The IMF Research Bulletin, a quarterly publication, selectively summarizes research and analytical work done by various departments at the IMF, and also provides a listing of research documents and other research-related activities, including conferences and seminars. The Bulletin is intended to serve as a summary guide to research done at the IMF on various topics, and to provide a better perspective on the analytical underpinnings of the IMF’s operational work.
El Gobierno de Chile ha anunciado que está comprometido a alcanzar su meta fiscal y
contener el crecimiento del gasto. El objetivo de la meta fiscal es reducir el déficit estructural en
0,2% del PIB en cada año del mandato presidencial (2018-2021). A fin de alcanzar esa meta, el
Gobierno anunció un plan de consolidación cuatrienal para reducir gradualmente el gasto anual,
en aproximadamente US$1.100 millones, para lograr un ahorro total de US$4.400 millones durante
el período1. El Gobierno ha alcanzado la meta que había fijado para el balance estructural de 2018.
Con el objetivo de facilitar la consecución de estas metas en los próximos años, y liberar espacio
fiscal para el programa del Presidente, el Gobierno está adoptando una nueva herramienta: las
revisiones del gasto (RGs).
This technical assistance report on Chile focuses on introducing and institutionalizing spending reviews (SR). The Chilean government has announced its commitment to achieving its fiscal target and containing expenditure growth. This report proposes a SR framework with targeted reviews conducted on an annual rolling basis, combined with a periodic comprehensive review at most once every four years. Both types of reviews include targets to identify savings options. Targeted reviews focus on a limited predefined review topic or area and on value for money and efficiency. Comprehensive reviews do not have any predefined review topics; they undertake an unconstrained search for the best saving options. The report sets out a four-stage process for conducting an SR, which would start in September and have final saving decisions made in April or May of the following year. The government will need to announce the topic for the first full targeted review to Congress in September 2019. This review will be conducted in late 2019 and early 2020; the results will be ready in April 2020 in time for incorporation into the process for the 2021 budget.
This paper discusses that the governments of forty-nine countries have accepted the Articles of Agreement of the IMF. They have accepted the Agreement on their own behalf and in respect of all their colonies, overseas territories, all territories under their protection, suzerainty, or authority and all territories in respect of which they exercise a mandate. Although the concept of a fixed par value and of rates of exchange based on it is of fundamental importance under the Articles of Agreement, provision is also made for the retention, adaptation and introduction of multiple currency practices in certain circumstances. Courts are frequently called upon to decide at what rate of exchange one currency shall be translated into another. The courts of many countries have been faced, both before and after the coming into force of the IMF Agreement, with the problem whether they should recognize the effect of the exchange control regulations of other countries.
Vincent Belinga, Ms. Dora Benedek, Ruud A. de Mooij, and Mr. John Norregaard
By how much will faster economic growth boost government revenue? This paper estimates short- and long-run tax buoyancy in OECD countries between 1965 and 2012. We find that, for aggregate tax revenues, short-run tax buoyancy does not significantly differ from one in the majority of countries; yet, it has increased since the late 1980s so that tax systems have generally become better automatic stabilizers. Long-run buoyancy exceeds one in about half of the OECD countries, implying that GDP growth has helped improve structural fiscal deficit ratios. Corporate taxes are by far the most buoyant, while excises and property taxes are the least buoyant. For personal income taxes and social contributions, short- and long-run buoyancies have declined since the late 1980s and have, on average, become lower than one.