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Abstract
The papers contained in this volume draw on background work done in preparation for a study of the governance of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) by the Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) of the IMF, and they seek to contribute to the ongoing dialogue on how best to strengthen the governance of this important global institution.1 Since the IEO study was released in May 2008, the task of strengthening the IMF’s governance, already pressing and long overdue, became a matter of urgent attention. The ongoing financial crisis that has precipitated the deepest global recession since the 1930s has raised questions about the Fund’s capacity to perform its key surveillance mandate under its current governance arrangements. There is widespread concern that the Fund (and other international organizations as well) appears to have missed the crisis as it was evolving and thus did not issue timely and effective warnings. This has intensified calls to restructure the international financial architecture. But even as world leaders move in this direction, they seem to agree overwhelmingly that the IMF should remain a central part of that architecture. At the same time, they emphasize that a more legitimate, accountable, and effective IMF must emerge from the crisis.
Abstract
This evaluation assesses IMF financial surveillance. For the IMF, financial surveillance includes a broad range of activities at the country and global levels occurring at the intersection of its financial sector work and its broader surveillance activity. The key goals of financial surveillance are to advise individual member countries on policies to foster financial stability and financial development, as well as to inform the IMF membership of vulnerabilities and risks to global financial stability and policies to address them.
Abstract
In 2007, the IEO completed an evaluation of IMF Exchange Rate Policy Advice. The evaluation addressed issues at the heart of the IMF’s work, as laid out by the Articles of Agreement. In particular, the Articles call on the institution to oversee the effective operation of the international monetary system and to collaborate with member countries in promoting growth, stability, and a stable system of exchange rates.1 This function is carried out through surveillance, a process that provides for periodic dialogue between the Fund and its members, with the IMF providing advice on exchange rate and other policies.2
Abstract
The IEO completed an evaluation of the governance of the IMF in 2008 when the stability of the international monetary system was under threat and the relevance and legitimacy of the IMF was in question. The 2008 evaluation assessed the extent to which IMF governance was effective and efficient, and whether it provided sufficient accountability and channels for stakeholder voices to be heard. It concluded that effectiveness had been the strongest aspect of the Fund’s governance while accountability and voice had been the weakest, with the potential to undermine legitimacy and effectiveness if not addressed.
Abstract
The Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) completed an evaluation of IMF Involvement in International Trade Policy Issues in 2009. The evaluation was published at a time when global trade was experiencing a historically unprecedented decline in the wake of the global financial crisis (GFC). This report updates the IEO’s 2009 study, covering the period from January 2010 to August 2019, examining the Fund’s reaction to the myriad developments that have reshaped the global trade system (GTS) over the last decade.
Abstract
1. The purpose of this evaluation is to examine technical assistance (TA) provided by the IMF to its member countries and to derive operational recommendations that can enhance the contribution of TA to the overall IMF mandate.