The COVID-19 pandemic has created severe disruption in the global financial system, with many emerging market and developing countries (EMDCs) facing liquidity shortages.
In the context of intensified demand for liquidity and heightened global uncertainty, staff has revisited the 2017 proposal for a new facility to provide liquidity support to the Fund’s membership.
This paper proposes the establishment of a new Short-term Liquidity Line (SLL) as a special facility in the General Resources Account (GRA), based on the key features of the 2017 blueprint.
International Monetary Fund. Finance Dept., International Monetary Fund. Monetary and Capital Markets Department, International Monetary Fund. Research Dept., International Monetary Fund. Strategy, Policy, &, Review Department, International Monetary Fund. Statistics Dept., and International Monetary Fund. Legal Dept.
This paper explores whether a broader role for the SDR could contribute to the smooth functioning and stability of the international monetary system (IMS). Recent staff assessments highlighted that the IMS has displayed considerable resilience. But episodes of stress point also to some weaknesses, including in external adjustment mechanisms; limitations of official liquidity provisions through the Global Financial Safety Net (GFSN); and large-scale reserve accumulation—with systemic side effects. Those weaknesses, together with the expansion of the SDR basket, have renewed interest in the SDR and motivated a discussion of whether there is an economic rationale for a broader SDR role. The paper looks into how those weaknesses can be mitigated by three concepts of the SDR: the official SDR, the reserve asset administered by the IMF (O-SDR); SDR-denominated financial instruments, or “market SDRs” (M-SDR); and the SDR as a unit of account (U-SDR). However, the paper does not propose specific reform options.
International Monetary Fund. Strategy, Policy, &, Review Department, International Monetary Fund. Legal Dept., International Monetary Fund. Finance Dept., and International Monetary Fund. European Dept.
"Despite a long history of program engagement, the Fund has not developed guidance on program design in members of currency unions. The Fund has engaged with members of the four currency unions—the Central African Economic and Monetary Community, the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union, the European Monetary Union, and the West African Economic and Monetary Union—under Fund-supported programs. In some cases, union-wide institutions supported their members in undertaking adjustment under Fund-supported programs. As such, several programs incorporated—on an ad hoc basis—critical policy actions that union members had delegated. Providing general guidance on program design for members in a currency union context would fill a gap in Fund policy and help ensure consistent, transparent, and evenhanded treatment across Fund-supported programs.
This paper considers two options on when and how the Fund should seek policy assurances from union-level institutions in programs of currency union members. Option 1 would involve amending the Conditionality Guidelines, which would allow the use of standard conditionality tools with respect to actions by union-level institutions. Option 2—which staff prefers—proposes formalizing current practices and providing general guidance regarding principles and modalities on policy assurances from union-level institutions in support of members’ adjustment programs. Neither option would infringe upon the independence (or legally-provided autonomy) of union-level institutions, since the institutions would decide what measures or policy actions to take—just as any independent central bank or monetary authority does, for example, in non-CU members."
In light of the changing contours of the global economy, this paper provides an overview of the challenges facing the International Monetary System (IMS). It seeks to forge a common understanding of the challenges facing the IMS and its shortcomings, and to lay the basis for discussing a possible roadmap for further work on reform areas.
This note provides general guidance on the use of the Precautionary and Liquidity Line (PLL). After an overview of the instrument, explaining its specific nature, the operational issues are grouped into five areas: an outline of the process and specific steps that need to be followed if a member expresses interest in an arrangement; guidance on access, phasing, and purchases; guidance on determining qualification of a member and appropriate ex-post conditionality; and a guide to the semi-annual review process.
The paper starts by presenting evidence of commonality in global financial conditions. This commonality is then related to specific drivers of global financial conditions through a range of transmission channels, including cross-border banking and portfolio flows. Empirical analysis shows a range of price and quantity factors, including measures of risk, bank leverage, and interest rates in financial centers, to drive in part these flows. Country specific policies, including exchange rate and prudential frameworks, are shown to affect the transmission of global conditions. Much remains unknown though, including how evolving structures of global funding, changing institutions, and ongoing financial innovations affect the mechanics of liquidity creation, the channels of liquidity transmission, and potential risks going forward.
This note provides guidance on the operation of the IMF’s Extended Rights to Purchase policy for General Resources Account (GRA) arrangements. Provided certain safeguards are met, this policy extends the period (up to some limits) in which a member may access accumulated but undrawn balances under a GRA arrangement once a new test date is reached but for which the test data are not yet available. In so doing it addresses some access “blackouts” which can affect all GRA arrangements with the Fund, but especially precautionary ones. To assist in program design, other possible access blackouts, not addressed by this policy, are also described in this note.
Staff conducted a survey of stress testing practices among selected national central banks and supervisory authorities. The online survey was undertaken in November 2011 as part of the preparatory work for the paper on ?Macrofinancial Stress Testing: Principles and Practices. The survey focused on stress testing for banks, which is more widespread and better established—and practices are therefore easier to compare across countries—but also included questions on stress testing for nonbank financial institutions.
The Precautionary and Liquidity Line (PLL) was introduced in the context of the Board discussion on the Fund's Financing Role: Reform Proposals on Liquidity and Emergency Assistance in November 2011, replacing and broadening the scope of the previously established Precautionary Credit Line (PCL). The following note provides operational guidance to staff and further background information on the PLL. SPR (the Emerging Markets Division), FIN, and LEG stand ready to clarify any further questions that departments may have on the PLL