partnership projects. | High | Many (more than 10 percent of) public investments the past 3 years have been implemented as public-private partnerships and are consistent with the public-private partnership policy and legal/regulatory framework. | ||
5.c | Low | There is no legal requirement that the government systematically review the investment plans of PCs. | Low | The review process covers few PC infrastructure investments (less than 25 percent of total value) over the past 3 years. | |
Medium | There is a legal requirement that the government reviews the investment plans of PCs but not for publication of a consolidated report on these plans or the financial performance of PCs. | Medium | The review process covers at least the 5 largest PCs measured by assets or some (25–75 percent of) PC infrastructure investments over the past 3 years. | ||
High | There is a legal requirement that the government reviews the investment plans of PCs and publishes a consolidated report on these plans and the financial performance of PCs. | High | The review process covers at least the 10 largest PCs measured by assets or most (75 percent or more of) PC infrastructure investments over the past 3 years. | ||
6 | 6.a | Low | There are no published multiyear estimates for capital spending in budget documentation. | Low | Medium-term capital projections are missing, or approved capital budget allocations deviate significantly (by more than 20 percent) from capital spending projections for the same years. |
Medium | Medium-term projections of aggregate capital spending are published in budget documentation. | Medium | Approved capital budget allocations deviate somewhat (by 10–20 percent) from capital spending projections for the same years. | ||
High | Medium-term projections for capital spending by ministry or sector are published in budget documentation. | High | Approved capital budget allocations are consistent (deviation less than 10 percent) with capital spending projections for the same years. | ||
6.b | Low | There are no multiyear ceilings on capital expenditure by ministry, sector, or program. | Low | No multiyear ceilings, or approved budget amounts for capital spending are significantly (more than 15 percent) higher than the aggregate multiyear ceilings for the same years. | |
Medium | There are indicative multiyear ceilings on capital expenditure by ministry, sector, or program. | Medium | Approved budget amounts for capital spending are somewhat (5–15 percent) higher than the aggregate multiyear ceilings for the same years. | ||
High | There are binding multiyear ceilings on capital expenditure by ministry, sector, or program. | High | Approved budget amounts for capital spending are consistent (less than 5 percent higher) with the multiyear ceilings for the same years. | ||
6.c | Low | There are no published estimates of total construction costs for all major projects in. | Low | Total construction costs for major projects are not included in budget documentation, or total costs are presented but changes in estimates are not identified. | |
Medium | Total construction costs for all major projects are published, but without indication of the distribution of these costs over time. | Medium | Total construction costs for major projects are published in budget documentation, and changes in estimates are recorded and explained. | ||
High | Total construction costs for all major projects are published with indications of the distribution of these costs over a 3–5 year horizon. | High | Total construction costs and the annual breakdown of costs are published, and changes from one budget to the next are identified and explained in a published document. | ||
7 | 7. a | Low | The legal and regulatory framework allows significant capital spending by extrabudgetary entities (EBEs), and there is no legal requirement for authorization or disclosure in budget documents. | Low | Capital spending by EBEs is significant (more than 10 percent of the capital spending in the central government budget), and little extrabudgetary capital spending (less than 75 percent) is authorized or disclosed in the budget. |
Medium | The legal and regulatory framework allows significant capital spending by EBEs, but there is a legal requirement for authorization or disclosure in budget documents. | Medium | Capital spending by EBEs is significant (more than 10 percent of the capital spending in the central government budget), but most (more than 75 percent of) EBE capital spending is disclosed in the budget. | ||
High | The legal and regulatory framework allows little or no capital spending by EBEs, and any such spending should be authorized or disclosed in the budget. | High | Capital spending by EBEs is insignificant (less than 10 percent of the capital spending in the central government budget), and most of this (more than 75 percent) is authorized or disclosed in the budget. | ||
7.b | Low | The legal and regulatory framework requires none or only 1 of the 3 major financing sources (external, public-private partnerships, PCs) to be disclosed in the budget. | Low | None of the 3 sources are disclosed in the budget, or few projects in the listed categories are included in the budget (less than 50 percent of the total investment in these categories is included). | |
Medium | The legal and regulatory framework requires that 2 of the 3 major financing sources are disclosed in the budget. | Medium | At least 2 categories are included in the budget, containing many of the projects in the listed categories (more than 75 percent of the total investment in these categories is included). | ||
High | The legal and regulatory framework requires that all 3 of the major financing sources listed are disclosed in the budget. | High | All 3 categories and most projects in these categories are included in the budget (the value of projects in the budget is more than 75 percent of the total investment in the 3 categories). | ||
7.c | Low | Capital and current budgets are prepared by separate ministries and presented separately. | Low | The current cost impacts of few (less than 25 percent of) capital projects are reviewed by the central budget department during budget preparation. | |
Medium | Budget preparation and presentation are consolidated, but capital and current spending are not combined under a program or functional classification. | Medium | The current cost impacts of some (25–75 percent of) major capital projects are reviewed by the central budget department during budget preparation. | ||
High | Budget preparation and presentation are fully integrated. Current and capital spending are presented according to a program or functional classification. | High | The current cost impacts of most (more than 75 percent of) major capital projects are reviewed by the central budget department during budget preparation. | ||
8 | 8.a | Low | The legal and regulatory framework does not require information on total project costs to be included in the budget documentation. | Low | Budget documentation includes total project costs of few (less than 25 percent of) major projects that are appropriated. |
Medium | The legal and regulatory framework requires that the budget provides information about total project costs. | Medium | Total project costs for some (25–75 percent of) major projects that are appropriated are disclosed in budget documentation. | ||
High | The legal and regulatory framework requires that the budget also provides information about multiyear commitments related to the projects. | High | Total project costs and multiyear commitments for most (more than 75 percent of) major projects that are appropriated are disclosed in budget documentation. | ||
8.b | Low | There are no legal limitations on in-year transfers of appropriations (virement) from capital to current spending. | Low | Virement from capital to current spending is a significant share (more than 15 percent) of the initial capital budget. | |
Medium | Virement from capital to current spending requires approval by the Ministry of Finance (MoF). | Medium | Virement from capital to current spending is a moderate share (between 5 and 15 percent) of the initial capital budget. | ||
High | Virement from capital to current spending requires the approval of the legislature. | High | Virement from capital to current spending has been done with legislative approval and is a low share (less than 5 percent) of the initial capital budget. | ||
8.c | Low | There is no legal or regulatory mechanism that protects funding of ongoing projects. | Low | Some (less than 75 percent of) ongoing projects receive funding as needed, or there are several examples of major projects not receiving sufficient funding. | |
Medium | There is a legal or regulatory mechanism that protects funding of ongoing projects. | Medium | Most (75–90 percent of) ongoing projects receive funding as needed, or there are few examples of major projects not receiving sufficient funding. | ||
High | There is a legal or regulatory mechanism that protects funding for ongoing projects in the annual budget and over the medium term. | High | All (over 90 percent of) ongoing projects receive funding as needed, or there are no examples of major projects not receiving sufficient funding. | ||
9 | 9. a | Low | There are no standard methods for assessing the needs for routine (current) maintenance and its cost for main asset classes (for example, roads, buildings). | Low | Approved budget allocations for current maintenance funding for main asset classes are clearly inadequate (less than 50 percent of assessed maintenance needs). If there are no precise estimates for maintenance needs, maintenance funding is less than 2 percent of estimated asset replacement values. |
Medium | There are standard methodologies for assessing the needs for routine maintenance and its costs for main asset classes (for example, roads, buildings), but there is no formal requirement that the methodologies determine budget submissions for current maintenance. | Medium | Approved budgets for current maintenance funding for main asset classes are somewhat inadequate (50–90 percent of assessed maintenance needs). If there are no precise estimates for maintenance needs, maintenance funding is more than 2 percent of estimated asset replacement values. |
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High | There are standard methodologies for assessing the needs for routine maintenance and its costs for main asset classes (for example, roads, buildings), and there is a formal requirement that the methodologies determine budget submissions for current maintenance. | High | Approved budgets for current maintenance funding for main asset classes are broadly in line with requirements (at least 90 percent of assessed maintenance needs). | ||
9.b | Low | There are no standard methodologies for determining the needs for major improvements (capital maintenance). | Low | Approved budgets for capital maintenance are clearly inadequate (lower than 50 percent of estimated needs). If there are no precise estimates for capital maintenance needs, funding is less than 2 percent of asset replacement values. |
