Clearing up bad loans and recapitalizing insolvent banks can have important allocative effects, opening the way to more efficient allocation of credit and pricing of risk. This paper discusses whether the first-round fiscal and monetary effects associated with the government’s payment of interest on recapitalization bonds are important. It first discusses a benchmark case in which these first-round effects are irrelevant, and then examines some qualifications to this result. It concludes that the fiscal impact of recapitalization does not, in general, correspond to interest paid on recapitalization bonds.
International Monetary Fund. Legal Dept. and International Monetary Fund. Monetary and Capital Markets Department
This paper reports on progress in inclusion of enhanced collective action clauses and modified pari passu clauses as of end-October 2018. The report finds that enhanced CACs have now become the market standard, with only a few issuers standing out from the market trend. Around 88 percent of international sovereign bonds (in aggregate principal amount) issued since October 2014 in the main jurisdictions of New York and England include such clauses. The modified pari passu clause continues to be incorporated as a package with the enhanced CACs, with few exceptions. In line with findings in previous reports, the inclusion of enhanced CACs does not seem to have an observable pricing effect, according to either primary or secondary market data. The outstanding stock of international sovereign bonds without enhanced CACs remains high, with about 39 percent of the outstanding stock including enhanced CACs.
This paper provides case studies of 13 of the largest non-UMP countries. The case studies begin with an overview of recent macro-economic developments as well as capital flow patterns during the crisis up to the first U.S. tapering announcement in May 2013. Country experiences with capital inflows are judged along five dimensions: (i) the size of capital inflows, (ii) policies used to manage inflows, (iii) external stability, measured by exchange rate overvaluation and current account deficits relative to fundamentals,2 (iv) asset price and credit market reactions, and (v) financial sector stability. Case studies mostly draw on published IMF Staff Reports for each country, as well as the 2013 Pilot External Stability Report (IMF 2013d).
This paper reviews commercial bank debt restructuring based on the recent experience of Bulgaria. While the deal is shown to have generated substantial debt relief at a remarkably low cost, several lessons are drawn that may be of broader relevance to countries restructuring bank debt. As, from time to time, it has been suggested that Bulgaria should have held out for more favorable treatment, or that it should now seek further debt reduction, the likely costs of these options are identified. Looking ahead, key policy issues are discussed that will determine growth prospects and debt sustainability over the medium term. It is argued that the deal’s success remains to be underpinned in particular by judicious fiscal and debt management policies.
There have been significant developments in sovereign debt restructuring involving private-sector creditors since the IMF’s last stocktaking in 2014.
While the current contractual approach has been largely effective in resolving sovereign debt cases since 2014, it has gaps that could pose challenges in future restructurings.
Bonds issued by the government or government agencies are often used to finance bank restructuring following a systemic crisis. Many conflicting considerations affect the design of the bonds used to pay for public sector investment in bank equity or the purchase of distressed assets from banks. Some bond features can leave restructured banks facing significant risks, laying the foundation for future banking sector problems. Sovereign default makes publicly financed bank restructuring more difficult, but it is still possible to carry out if banks receive sufficient interest income to provide a margin over their cost of funds.