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Ms. Eva H. G. Hüpkes, Mr. Michael W Taylor, and Mr. Marc G Quintyn

Abstract

Why are policymakers reluctant to grant independence to the agencies that regulate and supervise the financial sector, despite mounting empirical evidence that independence makes for a healthier financial system?

Ms. Eva H. G. Hüpkes, Mr. Michael W Taylor, and Mr. Marc G Quintyn

Abstract

Policymakers are often reluctant to grant independence to the agencies that regulate and supervise the financial sector because of the fear that these agencies, with their wide-ranging responsibilities and powers, could become a law unto themselves. This pamphlet describes mechanisms for making regulatory agencies accountable not only to the government but also to the industry they supervise and the public at large, with examples from a range of countries.

Ms. Eva H. G. Hüpkes, Mr. Michael W Taylor, and Mr. Marc G Quintyn

Abstract

Policymakers are often reluctant to grant independence to the agencies that regulate and supervise the financial sector because of the fear that these agencies, with their wide-ranging responsibilities and powers, could become a law unto themselves. This pamphlet describes mechanisms for making regulatory agencies accountable not only to the government but also to the industry they supervise and the public at large, with examples from a range of countries.

Ms. Eva H. G. Hüpkes, Mr. Michael W Taylor, and Mr. Marc G Quintyn

Abstract

Policymakers are often reluctant to grant independence to the agencies that regulate and supervise the financial sector because of the fear that these agencies, with their wide-ranging responsibilities and powers, could become a law unto themselves. This pamphlet describes mechanisms for making regulatory agencies accountable not only to the government but also to the industry they supervise and the public at large, with examples from a range of countries.

Ms. Eva H. G. Hüpkes, Mr. Michael W Taylor, and Mr. Marc G Quintyn

Abstract

Policymakers are often reluctant to grant independence to the agencies that regulate and supervise the financial sector because of the fear that these agencies, with their wide-ranging responsibilities and powers, could become a law unto themselves. This pamphlet describes mechanisms for making regulatory agencies accountable not only to the government but also to the industry they supervise and the public at large, with examples from a range of countries.

Mr. Steven T Phillips and Mr. Timothy D. Lane

Abstract

Ce document se penche sur la question de l'aléa moral dans le contexte des prêts du FMI au pays présentant des difficultés financières. Les préoccupations suscitées par l'aléa moral ont retenu l'attention au cours des débats récents portant sur la réforme de l'architecture du système financier international et sur le rôle futur du FMI.

Mr. Marc G Quintyn and Mr. Michael W Taylor

Abstract

En casi todas las grandes crisis financieras de la última década --desde Asia oriental a Rusia, Turquía y América Latina-- la interferencia política en la regulación del sector financiero contribuyó a agravar una situación ya de por sí mala. Las presiones políticas no solo debilitaron la regulación financiera sino que también impidieron que los órganos reguladores y supervisores tomaran medidas contra los bancos en problemas. En este estudio se investiga por qué, para cumplir con su mandato de preservar la estabilidad del sector financiero, los reguladores y supervisores del sector financiero tienen que ser independientes --de la industria de servicios financieros, así como del gobierno-- a la vez que deben rendir cuentas.

Ms. Eva H. G. Hüpkes, Mr. Michael W Taylor, and Mr. Marc G Quintyn

Abstract

Les décideurs rechignent souvent à accorder l’indépendance aux agences qui réglementent et supervisent le secteur financier, car ils craignent que ces agences, avec leurs responsabilités et leurs pouvoirs étendus, puissent imposer leur loi. Cette brochure décrit les mécanismes permettant de garantir que ces agences soient redevables non seulement envers l'État, mais également envers le secteur qu'elles supervisent et envers le grand public, et propose des exemples de divers pays.

Mr. Steven T Phillips and Mr. Timothy D. Lane

Abstract

Moral hazard is a term often used when analyzing the effects of insurance. It refers to the idea that the very provision of insurance raises the likelihood of the event being insured against taking place. This is because insurance reduces the incentives for the insured party to take preventive actions. Some simple examples would be:

Mr. Gian M Milesi-Ferretti, Ms. Enrica Detragiache, Mr. A. J. Tweedie, Mr. Michael Mussa, Mr. Barry J. Eichengreen, and Mr. Giovanni Dell'Ariccia

Abstract

Ce document porte sur les avantages et les risques potentiels de l'ouverture des marchés de capitaux en se penchant d'abord sur les avantages de la mobilité des capitaux selon la théorie économique classique, avant d'examiner les contre-arguments liés aux problèmes de manque d'informations et d'autres distorsions. Il montre que les risques liés à la suppression des contrôles sur les flux de capitaux au-delà des frontières nationales sont semblables à ceux liés à la suppression des contrôles sur les institutions financières nationales. Le document s'intéresse ensuite aux moyens de gérer la libéralisation afin de minimiser les risques et de maximiser les avantages.