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Medium | There are standard methodologies for determining the needs for improvements (capital maintenance), but these assessments are not reflected in national or sectoral plans. | Medium | Approved budgets for capital maintenance are somewhat inadequate (between 50 and 90 percent of estimated needs). If there are no precise estimates for capital maintenance needs, funding is more than 2 percent of asset replacement values. | ||
High | There are standard methodologies for determining the needs for major improvements (capital maintenance), and these needs are fully reflected in national and sectoral plans. | High | Approved budgets for capital maintenance are broadly in line with requirements (at least 90 percent of estimated needs). | ||
9.c | Low | Routine and capital maintenance cannot be systematically identified in the budget. | Low | Some (less than 75 percent of) estimated maintenance funding is identified in the budget. | |
Medium | Routine and capital maintenance can be systematically identified in the budget documentation using either the budget classif-cation or analytical information regularly provided in budget documentation. | Medium | Most (more than 75 percent of) estimated maintenance funding is identified in the budget. | ||
High | Routine and capital maintenance can be systematically identi-fed and regularly reported in budget documentation with approved budget amounts and actual spending by ministry. | High | Most (more than 75 percent of) estimated maintenance funding is identified in the budget and regularly reported with aggregate actual spending by ministry. | ||
10 | 10.a | Low | There is no formally required central review process for major capital investment projects (including those funded by donors or public-private partnerships) before consideration of inclusion in the budget. | Low | The number of projects rejected or returned for further development is low (less than 5 percent of those submitted). |
Medium | There is a formally required central review process for major capital investment projects (including those funded by donors or public-private partnerships) before consideration of inclusion in the budget. | Medium | The number of projects rejected or returned is medium (from 5 to 10 percent of submitted proposals). | ||
High | There is a formally required central review process for major capital investment projects (including those funded by donors or public-private partnerships) before consideration of inclusion in the budget, and this review includes independent inputs. | High | The number of projects rejected or returned is high (more than 10 percent of submitted proposals), and some (at least 10 percent) of the reviews include independent inputs. | ||
10.b | Low | There are no published, specific criteria for project selection and the project selection process is not defined in law or regulation. | Low | Few (Less than 50 percent of) major projects are selected in accordance with a prescribed process and criteria. | |
Medium | There are published, specific selection criteria, but the project selection process is not clearly defined in law or regulation. | Medium | Many (50–90 percent of) major projects are selected in accordance with the prescribed process and criteria. | ||
High | There are published, specific selection criteria, and the project selection process is clearly defined in law or regulation. | High | All (more than 90 percent of) major projects are selected in accordance with the prescribed process and criteria. | ||
10.c | Low | There is no formal requirement for a pipeline of appraised investment projects. | Low | Few (less than 50 percent of) major projects are selected from the pipeline. | |
Medium | There is a pipeline of appraised projects, but no formal requirement that projects be selected only from this pipeline. | Medium | Many (50–90 percent of) major projects are selected from the pipeline. | ||
High | There is a pipeline in place (including those funded by donors or public-private partnerships) and a formal requirement that this pipeline be used to select projects in the annual budget and in the medium term. | High | All (more than 90 percent of) major projects are selected from the pipeline. | ||
11 | 11.a | Low | The legal and regulatory framework does not require competitive procurement of major projects. | Low | Few (less than 50 percent of) major projects are based on effective competitive procurement. |
Medium | The legal and regulatory framework requires competitive procurement of major projects. | Medium | Many (between 50 and 90 percent of) major projects are based on effective competitive procurement. | ||
High | The legal and regulatory framework requires competitive procurement of major projects and publication of complete and timely procurement information. | High | All (more than 90 percent of) major projects are based on effective competitive procurement, and complete and timely procurement information is publicly available. | ||
11.b | Low | There is no procurement database or the information in the database is incomplete or not timely. | Low | There is no database with complete and timely information, or analytical reports are available after more than 6 months, or not at all. | |
Medium | The database has reasonably complete information, but it is not required to produce regular analytical reports. | Medium | The database is reasonably comprehensive, but analytical reports are not available at all or after more than 6 months. | ||
High | The database has reasonably complete information and produces standard analytical reports to support a formal procurement monitoring system. | High | The database is used by a monitoring system that produces monthly or quarterly analytical reports drawing conclusions and making recommendations for improvement. | ||
11.c | Low | The legal and regulatory framework does not require that procurement complaints be reviewed by an independent body. | Low | No independent review body or the average time to decide complaints is long (more than 6 months). | |
Medium | The legal and regulatory framework requires that procurement complaints be reviewed by an independent body, but the recommendations of this body are not required to be produced on a timely basis, nor published, nor rigorously enforced. | Medium | The average time to decide complaints is medium (2–6 months). | ||
High | The legal and regulatory framework requires that procurement complaints be reviewed by an independent body whose recommendations are required to be timely, published, and rigorously enforced. | High | Independent reviews are published and rigorously enforced, and the average time to resolve complaints is short (less than 2 months). | ||
12 | 12. a | Low | There is no legal or regulatory framework for systematic cash flow forecasting. | Low | Cash flow forecasts are missing or not documented, or actual net cash flows on average deviate significantly (more than 10 percent) from forecasts. |
Medium | The legal or regulatory framework requires that cash flow forecasts are at least quarterly and that ministries be provided commitment ceilings at least a quarter in advance. | Medium | Actual net cash flows on average deviate somewhat (by 5–10 percent) from forecasts, and ministries are provided with commitment ceilings at least a quarter in advance. There may be examples of commitment ceilings not funded. | ||
High | The legal or regulatory framework requires that cash forecasts be monthly and that commitment ceilings for the whole fiscal year are provided at the beginning of the year. | High | Actual net cash flows on average deviate little (less than 5 percent) from forecasts, and commitment ceilings for the whole fiscal year are provided at the beginning of the year. There are no examples of commitment ceilings not funded. | ||
12.b | Low | There are no formal mechanisms to ensure timely release of project funds when payments become due. | Low | Not all (less than 75 percent of) invoices for major projects are paid on time. | |
Medium | There are formal mechanisms to ensure timely release of project funds, but they are not sufficiently strong to ensure that funds always are released for payment in line with appropriations. | Medium | Most (75–90 percent of) invoices for major projects are paid on time. | ||
High | There are strong mechanisms to ensure timely release of funds for payment, in line with the annual appropriation. | High | All (more than 90 percent of) invoices for major projects are paid on time, and cash releases are in line with appropriations. | ||
12.c | Low | There is no legal or regulatory requirement that external financing is at the central bank. | Low | The MoF/treasury is informed of the cash payments (date, amount, and related project) for externally financed projects not later than one month from the date of payment. | |
Medium | External financing is required to be held at the central bank but not as part of the main government bank account structure. | Medium | The MoF/treasury is informed of the cash payments (date, amount, and related project) for externally financed projects within a week from the date of payment. | ||
High | External financing is required to be fully integrated in the main government bank account structure. | High | The MoF/treasury is informed in advance of the cash payments (date, amount, and related project) for externally financed projects. | ||
13 | 13.a | Low | There is no legal or regulatory framework for systematic monitoring of major capital projects. | Low | There are only partial data on portfolio delays and cost overruns (covering less than 50 percent of the portfolio), or many (more than 50 percent) of the monitored projects (by value) are behind schedule or over budget. |
Medium | There is a legal or regulatory framework for monitoring annual project costs and physical progress during implementation of major projects. | Medium | There are systematic data on portfolio delays and cost overruns for many projects (more than 50 percent of the portfolio), and some (25–50 percent of) major projects are behind schedule or over budget. | ||
High | There is a legal or regulatory framework for central monitoring of project costs and physical progress during implementation of major projects, including for in-year reports. | High | There are systematic data on portfolio delays and cost overruns for many projects (more than 50 percent of the portfolio), and few (less than 25 percent of) major projects are behind schedule or over budget. | ||
13.b | Low | The legal or regulatory framework does not allow reallocation of funds between projects under different appropriations. | Low | There is no evidence that reallocation has promoted accelerated implementation of projects, or capital budget execution is low (less than 75 percent). | |
