We revisit the conventional view that output fluctuates around a stable trend by analyzing professional long-term forecasts for 38 advanced and emerging market economies. If transitory deviations around a trend dominate output fluctuations, then forecasters should not change their long-term output level forecasts following an unexpected change in current period output. By contrast, an analysis of Consensus Economics forecasts since 1989 suggest that output forecasts are super-persistent—an unexpected 1 percent upward revision in current period output typically translates into a revision of ten year-ahead forecasted output by about 2 percent in both advanced and emerging markets. Drawing upon evidence from the behavior of forecast errors, the persistence of actual output is typically weaker than forecasters expect, but still consistent with output shocks normally having large and permanent level effects.
This paper develops a model featuring both a macroeconomic and a financial friction that
speaks to the interaction between monetary and macro-prudential policies. There are two main
results. First, real interest rate rigidities in a monopolistic banking system have an asymmetric
impact on financial stability: they increase the probability of a financial crisis (relative to the
case of flexible interest rate) in response to contractionary shocks to the economy, while they
act as automatic macro-prudential stabilizers in response to expansionary shocks. Second, when
the interest rate is the only available policy instrument, a monetary authority subject to the same
constraints as private agents cannot always achieve a (constrained) efficient allocation and faces
a trade-off between macroeconomic and financial stability in response to contractionary shocks.
An implication of our analysis is that the weak link in the U.S. policy framework in the run up
to the Global Recession was not excessively lax monetary policy after 2002, but rather the
absence of an effective regulatory framework aimed at preserving financial stability.
This paper estimates a New Keynesian DSGE model with an explicit financial intermediary sector. Having measures of financial stress, such as the spread between lending and borrowing, enables the model to capture the impact of the financial crisis in a more direct and efficient way. The model fits US post-war macroeconomic data well, and shows that financial shocks play a greater role in explaining the volatility of macroeconomic variables than marginal efficiency of investment (MEI) shocks.
The limited access to bank credit in recent years has increased the pressure on small and medium size enterprises (SMEs), forcing them to scale down investment plans and production. This paper, which explores the macroeconomic implications of this channel, finds evidence that countries with high prevalence of SMEs tended to recover more slowly from the global financial crisis than their peers, implying that the interaction of the economic structure and access to bank financing plays a critical role in episodes of economic recovery. This conclusion is reinforced by a VAR estimation, which demonstrates that a negative credit supply shock applied to SMEs has an adverse effect on economic activity, and this impact is amplified in countries that have a high share of SMEs.
Ms. Sally Chen, Mr. Philip Liu, Andrea M. Maechler, Chris Marsh, Mr. Sergejs Saksonovs, and Mr. Hyun S Shin
This paper explores the concept of global liquidity, its measurement and macro-financial importance. We construct two sets of indicators for global liquidity: a quantity series distinguishing between core and noncore liabilities of financial intermediatires and a corresponding price series. Using price and quantity indicators simultaneously, it is possible to distinguish between shocks to the supply and demand for global liquidity, and isolate their impact on the economy. Our results confirm that global liquidity conditions matter for economic and financial stability, and points to indicators whose regular monitoring could be valuable to policymakers.
Ms. Natalia T. Tamirisa, Mr. Prakash Loungani, and Mr. Herman O. Stekler
We document information rigidity in forecasts for real GDP growth in 46 countries over the past two decades. We investigate: (i) if rigidities are lower around turning points in the economy, such as in times of recessions and crises; (ii) if rigidities differ across countries, particularly between advanced countries and emerging markets; and (iii) how quickly forecasters incorporate news about growth in other countries into their growth forecasts, with a focus on how advanced countries‘ growth forecasts incorporate news about emerging market growth and vice versa.
This paper proposes a tractable Sudden Stop model to explain the main patterns in firm level data in a sample of Southeast Asian firms during the Asian crisis. The model, which features trend shocks and financial frictions, is able to generate the main patterns observed in the sample during and following the Asian crisis, including the ensuing credit-less recovery, which are also patterns broadly shared by most Sudden Stop episodes as documented in Calvo et al. (2006). The model also proposes a novel explanation as to why small firms experience steeper declines than their larger peers as documented in this paper. This size effect is generated under the assumption that small firms are growth firms, to which there is support in the data. Trend shocks when combined with financial frictions in this model also generate strong leverage effects in line with what is observed in the sample, and with other observations from the literature.
June 2011: The Q&A in this issue features seven questions on the global trade collapse of 2008-09 (by Rudolfs Bems); the research summaries are "The Impact of the Great Recession on Emerging Markets" (by Ricardo Llaudes, Ferhan Salman, and Mali Chivakul) and "The Missing Link between Dutch Disease, Appreciation, and Growth (by Nicolás E. Magud and Sebastián Sosa). The issue also lists the contents of the June 2011 issue of the IMF Economic Review, Volume 59 Number 2; visiting scholars at the IMF during April-June 2011; and recent IMF Working Papers and Staff Discussion Notes.