Abstract
Policymakers are often reluctant to grant independence to the agencies that regulate and supervise the financial sector because of the fear that these agencies, with their wide-ranging responsibilities and powers, could become a law unto themselves. This pamphlet describes mechanisms for making regulatory agencies accountable not only to the government but also to the industry they supervise and the public at large, with examples from a range of countries.
Abstract
Why are policymakers reluctant to grant independence to the agencies that regulate and supervise the financial sector, despite mounting empirical evidence that independence makes for a healthier financial system?
Abstract
Policymakers are often reluctant to grant independence to the agencies that regulate and supervise the financial sector because of the fear that these agencies, with their wide-ranging responsibilities and powers, could become a law unto themselves. This pamphlet describes mechanisms for making regulatory agencies accountable not only to the government but also to the industry they supervise and the public at large, with examples from a range of countries.
Abstract
Policymakers are often reluctant to grant independence to the agencies that regulate and supervise the financial sector because of the fear that these agencies, with their wide-ranging responsibilities and powers, could become a law unto themselves. This pamphlet describes mechanisms for making regulatory agencies accountable not only to the government but also to the industry they supervise and the public at large, with examples from a range of countries.
Abstract
Policymakers are often reluctant to grant independence to the agencies that regulate and supervise the financial sector because of the fear that these agencies, with their wide-ranging responsibilities and powers, could become a law unto themselves. This pamphlet describes mechanisms for making regulatory agencies accountable not only to the government but also to the industry they supervise and the public at large, with examples from a range of countries.
Abstract
Un nombre croissant de pays adoptent des régimes de taux de change flexible car la flexibilité assure une meilleure protection contre les chocs externes et donne plus d'indépendance à la politique monétaire. Ailleurs, la transition se fait parfois de façon désordonnée, avec une forte dépréciation de la monnaie lors d'une crise. Quel que soit le motif de l'adoption d'un taux de change flexible, la réussite de la transition dépend de la bonne gestion de plusieurs aspects institutionnels et opérationnels. Les auteurs de ce numéro des Dossiers économiques décrivent les éléments nécessaires pour passer un régime flexible, ainsi que la cadence et l'ordre idéal de ces éléments dans différentes circonstances.
Abstract
Ce document se penche sur la question de l'aléa moral dans le contexte des prêts du FMI au pays présentant des difficultés financières. Les préoccupations suscitées par l'aléa moral ont retenu l'attention au cours des débats récents portant sur la réforme de l'architecture du système financier international et sur le rôle futur du FMI.