Medium | The legal or regulatory framework allows reallocation of funds between projects under different appropriations but does not require that this be based on systematic monitoring and transparent procedures. | Medium | There is some evidence that reallocation has promoted accelerated implementation of projects, and capital budget execution rate is medium (75–90 percent). | ||
High | The legal or regulatory framework allows reallocation of funds between projects under different appropriations and requires that this be based on systematic monitoring and transparent procedures. | High | There is significant evidence that reallocation has promoted accelerated implementation of projects, and capital budget execution rate is high (more than 90 percent). | ||
13.c | Low | There is no formal requirement for ex post reviews for major projects. | Low | Government ex post reviews cover few (less than 10 percent of) major projects. | |
Medium | There is a formal requirement for ex post review of major projects focusing on project costs, deliverables, and outputs. | Medium | Government ex post reviews cover some (10–25 percent of) major projects. | ||
High | There is formal requirement for ex post review of major projects focusing on project costs, deliverables, and outputs conducted by independent parties and systematically used to adjust policies and procedures. | High | Government ex post reviews cover many (more than 25 percent of) major projects and the information has been systematically used to adjust policies and procedures. | ||
14 | 14.a | Low | There are no legal or regulatory requirements for either appointment of senior responsible officers or implementation plans before approval of major projects. | Low | Not all (less than 75 percent of) major projects have identified senior responsible officers or project implementation plans before project approval. |
Medium | There are legal or regulatory requirements for appointment of senior responsible officers but not for implementation plans before approval of major projects. | Medium | Most (more than 75 percent of) major projects have identified senior responsible officers or project implementation plans before project approval. | ||
High | There are legal or regulatory requirements for appointment of senior responsible officers and for implementation plans before approval of major projects. | High | Most (more than 75 percent of) major projects have identified senior responsible officers and project implementation plans before project approval. | ||
14.b | Low | There are no standardized rules and procedures for project adjustments. | Low | Project adjustment proposals are not analyzed and documented, or few (less than 10 percent of) projects are subject to formal adjustment over the implementation period. | |
Medium | There are standardized rules and procedures for project adjustments, but these do not require a fundamental review of the project’s rationale, costs, and expected outputs when circumstances change significantly. | Medium | Project adjustment proposals are consistently analyzed and documented, and some (more than 10 percent of) projects are subject to formal adjustment over the implementation period. | ||
High | There are standardized rules and procedures for project adjustments, and these do require a fundamental review of the project’s rationale, costs, and expected outputs when circumstances change significantly. | High | Some major projects are cancelled or substantially redesigned following fundamental review and some (more than 10 percent of) projects are subject to formal adjustment over the implementation period. | ||
14.c | Low | The legal mandate for the external auditor does not cover ex post, external project audits or allow publication of the audit result. | Low | Few (less than 10 percent of) major projects have been subjected to external ex post audit. | |
Medium | The legal mandate for the external auditor covers ex post, external project audits and allows publication of the results of these audits. | Medium | Some (10–25 percent of) major projects have been subjected to external ex post audit. | ||
High | The legal mandate for the external auditor covers ex post, external project audits, and requires that the results be both regularly published and scrutinized by the legislature. | High | Many (more than 25 percent of) major projects have been subjected to external ex post audit. | ||
15 | 15.a | Low | Fixed asset registers are not required by law or regulation to be comprehensive or regularly updated. | Low | There is no centralized register of fixed assets, or fixed asset registers maintained by respective agencies have only partial coverage. |
Medium | Fixed asset registers are required by law or regulation to be either comprehensive or regularly updated. | Medium | The centralized fixed asset register or registers maintained by agencies are regularly updated, cover most (at least 75 percent of) government fixed assets, and are readily accessible. | ||
High | Fixed asset registers are required by law or regulation to be both comprehensive and regularly updated. | High | Fixed asset registers are maintained or consolidated centrally, are verified and updated at least every 2 years, and cover all (at least 90 percent of) government fixed assets. | ||
15.b | Low | There is no legal or regulatory requirement that government financial statements provide systematic information about fixed assets. | Low | Few (less than 25 percent of) government fixed assets are included in the government accounts. | |
Medium | There is a legal or regulatory requirement for inclusion of some fixed assets in the government financial statement, but not for revaluation of these assets on a regular basis. | Medium | Many (25–75 percent of) government fixed assets are included in the government accounts. | ||
High | There is a legal or regulatory requirement that most fixed assets be included in the government financial statements and revalued regularly. | High | Most (more than 75 percent of) government fixed assets are included in the government accounts and revalued regularly. | ||
15.c | Low | There is no legal or regulatory requirement for recording of depreciation of fixed assets in government accounts. | Low | Depreciation is less than 1 percent of fixed assets. | |
Medium | There is a legal or regulatory requirement that depreciation of fixed assets be recorded in government accounts based on statistical estimates. | Medium | Depreciation is 1–2 percent of fixed assets. | ||
High | There is a legal or regulatory requirement that depreciation of fixed assets be recorded in government accounts based on asset-specific assumptions. | High | Depreciation is more than 2 percent of fixed assets. |
Appendix III Conducting a PIMA
Conducting a PIMA involves several steps, as outlined in Figure III.1.
PIMA Request
Public Investment Management Assessments (PIMAs) are based on requests from IMF member countries. The requests may be a result of specific challenges that have emerged in the country’s public investment management (PIM) system or a result of more general interest in continuous improvement of management frameworks. The requests will often emerge during the continuous dialog between the country and the IMF. Requests are assessed and approved by the IMF Fiscal Affairs Department (FAD) part of its annual work program, based on inputs from the relevant area department.
Before the Mission
The first step in planning a PIMA mission is to agree on the timing and scope of the mission. A PIMA mission will usually require two weeks in the country. The PIMA framework itself will define the broad parameters of the mission, but countries will often have specific issues or questions they want the assessment to cover, for instance:
How to better include public investment in national planning
How to incorporate PPPs in the overall management framework for public investments
How to promote more effective and timelier project implementation
Mission preparation will usually include steps to familiarize the country with the PIMA framework and to have officials conduct an initial self-assessment. Familiarization may include a short preparatory mission to conduct a workshop. (Workshops may also be done remotely). The new infrastructure governance portal (https://infrastructuregovern.imf.org/) includes facilities to introduce and explain the PIMA framework to countries and to assist them in the self-assessment. The self-assessment is an effective way for countries to explore the PIMA framework and to help them prepare for the mission. The self-assessment will also help countries identify and engage the authorities’ PIMA counterpart. This is important for the effectiveness of the mission.
Data requirements for the assessment are defined well ahead of the mission. There are substantial amounts of relevant data in IMF databases (see Box III.1). Data for the country itself and for relevant comparator countries are extracted from these databases for use during the PIMA. There will also be a need to collect additional data from the country:
Data needed to fill gaps in data or to explain outliers in the Investment and Capital Stock Template. Additional data may be requested to develop a macro-fiscal analytical theme in the context section of the PIMA report.1
Data needed to help in scoring dimensions and writing the explanatory text in the assessment section of the PIMA report. The indications of important documents and useful data under each dimension in this handbook could be a starting point for defining the needs for additional data for the PIMA.
Public investment plans and programs will be particularly useful to help the mission identify major projects for further analysis. A detailed meeting schedule will also be prepared before the mission. The PIMA covers many topics and institutions. The meetings must be planned to ensure sufficient time is allocated to discussing each topic.
PIMA Tables Maintained by the IMF
Investment and Capital Stock Template—an Excel spreadsheet designed and maintained by the FAD Expenditure Policy Division. It is the source for data and figures for use in the context section of the PIMA report, information on comparator countries, the efficiency frontier analysis, and intermediate PIM indicators such as volatility of public investment spending. It may be necessary to collect additional information to explain any biases, outliers, or limitations in the data for the mission country and comparator countries. For example, data may only cover central government while the counterpart country or comparator country is a federal state, or there may be anomalies in the data. Gaps in data can be filled or unreliable data corrected, by collecting data from the country before or during the PIMA mission.
The PIMA Scoring Template—an Excel spreadsheet designed and maintained by the FAD Public Financial Management divisions. It contains scores of all countries that have had a PIMA. It is the source for the form to enter dimension data and calculate institution scores, the heat map, and the spider charts for design and effectiveness.
During the Mission
The introductory meetings will provide an over view of the PIMA framework and the plans for the assessment, as well as the initial findings from country data in the IMF databases. The purpose is to ensure that key counterparts are fully aware of the PIMA framework and approach and that the mission team is familiar with the specific concerns and issues of importance to the country. The presentation of country-specific public investment trends and efficiency helps put the PIMA into perspective and retain the authorities’ attention from the beginning.
The topical meetings will usually occupy the mission team full time for at least the first week.
The PIMA framework includes 45 dimensions, many of which will require separate meetings. There will typically be some additional meetings, including follow-up meetings, during the second week.
A midpoint presentation or workshop to discuss the preliminary assessment and recommendations is useful. This will allow the mission team to verify that their preliminary assessment is based on correct information and understanding, and that tentative recommendations are seen as relevant and credible. It will allow the authorities to clarify any misconceptions and to begin thinking about the recommendations.
The PIMA mission will prepare the draft report in the field. The report will reflect the framework described in this handbook and will be handed to the authorities by the end of the mission.
After the Mission
The draft PIMA report will be reviewed by the authorities. They will have the opportunity to correct any factual errors or misconceptions. They will also be asked to provide their views on the findings and recommendations of the report, including the action plan. The authorities will be asked to provide their comments within three weeks after the mission.
The draft PIMA report will also be reviewed by IMF departments. This will include review by FAD as well as the relevant area department. One key purpose of FAD’s review is to ensure that the PIMA framework is consistently applied across different countries. The review by the area department helps ensure that the findings are based on a good understanding of the situation of the country and that recommendations support the country’s fiscal and development priorities.
The final report will reflect the comments received from the authorities and from IMF departments. The target is to finalize the report within six weeks after the PIMA mission.
Final PIMA Report
The final PIMA report will be submitted to the country, and country authorities will be requested to agree to publication of the report. FAD believes that publication will enhance the effectiveness of the PIMA assessment and the report but will only publish the PIMA with permission from the authorities. Agreement to publish the PIMA report announces the willingness of the government to acknowledge issues uncovered in the PIMA. The report provides a structure for discussion within government, and with civil society and development partners, to address PIM improvements.
PIMA Follow-Up
The PIMA action plan will often include proposals for further technical assistance from FAD and from other institutions. This assistance will be important for necessary capacity building and institutional development. The authorities are encouraged to use the action plan to request and coordinate technical assistance from the full range of development partners. IMF regional centers and in-country advisors will often be asked to contribute.
Periodic assessment of progress in strengthening PIM will be useful. This will usually be a component of any TA from FAD. A broader assessment could involve updating the PIMA after a few years. The update would usually include a PIMA self-assessment by country authorities.
Appendix IV: Outline of a PIMA Report
Public Investment Management Assessment (PIMA) reports are structured in several ways. Box IV.1 describes a common organization of the PIMA report. However, there is considerable variation in how PIMA reports are structured in practice. This appendix assumes that the organization in Box IV.1 is used. The recommendations must be adjusted to variations in the chosen structure.
Common Organization of the PIMA Mission Report
Executive Summary
Section 1. Public Investment Context
Trends in Total Public Investment
Composition
Impact
Efficiency
Section 2. Public Investment Management
Institutions
Overall Assessment
PIMA Institutional Analyses
Section 3. Cross-Cutting Issues
Overall Assessment
Cross-Cross-Cutting Issues Analyses
Section 4. Reform Priorities and Recommendations
Overall Assessment
Recommendations
Appendix 1. Action Plan
Appendix 2. Detailed PIMA Scores
Executive Summary
The executive summary should include the spider chart, the heat map at the institution level, and a high-level table of recommendations. The spider chart provides a motivation for change by comparing the country with other countries, the heat map explains the scoring by institution, and the table of recommendations puts forward actions to address public investment management (PIM) weaknesses. Different variations of the spider chart are possible—design, effectiveness, comparing design with effectiveness for the country, or comparing either design or effectiveness with comparable country groups. The choice of spider chart should support the main message of the report.
Section 1. Public Investment Context
This section has two major purposes. Firs t, it provides a macro-fiscal context within which PIM institutions operate and thus highlights how macro-fiscal conditions help to shape PIM institutions. For example, high debt levels in a country may limit its ability to smooth multiyear funding for public investment, which affects the need to strengthen the medium-term fiscal framework, multiyear budgeting, and cash management institutions.
Second, the section provides a motivation to change by making cross-country comparisons. Using comparable countries, with similar macro-fiscal or other conditions, the relative performance of PIM institutions is highlighted.
Certain content should be covered in this section, which is typically divided into four subsections. The mission has discretion in the organization of the section, while covering main elements of the content the following main elements of the content:
Trends in total public investment. This addresses the history of public investment spending and resulting capital stock. Standard figures are provided by the Expenditure Policy Division, based on their dataset in the Investment and Capital Stock Template. Mission chiefs can be selective in what figures they choose to include in the report and how to group them, based on issues or trends to be highlighted or any perceived weaknesses in the data. Reference to the macroeconomic impact of public investment, available through other sources such as Article IV reports, is encouraged. Sources of funding are relevant as a measure of the sustain-ability of public investment spending (for example, government debt levels and external supplier of capital to governments, such as international financial institutions or China, and the private sector).
Association of public investment with other macro-fiscal variables. Chief among these are economic growth, debt, and fiscal risk (for example, contingent liabilities).
Certain technical issues. These include (1) definition of capital stock—the cumulative sum of prior-year spending on economic infrastructure1; (2) the source of the data in the expenditure policy dataset; (3) infusions of capital into public corporation by government, which is shown as public investment in the expenditure policy data; and (4) explanation of data outliers.
Composition of public investment. This relates to (1) the purpose of public investment (for example, function, and social versus economic infrastructure) and (2) public investment financing sources (i.e., central government, general government, public corporations, public-private partnerships, and private sector).
Impact of public investment. This refers to the outputs and outcomes of public investment, including performance measures (qualitative and quantitative). Mission chiefs may decide whether to focus on qualitative, quantitative, or hybrid measures of performance. For example, some quantitative measures may be misleading, such as kilometers of roads per population for a densely populated country.
Efficiency of public investment. This brings together capital stock and impact data to measure efficiency. For example, outcome measures (that is, perceptions index) are related to input measures (per capita capital stock) in the efficiency frontier and whisker charts. Volatility and churn should also be addressed here, because they directly affect the ability to translate inputs into outputs and outcomes. Any distortion caused by megaprojects should be noted.
Figures. The efficiency frontier and whisker charts should be included in this section and typically require explanation in the text. Missions should be prepared to explain verbally (not necessary in the text) that (1) the efficiency frontier figure is three dimensional; (2) the scale of public perceptions stops at 7; (3) perceptions are provided by the World Economic Forum—some mission country staff contribute to the survey and may be familiar with its methodology and weaknesses; (4) the increase in efficiency, as shown in the whisker figure, is not based on a percentage increase in the mission country’s performance but rather is based on moving up on a scale of 100. Special attention needs to be given if the comparator countries perform significantly better than the mission country.
The text should analyze rather than describe the data. The themes or issues should be identified, which should be supported by figures.
Section 2. Public Investment Management Institutions
An introduction to this section should be used to explain the questionnaire, summarize scoring, and highlight issues. It should include the following: ü The purpose and structure of the section, possibly including the style of text for each institution (see writing options below); ü The principal concepts and methodologies used, such as PIM phase, institution, and dimension levels of the PIMA questionnaire (include the three-phase circular figure here), and scoring for design, effectiveness, and reform priority; and ü The overall scoring results, including the spider diagram and heat map. The text could summarize institutions that are particularly weak and strong, important linkages between institutions, or institutions that have received attention by the authorities in recent years. Connections with themes laid out in Section 1 should be made. The text for each institution must cover two main issues. That is, (1) the reason for scoring and (2) practices that may be the subject of a recommendation, including material cross-cutting issues. The length of text for each institution should be not more than 1–1.5 pages.
The PIMA should use one of the following styles of writing for each institution. Whatever style is chosen, it should be used consistently for all 15 institutions.
Option 1
Paragraph 1: addresses why the institution is important and introduces the three dimensions and how they capture the essence of the institution.
