Two recent investigations of the 1967 devaluation of the pound sterling concluded that the benefits of that devaluation were delayed in timing and were relatively small in magnitude. If confirmed, their conclusion would clearly tend to undermine the case for exchange rate changes as a means of promoting current account adjustment; it would also refute the previous consensus on the size of international trade elasticities. It is therefore of the greatest importance to scrutinize the devaluation experience of the United Kingdom more closely, so that the right lessons may be drawn from it. A further and more detailed investigation of the U. K. devaluation is presented here. Its conclusion differs sharply from that reached in the recent investigations by the National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR, 1972) and the London Business School (LBS, by Ball, Burns, and Miller, 1972). It is estimated in the present study that positive benefits from the devaluation occurred relatively rapidly and were large in their magnitude.