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International Monetary Fund
This paper presents key findings of the detailed assessment on the implementation of the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) objectives and principles of securities regulation for Thailand. The assessment recommends creating a formal coordination mechanism among governmental agencies with regulatory authority over capital markets. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) should amend its code of conduct and provide that restrictions on securities investments by its staff also applies to spouses, minor children, and all other accounts over which an employee has the authority to make investment decisions.
International Monetary Fund. Monetary and Capital Markets Department
This paper discusses key findings of the Detailed Assessment of Implementation of the IOSCO (International Organization of Securities Commissions) Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation on the United States. The United States has large, well-developed, and complex securities and derivatives markets. Postcrisis, the legal mandates of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) have significantly expanded. The level of funding of both the SEC and CFTC is a key challenge affecting their ability to deliver on their mandates in a way that provides confidence to markets and investors. The fragmented structure of equity markets remains a key challenge for the SEC.
International Monetary Fund. Monetary and Capital Markets Department
SUMMARY The Korean authorities have made significant progress since the last FSAP in revising the securities regulatory framework, with the current framework achieving good overall compliance with the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) Principles. Importantly, the earlier legal impediments to international cooperation and exchange of information have been removed. Since 2011, Korea also applies the Korean International Financial Reporting Standards (K-IFRS) that follow the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Although the regulators’ responsibilities are defined in legislation, the complexity of the structure obscures the transparency of the decision-making processes. The responsibility for deciding on a particular supervisory or enforcement action can lie either at the Financial Services Commission (FSC), Securities and Futures Commission (SFC), or Financial Supervisory Service (FSS), depending on the nature and gravity of action, but it is not always clear which one of them is ultimately in charge. The process is further complicated by the use of pre-deliberation committees at various levels. Self-regulatory organizations—the Korea Exchange (KRX), the Korea Financial Investment Association (KOFIA) and the Korean Institute of Certified Public Accountants (KICPA)— also play a role in the regulatory and supervisory processes. Publication of additional information on the decision-making structure and processes would be beneficial. Operational cooperation and coordination between the various authorities is currently addressed by having the agencies represented in each others’ decision-making bodies. However, the full participation of the Minister of Strategy and Finance at the FSC Board has the potential of compromising the independence of the FSC’s supervisory and enforcement decisions. Consideration should be given on how best to mitigate the potential for undue political influence arising from such governance arrangements by, for example, restricting the participation of the Minister of Strategy and Finance in the supervisory and enforcement decisions. Attention should also be paid to ensuring that the various arrangements for gathering commercial input provide for equal and transparent treatment of market participants.
Michael Koetter, Mr. Tigran Poghosyan, and Thomas Kick
Based on detailed regulatory intervention data among German banks during 1994-2008, we test if supervisory measures affect the likelihood and the timing of bank recovery. Severe regulatory measures increase both the likelihood of recovery and its duration while weak measures are insignificant. With the benefit of hindsight, we exclude banks that eventually exit the market due to restructuring mergers. Our results remain intact, thus providing no evidence of "bad" bank selection for intervention purposes on the side of regulators. More transparent publication requirements of public incorporation that indicate more exposure to market discipline are barely or not at all significant. Increasing earnings and cleaning credit portfolios are consistently of importance to increase recovery likelihood, whereas earnings growth accelerates the timing of recovery. Macroeconomic conditions also matter for bank recovery. Hence, concerted micro- and macro-prudential policies are key to facilitate distressed bank recovery.
International Monetary Fund
Over the past six months, a key theme has been ensuring strong follow-up to IEO evaluations, a priority stressed by the recently competed External Evaluation of the IEO. Of particular note, the Managing Director has issued a statement highlighting actions planned to strengthen the IMF’s engagement with fragile states following our recent evaluation, and this statement is being presented to the IMFC for endorsement. In addition, the IEO has completed two updates of past evaluations, advanced work on two ongoing evaluations (on IMF financial surveillance and on IMF advice related to unconventional monetary policies), and is now considering its future work program in light of the External Evaluation.