This paper discusses enhanced structural adjustment facility trust—borrowing agreement. The Trustee may make drawings under this agreement at any time during the period from the effective date of this agreement through December 31, 1999, upon giving the Government of Canada at least five business days (Washington, D.C.) notice. If any instalment of principal or interest is not paid to the Government of China within a period of 10 days after its due date, the Trustee shall not make further drawings under this agreement pending consultations with the Government of China on this matter. Upon request, the Trustee shall issue to the Government of China a non-negotiable certificate evidencing its claim on the Trust resulting from a drawing outstanding under this agreement. By agreement between the Government of China and the Trustee, any drawing or part thereof may be repaid by the Trustee at any time in advance of maturity.
This volume, entitled Selected Decisions of the IMF and Selected Documents, follows the Fifth Issue of Selected Decisions of the Executive Directors and Selected Documents. The change in title has been made because of the inclusion of more Resolutions of the Board of Governors of the Fund than in the preceding volume. The present volume contains selected decisions and interpretations of the Executive Directors and resolutions of the Board of Governors of the IMF adopted prior to September 30, 1972, as well as certain selected documents of the Fund and of the United Nations to which frequent reference is made. With few exceptions, the decisions are of a general nature and relate to certain obligations, policies, and procedures under the Articles of Agreement. This issue contains most of the decisions that were published in earlier issues (September 1962, September 1963, January 1965, April 1970, and July 1971), and general decisions taken since then.
This paper presents Selected Decisions and Selected Documents’ Fourth Issue of the IMF. In order to ensure the uniform application of the relevant Articles of Agreement as they apply to determinations of member's net official holdings of gold and US dollars for the purposes of Article III, Section 3(&)(ii), the IMF adopts or reaffirms several principles of interpretation for the indicated provisions of the IMF Agreement. Each member shall furnish to the IMF the data necessary to determine its net official holdings of gold and United States dollars. The IMF does not intend to apply the rules set forth in II to its holdings of members' currencies having fluctuating rates when there is no practical interest for the IMF or members to do so. In order to avoid misunderstanding, it may be useful to point out that these rules do not constitute a formula for dealing with the currencies of countries in which current transactions are conducted at multiple rates.
This paper analyses several IMF’s selected decisions of the Executive Board and selected documents. Each member shall furnish to the IMF the data necessary to determine its net official holdings of gold and United States dollars. The usability of gold or dollars for the payment of the gold subscription is not necessary to constitute “holdings.” It has been decided to recommend to the Board of Governors, where a member presents, for reasons which it shall submit to the IMF, that its reserves should not be reduced by an immediate 25 percent gold payment, that such member shall be permitted in accordance with an appropriate resolution to have its quota increased in five annual installments, with the right to accelerate the payment of such installments. In June 1947, the IMF issued a statement recommending to its members that they take effective action to prevent external transactions in gold at premium prices, because such transactions tend to undermine exchange stability and to impair monetary reserves.
This paper explains various selected decisions of the IMF’s Executive Directors. The IMF has examined certain problems relating to the adjustment of its holdings of fluctuating currencies and to transactions and computations involving such currencies and has come to several conclusions. The IMF does not intend to apply the rules set forth in in the section II to its holdings of members' currencies having fluctuating rates when there is no practical interest for the IMF or members to do so. Whenever the IMF revalues its holdings of a fluctuating currency under paragraph 3, it will establish an account receivable or an account payable in respect of the amount of the currency payable by or to the member under Article IV, Section 8. Despite the improvement in the payments position of many members, sound gold and exchange policy of members continues to require that to the maximum extent practicable, gold should be held in official reserves rather than go into private hoards.