Paragraph 2: the topic sentence provides an overall assessment of the design of the institution, using criteria terms used in the questionnaire. Supporting sentences address the design of each of the three dimensions.
Paragraph 3: the topic sentence provides an overall assessment of the effectiveness of the institution, using criteria terms in the questionnaire. Supporting sentences address the effectiveness of each of the three dimensions.
Paragraph 4: presents major issues and their importance, providing a basis for the assessment of reform priorities in Section 4 of the report.
Option 2
Paragraph 1: the topic sentence provides an assessment of the design and effectiveness of the first dimension, using criteria terms used in the questionnaire. Supporting sentences add details.
Paragraph 2: the topic sentence provides an assessment of the design and effectiveness of the second dimension, using criteria terms used in the questionnaire. Supporting sentences add details.
Paragraph 3: the topic sentence provides an assessment of the design and effectiveness of the third dimension, using criteria terms used in the questionnaire. Supporting sentences add details.
Paragraph 4: selectively analyzes the major strengths and weaknesses reflected in dimensions (not necessarily in each dimension) as they relate to the aims of the institution, the weaknesses of which provide the basis for reform priorities in Section 4 of the report.
Section 3. Cross-Cutting Issues
The overall assessment should be used to explain the purpose and structure of the section. Cross-cutting issues are defined as enablers of the 15 institutions in Section 2. Weaknesses should be noted in the Section 2 text, in particular if cross-cutting weakness materially impedes higher scores for the design and effectiveness of specific dimensions.
If any cross-cutting issue is found to materially influence institution scores, it should be analyzed. It can be the subject of recommendations. The length of the analysis of each cross-cutting issue should be comparable to the text for a typical institution in Section 2. The text should generally adhere to the following structure.
Paragraph 1: why the issue is important and how it influences PIM practices.
Paragraph 2: overall description of the current situation in the country with regard to the issue. Tables summarizing key cross-cutting elements (laws, IT systems) related to different PIMA institutions can be useful.
Multiple paragraphs: topic sentence identifies the institution(s) and how the issue affects it (them).
Concluding paragraph: summary assessment of the problem and how remedies might improve the scores of institutions.
Section 4. Reform Priorities and Recommendations
The overall assessment should provide a rationale for why the recommendations were selected from among all possible recommendations. This would involve tying together the seriousness of the problem and the likelihood of successful implementation. This section may also be used to identify commitments the authorities have already made, such as a reform roadmap, and describe how the recommendations ft within those commitments. Recommendations are not required for all institutions. The recommendations must reflect a realistic assessment of the capacity in the country and give guidance on priority and sequencing.
This section should be short and avoid unnecessary repetition from other sections. An alternative to a separate section on recommendations is to include these under the relevant parts of Section 3. This will link the recommendations directly to specific institutions. Recommendations should follow a common format. Recommendations should be made in or generally follow the format shown below.
Appendix 1. Action Plan
The PIMA report should include a detailed action plan outlining the necessary steps and the timetable to implement the recommendations. Table IV.1 provides an example of a PIMA action plan for Georgia.
Format for Recommendations
1. Issue or problem to be solved: short paragraph
2. Recommended solution: short paragraph, indicating intended change rather than actions to be taken
3. Actions to be taken: short paragraph(s) with bullets, and how they achieve the recommended solution (linked to action plan)
4. Responsible agencies: short list (if known)
5. Implementation risks: short paragraph with bullets
Georgia: Proposed Action Plan
Georgia: Proposed Action Plan
Action | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | Responsible Agency |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Recommendation 1: Improve national and sectoral planning | |||||
Update the public investment component of the national development strategy, including all sources of financing, all levels of government, and all procurement options | Obtain government approval for modification to the planning framework | Design new framework Conduct training in new framework | Implement new framework in (1) new national development strategy; (2) new government platform; | Government administration and Ministry of Finance (MoF) | |
Ensure that sectoral strategies distinguish public investment; are comprehensive in coverage; include existing projects and new initiatives; include a clear resource envelope and clear definition of economic efficiency objectives; and are updated for new investment plans | Obtain government approval for modification to the planning framework | Design new framework Conduct training in new framework | Implement new framework in sector strategies | Government administration and MoF | |
Ensure that the ministry action plans are aligned with the sectoral strategies and are fully coordinated to avoid fragmentation of PIM | Obtain government approval for modification to the planning framework | Design new framework. Conduct training in new framework | Implement new framework in the basic data and directions (BDD) and ministry action plans | MoF | |
Recommendation 2: Improve project appraisal processes | |||||
Implement the new PIM methodology | Review PIM methodology on basis of pilots and need to harmonize with public-private partnership framework | Approve timeline of extending mandatory coverage of PIM methodology | Review implementation | Review implementation | MoF and line ministries |
Ensure that the MoF will be responsible, in all projects, for providing central support for line ministry project appraisal and for developing and maintaining the project appraisal methodology | Approve MoF order to allocate PIM responsibilities to different units of the MoF | Provide workshops for line ministries | MoF | ||
Ensure that key economic assumptions in donor-funded public investment projects are consistent with the assumptions used for projects not funded by donors and by the MoF and the Ministry of Economy and Sustainable Development in their economic forecasting and risk assessments | Include in PIM methodology approved by the order of MoF | Establish regular communication channels with line ministries | MoF | ||
Approve a discount rate methodology and specific discount rates, reflecting the economy’s opportunity cost of capital, to be applied to all public investment | Undertake research (technical assistance support needed) | Include new discount rate methodology and new discount rates in draft amended decree on PIM methodology | MoF | ||
Recommendation 5: Strengthen multiyear budgeting | |||||
Introduce a rolling baseline in the budget process | Develop methodology and simple model for ministries to prepare their baselines for each program | Train MoF and spending ministry staff in the methodology and model | Incorporate preparation of the baseline projections into the budget process | MoF | |
Strengthen the credibility of outer-year capital projections | Design reconciliation tables to be used in the BDD/budget documents for capital spending projections over the medium term | Use e-budget system functionality to fill in ministries’ medium-term capital projections as base for their preparation of BDD/ budget submissions Include in budget instructions that ministries should provide reconciliations of their medium-term capital spending projections on a rolling basis and explanations of significant changes | As part of the training on the rolling baseline, discuss its role in strengthening the credibility of medium-term capital projections | MoF | |
Improve the clarity and linkage between different parts of the budget documentation | Include in Chapter VIII of the budget document the agreed definitions of capital/ investment and capital/ investment projects | Include in the budget document additions to existing and new tables for consistency and enable linkages to be made between Chapters III, VI, and the capital projects annex | MoF | ||
Recommendation 6: Implement mechanisms to prioritize the completion of ongoing projects in the budget process | |||||
Facilitate and improve transparency for the prioritization of ongoing projects in the budget process | Specify in BDD/budget instructions that spending ministries should prioritize the completion of ongoing projects over new projects in their budget submissions | Use the e-budget system to pre-fill ministries’ existing project commitments for the coming budget year and medium-term period Focus on status of ongoing projects during budget negotiations with ministries; require them to provide clear justification for beginning new projects alongside their ongoing project portfolio | E-budget system to include realistic total project costs, disaggregated by main category of costs | MoF | |
Recommendation 7: Develop standardized methodology for estimating maintenance needs | |||||
Develop a standardized methodology for estimating current and capital maintenance needs | Approve timeline for developing the methodology for particular asset classes, on the basis of relevant international experience | Develop a methodology for particular asset classes, on the basis of relevant international experience Maintenance | Include a review of planned maintenance expenditures in MoF’s templates for its review of ministry submissions | MoF | |
Incorporate a review of the adequacy of planned maintenance expenditures in budget negotiations | Enable IT systems to link data on asset conditions from asset registers into planning and budgeting systems | ||||
Ensure future maintenance spending is captured in the full life-cycle costing and analysis of new projects | In line with the new PIM procedures, ensure that the documentation required for the analyses of the project includes the preparation of full life-cycle costs | Training for MoF and spending ministry staff on preparing life-cycle project costs | MoF | ||
Ensure maintenance spending is explicitly budgeted and reported for all relevant assets | Provide in the budget documentation for an annex on annual and medium-term allocations and projections for maintenance spending | Ensure budget execution reports include comparisons by ministry of planned and actual maintenance expenditures | MoF | ||
Recommendation 8: Operationalize the project selection procedures in the PIM Guidelines/Manual and incorporate in the budget process | |||||
