Sebastian Beer, Maria Delgado Coelho, and Sebastien Leduc
We analyze the impact of exchange of information in tax matters in reducing international tax evasion between 1995 and 2018. Based on bilateral deposit data for 39 reporting countries and more than 200 counterparty jurisdictions, we find that recent automatic exchange of information frameworks reduced foreign-owned deposits in offshore jurisdictions by an average of 25 percent. This effect is statistically significant and, as expected, much larger than the effect of information exchange upon request, which is not significant. Furthermore, to test the sensitivity of our findings, we estimate countries’ offshore status and the impact of information exchange simultaneously using a finite mixture model. The results confirm that automatic (and not upon request) exchange of information impacts cross-border deposits in offshore jurisdictions, which are characterized by low income tax rates and strong financial secrecy.
This Technical Note evaluates the state of Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism in Liechtenstein. Liechtenstein has made significant steps and achieved considerable progress since the last mutual evaluation, particularly in bringing its legal framework more closely in line with the Financial Action Task Force recommendations, consolidating an overall robust institutional framework for combating money laundering and terrorist financing and moving toward greater transparency. Domestic cooperation is robust, and key stakeholders enjoy the trust of the financial and nonfinancial sectors. However, effective implementation is uneven and not always optimal. Liechtenstein’s proactive use of the in rem regime of confiscation of criminal proceeds has proven to be quite effective.
St. Vincent and the Grenadines (SVG) is exposed to money laundering (ML) and financing of terrorism (FT) risk related to drug trafficking and international criminal groups. The financing of terrorism has also been criminalized and is largely in conformity with the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (SFT) Convention. The legal and institutional framework regarding the cross-border transportation of cash and bearer instruments is largely in place. The preventive measures regime covers most of the financial and designated nonfinancial businesses and professions (DNFBP) sectors as required under the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendations.
Globalization requires enhanced information flows among financial regulators. Standard-setting bodies for financial sector regulation provide extensive guidance, but financial sector assessments have often found that problems in cooperation and information exchange continue to constrain cross-border supervision and financial integrity oversight. In July 2004, the IMF organized a conference on cross-border cooperation for standard setters, financial intelligence units (FIUs), and financial regulatory agencies. This book brings together conference papers in which participants discuss: information exchange for an effective anti–money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regime, in terms of both standards and practices; the standards for cooperation in the insurance sector; and the experiences of regulators from banking, securities, and unified regulatory agencies with international cooperation. The book also includes papers providing a general overview of international standards and their implementation and, on the basis of survey results, of practices among financial sector regulators and FIUs.
This paper examines legal provisions and practices of the IMF that involve nonmember states. It considers certain preliminary topics including: categories of nonmembers, subordinate territories for which members are responsible, and ex-members. It then discusses three ways in which nonmembers are affected either because members are limited in their freedom of action in dealing with nonmembers or because nonmembers have consented to certain obligations or standards that parallel those of the Articles. Withholding of certain benefits from nonmembers is also outlined.
The experience of the International Monetary Fund in relation to non-member states illustrates the misleading character of any principle, however formulated, which suggests that states cannot be affected, to their advantage or disadvantage, by a treaty to which they are not parties.
The Fund has taken cognizance of the fact that the signatory of a special exchange agreement would not be free to impose discriminatory exchange restrictions against other contracting parties, without having the benefit of any provision in the special exchange agreement comparable to Article XI, Section 2, of the Fund’s Articles. Therefore, a signatory would be unable to impose exchange restrictions against contracting parties that were members of the Fund, but the latter would be able to impose exchange restrictions against the signatory. Members would be able to do this under Article XI, Section 2, unless, of course, the Fund made the finding referred to in that provision. It is true that Article XV: 4 of GATT provides that contracting parties shall not, by exchange action, frustrate the intent of the provisions of GATT, but Article XV: 9(a) states that nothing in GATT precludes the use of exchange restrictions if they are in accordance with the Fund’s Articles.
One effect of the Articles on non-members results from the exercise of the Fund’s authority to enter into agreements with them. The major example of an international agreement of this kind is the agreement of June 11, 1964 between the Fund and Switzerland.44
At a time when the growth in premium gold transactions engaged the close attention of the Fund, an effort was made to affect the actions of non-members in connection with these transactions. Under Article IV, Section 2, members must refrain from buying gold at a premium (a price above the par value plus the prescribed margin) or selling it at a discount (a price below the par value minus the margin). The provision does not explicitly prohibit sales by members at a premium or purchases at a discount, and it does not deal with purchases or sales by private parties or non-members. However, as already noted, under Article I (iii), it is a purpose of the Fund to promote exchange stability, maintain orderly exchange arrangements among members, and avoid competitive exchange depreciation; and under Article IV, Section 4(a), members undertake to collaborate with the Fund to promote exchange stability, maintain orderly exchange arrangements with other members, and avoid competitive exchange alterations. On June 18, 1947, the Fund communicated to members a policy statement 16 in which it deprecated international sales of gold at a premium and recommended that all members take effective action to prevent these transactions with “other countries or with the nationals of other countries.” The statement went on to say that: