ADOLFO BARAJAS, EMILIANO BASCO, V. HUGO JUAN-RAMÓN, and CARLOS QUARRACINO
The simple answer to both questions in the title of this paper: No. We concentrate on three key aspects of the banking system’s difficulties during the 2001-02 crisis. Two are related to bank behavior (increasing dollarization of the balance sheet and expanding exposure to the government), and the other is related to the degree by which banks were hurt by depositor preferences, specifically, the run on deposits during 2001. We find that there was substantial cross-bank variation, that is, not all banks behaved equally nor were hurt equally by the macroeconomic shocks they faced during the run-up to the crisis. Furthermore, using panel data estimation, we find that depositors were able to distinguish high-risk from low-risk banks, and that individual bank’s exposure to currency and government default risk depended on fundamentals and other bank-specific characteristics. Finally, our results have implications for the existence of market discipline in periods of stress, and for banking regulation, which may have led banks to underestimate some of the risks they incurred. IMF Staff Papers (2007) 54, 621–662. doi:10.1057/palgrave.imfsp.9450022
This paper provides evidence on the susceptibility of different types of exchange rate regimes to currency crises during 1990-2001. It explores the incidence of crises, identified as episodes of severe exchange market pressure, to seek evidence on whether pegged regimes are more crisis prone than floating regimes and on whether certain types of pegged regimes are more crisis prone than others. The paper finds that pegged regimes, as a whole, have been characterized by a higher incidence of crises than floating regimes, for countries that are more integrated with international capital markets; and that intermediate regimes (mainly soft pegs and tightly-managed floating regimes) have been more crisis prone than both hard pegs and other floating regimes-a view consistent with the bipolar view of exchange rate regimes. The degree of crisis proneness seems to be broadly similar across different types of intermediate regimes.
This paper puts forward a package of proposed decisions to implement the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (“MDRI”) and establish the Exogenous Shocks Facility within the PRGF Trust; it also provides a Commentary on key aspects of the decisions. The proposed decisions generally reflect the overall structure and modalities that have been identified by the staff and endorsed by Executive Directors in the several meetings held to date concerning the G-8 debt relief proposal/MDRI and ESF.
This paper proposes that the Executive Board approve the disbursement of a second 6-month tranche of CCRT debt service relief to 28 of the 29 members, covering the period October 14, 2020 through April 13, 2021, given staff’s assessment that sufficient financial resources are available.2 In this context, the paper also provides brief updates for each beneficiary country on its policy responses to the pandemic and staff’s assessment of these policies and the use of resources freed up by debt service relief. It also provides an update on the finances of the CCRT and the fundraising efforts to secure adequate resources for grant assistance in the future. Based on grant pledges to date, resources are not sufficient to extend CCRT relief beyond the proposed second sixth-month period.
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