Apply project selection procedures to all public investment, regardless of the funding source Formalize and incorporate new PIM procedures in annual budget calendar/process |
Devise an implementation plan for the new procedures, including overall timetable and setting out specific activities and timing for operation of the new procedures for each type of stakeholder | Adopt a timeline for procedures to be covering all projects regardless the funding source | Implementation of the plan | Implementation of the plan | MoF, new PIM coordinating body |
Decide on key outstanding PIM procedures | Decide on thresholds of project to determine extent of project appraisal to be undertaken; criteria for independent review of appraisals by MoF; and criteria (checklist) for government to approve projects for inclusion in the list of approved projects | MoF, new PIM coordinating body | |||
Enforce gatekeeping role by MoF | Work with the PIM coordinating body to ensure the effectiveness of the gatekeeping role | Prevent projects from bypassing the procedures and being parachuted into the selection process | MoF, PIM coordinating body | ||
Set out a clear documentation trail for selection decisions at two key stages: for entry into the approved list of projects (pipeline); and for final inclusion in the budget (accountability) | Incorporate in the new procedures the documented steps which will be required for recording selection decisions and how they will be documented | Implement the documentation/ recording procedures | MoF, new PIM coordinating body | ||
Recommendation 9: Strengthens procurement practices | |||||
Introduce live machine-readable data | Improve current systems to introduce live machine- readable data | SPA | |||
Develop an application programming interface for “receiving from/ sending data to” the SPA’s new Open Contracting Data Standard portal to allow and facilitate different types of users to access and analyze procurement data | Develop the application | Test and improve the application | SPA | ||
Recommendation 10: Strengthen project implementation monitoring | |||||
Issue guidelines for preparation of capital project monitoring reports | Design monitoring and reporting system. Align with standard project profile and implementation plan. Align with new FMC system | Pilot in two ministries with significant capital project implementation responsibility, for example, the Ministry of Regional Development and Infrastructure | Revise design on basis of pilot, if needed, and expand to other implementing agencies | MoF Ministry of Regional Development and Infrastructure | |
Recommendation 11: Strengthen project management | |||||
Issues guidelines for preparation of project implementation plans | Design project management data and forms. Standardize to enable consolidation and reporting; more detail can be added for specific project/agency requirements. Align with monitoring system | Pilot in same ministries as project monitoring/ reporting system | Expand to other implementing agencies in coordination with new monitoring/ reporting system | MoF Ministry of Regional Development and Infrastructure |
Georgia: Proposed Action Plan
Action | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | Responsible Agency |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Recommendation 1: Improve national and sectoral planning | |||||
Update the public investment component of the national development strategy, including all sources of financing, all levels of government, and all procurement options | Obtain government approval for modification to the planning framework | Design new framework Conduct training in new framework | Implement new framework in (1) new national development strategy; (2) new government platform; | Government administration and Ministry of Finance (MoF) | |
Ensure that sectoral strategies distinguish public investment; are comprehensive in coverage; include existing projects and new initiatives; include a clear resource envelope and clear definition of economic efficiency objectives; and are updated for new investment plans | Obtain government approval for modification to the planning framework | Design new framework Conduct training in new framework | Implement new framework in sector strategies | Government administration and MoF | |
Ensure that the ministry action plans are aligned with the sectoral strategies and are fully coordinated to avoid fragmentation of PIM | Obtain government approval for modification to the planning framework | Design new framework. Conduct training in new framework | Implement new framework in the basic data and directions (BDD) and ministry action plans | MoF | |
Recommendation 2: Improve project appraisal processes | |||||
Implement the new PIM methodology | Review PIM methodology on basis of pilots and need to harmonize with public-private partnership framework | Approve timeline of extending mandatory coverage of PIM methodology | Review implementation | Review implementation | MoF and line ministries |
Ensure that the MoF will be responsible, in all projects, for providing central support for line ministry project appraisal and for developing and maintaining the project appraisal methodology | Approve MoF order to allocate PIM responsibilities to different units of the MoF | Provide workshops for line ministries | MoF | ||
Ensure that key economic assumptions in donor-funded public investment projects are consistent with the assumptions used for projects not funded by donors and by the MoF and the Ministry of Economy and Sustainable Development in their economic forecasting and risk assessments | Include in PIM methodology approved by the order of MoF | Establish regular communication channels with line ministries | MoF | ||
Approve a discount rate methodology and specific discount rates, reflecting the economy’s opportunity cost of capital, to be applied to all public investment | Undertake research (technical assistance support needed) | Include new discount rate methodology and new discount rates in draft amended decree on PIM methodology | MoF | ||
Recommendation 5: Strengthen multiyear budgeting | |||||
Introduce a rolling baseline in the budget process | Develop methodology and simple model for ministries to prepare their baselines for each program | Train MoF and spending ministry staff in the methodology and model | Incorporate preparation of the baseline projections into the budget process | MoF | |
Strengthen the credibility of outer-year capital projections | Design reconciliation tables to be used in the BDD/budget documents for capital spending projections over the medium term | Use e-budget system functionality to fill in ministries’ medium-term capital projections as base for their preparation of BDD/ budget submissions Include in budget instructions that ministries should provide reconciliations of their medium-term capital spending projections on a rolling basis and explanations of significant changes | As part of the training on the rolling baseline, discuss its role in strengthening the credibility of medium-term capital projections | MoF | |
Improve the clarity and linkage between different parts of the budget documentation | Include in Chapter VIII of the budget document the agreed definitions of capital/ investment and capital/ investment projects | Include in the budget document additions to existing and new tables for consistency and enable linkages to be made between Chapters III, VI, and the capital projects annex | MoF | ||
Recommendation 6: Implement mechanisms to prioritize the completion of ongoing projects in the budget process | |||||
Facilitate and improve transparency for the prioritization of ongoing projects in the budget process | Specify in BDD/budget instructions that spending ministries should prioritize the completion of ongoing projects over new projects in their budget submissions | Use the e-budget system to pre-fill ministries’ existing project commitments for the coming budget year and medium-term period Focus on status of ongoing projects during budget negotiations with ministries; require them to provide clear justification for beginning new projects alongside their ongoing project portfolio | E-budget system to include realistic total project costs, disaggregated by main category of costs | MoF | |
Recommendation 7: Develop standardized methodology for estimating maintenance needs | |||||
Develop a standardized methodology for estimating current and capital maintenance needs | Approve timeline for developing the methodology for particular asset classes, on the basis of relevant international experience | Develop a methodology for particular asset classes, on the basis of relevant international experience Maintenance | Include a review of planned maintenance expenditures in MoF’s templates for its review of ministry submissions | MoF | |
Incorporate a review of the adequacy of planned maintenance expenditures in budget negotiations | Enable IT systems to link data on asset conditions from asset registers into planning and budgeting systems | ||||
Ensure future maintenance spending is captured in the full life-cycle costing and analysis of new projects | In line with the new PIM procedures, ensure that the documentation required for the analyses of the project includes the preparation of full life-cycle costs | Training for MoF and spending ministry staff on preparing life-cycle project costs | MoF | ||
Ensure maintenance spending is explicitly budgeted and reported for all relevant assets | Provide in the budget documentation for an annex on annual and medium-term allocations and projections for maintenance spending | Ensure budget execution reports include comparisons by ministry of planned and actual maintenance expenditures | MoF | ||
Recommendation 8: Operationalize the project selection procedures in the PIM Guidelines/Manual and incorporate in the budget process | |||||
Apply project selection procedures to all public investment, regardless of the funding source Formalize and incorporate new PIM procedures in annual budget calendar/process |
Devise an implementation plan for the new procedures, including overall timetable and setting out specific activities and timing for operation of the new procedures for each type of stakeholder | Adopt a timeline for procedures to be covering all projects regardless the funding source | Implementation of the plan | Implementation of the plan | MoF, new PIM coordinating body |
Decide on key outstanding PIM procedures | Decide on thresholds of project to determine extent of project appraisal to be undertaken; criteria for independent review of appraisals by MoF; and criteria (checklist) for government to approve projects for inclusion in the list of approved projects | MoF, new PIM coordinating body | |||
Enforce gatekeeping role by MoF | Work with the PIM coordinating body to ensure the effectiveness of the gatekeeping role | Prevent projects from bypassing the procedures and being parachuted into the selection process | MoF, PIM coordinating body | ||
