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Mr. G. Russell Kincaid, K. Burke Dillon, Mr. Maxwell Watson, and Ms. Chanpen Puckahtikom

Abstract

The number of debt restructurings has increased sharply since the emergence of widespread payments difficulties in 1982. In that year, only 7 bank and 6 official restructuring agreements or temporary deferments were negotiated; in 1984, there were 21 and 13 respectively. Moreover, a substantial portion of the recent new private lending being made to developing countries has been coordinated under restructuring arrangements.

Mr. Jorge P. Guzmán and Mr. Michael G. Kuhn

Abstract

This paper reviews recent developments in multilateral official debt restructuring during 1988 and 1989.1 This period was marked by two significant trends: debtor countries increasingly relied on debt reschedulings through the Paris Club and official creditors further adapted their policies in response to protracted problems in the most heavily indebted low-income countries.2

Mr. G. Russell Kincaid, K. Burke Dillon, Mr. Maxwell Watson, and Ms. Chanpen Puckahtikom

Abstract

No formal framework existed for conducting commercial bank debt negotiations when the serious problems of major debtor countries became evident during the course of 1982. Earlier bank debt restructurings were sporadic, involved relatively small amounts, and posed less serious difficulties for bank management and for the international financial system. The problems emerging in 1982 required procedures to restructure large volumes of debt due to hundreds of creditor banks, and to help resolve issues of burden sharing among private and official creditors. Moreover, both creditor banks and authorities in debtor countries needed a framework to facilitate the maintenance of short-term bank exposure during and after debt restructuring and to reach agreement where appropriate on commitments of new money.

Mr. Jorge P. Guzmán and Mr. Michael G. Kuhn

Abstract

From 1976 through 1989, 50 debtor creditors concluded 150 multilateral rescheduling agreements with official creditors for a cumulative cash-flow relief of nearly $110 billion.4 During the first half of the 1980s, Paris Club creditors consolidated $19 billion in 46 reschedulings for 21 countries. Activity in the Paris Club more than doubled during the second half, as 45 debtor countries obtained 93 rescheduling agreements and the amount consolidated by official creditors more than quadrupled to $85 billion.

Mr. G. Russell Kincaid, K. Burke Dillon, Mr. Maxwell Watson, and Ms. Chanpen Puckahtikom

Abstract

This section describes the principal features of official multilateral debt restructurings that took place during 1983–84, particularly in comparison with agreements reached during the preceding eight-year period from 1975. It documents the sharp increase in the number of reschedulings and focuses on notable recent developments, especially the trend toward an easing in the repayment terms for some countries that have had successive reschedulings. It also addresses issues relating to multiyear debt restructurings by official creditors with reference to the recent MYRA for Ecuador.

Mr. Jorge P. Guzmán and Mr. Michael G. Kuhn

Abstract

Official creditors have provided cash-flow relief to a large number of low-income countries through Paris Club reschedulings. SAF- and ESAF-eligible countries account for half of the Paris Club rescheduling countries but were involved in nearly two thirds of the reschedulings since 1976, as most of these countries had repeatedly sought relief from the Paris Club (Chart 6). Generally the reschedulings for these countries were more comprehensive in coverage and percentage of debts rescheduled than those for other creditors. However, given the protracted nature of their balance of payments problems, many of these countries experienced serious difficulties in adhering to the repayment schedules from previous agreements, largely because, as creditors recognized, the repeated application of standard terms over a long period had not provided an adequate response to the medium-term debt-servicing problems of the poorest and most heavily indebted countries.

Hans Weisfeld, Mr. Irineu E de Carvalho Filho, Mr. Fabio Comelli, Rahul Giri, Klaus-Peter Hellwig, Chengyu Huang, Fei Liu, Mrs. Sandra V Lizarazo Ruiz, Alexis Mayer Cirkel, and Mr. Andrea F Presbitero
In recent years, Fund staff has prepared cross-country analyses of macroeconomic vulnerabilities in low-income countries, focusing on the risk of sharp declines in economic growth and of debt distress. We discuss routes to broadening this focus by adding several macroeconomic and macrofinancial vulnerability concepts. The associated early warning systems draw on advances in predictive modeling.
Mr. Ashraf Khan and Majid Malaika
Based on technical assistance to central banks by the IMF’s Monetary and Capital Markets Department and Information Technology Department, this paper examines fintech and the related area of cybersecurity from the perspective of central bank risk management. The paper draws on findings from the IMF Article IV Database, selected FSAP and country cases, and gives examples of central bank risks related to fintech and cybersecurity. The paper highlights that fintech- and cybersecurity-related risks for central banks should be addressed by operationalizing sound internal risk management by establishing and strengthening an integrated risk management approach throughout the organization, including a dedicated risk management unit, ongoing sensitizing and training of Board members and staff, clear reporting lines, assessing cyber resilience and security posture, and tying risk management into strategic planning.. Given the fast-evolving nature of such risks, central banks could make use of timely and regular inputs from external experts.
Mr. G. Russell Kincaid, K. Burke Dillon, Mr. Maxwell Watson, and Ms. Chanpen Puckahtikom

Abstract

As a key element in effective debt relief operations, official creditors attach importance to the principle of comparable treatment for all creditors and for all types of debt, apart from obligations owed to multilateral institutions. Concern with comparable treatment arises not only from the desire to achieve an equitable sharing of the burden of debt relief among creditors, but also from the need to ensure an appropriate balance between financial support from all creditors and the adjustment efforts of the debtor countries themselves. This question has received increased emphasis in recent years as a number of countries have sought debt relief and other exceptional financing in substantial amounts or for prolonged periods and both official and private creditors have recognized the need to ensure that their efforts are integrated into an overall financing plan for the debtor.

Mr. Jorge P. Guzmán and Mr. Michael G. Kuhn

Abstract

Paris Club negotiations have always given special consideration to the principle that the debtor country should seek comparable treatment from its various creditors, and comparability has long been a standard feature in the Paris Club Agreed Minutes. Paris Club creditors expect a debtor to obtain comparable relief from all other creditor groups to which it has significant debt-service obligations with the notable exception of the multilateral institutions, whose preferential status has long been accepted by official creditors.