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Mr. Ghiath Shabsigh, Mr. Tanai Khiaonarong, and Mr. Harry Leinonen
Major transformations in payment and settlements have occurred in generations. The first generation was paper-based. Delivery times for payment instruments took several days domestically and weeks internationally. The second generation involved computerization with batch processing. Links between payment systems were made through manual or file-based interfaces. The change-over period between technologies was long and still some paper-based instruments like checks and cash remain in use. The third generation, which has been emerging, involves electronic and mobile payment schemes that enable integrated, immediate, and end-to-end payment and settlement transfers. For example, real-time gross settlement systems have been available in almost all countries. DLT has been viewed as a potential platform for the next generation of payment systems, enhancing the integration and the reconciliation of settlement accounts and their ledgers. So far, experiments with DLT experimentations point to the potential for financial infrastructures to move towards real-time settlement, flatter structures, continuous operations, and global reach. Testing in large-value payments and securities settlement systems have partly demonstrated the technical feasibility of DLT for this new environment. The projects examined analyzed issues associated with operational capacity, resiliency, liquidity savings, settlement finality, and privacy. DLT-based solutions can also facilitate delivery versus payment of securities, payment versus payment of foreign exchange transactions, and efficient cross-border payments.
Ronald Heijmans and Ms. Froukelien Wendt
Banks and financial market infrastructures (FMIs) that are not able to fulfill their payment obligations can be a source of financial instability. This paper develops a composite risk indicator to evaluate the criticality of participants in a large value payment system network, combining liquidity risk and interconnections in one approach, and applying this to the TARGET2 payment system. Findings suggest that the most critical participants in TARGET2 are other payment systems, because of the size of underlying payment flows. Some banks may be critical, but this is mainly due to their interconnectedness with other TARGET2 participants. Central counterparties and central securities depositories are less critical. These findings can be used in financial stability analysis, and feed into central bank policies on payment system access, oversight, and crisis management.
International Monetary Fund. Monetary and Capital Markets Department
This Detailed Assessment of Observance on the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems-International Organization of Securities Commissions Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures on Singapore discusses that the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) has taken important steps to address the recommendations made for capital market financial market infrastructures (FMIs). MAS has led efforts to develop international guidance on the cyber resilience for FMIs and moved swiftly to strengthen Singapore’s governance and resiliency of the payment system. The assessment of New MAS Electronic Payment and Book-Entry System (MEPS+) finds that most of the principles are observed, however, also identifies opportunities for further improvement relative to international best practices. One of the several observations is that the legal basis is sound with further enhancements made for insolvency protection, designation criteria, and administrative powers for MAS. Also, governance arrangements are clear and transparent and should continue to ensure the independence of the oversight and supervisory functions for MEPS+.
International Monetary Fund. Monetary and Capital Markets Department
Brazilian FMIs are among the top twenty worldwide. All together there are sixteen financial market infrastructures2 (FMIs) operating in the Brazilian payment system (SPB), out of which nine3 are systemically important and four belong to the top twenty FMIs in the world4. FMIs play an essential role in the Brazilian financial system and are highly relevant in terms of domestic financial stability. In terms of value of transactions, STR (Reserves Transfer System - Sistema de Transferência de Reservas), the Brazilian Real Time Gross Settlement system (RTGS) is the backbone of the SPB, and belongs to the top ten large value payment systems worldwide. SELIC is among the top ten central securities depository/securities settlement systems (CSD/SSSs), CETIP among the top twenty SSSs, and BM&FBOVESPA Clearinghouse, the largest central counterparty (CCP) in Latin America, belongs to the top ten. These infrastructures facilitate the clearing, settlement, and recording of monetary and other financial transactions, such as payments, securities, and derivatives contracts (including derivatives contracts for commodities). Brazilian post-trading services are integrated. The entities providing securities settlement services also provide other post-trade processing, acting both as a clearing house, and a CSD or as a trade repository (TR).
International Monetary Fund. Monetary and Capital Markets Department
This paper presents an assessment of observance of the CPMI–IOSCO (Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures–International Organization for Securities Commissions) principles for financial market infrastructures in Turkey. The electronic funds transfer system in Turkey broadly observes the risk management framework and liquidity risk management, default management, and operational risk management principles. It partially observes the tiered participation principle. The rest are observed or not applicable. The electronic securities transfer system broadly observes the risk management framework, liquidity, default management, and operational risk principles; the rest are observed or not applicable.
International Monetary Fund. Monetary and Capital Markets Department
This paper provides a detailed assessment of observance on the Eurex Clearing AG observance of the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems-International Organization of Securities Commissions principles for financial market infrastructures. Eurex Clearing is a global central counterparty clearing house that clears a broad range of both listed and over-the-counter (OTC) products. It offers fully automated and straight-through post trade services to the derivatives markets Eurex Deutschland and Eurex Zürich, the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, the multilateral trading systems of Eurex Bonds GmbH and Eurex Repo GmbH, the Irish Stock Exchange as well as clearing services for OTC interest rate derivatives (Eurex OTC Clear), as well as clearing services for transactions in cash equities, bonds, repos, derivatives, secure funding, securities financing, and transactions.
International Monetary Fund. Monetary and Capital Markets Department
This paper discusses key findings and recommendations of the Detailed Assessment of Observance of the CPMI–IOSCO (Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures–International Organization of Securities Commissions) Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Major achievements have been made in modernizing the payment system. Resiliency of the interbank payment system was demonstrated against the severe floods of May 2014. The currency board arrangement has helped protect the payment system from credit risks. The formal assessment of the real-time gross settlement system suggests that many of the standards are observed. The legal basis is relatively sound, but finality and netting arrangements require greater legal certainty and protection at the law level.
Mr. Manmohan Singh
Nonbanks such as central counterparties (CCPs) are a useful lens to see how regulators view the role of the lender-of-last-resort (LOLR). This paper explores the avenues available when a nonbank failure is likely, specifically by considering the options of keeping CCPs afloat. It is argued that CCPs have, by regulatory fiat, become “too important to fail,” and thus the imperative should be greater loss-sharing by all participants that better align the distribution of risks and rewards of CCPs, the clearing members and derivative end-users. In the context of LOLR, the proposed variation margin gains haircut (VMGH) is discussed as a way of limiting the taxpayer put.
International Monetary Fund. Monetary and Capital Markets Department
This Technical Note analyzes financial risk management and supervision of Cassa Di Compensazione e Garanzia S.P.A. (CC&G) in Italy. CC&G, the Italian central counterparty (CCP), is systemically important for the Italian market, and through the link with the French CCP, it is also relevant in terms of cross-border financial stability. CC&G’s financial risk management framework is being improved further to comply with European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) requirements. The main changes that CC&G needs to implement include higher “skin in the game” resources, the introduction of concentration limits on collateral, the reform of its liquidity management and of its investment policy, and introduction of individual client account segregation.