Despite offering a more realistic macroeconomic outlook than the I-Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), the baseline scenario under the full Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy Paper (PRGSP) is overly optimistic. The authorities estimate the cost of the five-year strategy at US$1.4 billion, nearly all to be funded with assistance from donors. The PRGSP rightly notes the adverse impact of real exchange rate appreciation on external viability. The PRGSP identifies three main sectors—agriculture, fisheries, and tourism—that have the potential to generate sustained economic growth. Comoros’s development goals and reform agenda under the full PRGSP are ambitious.
A poverty profile for the Comoros has been established based on the latest poverty data (EIM 2004). The data indicate that monetary poverty is still widespread in the Comoros. For the overall country, the incidence of poverty at the household level was estimated at 36.9 percent in 2004. Three socioeconomic groups account for nearly two-thirds of national poverty: farmers' households (30.2 percent), unprotected wage earners' households (15.8 percent), and households headed by an inactive person (19.6 percent).
This paper presents a Joint Staff Advisory Note on the Union of the Comoros’s Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP). The I-PRSP’s macroeconomic framework is broadly in line with the government’s objectives of improving opportunities and living conditions for the poor. It envisages higher real GDP growth, continued low inflation, higher social spending, and an ambitious medium-term public investment program. The full PRSP could develop the medium-term macroeconomic framework more fully, including by developing alternative scenarios for GDP growth and underlying sectoral performance.
This recent economic developments report (RED) provides background information on economic developments in the Comoros during 1997–2000. Revenue and domestic expenditure developments resulted in small overall domestic deficits over much of the period, equivalent of 0.4 percent of GDP in 1998 and declining to 0.2 percent of GDP in both 1999 and 2000. With no source of financing, domestic or external, the Anjouan authorities accumulated substantial wage arrears, estimated at about 15 months at end-2000, as well as suppliers arrears.