Set out a clear documentation trail for selection decisions at two key stages: for entry into the approved list of projects (pipeline); and for final inclusion in the budget (accountability) | Incorporate in the new procedures the documented steps which will be required for recording selection decisions and how they will be documented | Implement the documentation/ recording procedures | MoF, new PIM coordinating body | ||
Recommendation 9: Strengthens procurement practices | |||||
Introduce live machine-readable data | Improve current systems to introduce live machine- readable data | SPA | |||
Develop an application programming interface for “receiving from/ sending data to” the SPA’s new Open Contracting Data Standard portal to allow and facilitate different types of users to access and analyze procurement data | Develop the application | Test and improve the application | SPA | ||
Recommendation 10: Strengthen project implementation monitoring | |||||
Issue guidelines for preparation of capital project monitoring reports | Design monitoring and reporting system. Align with standard project profile and implementation plan. Align with new FMC system | Pilot in two ministries with significant capital project implementation responsibility, for example, the Ministry of Regional Development and Infrastructure | Revise design on basis of pilot, if needed, and expand to other implementing agencies | MoF Ministry of Regional Development and Infrastructure | |
Recommendation 11: Strengthen project management | |||||
Issues guidelines for preparation of project implementation plans | Design project management data and forms. Standardize to enable consolidation and reporting; more detail can be added for specific project/agency requirements. Align with monitoring system | Pilot in same ministries as project monitoring/ reporting system | Expand to other implementing agencies in coordination with new monitoring/ reporting system | MoF Ministry of Regional Development and Infrastructure |
Appendix V: Glossary
Term | Definition |
---|---|
Assets | Any economic resource controlled by an entity as a result of past transactions or events and from which the economic owner may obtain future economic benefits over a period of time. Assets may be financial or nonfinancial, and the latter include infrastructure assets (see definition of infrastructure below). |
Budget documents | The documents that are published with the executive’s annual budget submission to the legislature or that are related to the process of preparing the budget. In addition to the draft appropriation bill, these documents could include a fiscal strategy statement, a medium-term budget framework, a fiscal risk statement, and a report on the execution of the budget for the previous year. |
Budgetary central government | The ministries, departments, agencies, and other entities belonging to the central government whose spending, revenues, and borrowing activities are included in the central government’s annual budget. |
Cabinet | For the purpose of the field guide, this term (sometimes called the Council of Ministers) is used to represent the highest executive decision-making body in a country, whose decisions are applicable, and can be enforced, across the executive. The Cabinet (or Council of Ministers as it is sometimes called) is usually chaired by a prime minister or a country’s president. The extent of the Cabinet’s mandate and powers varies widely from country to country. |
Capital budget | As defined variously in different countries. The approved capital budget includes appropriations that authorize spending on infrastructure assets and equipment for specified purposes and up to a specified amount. The capital budget is assumed to be annual, unless otherwise specified. |
Capital projects | Projects funded through the capital budget. Such projects normally comprise investment in infrastructure (see definition below) and equipment. |
Capital spending | Spending to acquire a physical asset or to extend the usable life of a physical asset. |
Capital stock | Accumulated capital spending in a country. Since in many countries there are no direct estimates of the capital stock, it is usually measured in PIMA reports as the cumulative sum of public investment over time, adjusted for depreciation. |
Central government | All government entities that are included in the budgetary central government, plus any units funded by extrabudgetary funds and nonmarket nonprofit institutions that are controlled by the central government. Depending on legal arrangements, social security funds are often considered part of central government. |
Current budget | Most countries distinguish between capital and current (or recurrent) budgets. The latter includes spending on wages and salaries, and goods and services. Sometimes referred to as the “operating budget.” |
Development budget | Some countries have a current (or recurrent) and development budget, rather than a current and a capital budget. In such cases, the development budget may include elements of spending that are both recurrent and capital in nature. For the purpose of the field guide, use of the term “capital budget” in a country with a development budget should be interpreted as meaning all spending in the development budget that is capital in nature. |
Dimension | The lowest level in the PIMA questionnaire. There are 45 dimensions in the PIMA questionnaire. |
External financing | Financing provided by international financial institutions or bilateral development partners, by means of grants and concessional or non-concessional loans. Sometimes it includes project-related loans provided, in the context of a bilateral agreement, by a foreign commercial bank to the government or a public corporation—often under the assumption that the project will generate enough funds to repay the loan. This term does not include funds supplied by externally-based investors in domestic securities or by the issuance of securities in foreign capital markets. |
Financing source | Term used in the budget to describe a type of financing; it is not an accounting or banking term. The term is used to describe types of financing with broadly similar conditions, such as external financing or public-private partnerships. The term “budget funds” is commonly used to refer to the pool of funds from tax, non-tax, and domestic borrowing over which the government has full discretion over its use. “Financing source” should not be confused with “financing,” or “below the line” transactions, used in the GFSM 2014 framework. |
Fiscal transparency | Fiscal transparency refers to the clarity, reliability, frequency, timeliness, and relevance of public fiscal reporting and the openness of such information. |
General government | Comprises all entities of the central, state, regional, provincial, municipal, or local government; all extrabudgetary entities, including social security funds, at each level of government; and all nonmarket nonprofit institutions that are controlled and financed mainly by government units. It does not include public corporations, even when these companies are owned and controlled by the government |
Independent | Used in the PIMA questionnaire to describe external review, regulator, agency, expert, body, and entity. Generally, it describes a party who has no direction, connection to, or involvement in a decision-making process (for example, the selection of infrastructure projects) or is hired to provide impartial advice on that process, and is thus more likely to objectively apply a standard set of rules or criteria. |
Infrastructure | Nonfinancial fixed assets, including economic and social infrastructure. Social infrastructure supports the provision of public services such as schools, hospitals, and public housing. Economic infrastructure supports economic activity with telecommunication networks, transportation assets ((for example, roads, railways, canals, ports, and airports), water and wastewater pipes and treatment plants, and electricity production and transmission (see https://www.imf.org/external/np/fad/publicinvestment/). |
Medium-term | A period usually covering the current year plus 2–3 additional years which may be applied both to budgets and planning documents. |
Ministry of Finance (MoF) | For this field guide, the MoF is assumed to act as the central fiscal authority and will usually include the central budget office. In many countries, a separate ministry or agency acts as the principal body responsible for national development planning. |
Ongoing project | A project that has received at least one appropriation for its construction, regardless of expenditures. Appropriations for project preparation (including appraisals and feasibility studies), do not contribute to the definition of a project as ongoing, because it is not yet decided that the project will go forward. |
Operating budget | See current budget. |
Outlay | Cash outflows relating to expenditures, transfers, and subsidies. |
PIMA framework | The range of issues addressed in the PIMA report, and the PIMA questionnaire. |
PIMA questionnaire | Comprising 15 institutions and 45 dimensions. The basis for the scoring portion of the PIMA report. Part of the PIMA framework. |
Public corporation (PC) | A legal entity that is owned or controlled by the government and that produces goods or services for sale in the market at economically significant prices. |
Public-private partnership (PPP) | Long-term contracts between a public and a private entity, whereby the private entity acquires or builds an asset or set of assets, operates it for a period, and then usually hands the asset over to the public entity. PIMAs treat as PPP any long-term concession for the construction, improvement/extension, or operation of public infrastructure. (see GFSM 2 014) . |
Published information, or publications | Information that is made readily accessible by the general public in a proactive and inexpensive way. Modes of communication that constitute publication include printed documents prepared by the government, open-access government websites, social media, radio, television, newspapers and magazines. |
Themplate: Investment and Capital Stock | An Excel spreadsheet designed and maintained by the FAD Expenditure Policy Division. It is the source of data and figures for use in Section 1 of the PIMA report. It is the source of information for comparator countries, and for the efficiency frontier figure. |
Template: PIMA Scoring | An Excel spreadsheet designed and maintained by the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department Public Financial Management divisions. Contains scores of all countries that have had a PIMA. It is the source of the form to enter data on the various dimensions of the PIMA framework and calculate the respective scores, the heat map, and the design and effectiveness spider charts. |
Total project lifecycle costs | Total costs of designing, constructing, operating, and maintaining an asset over its lifetime. In some OECD countries, the term is used as synonymous with total project costs (see definition below). |
