Mr. Thomas J Sargent, Mr. George Hall, Mr. Martin Ellison, Mr. Andrew Scott, Mr. Harold James, Ms. Era Dabla-Norris, Mark De Broeck, Mr. Nicolas End, Ms. Marina Marinkov, and Vitor Gaspar
World War I created a set of forces that affected the political arrangements and economies of all the countries involved. This period in global economic history between World War I and II offers rich material for studying international monetary and sovereign debt policies. Debt and Entanglements between the Wars focuses on the experiences of the United States, United Kingdom, four countries in the British Commonwealth (Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Newfoundland), France, Italy, Germany, and Japan, offering unique insights into how political and economic interests influenced alliances, defaults, and the unwinding of debts. The narratives presented show how the absence of effective international collaboration and resolution mechanisms inflicted damage on the global economy, with disastrous consequences.
Why did monetary authorities hold large gold reserves under Bretton Woods (1944–1971) when
only the US had to? We argue that gold holdings were driven by institutional memory and
persistent habits of central bankers. Countries continued to back currency in circulation with gold reserves, following rules of the pre-WWII gold standard. The longer an institution spent in the
gold standard (and the older the policymakers), the stronger the correlation between gold reserves and currency. Since dollars and gold were not perfect substitutes, the Bretton Woods system never
worked as expected. Even after radical institutional change, history still shapes the decisions of policymakers.
International Monetary Fund. Asia and Pacific Dept
The Indian economy is on a recovery path, helped by a large terms of trade gain, positive policy actions, improved confidence, and reduced external vulnerabilities. A faster-than-expected decline in inflation created space for nominal policy rate cuts. Persistently high inflation expectations and large fiscal deficits remain key macroeconomic challenges, resulting in limited policy space to support growth through demand management measures. In addition, supply bottlenecks and structural challenges constrain medium-term growth and hinder job creation. Risks are weighted to the downside, with external risks mainly from intensified global financial market volatility and slower global growth. On the domestic side, a further weakening of bank and corporate balance sheets could pose risks to economic recovery and weigh on financial stability, while setbacks in the pace of structural reforms could dampen growth and undermine sentiment. In contrast, lower-for-longer global energy prices constitute an upside risk for India.
The medium-term income projections have been updated since the last estimate provided to the Executive Board in April 2014. The main changes to the outlook stem from a lower path for credit outstanding and expectations for a more gradual rise in interest rates.
The revised projections show lower levels of net operational income over the coming years. Lending income is lower compared with earlier estimates as a result of lower credit levels, including the advance repurchases by Ireland and Portugal. Non-lending income is also projected to be lower reflecting a further downward shift in SDR interest rates and, thus, returns on investments and interest-free resources. The updated expenditure path assumes the net administrative budget remains constant in real terms at the FY 2012 level. The long-run projections indicate a broad balance between income and expenditures, assuming that interest rates rise to 3.5 percent and with lending returning to pre-crisis levels.
The pace of reserve accumulation is expected to slow, reflecting the decline in Fund credit, and precautionary balances are now projected to remain slightly below the projected target of SDR 20 billion over the medium term compared with the earlier estimates.