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Ms. Eva H. G. Hüpkes, Mr. Michael W Taylor, and Mr. Marc G Quintyn

Abstract

Policymakers are often reluctant to grant independence to the agencies that regulate and supervise the financial sector because of the fear that these agencies, with their wide-ranging responsibilities and powers, could become a law unto themselves. This pamphlet describes mechanisms for making regulatory agencies accountable not only to the government but also to the industry they supervise and the public at large, with examples from a range of countries.

Ms. Eva H. G. Hüpkes, Mr. Michael W Taylor, and Mr. Marc G Quintyn

Abstract

Les décideurs rechignent souvent à accorder l’indépendance aux agences qui réglementent et supervisent le secteur financier, car ils craignent que ces agences, avec leurs responsabilités et leurs pouvoirs étendus, puissent imposer leur loi. Cette brochure décrit les mécanismes permettant de garantir que ces agences soient redevables non seulement envers l'État, mais également envers le secteur qu'elles supervisent et envers le grand public, et propose des exemples de divers pays.

Ms. Eva H. G. Hüpkes, Mr. Michael W Taylor, and Mr. Marc G Quintyn

Abstract

Policymakers are often reluctant to grant independence to the agencies that regulate and supervise the financial sector because of the fear that these agencies, with their wide-ranging responsibilities and powers, could become a law unto themselves. This pamphlet describes mechanisms for making regulatory agencies accountable not only to the government but also to the industry they supervise and the public at large, with examples from a range of countries.

Ms. Eva H. G. Hüpkes, Mr. Michael W Taylor, and Mr. Marc G Quintyn

Abstract

Las autoridades de política económica suelen ser renuentes a otorgar independencia a los organismos que regulan y supervisan el sector financiero debido al temor de que estos organismos, con responsabilidades y poderes de amplio alcance, puedan convertirse en una fuente normativa por sí mismos. Este folleto describe los mecanismos para que los organismos reguladores rindan cuentas no solo ante el gobierno sino también ante la industria que supervisan y el público en general, con ejemplos sobre una amplia gama de países.

Ms. Eva H. G. Hüpkes, Mr. Michael W Taylor, and Mr. Marc G Quintyn

Abstract

Policymakers are often reluctant to grant independence to the agencies that regulate and supervise the financial sector because of the fear that these agencies, with their wide-ranging responsibilities and powers, could become a law unto themselves. This pamphlet describes mechanisms for making regulatory agencies accountable not only to the government but also to the industry they supervise and the public at large, with examples from a range of countries.

Ms. Eva H. G. Hüpkes, Mr. Michael W Taylor, and Mr. Marc G Quintyn

Abstract

Policymakers are often reluctant to grant independence to the agencies that regulate and supervise the financial sector because of the fear that these agencies, with their wide-ranging responsibilities and powers, could become a law unto themselves. This pamphlet describes mechanisms for making regulatory agencies accountable not only to the government but also to the industry they supervise and the public at large, with examples from a range of countries.

Mr. Marc G Quintyn and Mr. Michael W Taylor

Abstract

In nearly every major financial crisis of the past decade-from East Asia to Russia, Turkey, and Latin America-political interference in financial sector regulation helped make a bad situation worse. Political pressures not only weakened financial regulation, but also hindered regulators and supervisors from taking action against troubled banks. This paper investigates why, to fulfill their mandate to preserve financial sector stability, financial sector regulators and supervisors need to be independent-from the financial services industry as well as from the government-as well as accountable.

Mr. Marc G Quintyn and Mr. Michael W Taylor

Abstract

En casi todas las grandes crisis financieras de la última década --desde Asia oriental a Rusia, Turquía y América Latina-- la interferencia política en la regulación del sector financiero contribuyó a agravar una situación ya de por sí mala. Las presiones políticas no solo debilitaron la regulación financiera sino que también impidieron que los órganos reguladores y supervisores tomaran medidas contra los bancos en problemas. En este estudio se investiga por qué, para cumplir con su mandato de preservar la estabilidad del sector financiero, los reguladores y supervisores del sector financiero tienen que ser independientes --de la industria de servicios financieros, así como del gobierno-- a la vez que deben rendir cuentas.

Mr. Marc G Quintyn and Mr. Michael W Taylor

Abstract

L'ingérence des responsables politiques dans la réglementation et le contrôle du secteur financier a aggravé la quasi-totalité des crises financières majeures de la dernière décennie, de l'Asie de l'Est, à la Russie, en passant par la Turquie et l'Amérique latine. Outre qu'elles affaiblissent la réglementation financière en général, les pressions politiques nuisent au travail des responsables de la réglementation et du contrôle chargés d'intervenir auprès des banques en difficulté. Cette brochure examine les raisons pour lesquelles les régulateurs financiers devraient pouvoir compter sur un large degré d'indépendance, non seulement vis-à-vis de l'État, mais aussi vis-à-vis des sociétés de services financiers, afin de s'acquitter de leur mandat qui est de préserver la stabilité du secteur financier.

Mr. Marc G Quintyn and Mr. Michael W Taylor

Abstract

In nearly every major financial crisis of the past decade-from East Asia to Russia, Turkey, and Latin America-political interference in financial sector regulation helped make a bad situation worse. Political pressures not only weakened financial regulation, but also hindered regulators and supervisors from taking action against troubled banks. This paper investigates why, to fulfill their mandate to preserve financial sector stability, financial sector regulators and supervisors need to be independent-from the financial services industry as well as from the government-as well as accountable.

Mr. Marc G Quintyn and Mr. Michael W Taylor

Abstract

In nearly every major financial crisis of the past decade-from East Asia to Russia, Turkey, and Latin America-political interference in financial sector regulation helped make a bad situation worse. Political pressures not only weakened financial regulation, but also hindered regulators and supervisors from taking action against troubled banks. This paper investigates why, to fulfill their mandate to preserve financial sector stability, financial sector regulators and supervisors need to be independent-from the financial services industry as well as from the government-as well as accountable.

Mr. Marc G Quintyn and Mr. Michael W Taylor

Abstract

In nearly every major financial crisis of the past decade-from East Asia to Russia, Turkey, and Latin America-political interference in financial sector regulation helped make a bad situation worse. Political pressures not only weakened financial regulation, but also hindered regulators and supervisors from taking action against troubled banks. This paper investigates why, to fulfill their mandate to preserve financial sector stability, financial sector regulators and supervisors need to be independent-from the financial services industry as well as from the government-as well as accountable.

Ms. Eva H. G. Hüpkes, Mr. Michael W Taylor, and Mr. Marc G Quintyn

Abstract

Why are policymakers reluctant to grant independence to the agencies that regulate and supervise the financial sector, despite mounting empirical evidence that independence makes for a healthier financial system?

Mr. Marc G Quintyn and Mr. Michael W Taylor

Abstract

In nearly every major financial crisis of the past decade—from East Asia to Russia, Turkey, and Latin America—political interference in financial sector regulation helped make a bad situation worse. Political pressures not only weakened financial regulation generally, they also hindered regulators and the supervisors who enforce the regulations from taking action against banks that ran into trouble. In so doing, they crippled the financial sector in the run-up to the crisis, delayed recognition of the severity of the crisis, slowed needed intervention, and raised the cost of the crisis to taxpayers.