Total project costs | Includes (1) the cost of feasibility studies and other preparatory work on the design of a project that may have been funded by budget appropriations that are separate from spending on the construction of the project itself; and (2) the sum of all the expenditures incurred on a project from the initiation and design phases in previous years, planned spending in the current year, and estimated spending required to complete the construction in future years. Total project costs usually exclude the cost of operating and maintaining the asset created by the project, but in some OECD countries it is used as synonymous with total project lifecycle costs (see definition above). |
Term | Definition |
---|---|
Assets | Any economic resource controlled by an entity as a result of past transactions or events and from which the economic owner may obtain future economic benefits over a period of time. Assets may be financial or nonfinancial, and the latter include infrastructure assets (see definition of infrastructure below). |
Budget documents | The documents that are published with the executive’s annual budget submission to the legislature or that are related to the process of preparing the budget. In addition to the draft appropriation bill, these documents could include a fiscal strategy statement, a medium-term budget framework, a fiscal risk statement, and a report on the execution of the budget for the previous year. |
Budgetary central government | The ministries, departments, agencies, and other entities belonging to the central government whose spending, revenues, and borrowing activities are included in the central government’s annual budget. |
Cabinet | For the purpose of the field guide, this term (sometimes called the Council of Ministers) is used to represent the highest executive decision-making body in a country, whose decisions are applicable, and can be enforced, across the executive. The Cabinet (or Council of Ministers as it is sometimes called) is usually chaired by a prime minister or a country’s president. The extent of the Cabinet’s mandate and powers varies widely from country to country. |
Capital budget | As defined variously in different countries. The approved capital budget includes appropriations that authorize spending on infrastructure assets and equipment for specified purposes and up to a specified amount. The capital budget is assumed to be annual, unless otherwise specified. |
Capital projects | Projects funded through the capital budget. Such projects normally comprise investment in infrastructure (see definition below) and equipment. |
Capital spending | Spending to acquire a physical asset or to extend the usable life of a physical asset. |
Capital stock | Accumulated capital spending in a country. Since in many countries there are no direct estimates of the capital stock, it is usually measured in PIMA reports as the cumulative sum of public investment over time, adjusted for depreciation. |
Central government | All government entities that are included in the budgetary central government, plus any units funded by extrabudgetary funds and nonmarket nonprofit institutions that are controlled by the central government. Depending on legal arrangements, social security funds are often considered part of central government. |
Current budget | Most countries distinguish between capital and current (or recurrent) budgets. The latter includes spending on wages and salaries, and goods and services. Sometimes referred to as the “operating budget.” |
Development budget | Some countries have a current (or recurrent) and development budget, rather than a current and a capital budget. In such cases, the development budget may include elements of spending that are both recurrent and capital in nature. For the purpose of the field guide, use of the term “capital budget” in a country with a development budget should be interpreted as meaning all spending in the development budget that is capital in nature. |
Dimension | The lowest level in the PIMA questionnaire. There are 45 dimensions in the PIMA questionnaire. |
External financing | Financing provided by international financial institutions or bilateral development partners, by means of grants and concessional or non-concessional loans. Sometimes it includes project-related loans provided, in the context of a bilateral agreement, by a foreign commercial bank to the government or a public corporation—often under the assumption that the project will generate enough funds to repay the loan. This term does not include funds supplied by externally-based investors in domestic securities or by the issuance of securities in foreign capital markets. |
Financing source | Term used in the budget to describe a type of financing; it is not an accounting or banking term. The term is used to describe types of financing with broadly similar conditions, such as external financing or public-private partnerships. The term “budget funds” is commonly used to refer to the pool of funds from tax, non-tax, and domestic borrowing over which the government has full discretion over its use. “Financing source” should not be confused with “financing,” or “below the line” transactions, used in the GFSM 2014 framework. |
Fiscal transparency | Fiscal transparency refers to the clarity, reliability, frequency, timeliness, and relevance of public fiscal reporting and the openness of such information. |
General government | Comprises all entities of the central, state, regional, provincial, municipal, or local government; all extrabudgetary entities, including social security funds, at each level of government; and all nonmarket nonprofit institutions that are controlled and financed mainly by government units. It does not include public corporations, even when these companies are owned and controlled by the government |
Independent | Used in the PIMA questionnaire to describe external review, regulator, agency, expert, body, and entity. Generally, it describes a party who has no direction, connection to, or involvement in a decision-making process (for example, the selection of infrastructure projects) or is hired to provide impartial advice on that process, and is thus more likely to objectively apply a standard set of rules or criteria. |
Infrastructure | Nonfinancial fixed assets, including economic and social infrastructure. Social infrastructure supports the provision of public services such as schools, hospitals, and public housing. Economic infrastructure supports economic activity with telecommunication networks, transportation assets ((for example, roads, railways, canals, ports, and airports), water and wastewater pipes and treatment plants, and electricity production and transmission (see https://www.imf.org/external/np/fad/publicinvestment/). |
Medium-term | A period usually covering the current year plus 2–3 additional years which may be applied both to budgets and planning documents. |
Ministry of Finance (MoF) | For this field guide, the MoF is assumed to act as the central fiscal authority and will usually include the central budget office. In many countries, a separate ministry or agency acts as the principal body responsible for national development planning. |
Ongoing project | A project that has received at least one appropriation for its construction, regardless of expenditures. Appropriations for project preparation (including appraisals and feasibility studies), do not contribute to the definition of a project as ongoing, because it is not yet decided that the project will go forward. |
Operating budget | See current budget. |
Outlay | Cash outflows relating to expenditures, transfers, and subsidies. |
PIMA framework | The range of issues addressed in the PIMA report, and the PIMA questionnaire. |
PIMA questionnaire | Comprising 15 institutions and 45 dimensions. The basis for the scoring portion of the PIMA report. Part of the PIMA framework. |
Public corporation (PC) | A legal entity that is owned or controlled by the government and that produces goods or services for sale in the market at economically significant prices. |
Public-private partnership (PPP) | Long-term contracts between a public and a private entity, whereby the private entity acquires or builds an asset or set of assets, operates it for a period, and then usually hands the asset over to the public entity. PIMAs treat as PPP any long-term concession for the construction, improvement/extension, or operation of public infrastructure. (see GFSM 2 014) . |
Published information, or publications | Information that is made readily accessible by the general public in a proactive and inexpensive way. Modes of communication that constitute publication include printed documents prepared by the government, open-access government websites, social media, radio, television, newspapers and magazines. |
Themplate: Investment and Capital Stock | An Excel spreadsheet designed and maintained by the FAD Expenditure Policy Division. It is the source of data and figures for use in Section 1 of the PIMA report. It is the source of information for comparator countries, and for the efficiency frontier figure. |
Template: PIMA Scoring | An Excel spreadsheet designed and maintained by the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department Public Financial Management divisions. Contains scores of all countries that have had a PIMA. It is the source of the form to enter data on the various dimensions of the PIMA framework and calculate the respective scores, the heat map, and the design and effectiveness spider charts. |
Total project lifecycle costs | Total costs of designing, constructing, operating, and maintaining an asset over its lifetime. In some OECD countries, the term is used as synonymous with total project costs (see definition below). |
Total project costs | Includes (1) the cost of feasibility studies and other preparatory work on the design of a project that may have been funded by budget appropriations that are separate from spending on the construction of the project itself; and (2) the sum of all the expenditures incurred on a project from the initiation and design phases in previous years, planned spending in the current year, and estimated spending required to complete the construction in future years. Total project costs usually exclude the cost of operating and maintaining the asset created by the project, but in some OECD countries it is used as synonymous with total project lifecycle costs (see definition above). |
Data may be severely lacking for some countries, in particular post-conflict countries. In such cases, the assessment team will need to populate the relevant databases.
For a review of the methodology used by the IMF Fiscal Affairs Department to calculate capital stock, see https://infrastructuregovern.imf.org/content/dam/PIMA/Knowledge-Hub/dataset/WhatsNewinIMFInvestmentandCapitalStockDatabase_ May2021.pdf.
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