Browse

You are looking at 1 - 10 of 10 items for :

  • Banks and Banking x
  • Financial and monetary sector x
  • Business and Financial x
  • Financial services law & regulation x
Clear All
International Monetary Fund
The 2006 Article IV Consultation found that the financial system in Ireland continues to perform well but rapid credit growth is a vulnerability. Central Bank officials noted that recent stress tests indicate that the major lenders have adequate buffers to cover a range of shocks. The Financial Regulator observed that the risk weighting on high loan-to-value mortgages was increased, consistent with the advice of the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) Update mission. The general government fiscal position has been either close to balance or in surplus for the past decade.
International Monetary Fund
In this study, the risks related to the euro area sovereign debt crisis are analyzed. Methods used to implement the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) are overviewed, and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), and the European Supervisory Authority (ESA) are the important framework for financial reforms and macroprudential policies. In this paper, the improvement over the fiscal and structural governance stability and growth pact (SGP) and excessive deficit procedure (SDP) is discussed. Finally, the findings of spillover analysis are outlined.
International Monetary Fund. Monetary and Capital Markets Department
Ireland has considerably strengthened financial sector regulation and supervision since the 2016 FSAP, aided by the ECB/SSM, and is working with European and international regulators to strengthen oversight of the large market-based finance (MBF) sector. This strengthening is evidenced by a successful navigation through the challenges of Brexit and the pandemic. Despite global headwinds, Ireland is exiting the pandemic with strong economic growth and a highly capitalized and liquid banking system. The financial system has grown rapidly and in complexity, especially after Brexit, and Ireland has become a European base for large financial groups. The MBF sector has grown to the second largest in Europe, with global interlinkages.
International Monetary Fund. Monetary and Capital Markets Department
Supervision of less significant institutions (LSIs) is largely effective in Ireland. The Central Bank’s supervisory approach to LSIs is intrusive and well-developed supervisory tools are appropriately applied. To enhance the capacity of supervisory tools and approaches, the supervision leverages on its membership in the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). Supervision has sufficient rigor, although some gaps in the enforcement framework yet to be covered by the legislative changes planned for 2022.2 The supervisory responses to changing conditions are timely and agile. The expertise of supervisors is expanding with the development of the market, although keeping up its pace can be a challenge. The independence of banking supervision is strong in practice, and benefits from the safeguards of the SSM. Recent efforts to enhance cooperation between prudential and conduct supervision of banks (Central Bank’s “One Bank” approach) has raised the quality of supervision, although scope remains for further enhancements to unleash the full potential of integrated prudential and conduct supervisory functions framed by strong cooperation arrangements and operational processes.
Mr. Michael W Taylor, Mr. Marc G Quintyn, and Ms. Silvia Ramirez
Compared with the case of central bank independence, independence for financial sector supervisors remains more controversial. This paper analyzes changes in independence and accountability arrangements in a set of 32 countries that overhauled their legal and/or institutional frameworks for supervision in recent years. Despite improvements, there is strong evidence that the endorsement of independence remains half-hearted, which shows itself through either overcompensation on the accountability side, or resort to political control mechanisms. The latter could potentially undermine the agency's credibility. The results indicate that policymakers still need to be persuaded of the long-term benefits of independence for financial sector soundness, and of the potential for a virtuous interaction between independence and accountability, if the arrangements are well-designed.
Jihad Dagher
Financial crises are traditionally analyzed as purely economic phenomena. The political economy of financial booms and busts remains both under-emphasized and limited to isolated episodes. This paper examines the political economy of financial policy during ten of the most infamous financial booms and busts since the 18th century, and presents consistent evidence of pro-cyclical regulatory policies by governments. Financial booms, and risk-taking during these episodes, were often amplified by political regulatory stimuli, credit subsidies, and an increasing light-touch approach to financial supervision. The regulatory backlash that ensues from financial crises can only be understood in the context of the deep political ramifications of these crises. Post-crisis regulations do not always survive the following boom. The interplay between politics and financial policy over these cycles deserves further attention. History suggests that politics can be the undoing of macro-prudential regulations.
Mr. Marc G Quintyn, Ms. Rosaria Vega Pansini, and Donato Masciandaro
The Asian financial crisis marked the beginning of worldwide efforts to improve the effectiveness of financial supervision. However, the crisis that started in 2007?08 was a crude awakening: several of these improvements seemed unable to avoid or mitigate the crisis. This paper brings the first systematic analysis of the role of two of these efforts - modifications in the architecture of financial supervision and in supervisory governance - and concludes that they were negatively correlated with economic resilience. Using the emerging distinction between macro- and micro-prudential supervision, we explore to what extent two separate institutions would allow for more checks and balances to improve supervisory governance and, thus, reduce the probability of supervisory failure.
Mr. Marc G Quintyn, Donato Masciandaro, and Ms. María Nieto
In June 2009 a new financial supervisory framework for the European Union (EU) was endorsed, consisting of a macro- and a micro-prudential pillar. The latter is composed of a Steering Committee, a supranational layer and a network of national supervisory authorities at the bottom, de facto establishing a complex multiple principals-multiple agents network. This paper focuses on the network of national agencies. Starting from an analysis of supervisory architectures and governance arrangements, we assess to what extent lack of convergence could undermine efficient and effective supervision. The main conclusion is that harmonization of governance arrangements towards best practice would better align supervisors' incentive structures and, hence, be beneficial for the quality of supervision.
Erlend Nier, Mr. Luis Ignacio Jácome, Jacek Osinski, and Pamela Madrid
A number of countries are reviewing their institutional arrangements for financial stability to support the development of a macroprudential policy function. In some cases, this involves a rethink of the appropriate institutional boundaries between central banks and financial regulatory agencies, or the setting up of dedicated policymaking committees. In others, efforts are underway to enhance cooperation within the existing institutional structure. Against this background, this paper provides basic guidance for the design of effective arrangements, in a manner that can provide a framework for country-specific advice. After reviewing briefly the main institutional elements of existing and emerging macroprudential policy frameworks across countries, the paper identifies stylized institutional models based on key features that distinguish institutional arrangements. It develops criteria to assess the effectiveness of models, examines the strengths and weaknesses of models against these criteria, and explores ways to improve existing setups. The paper finally distills lessons and sets out desired principles for effective macroprudential policy arrangements.
International Monetary Fund. Monetary and Capital Markets Department

Ireland has considerably strengthened financial sector regulation and supervision since the 2016 FSAP, aided by the ECB/SSM, and is working with European and international regulators to strengthen oversight of the large market-based finance (MBF) sector. This strengthening is evidenced by a successful navigation through the challenges of Brexit and the pandemic. Despite global headwinds, Ireland is exiting the pandemic with strong economic growth and a highly capitalized and liquid banking system. The financial system has grown rapidly and in complexity, especially after Brexit, and Ireland has become a European base for large financial groups. The MBF sector has grown to the second largest in Europe, with global interlinkages.