Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan, Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, Veronika Penciakova, and Nick Sander
We estimate the impact of the COVID-19 crisis on business failures among small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) in seventeen countries using a large representative firm-level database. We use a simple model of firm cost-minimization and measure each firm’s liquidity shortfall during and after COVID-19. Our framework allows for a rich combination of sectoral and aggregate supply, productivity, and demand shocks. We estimate a large increase in the failure rate of SMEs under COVID-19 of nearly 9 percentage points, ab-sent government support. Accommodation & Food Services, Arts, Entertainment & Recreation, Education, and Other Services are among the most affected sectors. The jobs at risk due to COVID-19 related SME business failures represent 3.1 percent of private sector employment. Despite the large impact on business failures and employment, we estimate only moderate effects on the financial sector: the share of Non Performing Loans on bank balance sheets would increase by up to 11 percentage points, representing 0.3 percent of banks’ assets and resulting in a 0.75 percentage point decline in the common equity Tier-1 capital ratio. We evaluate the cost and effectiveness of various policy interventions. The fiscal cost of an intervention that narrowly targets at risk firms can be modest (0.54% of GDP). However, at a similar level of effectiveness, non-targeted subsidies can be substantially more expensive (1.82% of GDP). Our results have important implications for the severity of the COVID-19 recession, the design of policies, and the speed of the recovery.
Gustavo Adler, Sergii Meleshchuk, and Ms. Carolina Osorio Buitron
The paper explores how international integration through global value chains shapes the working of exchange rates to induce external adjustment both in the short and medium run. The analysis indicates that greater integration into international value chains reduces the exchange rate elasticity of gross trade volumes. This result holds both in the short and medium term, pointing to the rigidity of value chains. At the same time, greater value chain integration is associated with larger gross trade flows, relative to GDP, which tends to amplify the effect of exchange rate movements. Overall, combining these two results suggests that, for most countries, integration into global value chains does not materially alter the working of exchange rates and the benefits of exchange rate flexibility in facilitating external adjustment remain.
Wage rises have remained stubbornly low in advanced Europe in recent years, but, at the same time, newer EU members are experiencing rapid wage acceleration. This paper investigates the drivers of this wage divergence. Econometric analysis using error correction models suggests that wage growth responds more quickly to changes in unemployment in the newer EU members than in advanced Europe, where wages are more closely related to inflation and inflation expectations in the short run, implying greater inertia in nominal wage rises in advanced Europe. In the years after the global crisis, this inertia contributed to the build up of a real wage overhang relative to sharply slowing labor productivity, which subsequently dragged on nominal wage rises even as unemployment began to decline. Spillovers of subdued wage growth between euro area countries also weighed on wage rises in advanced Europe.
International Monetary Fund. Independent Evaluation Office
In 2008, the IEO undertook an evaluation on the IMF governance and concluded that effectiveness had been the strongest aspect of IMF governance, while accountability and voice had been the weakest. Since then, IMF governance has been strengthened aided by quota and voice reforms to address misalignments in shares and chairs as well as numerous improvements in governance procedures and practices. The update finds that IMF governance has proven its effectiveness in supporting the Fund to fulfill its mandates, but concerns remain on voice and accountability. Challenges remain related to representation and voice, interaction between governance bodies, the selection process for management, and the role of the G20 in IMF governance. Addressing these challenges will take time and may be subject to difficult tradeoffs between governance objectives such as preserving effectiveness while ensuring appropriate representation.
The Belgium Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) stress testing exercise examines a financial sector that remains in a state of transformation. Domestic economic challenges remain sources of continued uncertainty as the banking sector consolidates and reduces funding risks. Insurers face challenges from adverse economic and business conditions. Solvency and funding shocks under different macroeconomic scenarios were assessed. Both banking and insurance tests underscore the importance of sovereign risk for financial stability. The implementation of stress tests needs to be closely aligned with the resolution and recovery planning.
