In a dynamic theoretical framework, commercial banks compete for customers by setting acceptance criteria for granting loans, taking regulatory requirements into account. By easing its acceptance criteria a bank faces a trade-off between attracting more demand for loans, thus making higher per period profits, and a deterioration of the quality of its loan portfolio, thus tolerating a higher risk of failure. Our main results state that more stringent capital adequacy requirements lead banks to set stricter acceptance criteria, and that increased competition in the banking industry leads to riskier bank behavior. In an extension of our basic model, we show that it may be beneficial for a bank to hold more equity than prescribed by the regulator, even though holding equity is more expensive than attracting deposits.
The paper shows that commercial banks’ ability to lower deposit interest rates (market power) can increase deposit mobilization. Interest expenses saved can subsidize and lower fees on checking and branching services and thus help attract deposits. United States data illustrates the financial deepening effect of this market power. Commercial banks’ ability to lower deposit interest rates diminishes when their deposits become closer substitutes to nonbank liabilities requiring greater interest rate competition. Lack of bank deposit market power, including through capital account mobility, may lessen financial deepening.
Some see India’s corporate sector as the fundamental driver of recent and future prosperity. Others see it as a source of excessive market power, personal enrichment, and influence over the State, with an ultimately distorting influence. To inform this debate, this paper analyses the correlates of profitability of firms listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange, covering a dynamic period-in terms of firm entry and growth-from the early 1990s to the late 2000s. Overall, the results do not provide support for the systematic exercise of market power via the product market. At least for this period, the story is more consistent with a competitive and dynamic business sector, despite the continued dominance of business houses and public sector firms in terms of sales and assets. Those with opposing views can, with justification, argue that our analysis does not cover influences, such as corporate governance and state-corporate relations, which may paint a less flattering picture of the corporate sector’s role. Those broader themes deserve further attention.
This paper examines the role of removing obstacles to competition in product markets in raising growth and productivity. Using firm-level data from Italy during 2003–13 and OECD measures of product market regulation, we estimate the effect of deregulation in network sectors on value added and productivity of firms in these sectors, as well as firms using these intermediates in their production processes. We find evidence of a significant positive impact. These effects are more pronounced in Italian provinces with more efficient public administration, underscoring the complementarities of advancing public administration and product market reforms simultaneously.
This paper discusses Rwanda’s Seventh Review Under the Policy Support Instrument (PSI), Request for a Three-Year PSI and Cancellation of Current PSI. Progress under the PSI has continued to be satisfactory. Except for the ceiling on nonconcessional borrowing (NCB), all quantitative assessment criteria were met. All indicative targets and structural benchmarks were also met. The nonobservance of the NCB ceiling came about when the authorities allowed Rwandair to contract a new US$50.7 million external loan in July. Presently, the IMF staff recommends a waiver on the basis of the authorities’ commitment to prevent any reoccurrence.