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International Monetary Fund. Monetary and Capital Markets Department
This Technical Note discusses the findings and recommendations in the Financial Sector Assessment Program for Spain regarding institutional arrangements for financial sector oversight. The macroprudential policy framework for banking is now in place, although the national macroprudential authority has not been established. Banco de España is the national designated authority for exercising certain macroprudential powers and, under the Banking Union, shares macroprudential oversight with the European Central Bank, which possesses “top-up” powers. It is recommended that the macroprudential toolkit be expanded, particularly to include more effective tools to deal with risks associated with real estate exposures. Monitoring of system-wide trends also needs to be conducted with a greater focus on risks and macro-financial perspectives.
International Monetary Fund
In this study, the risks related to the euro area sovereign debt crisis are analyzed. Methods used to implement the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) are overviewed, and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), and the European Supervisory Authority (ESA) are the important framework for financial reforms and macroprudential policies. In this paper, the improvement over the fiscal and structural governance stability and growth pact (SGP) and excessive deficit procedure (SDP) is discussed. Finally, the findings of spillover analysis are outlined.
Jihad Dagher
Financial crises are traditionally analyzed as purely economic phenomena. The political economy of financial booms and busts remains both under-emphasized and limited to isolated episodes. This paper examines the political economy of financial policy during ten of the most infamous financial booms and busts since the 18th century, and presents consistent evidence of pro-cyclical regulatory policies by governments. Financial booms, and risk-taking during these episodes, were often amplified by political regulatory stimuli, credit subsidies, and an increasing light-touch approach to financial supervision. The regulatory backlash that ensues from financial crises can only be understood in the context of the deep political ramifications of these crises. Post-crisis regulations do not always survive the following boom. The interplay between politics and financial policy over these cycles deserves further attention. History suggests that politics can be the undoing of macro-prudential regulations.