Growth is gaining momentum, led by strong external demand while domestic demand is also picking up. The central bank’s foreign exchange intervention policy has helped stem deflationary pressures but inflation is still well below target. Following substantial fiscal adjustment over the past three years, an easing of the fiscal stance is underway and the new government’s medium-term fiscal plans have not yet been fully elaborated. The financial system is sound and resilient to shocks, and improvements in the regulatory and supervisory architecture are ongoing. The challenge for the authorities is to create the conditions for strong and sustainable growth while maintaining macroeconomic stability.
This paper discusses Ukraine’s 2013 Article IV Consultation and First Post-Program Monitoring. The Ukrainian economy has been in recession since mid-2012, and the outlook remains challenging. In January–September 2013, GDP contracted by 1¼ percent year-over-year, reflecting lower demand for Ukrainian exports and falling investments. Consumer prices stayed flat, held down by decreasing food prices and tight monetary policy. The fiscal stance loosened in 2012–2013, contributing to the buildup of vulnerabilities. Ukraine remains current on all its payments to the IMF, and the authorities have reaffirmed their commitment to repay all outstanding IMF credit.
This Selected Issues paper analyses the impact that rising energy import prices might have on growth and inflation in Ukraine. The paper examines how rising gas prices might elevate macrofiscal risks in Ukraine’s state enterprise sector. It assesses Ukraine’s equilibrium exchange rate mainly based on the macroeconomic balance approach, and provides an account of the monetary framework debate. The paper also summarizes the current framework’s achievements and shortcomings, and looks at traditional criteria for determining whether a peg or float fits Ukraine’s economic characteristics.
The most salient trend in monetary policy over the past two decades has been increasing reliance on money market operations, which reflects the belief that allowing market forces to allocate financial resources brings about increased economic efficiency and growth. However, small economies and countries with undeveloped financial markets have found that a lack of competition in their financial markets complicates their efforts to rely on money market operations, at times forcing them to rely instead on direct instruments or moral suasion. In some larger countries, the shift toward a reliance on money market operations has been gradual and, at times, fraught with difficulty. This report draws on a variety of country experiences to analyze the reasons for such difficulties and proposes a stylized sequencing of reforms that enables countries to tailor the introduction of money market operations to their particular circumstances.
International Monetary Fund. External Relations Dept.
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Monetary policy has become increasingly important in the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as fiscal adjustment and structural reforms have taken root. Inflation has been brought down to relatively low levels in almost all of these countries, raising the question of what should be the appropriate nominal anchor at this stage. Formally, almost all CIS countries have floating exchange rate regimes, yet in practice they manage their exchange rates very heavily, perhaps because of high levels of dollarization (i.e., they suffer from "fear of floating"). This paper explores the issues underlying the choice of a nominal anchor in CIS countries and seeks to assess whether the present mixed regime will prove durable.
Forty years ago, Marcus Fleming and Robert Mundell developed independent models of macroeconomic policy in open economies. Why do we link the two, and why do we call the result the Mundell-Fleming, rather than Fieming-Mundell model?