International Monetary Fund. Monetary and Capital Markets Department
This financial stability assessment provides an update on the significant regulatory and supervisory developments in the banking and insurance sectors of Belgium since 2006. The Belgian financial system is relatively large with solid capital buffers on aggregate, and the 2008 global financial crisis has had a major impact on the Belgian financial sector. The links between banks and the Belgian sovereign have intensified owing to the crisis, with total exposure of the banking sector to the federal government at 10 percent of banking sector assets in mid-2012.
Mr. Marc G Quintyn, Ms. Rosaria Vega Pansini, and Donato Masciandaro
The Asian financial crisis marked the beginning of worldwide efforts to improve the effectiveness of financial supervision. However, the crisis that started in 2007?08 was a crude awakening: several of these improvements seemed unable to avoid or mitigate the crisis. This paper brings the first systematic analysis of the role of two of these efforts - modifications in the architecture of financial supervision and in supervisory governance - and concludes that they were negatively correlated with economic resilience. Using the emerging distinction between macro- and micro-prudential supervision, we explore to what extent two separate institutions would allow for more checks and balances to improve supervisory governance and, thus, reduce the probability of supervisory failure.
Voici plusieurs décennies que la nécessité d'une stratégie moderne de lutte contre le blanchiment de capitaux a été largement admise au niveau international. Le fait de priver les éléments criminels du produit de leurs crimes a été considéré de plus en plus comme un outil important pour lutter contre le trafic de stupéfiants et, plus récemment, comme un élément essentiel de la lutte contre le crime organisé, la corruption et le financement du terrorisme, ainsi que de la préservation de l'intégrité des marchés de capitaux. Les toutes premières cellules de renseignements financiers (CRF) ont été créées au début des années 90 en réponse à la nécessité pour les pays de disposer d'un organisme central pour la réception l'analyse et la diffusion d'informations financières en vue de lutter contre le blanchiment de capitaux. Au cours de la période qui a suivi, le nombre de CRF a continué d'augmenter : on en comptait 84 en 2003. Ce manuel répond aux besoins d'informations sur les CRF. Les informations fournies incluent le cas échéant des renvois aux normes pertinentes du GAFI.
A partir de la última década, se comenzó a reconocer a nivel internacional la necesidad de adoptar una estrategia moderna para la prevención del lavado de activos. Privar a los criminales del producto de su actividad delictiva se está convirtiendo, en forma creciente, en un instrumento importante para combatir el comercio ilegítimo de estupefacientes y, más recientemente, en un elemento esencial de la lucha contra la delincuencia organizada, la corrupción y el financiamiento del terrorismo, y una forma de mantener la integridad de los mercados financieros. Las primeras unidades de inteligencia financiera (UIF) se crearon a comienzos de los años noventa como respuesta a la necesidad de los países de contar con un organismo central para recibir, analizar y divulgar información financiera con el fin de combatir el lavado de dinero. En el período subsiguiente, la cantidad de unidades de inteligencia financiera siguió aumentando hasta llegar a 84 en 2003. Este manual constituye una respuesta a la necesidad de información sobre las unidades de inteligencia financiera. En los casos pertinentes, se hace referencia a las normas correspondientes del Grupo de Acción Financiera Internacional (GAFI).
Over the past decade and beyond, the need for a modern anti-money-laundering strategy has become widely accepted internationally. Depriving criminal elements of the proceeds of their crimes has increasingly been seen as an important tool to combat drug trafficking and, more recently, as a critical element in fighting organized crime, corruption, and the financing of terrorism, and maintaining the integrity of financial markets. The first few financial intelligence units (FIUs) were established in the early 1990s in response to the need for countries to have a central agency to receive, analyze, and disseminate financial information to combat money laundering. Over the ensuing period, the number of FIUs has continued to increase, reaching 84 in 2003. This handbook responds to the need for information on FIUs. It provides references to the appropriate Financial ActionTask Force (FATF) standards wherever appropriate.