Zineddine Alla, Mr. Raphael A Espinoza, and Mr. Atish R. Ghosh
This paper analyzes the use of unconventional policy instruments in New Keynesian setups in which the ‘divine coincidence’ breaks down. The paper discusses the role of a second instrument and its coordination with conventional interest rate policy, and presents theoretical results on equilibrium determinacy, the inflation bias, the stabilization bias, and the optimal central banker’s preferences when both instruments are available. We show that the use of an unconventional instrument can help reduce the zone of equilibrium indeterminacy and the volatility of the economy. However, in some circumstances, committing not to use the second instrument may be welfare improving (a result akin to Rogoff (1985a) example of counterproductive coordination). We further show that the optimal central banker should be both aggressive against inflation, and interventionist in using the unconventional policy instrument. As long as price setting depends on expectations about the future, there are gains from establishing credibility by using any instrument that affects these expectations.
Guyana’s residential real estate prices have been rising, particularly in the capital city Georgetown, following the discovery of oil in 2015. In line with the growing demand for housing, commercial banks’ housing loans have increased, prompting higher household debt. This paper presents two analyses which suggest that housing prices in Georgetown and banks’ lending to the housing sector appear to be in their early stages of growth. However, given the data limitations and caveats that underpin the analyses, the findings could also indicate early signals of possible risks. Further data collection would support surveillance and deeper studies. At the same time, enhancing prudential measures would help safeguard financial and macroeconomic stability. These include strengthening the monitoring of the housing market, bank lending practices and household debt, as well as fortifying the macroprudential framework, including with more effective toolkits for early intervention.
We develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with financial frictions on both financial intermediaries and goods-producing firms. In this context, due to high leverage of financial intermediaries, balance sheet disruptions in the financial sector are particularly detrimental for aggregate output. We show that the welfare gains from recapitalizing the financial sector in response to large but rare net worth losses are as large as those from eliminating business cycle fluctuations. We also find that these gains are increasing in the size of the net worth loss, are larger when recapitalization funds are raised from the household rather than the real sector, and may increase with a reduction in financial intermediaries idiosyncratic risk.
We study the effect of external financing constraint on job creation in emerging markets and
developing countries (EMDC) at the firm level by looking at a specific transmission channel
- the working capital channel. We develop a simple model to illustrate how the need for
working capital financing of a firm affects the link between financial constraint and the firm's
job creation. We show that the effect of relaxing financial constraint on job creation is greater
the smaller the firm scale and the more labor-intensive its production structure. We use the
World Bank Enterprise Surveys data to test the main predictions of the model, and find
strong evidence for the working capital channel of external finance on firm employment.
This paper proposes a tractable Sudden Stop model to explain the main patterns in firm level data in a sample of Southeast Asian firms during the Asian crisis. The model, which features trend shocks and financial frictions, is able to generate the main patterns observed in the sample during and following the Asian crisis, including the ensuing credit-less recovery, which are also patterns broadly shared by most Sudden Stop episodes as documented in Calvo et al. (2006). The model also proposes a novel explanation as to why small firms experience steeper declines than their larger peers as documented in this paper. This size effect is generated under the assumption that small firms are growth firms, to which there is support in the data. Trend shocks when combined with financial frictions in this model also generate strong leverage effects in line with what is observed in the sample, and with other observations from the literature.
Recent studies show that uncertainty shocks have quantitatively important effects on the real economy. This paper examines one particular channel at work: the supply of credit. It presents a model in which a bank, even if managed by risk-neutral shareholders and subject to limited liability, can exhibit self-insurance, and thus loan supply contracts when uncertainty increases. This prediction is tested with the universe of U.S. commercial banks over the period 1984-2010. Identification of credit supply is achieved by looking at the differential response of banks according to their level of capitalization. Consistent with the theoretical predictions, increases in uncertainty reduce the supply of credit, more so for banks with lower levels of capitalization. These results are weaker for large banks, and are robust to controlling for the lending and capital channels of monetary policy, to different measures of uncertainty, and to breaking the dataset in subsamples. Quantitatively, uncertainty shocks are almost as important as monetary policy ones with regards to the effects on the supply of credit.
This paper studies private investment in India against the backdrop of a significant investment
decline over the past decade. We analyze the potential causes of weaker investment at the firm
level, using both firm-level financial statements and a novel dataset on firms’ investment project
decisions, and find that financial frictions have played a role in the slowdown. Firms with higher
financial leverage invest less, as do firms with lower earnings relative to their interest expenses.
Consistent with the notion of credit constraints leading to pro-cyclical investment, we also find
that firms with higher leverage are (i) less likely to undertake new investment projects, (ii) less
likely to complete investment projects once begun, and (iii) undertake shorter-term investment
This paper evaluates what type of models can account for the recent episodes of output drops in Latin America. I develop an open economy version of the business cycle accounting methodology (Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan, 2007) in which output fluctuations are decomposed into four sources: total factor productivity (TFP), a labor wedge, a capital wedge, and a bond wedge. The paper shows that the most promising models are the ones that induce fluctuations of TFP and the labor wedge. On the other hand, models of fnancial frictions that translate into a bond or capital wedge are not successful in explaining output drops in Latin America. The paper also discusses the implications of these results for policy analysis using alternative DSGE models.
This paper develops a model featuring both a macroeconomic and a financial friction that
speaks to the interaction between monetary and macro-prudential policies. There are two main
results. First, real interest rate rigidities in a monopolistic banking system have an asymmetric
impact on financial stability: they increase the probability of a financial crisis (relative to the
case of flexible interest rate) in response to contractionary shocks to the economy, while they
act as automatic macro-prudential stabilizers in response to expansionary shocks. Second, when
the interest rate is the only available policy instrument, a monetary authority subject to the same
constraints as private agents cannot always achieve a (constrained) efficient allocation and faces
a trade-off between macroeconomic and financial stability in response to contractionary shocks.
An implication of our analysis is that the weak link in the U.S. policy framework in the run up
to the Global Recession was not excessively lax monetary policy after 2002, but rather the
absence of an effective regulatory framework aimed at preserving financial stability.