THERE IS AMPLE theoretical and empirical evidence that income expansion and inflation are often associated with increases in the money supply. Since, as a rule, monetary statistics are readily and currently available while inflationary pressure is a concept that is hard to measure, it has become customary to accept monetary statistics as reliable indicators of inflation and deflation, of expansion and contraction. When it is observed that the money supply in a country is rising, it is inferred that expansionary factors must be at work and that anti-inflationary policies should be introduced. Likewise, when the money supply declines, it is inferred that contractionary forces are more powerful and that anti-inflationary policies can safely be relaxed or reversed.
Overall competitiveness of the Dutch economy seems adequate, but domestically produced exports have lost market share recently. Over the past three decades, globalization has greatly influenced economies as countries have become more integrated. Empirical studies on business cycles synchronization and transmission of shocks among countries have provided conflicting results. In its descriptive part, this study concludes that Dutch export competitiveness is not a problem so far. This also finds that the Netherlands is relatively more exposed to supply-driven shocks while Germany is more exposed to demand-driven shocks.
This paper surveys theoretical issues and empirical evidence on the effects of central bank intervention in foreign exchange markets on exchange rate movements. The focus is on the ability of fully sterilized intervention to influence exchange rates in a predictable manner. Theoretical considerations suggest that the exchange rate may be affected by intervention if assets denominated in different currencies are imperfect substitutes, thus creating opportunities for intervention (undertaken for portfolio balance reasons) to modify interest differentials and, hence, the exchange rate. The same conclusion emerges when one looks at the effects of intervention on risk premiums in the foreign exchange markets, on differences between offshore and domestic interest rates, and on covered international interest differentials. The lack of any firm evidence that portfolio balance effects resulting from intervention in foreign exchange markets affect exchange rates predictably suggests that intervention policy cannot be distinguished from general monetary policy for practical purposes. This, in turn, implies that attempts to use these two policy instruments independently may lead to lesser, rather than to greater, exchange rate stability.
This paper presents a theoretical framework for analyzing pricing structures in debit card schemes featuring cardholders, retailers, their respective banks, and a network routing switch. The network routing switch controls the electronic debit card network and is jointly owned by the banks. In setting its prices, it needs to consider getting both consumers and retailers to participate in the market. In this two-sided market for debit cards, we show that the "double-monopolistic" network routing switch may want to supply consumers with cheap debit cards, deriving profits from charging a high retailer fee per transaction. This theoretic result resembles the current practice in the Netherlands where consumers pay no transaction fee, but retailers do. This corner solution carries over when we analyze socially optimal pricing.